Becoming Europeans in Central Eastern Europe: National Identity Construction After 2004
Becoming Europeans in Central Eastern Europe: National Identity Construction After 2004

Edited by Andrius Švarplys and Bartłomiej Zdaniuk

Warsaw 2014
Contents

Andrius Švarplys
Introduction. Approaching European and National Identities in Central Eastern Europe ........................................... 7

Andrius Švarplys

Ieva Karpavičiūtė
Dynamics of Foreign Policy, the Interplay of Identity and Interests: Lithuanian Case .............................................. 45

Gerda Jakštaitė
Foreign Policy Identity of Lithuania Constructed in the Lithuanian Mass Media After 2009 ................................. 67

Philippe Perchoc
Could Lithuania Be a Regional Leader After 2004? A Semantic Problem .......................................................... 91

Andis Kudors
Social Memory and Identity of Ethnic Russians in Latvia ................................................................. 99

Andrea Griffante
Building Democracy and Economy Through Europe: Slovenia and the EU .......................................................... 119

Bartłomiej Zdaniuk

Authors .............................................................................. 155

Tables .............................................................................. 157
Introduction. Approaching European and National Identities in Central Eastern Europe

European Identity in the Framework of the European Integration

The significance of national collective identities as the element of academic research in the European studies is associated with the political processes of the European integration as well as with the rise of the European identity problem.

European identity was not a political and academic problem in the early stages of the European integration and mostly resembled the cultural connotations of pan-European idea. The Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity (1973) echoed this idea associating European identity with common European civilization, representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice, and human rights. The cultural-political idea of pan-Europe accumulated historical European cultural achievements and political principles of liberal democracy, which are both constitutive elements of a famous conception of common European cultural heritage. European identity remained a cultural idea during the times when the European Commission started the cultural politics initiated by Tindemans Report in 1975 (Tindemans, 1976) and Adoninno Report in 1985 (Adonnino, 1985). European elites were more concerned with strengthening cultural consciousness of the people on the belonging to the same European space during the times of Eurosclerosis, however it was not the actual politicization stemming from the people. European identity became a true political problem only after the Maastricht Treaty (1992), when the doctrine of permissive consensus apparently ended what meant the collapse of only elite-driven European integra-
tion (Obradovic, 1996; Norris, 1997). The ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty within the member states initiated intense debates on the idea of the European integration and revealed a “naked emperor” (Weiler, 1995) being in a deep need for legitimacy and for new engines to proceed with the integration. With the highly stressed need to bring people back to the European politics the new foundations were laid for the search of the potential sources of European identity to come.

Earlier academic research was concerned primarily with explaining the ultimate agents and goals of the European integration. Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism differed in terms of major agents and the nature of the integration: European institutions versus national member-states, gradually evolving federation versus limited economic cooperation (Rosamond, 2000). However, they were both silent about the real process of becoming European in the minds of the people for different reasons. The neofunctionalists sought to explain economic logic of spill-over as the motor for integration but with clearly stated prognosis for the rise of psycho-sociological community of the Europeans in the future as the functional result of closer economic cooperation (Taylor, 1983, p. 4). For intergovernmentalists, on the contrary, the issue of common European identity remained basically irrelevant since they did not see the need and the conditions for closer political integration and common identity.

With the Maastricht Treaty, the end of elite-driven European politics changed the rules of the game both politically and academically. As to the political side of European identity, it became one of the major themes of democratic deficit – the existential problem for the European Union itself. The non-existence of common European identity presupposes the lack of European demos, which consequently leads to the deficiency of democratic rule of the EU. Meanwhile, in the academic context, the new theories emerged with expressed discontent regarding old theoretical debate and the problems it raised. They turned their focus from grand aspirations to the point of how the EU runs day-by-day as the *sui generis* political system (Hix, 1999). Continuous efforts were made to refuse a zero-sum game in the axis of European – national identities and to somehow integrate them without the intention of exclusion. From one directional top-bottom approach – European institutions as dominating
power and national agents as recipients – the research turned into more complex picture of mutually interdependent relationships (Risse et al., 2001). This was the conceptual precondition for re-stating the role of national collective identities in the course of scientific research.

**National Collective Identities in the European Studies**

Since the constructivist turn, which might be relatively dated back to 1999 (Christiansen et al., 1999), national collective identities penetrated the European studies as a legitimate object of research. Earlier, the studies on the relationship between citizens and the European polity were primarily based on the individual preferences and attitudes especially with regard to supporting the European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998). Some studies, especially those with focus on the history of nationalisms, indicated the significance of national collective identities to resemble a social and cultural power for maintaining “community of destiny” as a contrast to a loose common European idea (Eisenstadt and Giessen, 1995; Smith, 1992). They indicated a high relevance of national collective identities to the idea of Europe’s unity or of European identity.

The constructivists recognized the national collective level as the realm of Europeanization where the norms of the EU are not merely implemented, but rather re-interpreted in view of the existing national images and meanings. National considerations on the idea of Europe were developing over the centuries and were deeply associated with the idea of the nation. Modernity shaped national understandings on what is the nation and what is the nation’s role in Europe. Thus the process of becoming European is dependent on the national or regional historical context of geopolitical, cultural, economic, ideological constellations. As Thomas Risse says, “at the same time, the evidence suggests that socialization into European identity works not so much through transnational processes or through exposure to European institutions, but on the national levels in a process whereby Europeanness or ‘becoming European’ is gradually being embedded in understandings of national identities” (Risse, 2005, p. 291).
This is the leading idea of such kind of approach that evolves in numerous studies on national collective European identity: Risse (2001), Malmborg and Sträth (2002), Eder and Spohn (2005), Diez-Medrano (2003), Ichijo and Spohn (2005), Karolewski and Kaina (2006), Robyn (2005).

These authors showed, to a different extent, how the idea of Europe had been already involved in the construction of national perceptions of history, politics, culture, geography etc. shaping public opinion and peoples’ attitudes towards national and European politics. Some studies focused on the political side of the issue trying to reveal the resonance of why and how, for instance, a certain nation’s collective identity is more favourable to Europe as federation or to governmental Europe (Risse, 2001) or the relevance of national collective identities to euro currency (Risse et al., 1999). Some emphasized the significance of historical collective memories (Eder and Spohn, 2005), national culture (Diez Medrano, 2003) or national discourses (Malmborg and Sträth, 2000) to the interplay of national and European identities.

However, all of them were marked by the conceptual conviction that national collective identities were the sphere where fundamental meanings of nation and Europe were being produced and sustained.

National Collective Identities in Central Eastern Europe

Although the region of Central or Central Eastern Europe attained an increased level of focus during the European Union enlargement in 2004, some important ideas on the region’s identity issues were stated much earlier. The thoughts of Soviet dissidents and cultural figures on the region’s identity developed during the Cold War era. Probably the most notorious one was the article of a Czech writer Milan Kundera in The New York Review of Books about the “Tragedy of Central Europe” (Kundera, 1984) where he drew the line between two different worlds of political and cultural values, prescribing Central European region to the world of Western values.

The process of accession to the EU and actual membership achieved in 2004 was a fulfilment of a historical dream for resistance leaders to
Introduction...

{Soviet} communism as well as common people who preserved a historical memory of their countries’ independence. However, re-integration into the free world opened new spaces for explorations of collective identities in the CEE countries. These are the major topics that post-communist CEE countries discovered and used to interpret their collective identity in the national and European perspectives: modernization and backwardness, state-building and ethnic minority rights, the role of historical Other.

**Modernization and Backwardness**

It is generally believed that CEE countries bear a specific trauma for being detached from Europe during the communist rule that deprived them of (or limited their) sovereignty. From Estonia to Hungary and Slovenia the emancipation from the Soviet Union and communism was underlined by the idea of “returning to Europe”, “returning home”. Studies on the discourses of national elites revealed the tendency to equate the European Union with historical Europe and view them as a single road to modernization, democratization, prosperity, and security as well as the same cultural domain (Spohn, 2005; Kubis, 2005; Hroch, 2002; Törnquist-Plewa, 2002; Karlsson, 2002). Similar patterns of Europe’s meaning are also observed in the Western states which were prevented from the free development by authoritarian, albeit their own, regime, for example, Spain (Jauregui, 2005; Diez Medrano, 2003). The singing revolutions in the Baltic States and other CEE countries witnessed a massive support from the people for directing state’s course to Europe and this was understood as natural belonging to the same space of political and cultural values. It was at first moral restitution of historical justice rather than a political or economical deal.

But by the same token, collective identities of Central Eastern European societies usually are characterized by the late and peripheral state formation and nation building, very late democratization, economic and cultural backwardness. Something ill was already entangled in the collective emancipatory intentions of the societies, and this was the ambivalent relations with the Western world. Breaking out from the {Soviet} communism cage coincided with the feeling backward,
unmodern, in a constant need to enter the club of civilization where the Paradise awaited.

This image was reciprocal and sustained by both sides, i.e. Western and Eastern Europe. Coming from the Western side, as Larry Wolff demonstrated, it is a long tradition since the Enlightenment to establish frontier line between civilized Western Europe and barbaric Eastern Europe in the imagination of Western Europeans (Wolff, 1994). According to some authors similar patterns exist in the contemporary understandings (Jedlicki, 2005) and this is the issue the European Union somehow has to accommodate now after the Union's recent enlargements. Another side of backwardness-based consciousness was the image of West as a Paradise, as the land of the Goodness in the political and cultural imagination of Eastern Europeans. There is some evidence, however, that the mythical feeling about the West as a Paradise is being slightly adjusted, at least in Lithuania, by an increased awareness of the European Union as the club of selfish interest-oriented states (see the contribution by Andrius Švarplys in this volume).

The Role of the Other and National Minorities

Discourse of backwardness already implies the reference to the reason of delayed modernization. Russia was this historical and geopolitical Other in most Eastern Central European countries. (According to Iver Neumann, Russia plays an important historical role of the Other even to the European identity formation in Western Europe (Neumann, 1999). The Sovietisation of the memories of independence that Baltic States had during the interwar period was not successful. National collective memory played a significant role in the peaceful movements toward restoration of independence in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Back then, the moral attitude towards historical justice manifested through the feelings of returning to Europe in the common understanding of the people. The degree to which the landmarks of Russia (negatively) and Europe (positively) were embedded in the collective representations of Lithuanians revealed the fact that former communist leaders of the country never opposed to the European orientation and sometimes even led it. As a matter of fact, former leader of the Lithuanian
communist party Algirdas Brazauskas signed the country’s request to join NATO and the European Union in 1994 (January 4th). The consent between elites and the masses on geopolitical streamline towards the West was driven by the popular perception of the historical threat posed by Russia.

However, the Sovietisation of societies demographically changed the ethnic composition. It created extensive Russian-speaking minorities, especially in Latvia and Estonia. Other countries of CEE inherited the national minorities from the earlier period of collapse of the empires after the WWI or even earlier historical times. Just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, minority problem in the former communist countries raised the concern from the Western side on the potential aggressiveness of nationalism. Revival of nationalism eroded the Soviet Union and the communist rule, but it could also be a signal of the potential bloody deal with the enemy within the restored states. Nothing similar happened; still the existence of national minorities posed the democratic challenge of inclusion for further development. Roger Brubaker insisted on the role of the elites who saw the opportunities for nationalizing the state (Brubaker, 1996). But soon these “nationalist elites” implemented more or less liberal reforms that extended citizenship to national minorities, although for some countries this required external pressure from the European Union, as it were the case with Latvia and Estonia. Will Kymlicka justly pointed out that historical sensitivity of the national minority problem in post-communist CEE countries rests on the fact that host countries continue to feel threatened by the home countries of the minorities (Kymlicka, 2001). Today, this failed (or not happened) reconciliation of conflicting historical memories prevents the states from implementing liberal practises of inclusion. Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, Hungarian national minority in Slovakia and Romania, or Polish national minority in Lithuania serve as an example of such a case. Sometimes, national minority may play the role of an inside Other in terms of constructing the national historical memory, national collective identity, and foreign policies of the states.

How or whether at all the roles of the Other shifted after the CEE countries achieved the membership in the European Union? How or whether at all the traditional meanings of “Europe” (West) and Russia
changed within the national collective representations after these states were secured by the Western institutions like the European Union and NATO?

What is in the Book?

All these patterns of collective identities of the CEE region are reflected in one way or another in this volume. The idea was to explore national collective identities and politics of Lithuania as well as other CEE countries after the accession to the European Union. While bearing in mind all these political features of European and national identity formations in the EU and CEE we have just discussed above, we wanted to look at presumable changes that might have happened during 10 years after the accession. How is the process of becoming European evolving in terms of common guidelines of Other, modernization, backwardness, and national minority?

Since the majority of authors in this project chose to focus on Lithuania, the topic occupies the larger part of the book, including four contributions on the Lithuanian collective identity and foreign policy. Other contributions are geographically devoted to Latvia, Slovenia, and Moldova (which is still not a member of the EU, but undergoing an intensive process of nation-building receiving some stimulus from Europeanization).

The first contribution by Andrius Švarplys “Still not-yet Europeans?” explores biggest Lithuanian paper media over the period of 2004-2011 seeking to reveal the patterns of national identity construction. Notably, he finds the traditional role of the Other “played” by Russia is not changing even in times when the state for the very first time in the history fully belongs to the Western political and security structures, i.e. the EU and NATO. As to public awareness, Russia has changed the course of action. Instead of posing a direct threat through military aggression it is trying to affect the domestic political and economical processes in Lithuania. At the same time, Russia is trying to make mischief between the Western countries, leaving Lithuania’s vital interests disregarded by the Western partners. Meanwhile, Europe (European Union) is loosing
the long-standing unconditional support from collective representations in the Lithuanian public. Now it is being diluted with rising knowledge on some discrepancies within the European or Western politics. Formerly being homogenous club of civilization, modernity and security, now Europe sometimes appears to be merely a sphere of competition between selfish interests sought by the member states. This is rather new, thus not dominant, perspective that could be characterized as a shift from mythical image of the “civilized” European identity towards integrational identity, using the terminology developed by W. Spohn (Spohn, 2005). The contribution, furthermore, considers the issues of national identity, nationalism, Euroscepticism, inner (social, civil) security etc., attempting to grasp the latest trends of national self conceptualizations in the public sphere.

The following three papers by Ieva Karpavičiūtė, Gerda Jakštaite and Philippe Perchoc deal with the issue of national self addressing it in terms of foreign policy of the state. How is national identity, state’s status in the international arena and region is conceptualized in the Lithuanian foreign affairs and public discourses?

Ieva Karpavičiūtė proceeds through different stages of the Lithuanian foreign and security policy after the restoration of independence in 1990. Each of them was characterized by a different focus on (an interplay of) national identity and interests. According to the author, after the accession to NATO and the European Union in 2004, the country’s euphoria ended with a need to find a new state’s role (identity and interests) in the international arena. This was made by re-directing the focus of foreign policy to the East imagining Lithuania as the promoter of democratic values to the post-Soviet countries. At the same time, re-conceptualization of regional identity occurred with a shift from the Western direction (due to the fact that the membership was already achieved there) to the Nordic, Baltic Sea region while retaining the focus on the Eastern European countries. This also means the turn from enthusiastic image of West (Europe) to more pragmatic consolidation of interests of foreign and security policy. One may notice very similar trend in the image construction of “Europe”, i.e. from unconditional support to more realistic approach as demonstrated by Andrius Švarplys in this volume.
The article by Gerda Jakštaitė attempts to determine the self in Lithuania’s foreign policy through the analysis of Lithuanian leading media discourses. The author outlines several areas where the state’s identity is shaped: perception of Lithuania’s role in international relations, perception of Lithuania’s foreign policy goals and national interests, the opinion on the way of shaping and implementing Lithuania’s foreign policy (pragmatism vs. values); and the role of the Other in the state’s foreign policy. The author states that, while in all areas the national self is ambiguous, the dimension of the Other is more obvious.

Russia and the European Union continue to remain the most important contexts for defining the state’s role in foreign policy. Countries such as Latvia, Estonia, United States, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia and international organizations like NATO and the EU play key role in delineating Lithuania’s identity in foreign affairs.

Philippe Perchoc analyses the new concept of the Lithuanian foreign policy in post-entry to the EU and NATO era shaping historical and regional dimensions as well as the relationship with Poland. The author sees some problems related to the “regional leadership” doctrine, which has appeared in Lithuania just after the state has joined the EU in May, 2004. The lack of common historical understanding is the first issue. Different memories of the medieval states of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Republic of Two Nations still exist. Four neighbouring countries, i.e. Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine now share the legacy of these states. Secondly, the shifting borders of Europe render the region, in which Lithuania wants to be a leader, “nameless”, because it is very difficult to shape a coherent concept of the region of Central Eastern Europe or Eastern Europe. As the author puts it, “the inability to bring out an imagined community beyond the Schengen border, as was the case with the Visegrad Group in the 1990s, is a strong semantic challenge for the Lithuanian diplomacy” (p. 97 in this volume).

Contribution by Andis Kudors refers to the issue of the Russian minority in Latvia in terms of social memory. Inconsistencies between ideology and actual people’s social relationships in Soviet times led to the unarticulated problems that manifested themselves after the restoration of independence of Latvia in 1991, and remained relevant until now. Differences of social memory of the World War II shared by Latvians
and Latvian Russians contribute to ethnic division in social life and even in political party system. This situation is skillfully manipulated by the Russian propaganda through media channels which are very popular among the Russian-speaking population, since the new Russia’s foreign policy (starting from the second presidency of V. Putin) allows using Russian compatriots living abroad for achieving foreign policy tasks. All of the foregoing demonstrates the unfinished construction of the Latvian inclusive national collective identity, which is the necessary goal for successful integration of the national minority.

In his article, Andrea Griffante analyses the ambivalent relationship between Slovenia and the European Union. Like other countries in Central Eastern Europe, Slovenia saw the EU as the road to modernization, democratization, and prospect for social welfare. In the process of becoming part of Europe after the collapse of Yugoslavia there was also similar concern in the country about the potential loss of national identity. A. Griffante briefly demonstrates how these fears proved to be wrong, since the Slovenes continue to view the EU as a road to modernization, but through the national perspective. Being European does not necessarily mean rejecting national identity. On contrary, people understand that the state needs to be open to receive all the necessary benefits from the EU while retaining focus on the national allegiances. Europe is a factor for national strengthening, while national openness does not mean giving up national identity for the sake of Europe. In the author’s words, “the EU appears thus as an inevitable process of political convergence in which the nation state is not a unit menaced by integration and enlargement, but a nucleus for psychological security.” (p. 126 in this volume).

This is in line with the ideas of authors and literature of the post-Maastricht period, stressing the need to re-conceptualize the relationship between national and European identity since it can no longer last as zero-sum game as it had been in the old theories of European integration (Risse, 2001; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009). Instead, mutually beneficial relations have to be observed in the inclusive model of both identities.

The last contribution by Bartłomiej Zdaniuk is devoted to Republic of Moldova – the country with serious domestic problems of national and state consolidation. Though the state is not a member of the
European Union yet, it is useful to find out what political and cultural conditions undermine the process of nation building at the borders of the European Union. As author demonstrates, one of the leading political forces of society expresses pro-European course in very complicated situation of national identity formation.

Final Remarks: Between Europe and Nation-State

One might have noticed that all the contributions in this book deal with the attempts of former post-communist states to find the appropriate way to reconcile the nation-state building with Europe after achieving the EU membership in 2004. “Europe” has always been part of the cultural-political considerations (constructions) related to the state’s and nation’s development. Most Central Eastern European countries analysed here in the book were characterized by some degree of backwardness, lack of democratization, delay of modernity, need for the Other, and inherited problems of national minorities. The actual membership in the EU and NATO did not automatically provide the solutions for problems of nation-building and consolidation. However, it provided good impulses for reconsidering the old issues in the new light. The most important lesson that could be drawn from these contributions is that European identity of the analysed countries and nations continues to play the major driving role for pro-European direction; however, Europe is usually seen not as the final and reached destination, but as the next step towards (a tool for) reconsidering national interests. This is observed in the construction of the Lithuanian national identity and foreign policy, Slovenian perceptions of Europe, and, to a lesser extent, Latvia’s problem with the Russian minority. In any case, Europe provides political context for re-conceptualization of national problems, interests, and identity in a situation that has changed due to the membership. Europeanization continues to mean a help for solving old problems or provides the safe environment for initiating new developments. The process of becoming European in these and, presumably, other Central Eastern European countries is not about the loss of sovereignty, identity, but rather about using European platform to strengthen national
ability to prompt a new stage for development. The whole picture is much more complex. Europe is still associated with modernization, democratization, security, and economic-social development, while the critical awareness of competition between selfish interests of the member states continues to grow (in Lithuania); or the state considering taking the direction of foreign policy oriented towards the East or North East, because of being already rooted in Western political structures (as observed in Lithuania). The state may bring the unsolved problem of domestic integration of the national minority to the EU due to the outside pressure from its neighbour country, but continue to view the EU as a protector and guarantee for a civilized domestic integration (in Latvia); or the country may have viewed the EU as a single road to modernization since the early 1990s, while consistently demonstrating stronger attachment to the state rather than Europe (as observed in Slovenia). The point is not about the situation when the state surrenders to the supra-national space of Europe, but about using this space as a tool to seek its own national prospects.

Generally, it is not a new idea. The intergovernmentalists (Hoffman, 1966; Milward, 2000; Moravscik, 1998) has long ago indicated similar logic behind the European integration. The new aspect is the authentic experience of member states of the 2004 enlargement wave. They came (or came back) to Europe with high historical expectations as well as with some critical notion of losing sovereignty or identity that they recently regained. It seems that it was overestimation on both points. European and national dimensions are closely interconnected and serve for further evolution of the state under the new political conditions brought about by the membership. The process of becoming European takes place in the context of national considerations when the states are trying to deal with the old problems in the new geopolitical environment, i.e. as the members of the European Union.

Literature:

HOFFMAN, S. (1966) Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe. Deadalus. 95. p. 862-914.


Introduction. What Kind of “Europe” Was Inherent in National Identities of Central Eastern Europe?

In the European studies, national collective identities are analysed as an integral part of European identity and *vice versa*. From the beginning of the first decade of this century, numerous studies have appeared on national collective identities of various member states: Risse (2001), Malmborg and Sträth (2002), Eder and Spohn (2005), Diez-Medrano (2003), Ichijo and Spohn (2005), Karolewski and Kaina (2006), Robyn (2005), Drulak (2001). The importance of their study was, perhaps, best summed up by Thomas Risse: “the evidence suggests that socialization into European identity works not so much through transnational processes or through exposure to European institutions, but on the national levels in a process whereby Europeanness or ‘becoming European’ is gradually being embedded in understandings of national identities” (Risse, 2005, p. 291). According to this direction, national identities play a crucial role in the process of European identity formation, since “Europe” is deeply embedded in the national identity construction.

New member states of the EU from Central Eastern Europe share a historically common civilizational European identity (Spohn, 2005), which stems from historical perception of backwardness from the Western Europe that resulted from Russia’s and, later on, Soviet imperialistic aggression. The Central European national collective identities
are generally characterized by two basic features: orientation towards Europe as a sole road to modernity, democracy, safety, and prosperity, and secondly, a perceived threat from Russia stemming from the Soviet period (or earlier history) and the resulting collective historical trauma. A well-known Milan Kundera’s (1984) note on the tragedy of Central Europe gives an example of such an essential distinction between Central Europe that has always been a part of Western civilization and Eastern Europe and Russia that kidnapped Central European countries from their home, i.e. Europe. For this reason, Europe has always been seen as a space for the same cultural, political and civilizational values, which should include both Central European states and the Baltic States. In this historical and geopolitical context only, can we understand the moral argument declared by these countries after the collapse of communism stating that now Europe should implement historical justice and ensure their re-integration into Europe. Periphery of Europe, grey zone and being caught “in-between” are the most significant negative feelings reflected in the national understandings of this region.

In case of Lithuania, “Europe” or “West” has long been imagined in the national collective identity as a safety and prosperity zone, where small nations can obtain protection from the Eastern imperial powers (Russia). European identity of the Lithuanians has always been strong in geopolitical and cultural terms of “belonging to Europe”. Each national movement and fight for independence against the occupant Russia (tsarist or Soviet) in the nineteenth/twentieth century embraced the idea of being part of Europe. European element was also evidently present in the fight for independence in 1988-1993 (when the last Soviet soldier left the state) at the time of the fall of the Soviet Union, when a motive to return to Europe and break away from the Soviet terror was an inherent part of Lithuanian freedom. Europe and the independence of Lithuania were then, as always, closely interrelated. Such a massive support of the society for the fight for independence and for taking pro-European course evidenced how deeply civilizational European identity predominated in the national understandings of Lithuanians. This course was further supported until joining the European Union in 2004, even when former communists (subsequent social democrats)
governed the state. This can be explained by a long and intense post-war resistance movement against the Soviet rule and the collective memory (pride) of the interwar sovereignty.

Therefore, “Europe” and “Russia” are the most significant landmarks for collective identities of the Central Eastern European countries, including Lithuania. They have always been more than mere territorial or geographical images. And, therefore, they both had been playing a historical, geopolitical, cultural, and moral guide-role in the construction of national collective identities.

Theoretical Background

This research is theoretically guided by the distinction between civilizational and integrational identity encompassing and comparing the Central Eastern Europeans and Western Europeans, as referred to by Wilfried Spohn (Spohn, 2005). According to the author, such Central Eastern European countries as Lithuania took on the pro-European course after the collapse of the Soviet Union because of deep civilizational European identity which encompassed the feelings of historical belonging to Europe as well as being pulled out by Russia’s aggression. Joining Europe was supposed to be a moral return to the same space of cultural-political values and obtaining the assurance of protection against Russia. The integrational identity, however, means that member states have been forming their common representations on successful economic and political cooperation in a post-war era. Integrational identity, as W. Spohn notices, is typical of the older member states of the EU which have been experiencing common integration since the 1950s, where building European Communities ensured long lasting peace and social welfare for their citizens. Both types of identity are not mutually exclusive; they rather refer to different bases for common national representations. The integrational type of European identity

---

1 Klaus Eder refers to this distinction as core Europeans/peripheral or not-yet Europeans (Eder, 2005, p. 201).
does not presuppose a threat from Russia or doesn’t attribute to Europe the role of salvation for small states.

As noted before, civilizational identity has played the most important role to Lithuania in the country’s choice to take on the pro-European course after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when it helped unite Lithuanian political elites as well as the society on their path towards West and Europe. On the basis thereof, in 1994, Lithuanian official diplomacy declared three strategic goals in foreign and security politics: to enter NATO, to join the EU, and to maintain good relations with the neighbouring states.

After the vital interest was secured on the 1st of May, 2004, new social and political experiences emerged with the migration without borders within the EU, political participation in the institutions of the EU, doing business and making contacts across various social levels, in sum, getting behind the curtain of the European political, institutional, social, and economical life.

The distinction between civilizational and integrational identities could explain potential changes of the national identities of the new

---

3 As a matter of fact, this civilizational European identity of Lithuanians did include certain mythical elements due to the fact that Europe or West was idealized only. “Return to Europe” motive shielded deeper syndromes of national grievances suffered from the Soviet terror, such as the loss of freedom, oppression by alien Soviet rule, being lost and forgotten, interrupted natural development of the nation and the state, backwardness, even being betrayed by the West. Europe was a historical solution to all national misfortunes. Uneasy past was, therefore, automatically replaced by and transferred on the shoulders of the other good, i.e. “Europe”. Such a subconscious ideology is doomed to fail sooner or later. The first shock came soon from the real post-Soviet developments which showed that “return to Europe” had more to do with painful economic, social, and democratic reforms, rather than with automatic leap into the paradise. Introduction of the free market and liberal democracy associated with the direction towards Europe and West exposed majority of people to harsh social conditions. As one observer concluded in her study, “although originally the Eastern European countries' return to Europe ... was inspired by pure idealism, some idealism has been lost in the process now that the venture has almost become reality and political pragmatism has taken place” (Petraškaite-Pabst, 2010, p. 49). Nevertheless, support to “Europe” remained stable while treating social issues as inevitable costs for being independent.
member states: does the membership in the EU de facto initiate some changes in the traditional understanding of Lithuanians? To put it differently, if Europe had been viewed as a means of protection from Russia when Lithuania was outside of the European borders, it would be reasonable to think that actual being within Europe may, to some extent at least, help to reduce perceived threat from Russia. In other words, when trying to become a member of the European family, it is easy to see Europe in the most favourable light only (thereby justifying the strategic target to join it); however, the reality that the state and society faces when within the EU may force them to somehow reconstruct the traditional positive image of Europe as “paradise” or to reinforce it. In theory, it would be reasonable to ask whether Lithuanian European identity has changed due to the fact that the state fulfilled its historical desire to join the European family.

Historically, public discourse has played one of the most important roles in constructing national collective identity (Habermas, 1998; Habermas, 2001). Common national representations, national values and threats, national memory and prospects as well as the image of Europe and the nation's relationship with Europe are debated and contested in the public sphere (Krzyzanowski, 2010; Risse, 2010; Šarič et al., 2010). In short, national European identities are being constructed and re-constructed in and through public debates in newspapers, magazines, and other public discourses or media. Similarly to the function of “print capitalism”, when public media helped to imagine national community at the rise of centralized modern state (Andersen, 1983), now the national media actually perform the same function, i.e. they produce common meanings, images, arguments that constitute national understandings about common values, threats, past memories, and targets to be achieved. In other words, national media are involved in constructing and promoting national collective identities. The meaning of Europe is one of the crucial elements in the national identity construction, since Europe is used as a guideline for the understanding of the nation itself, as noted above (Malmborg and Sträth, 2002; Diez-Medrano, 2003; Ichijo and Spohn, 2005).

Therefore, this research focuses on the Lithuanian public debate, looking for the ways how national and European identities are being
Andrius Švarplys
constructed. In view of the fact that so-called civilizational Lithuanian European identity – the not-yet compromised image of Europe – has been firmly identified in the previous academic researches, this inquiry looks for possible changes to the traditional national understandings of Lithuanians driven by the country’s accession to the EU. What is the image of Europe now: did it remain the same or did it change? In a broader sense, did eight years of membership in the EU have any impact on the national collective identity in the Lithuanian public sphere?

It is indeed rather naive to expect radical changes over such a short period of membership, especially if compared with such a long period of hoping to return to Europe. However, being an actual part of the Union and among the other and older western European states is likely to provide some new experience and cause potential changes in the national perceptions.

Collection of Data

Monitoring of the national mass media covered the period of 2004-2011 (starting from the 1st of May, i.e. the accession date for the ten Central Eastern European countries). Four national Lithuanian newspapers were selected: “Lietuvos rytas”, “Respublika”, “Lietuvos žinios”, “Vakaro žinios”, and one weekly journal “Veidas”. Unlike other newspapers, these sources of media are the only ones that cover all the territory of the state, all the population of the country can order, buy and read them even if residing in the most remote areas.

First, these sources of media were filtered using keywords such as Lithuanian identity, national identity, European identity, Europe, European Union, West, Russia, national interests-values-threats, etc. (quantitative screening). This was done by a private capital enterprise that scans all nationally distributed and published sources of media. Thus, all the materials associated with the specified words, in sum, a total of 654 media articles and reports were selected. Then, the content of the selected articles was analysed by crystallizing the key message they sought to convey to the reader (qualitative analysis). Discourse content analysis allows revealing the true message (seeing the full picture, i.e.
images, photos, headings and subheadings) that media wants to convey to the audience thereby shaping perceptions of the readers. The articles were grouped by topic, based on their content.

Grouping of the articles by topic was, moreover, performed with the aim of obtaining a quantitative view of the most important factors discussed in the Lithuanian public sphere. The most significant topics regarding national collective identity in the Lithuanian national newspapers during the period from 01 05 2004 to 01 09 2011 are summarized in the table attached hereto. Percentage values reflect different parts of the public discourse, i.e. focus on the specific topic, obtained from the analysis of all articles.

Discussion on the Results

Lithuania: Between Europe and Russia

The factor of Russia played the essential role in the public debates of Lithuanian newspapers over the entire monitored period. One could have presumed that the accession to the European Union in the middle of 2004 would possibly reduce the level of threat from Russia perceived by Lithuania to some extent at least, but the monitoring of national public discourse gives rather contrary evidence. Over the years right after joining the EU, Lithuanian newspapers openly and firmly stated the interests of Russia in the Lithuanian domestic arena: to penetrate and control the enterprises of national importance, especially in the energy sector. Since the restoration of independence in 1990, Lithuania has never doubted that purely economic issues have political significance to the foreign policy of Russia. In other words, traditionally, Russia has been using economical capital as a pressure when pursuing its political goals. Concerns about how local politicians are vulnerable to the impact of Russia are also widely shared among the monitored sources of media.

Therefore, it has been commonly agreed in the media that accession to the EU and NATO provided the security from Russia formally and nominally only, but the threat has not effectively disappeared. It has grown even stronger instead.
The main concern is probably best expressed in the following citation: “Under the conditions of globalization, the methods of the politics of foreign affairs are changing: in order to make Lithuania its vassal, Russia can overmaster national energy sector, public sphere of information and other fields. ... In the Lithuanian energy sector, Russia uses a strategy of total domination, i.e. creates a vertical control over the Lithuanian energy sector. The enterprises controlled by the Russian capital may become the means of political pressure from Moscow. Moreover, this can lead to the convergence of the Russian capital and Lithuanian political elites. Through its people in the political parties and state institutions, Russia is able to affect the political processes in our state. More importantly, Russia makes use of the possibility to influence Lithuania through NATO and the EU structures, or by trying to trigger the inner erosion of those organizations. ... Russia grounds the relationship with the EU and NATO on double strategy: it either tries to restrict the influence of these organizations on certain matters of international politics that are important to Russia, or attempts to penetrate the decision-making processes of these institutions. The second direction of the Russian politics employed in relation to the EU and NATO poses the greatest threat to Lithuania. ... In view of these new security dilemmas faced by Lithuania, we can conclude that the membership in NATO and the EU has not eliminated the status of Lithuania as the periphery of Europe so far” (“Veidas”, 2007b).

Lithuanian integrational European identity (feeling as a member of the EU and NATO on the inside) is not likely to form in a similar manner as in the old member states, i.e. as a post-war success story of economic and social cooperation. Unlike the Western European member states, which have managed to deal with the traumas suffered from both world wars and achieve reconciliation, Lithuania cannot enjoy such a “European paradise”, because it is still too involved in historical and contemporary hostility with Russia. To put it simply, Lithuania has not quenched enmity in relation to Russia and this ongoing threat prevents Lithuania from enjoying peace and well-being like these are enjoyed by co-member states from the Western part. The presence of Russia continues to heavily affect Lithuanian European identity. Lithuania is forced to direct its diplomacy and behaviour within the European
Still *not-yet* Europeans?...

Union by paying attention to the factor of Russia. This component of civilizational European identity, i.e. essential difference of political culture of Europe and Russia, produces all major discrepancies between Lithuania and the “old Europe”. This is the main reason of all troubles faced by the country in shaping its foreign politics and national European identity. National public discourse reflects the feeling that Western partners do not understand Lithuania’s sensitive interests in relation to Russia; they underestimate the threat posed by Russia. The following citations even reflect the feeling of being betrayed by them: “New maps are drawn behind our backs, and we are treated as mere object of exchange” ("Respublika", 2004a); “The state’s membership in NATO is important, but provides only relative security guarantee. If need be, a pretext would always be found to betray the new member states for the sake of “more important” goals” ("Veidas", 2006b).

The role of security and prosperity zone that Europe has previously played is now being reconstructed in the Lithuanian public discourse reflecting the unwillingness of Western partners to provide the dreamed support in the fight against Russia. A well-known thesis on the distinction between the “old Europe” and “new Europe” expressed by the then Defence Secretary of the U.S. Donald Rumsfeld in early 2003, was firmly, though “silently”, supported by the observed sources of media, even though Lithuanian official diplomacy has always declared the state’s interest in the European unity. Lithuania saw its security guarantee more with the United States than with major European countries such as Germany and France, which often “flirted” with Russia: “Until now, the position of Washington in the Northern Alliance has been closer to that of our country, unlike the position of the major EU states, which was often constrained by pro-Russian attitudes. …pro-American direction of the Lithuanian politics of foreign affairs was determined by Lithuania’s strategic interests, namely” ("Lietuvos rytas", 2008a).

Russia successfully exploits this discrepancy by presenting Lithuanian concerns as exaggerated phobias supported by the narrow nationalist interests that disturb normal relationships between Russia and Western states.

The divergent positions of Lithuania and Western colleagues on the role of Russia have been accompanied by the sad understanding of the inner disunity of the EU. Before the accession to the EU, Lithuanians
shared a popular belief that “Europe” and “West” form a homogenous political-cultural entity, united area of freedom, security and prosperity. Now, when the state is actually part of these Western organizations, some new perceptions in the public representations of the Lithuanian media began to appear. The European Union is sometimes pictured as a selfish club where members fight only for their national interests: “The European Union does not care about the peace in the Baltic region. … Lithuanian politicians have finally opened their eyes to see that the older member-states of the EU focus only on their own interests, rather than those of the Baltic States” (“Vakaro žinios”, 2007); “…it is common practice in the European Union to fight for the interests of one’s own country almost in every step. … The EU shows resemblance to a political marketplace” (“Lietuvos rytas”, 2008c); “Discussion about the European Union’s matters in Seimas (Parliament) has revealed that Lithuanian officials have already begun to criticize the European Union more openly. However, it took a shameful meeting of the EU leaders in June, where the member-states have openly bickered about the money, to see how deeply divided and national-interest-driven this club is. … The EU has always been a union of states mostly focused on their own national interests. … It is time to fight seriously for our own interests. The EU arena is, however, dominated by major players, so we need to seek their support” (“Veidas”, 2005b).

It is difficult to view these ideas as something other than the shift in the civilizational European identity of Lithuanians. Especially in view of the fact that now, after several years of membership in the EU, the uncompromised image of Europe is contested in terms of the recognised national interests that exist in the EU, which usually do not correspond to the vital interests of Lithuania. However, this is not a radical change and does not mean an ultimate rejection of the civilizational image of Europe. The same sources of media continue to view the European Union as a single road to the country’s modernization and an undisputed economic and social benefit for the society and economy. Moreover, the EU is usually seen as a tool and opportunity to influence Russia’s position in the relationships with Lithuania: “Yesterday, Vilnius experiencing pressure from all sides has managed to survive and reach an important diplomatic victory: it obtained the approval of its requirements
in the negotiations between the EU and Russia” (“Lietuvos rytas”, 2008b); “Lithuania should use the membership in the EU and NATO as a tool to construct its relationship with its largest neighbour” (“Lietuvos rytas”, 2004a); “The pressure from Russia is only getting more intense. ... Now, when we are already equal members of the Euro-Atlantic community, we will have new possibilities to solve our specific problems in the relationship with Russia” (“Lietuvos rytas”, 2004b).

Such ambiguous representations, i.e. disappointment with the lack of understanding and unity within Europe, while viewing the EU as beneficial and valuable instrument to make an impact on Russia, can serve as the best evidence that Lithuania has been rapidly losing the uncompromised civilizational image of Europe as “paradise” and getting new skills to navigate between different interests in the EU. Homogenous picture of Europe is now fragmented and supplemented by more nuanced details. This new conception of Europe can be attributed to the integrational experience when the state is forming its politics by participating in decision-making processes within the European community.

This ambivalent situation is the reason why Lithuanian politics of foreign affairs lost its perspective after the accession to the EU. On the one hand, the historical target was achieved; on the other hand, however, Russia’s threat remained undefeated. Moreover, the present situation is accompanied by the realization of reluctance of the Western partners to understand and help Lithuania to stop Russia. Over the two cadences of Valdas Adamkus (1998–2003 and 2004–2009), Lithuania pursued active foreign affairs politics directed towards the East. Focus on the East (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Belarus) was the target in the new strategy of foreign and security affairs, which envisioned Lithuania as a regional leader in terms of being a centre for promoting initiatives of democracy, or as a mediator between the East and West. With Dalia Grybauskaitė as the President since 2009, Lithuania began to seek pragmatic foreign policy and this gave rise to the ongoing debates about the inconsistencies in the state’s foreign course: between value-based and pragmatic lines. According to the public debates, this uncertainty actually stems from the situation Lithuania found itself in during the post-accession era: semi-European and semi-dependent on Russia.
In summary, two basic elements of the civilizational European identity of Lithuania, i.e. persistent threat from Russia and historical belonging to the unified European sphere with the same political-cultural values, is being transformed into more realistic view on the basis of the actual reality faced within the EU. Nevertheless, as long as Russia prevails as the major factor in the national perception of Europe and of the self, Lithuanian European identity will continue to harbour a certain gap which will distance Lithuanian image of “Europe” from that of the Western member states.4

Euroscepticism and National Identity

Euroscepticism in the Lithuanian public debates is closely related with the problems of national interests, challenges of the national identity, and surrender to the authority of Brussels. It is rather difficult to discuss the Lithuanian Euroscepticism in the public sphere, given the fact that it is fragmented and can be mainly observed in two newspapers: “Respublika” and “Vakaro žinios”, both having the same owner and publisher. The publisher of “Respublika” committed administrative offence and was punished in 2005 for publications inciting national, racial or religious hatred. These newspapers are well-known for nationalist, anti-Semitic, homophobic attitudes; therefore, it is not surprising to find anti-European, anti-globalist, radical nationalist ideas expressed therein. Chronologically, in the period of 2004-2008, even these sources of media published only several articles on nationalism, patriotism, and Euroscepticism. However, as of 2009, the number of messages with nationalist content has been growing and reached 63, which makes

---

4 It would certainly be a mistake to hold that the old member states possess a unified image of “Europe”. As studies on this matter have shown (Risse, 2001; Malmborg and Strath, 2002), the way in which “Europe” is embedded in the national collective identities vary among such countries as Germany, France, UK., Italy, Spain, Sweden etc. However, the important point here is the construction of national European identities in these countries in the absence of the factor of Russia, which is essential in case of Lithuania and constitutes the background for civilizational European identity of Eastern Central European countries.
9.63% of all monitored sources. Even though the topic is mainly limited to the two newspapers only, it occupies rather significant part of the public debates. In view of the fact that both sources of media are among top 3 largest Lithuanian newspapers in terms of the audience, the significance of their messages is also increasing.

Euroscepticism reflected by “Respublika” and “Vakaro žinios” is primitive, declarative, and lacks serious argumentation to support the position. The sources merely shape negative attitudes towards the European Union: “The illusion of independence is melting” (“Vakaro žinios”, 2010); “At the service of the European Union! A secret war against Lithuania” (“Respublika”, 2011b); “Lost future in the shadows of the European Union” (“Vakaro žinios”, 2011); “The flag of Lithuania defended with bloodshed is more and more often overshadowed by the meaningless flag of the European Union, which reminds us of an impending repeal of our citizenship” (“Respublika”, 2010b).

Sometimes, the EU is viewed as a negative and positive phenomenon at the same time. The membership gives some advantages to the state, but throws down some challenges as well: “Some believe that the EU is the guarantee of stability for Lithuania, others claim that it weakens nationhood, state’s identity, and does not provide any benefits” (“Respublika”, 2011a).

However, the main argument in the framework of these debates is the concern that the membership in the EU is a real direct threat to the national sovereignty and culture. The country is now forced to obey the common rules of the Union and not all of them correspond to national cultural values. Sometimes, even the nature of the EU, the principle on the basis of which it operates and works, is treated as alien and challenging the country’s national identity: “From the very beginning, the European Union has been characterized by a certain degree of potential to diminish the nationhood of the states” (“Respublika”, 2011a); “What is the extent of Europe’s power over us and what is the extent to which we willingly surrender to things that are neither logical nor useful to our small country? ... it seems that we no longer have anything to be proud of, which gives rise to a question whether any parallels could be drawn between the present European Union and former Soviet Union?” (“Respublika”, 2010a).
This kind of image suggests that “Europe” is something alien and oppressive to the need of Lithuania to preserve its national values in cultural and political terms. This image is rather contrary to the image of Europe as “our home”, where we have always belonged. However, given the fact that this kind of Euroscepticism can only be found in strictly limited field of the public sphere, we cannot generalize it as a trend observed in relation to Lithuanian collective identity.

Nevertheless, when looking more generally how national identity is reflected in the public debates, we find the concern about the condition of Lithuanian nationhood in the context of global processes without radical nationalism. Worries about the emigration, inner dissolution of the society, the fate of national language and culture, and interest in ways how Lithuanian emigrants preserve their national culture: these topics find their place in the debates. Traditionalist understandings of national culture are dominated by a pessimistic view of the present situation, considering it to be bad and detrimental to unique and original Lithuanian culture. Negative attitude towards global market forces finds its place here: “globalization pulls out individuals from their roots. This forced freedom is immoral. Market fundamentalism enslaves not only political or national, but even ethical principles” (“Respublika”, 2006).

What is common to the attitudes of traditionalists is the willingness to blame the European Union for social problems faced by the Lithuanian society, for example, growing prices and increased emigration rates. Moreover, the people express dissatisfaction with the politics of foreign affairs and politicians for their attempts to surrender to the will of Westerners (European Union and NATO): “While defending their interests, the Westerners attack our national values” (“Respublika”, 2004b).

In sum, the vision of traditionalists of national and European identity is dominated by: general nationalistic concern about the survival of national cultural uniqueness; a construction of a threat coming from the West (including social problems); the lack of a strong national politics which would resist the more global and stronger powers.

In less influential liberal outlook on the national culture, optimistic attitude towards Europe and the globalized world prevails. In this case, they are viewed as an opportunity to modernize national identity: “The
European Union is not a “bugaboo” to our culture, but a tool to express ourselves and, thus, to strengthen our identity” (“Lietuvos žinios”, 2004); “Lithuanian culture will not disappear in Europe. We will be able to independently thrive in our home. Europe is unified by its common cultural values” (“Veidas”, 2004).

What is quite strange and unexpected, no systematic concern about the emigration rates is expressed in the Lithuanian public sphere of 2004-2011 (13 items, 2%), even though statistically Lithuania suffers from the highest emigration level among the member states of the European Union. Attention to negative or positive implications of globalization is marginal altogether.

Internal (Social, Civil) Security

This topic occupies a small, but still clearly visible share in the Lithuanian public debates (8.61%). The main argument stated here is the need for national politicians to implement social reforms faster in order to improve the standard of living for the people. The proponents of this view focus on the foreign and domestic politics as tools to ensure social security and civil society. They believe that only through social or civil security the trust between society and the state can be built. In this context, civil security is often regarded as a true remedy against the obscure insecurity in the international relations, where major forces do not depend on Lithuania’s will. In the domestic field, the state can and should direct the politics towards improving social conditions and strengthening civil engagement of the society. Sometimes, an astonishing argument that internal security is more important than the military protection of NATO or external threats, including the threat from Russia, can be observed here: “If the Lithuanian Government will manage to make sure that transparency and harmony are intrinsic

---

to the domestic politics, no Eastern influence will be able defeat us” (“Veidas”, 2007a); “What other protection do Lithuanian people have, except NATO fighters? ... The military protection alone is far from sufficient: we need consistency in the state’s politics in the area of economics, social security, culture, education and science, to ensure the internal security through the environmental, health insurance politics” (“Lietuvos rytas”, 2005a).

In line with this argument, Lithuania should use its membership in the European Union to create the welfare to its citizens: “Lithuanian Government has no vision of what it should try to achieve in the EU. ... The EU membership sought throughout the years of independence should not be an end in itself. We must always remember the basic purpose for which our country joined the EU. It is our goal to use the economic opportunities of the internal market to ensure the growth of well-being for all people of the country” (“Lietuvos rytas”, 2005b).

The alienation of the society from the state resulted in a situation where Lithuania has taken on a post-Soviet profile “democracy without citizens” or “justice without the people”. This process has deserved the attention in the public discourse as the inner threat that challenged security of the state: “So our biggest problem is the deficiency of active civil and primary communities, both territorial and functional and professional. Without them, our democracy becomes a formal procedure for the observation of democracy, instead of being participatory democracy” (“Veidas”, 2006a); “Democracy without citizens is democracy of bureaucrats, who have already learned how to manipulate it” (“Veidas”, 2005a); “The alienation of the citizens from the government is the main reason why the political identity is not being formed” (“Lietuvos rytas”, 2006).

In short, this part of the public discourse focuses on domestic duty that political will has to be accomplished with the help of the European Union. It raises understanding that a healthy civil society and democracy focused on the people is the basis for real security and for further objectives the state can seek. This kind of public debate can be evaluated as a positive attribute of Lithuanian European identity, since it defeats the mythical image of Europe – “instead of relying on the
“European paradise”, we are the only ones responsible for ourselves” – without losing pro-European orientation.

Conclusions

The main aim of this research was to find out whether the factual membership in the European Union affected the transformation of Lithuanian collective identity constructed in the public debates in the national newspapers. The premise for such expectation was the distinction between civilizational/integrational European identities (Spohn, 2005; Eder, 2005) that reflects different approach to “Europe” of East Central European states and of the old member states in the European Union. Traditionally, Lithuania as other post-communist countries from East Central Europe possessed an image of “Europe” as a home of freedom, security, welfare, and road to modernization. The fundamental factor for constructing such national European identity was perceived threat from Russia.

The analysis of Lithuanian public discourse of 2004-2011 revealed that the traditional role of Russia as a historical threat and imperialistic power did not disappear from Lithuanian collective representations, and even grew stronger. Now, when the country is protected by NATO and a member of the EU, instead of a danger of direct military intervention the major threat stems from the attempts of Russia to influence domestic politics and economics, especially in the energy sector. Lithuanian media expresses disappointment with the Western partners’ unwillingness to understand the country’s fear of threat from Russia as well as the anxiety about Russia’s politics attempting to exploit this discrepancy and deepen the split among the EU members. Thus, the traditional role of Russia as the Other has not changed and continues to be the major concern in Lithuanian collective identity, as it is constructed in the public debates.

The role of “Europe”, however, is changing in terms of the growing awareness of the inner division between individual states and their distinct interests. The traditional image of “Europe” and “West” as the area of security, welfare and shared cultural values, in short, as the road
to modernization, is being additionally supplemented and even outweighed by the understanding that “Europe” is not homogeneous and is sometimes deeply divided into the selfish member states. Unwillingness of the European Union to understand Russia’s threat and an impotence to form the unified political will against it causes the greatest disappointment in the Lithuanian public discourse. The focus on the internal security and the fact that no other external force (NATO, EU) can guarantee the state’s security, which can only be ensured through strong civil society, further reduces the unconditional attachment to the idea of Europe as paradise.

Euroscepticism in the Lithuanian public sphere is basically observed in two newspapers from the five monitored sources of national media. However, due to the fact that they are among top five largest sources of media by the number of readers, their capacity to form peoples’ attitudes is quite significant. Their scepticism, however, is based on primitive declaration of negative attitudes towards the EU, NATO or the “West” formally in the name of national interests. Other ideas expressed in the remaining sources of media on national identity reflect the concerns about the national culture, identity, language, emigration. The traditionalist point of view is dominated by a pessimistic assessment, while the liberal vision expresses more self-confident and affirmative views.6

Finally, all these tendencies may witness that positive image of “Europe” and “West” is slowly but gradually shifting from the mythical “Paradise” to more critical understandings. However, “Europe” continues to possess positive connotation in the national collective identity of Lithuanians, but some trends in the public discourse witness that it is losing previous unconditional support. And this could be evaluated as a positive shift, since the mythical character of civilizational European identity is being replaced by more realistic awareness of how to deal with major challenges of being within the European Union and NATO by cooperating with other member states (thus acquiring integrational

6 Although one may observe the rising debates on “national” versus “European” in recent years, the positions of Eurosceptics in the Lithuanian society is relatively weak. The main nationalist party “Tautininkų sąjunga” received only 2% of votes in the elections to the European Parliament in 2014, and this was in radical contrast with the success of the fellows parties in other member states of the EU.
European identity). Nevertheless, as long as Russia is considered a fundamental threat, this attribute of Lithuanian European identity will produce a certain inconsistency with the European identity of the old member states.7

Table 1. The main topics of the Lithuanian public discourse in the field of construction of national collective identity, 2004-2011. (Made by the author).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Share of the public discourse covered (items and percentage values)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor of Russia (danger)</td>
<td>167 (25.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National and European identity</td>
<td>111 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania in the European Union (news, events,</td>
<td>65 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>statistics regarding public opinions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation within the EU and NATO</td>
<td>50 (7.64%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal (civil, social) security</td>
<td>50 (7.64%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroscepticism</td>
<td>44 (6.72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania: a mediator between the democratic West</td>
<td>34 (5.198%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and non-democratic East</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU and NATO: a road to modernization and prosperity</td>
<td>32 (4.89%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral relations with the neighbouring countries</td>
<td>30 (4.58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Poland, Belarus, Sweden)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia as a partner</td>
<td>14 (2.14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>14 (2.14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration</td>
<td>13 (1.98%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>30 (4.58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>654 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 Needless to say, after the occupation of Crimea by Russia in early 2014 and its direct involvement in further military actions in the Donbass region of Ukraine, Lithuanian media apparently returned to the more expressed image of Russia’s threat. As Edward Lucas, one of the editor of „The Economist“, said about the CEE countries in this respect, “now they have been proved right“ (Lucas, 2014).
Literature:


Monitored media sources:

Dynamics of Foreign Policy, the Interplay of Identity and Interests: Lithuanian Case

Social Constructivism and Foreign Policy

Foreign policy analysis may seem a very narrow and limited field of study at first sight only; when getting deeper into the subject one may find exceptional complexity and dynamic nature of it: it includes wide spectrum of actors, encompasses numerous internal and external factors, and reflects interplay between them. As A. Heywood (2011, p. 128) emphasizes, foreign policy shows “the importance of statecraft as an activity through which national governments manage their relations with other states and international bodies”. Laura Neack (2003, p. 8-11) notes that “such policy is conducted in complex internal and international environments; it results from coalitions of active actors and groups situated both inside and outside state boundaries; its substance emanates from issues of both domestic and international politics; and it involves processes of bargaining and compromise involving trade-off affecting the interests of both domestic and international groupings”. “This double-sided nature of foreign policy has complicated the analysis since its first steps” (Smith, Hadfield, Dunne, 2012, p. 113).

Today, foreign policy analysis focuses on national identity and interests, while institutions make it possible to get into the very essence of decision making. Moreover, foreign policy analysis incorporates normative elements such as values and norms. Naturally, for a long time it was hard to find appropriate conceptualisation and build adequate theoretical frameworks for foreign policy analysis (FPA). Nevertheless, “for many years, FPA has been a kind of free-floating enterprise, logically unconnected to, and disconnected from, the main theories of International Relations (IR)” (Houghton, 2007, p. 24). For a long time,
IR studies tried to keep a distance from foreign policy analysis. FPA was encapsulated and focused only on internal processes that were based on institutional analysis, rational choice of actors, decision-making models, bureaucratic theories, etc. FPA was not able to answer questions about external impacts on foreign policy and security, internal-external interplay; nor was it able to approach agency-structure questions.

Foreign policy was and still is assessed as a sub-discipline of IR, and receives less attention from scholars and analysts, because of its interdisciplinary nature. For some time now, classical theories of IR have attempted to avoid inclusion of FPA into their theoretical structures of argumentation. For example, Kenneth Waltz and others emphasized that state behaviour could essentially be explained through the power balances that shape the international system (Heywood, 2011, p. 128) (states are perceived as billiard balls and nobody is interested in what is going on inside these balls). Traditional theories prioritized systemic factors as decisively important, “little or no role discretion was left to foreign policy actors, such as heads of government, foreign ministers, leading diplomats and so forth” (Heywood, 2011, p. 128), obviously neo-realism neglects foreign policy. “Both neo-realists and neoliberals view foreign policy making as a process of constrained choice on the part of states acting rationally and strategically” (Smith, Hadfield, Dunne, 2012, p. 113).

Changes in FPA appeared in the context of the third inter-paradigm debates, when positivist theories were challenged by a large group of post-positivists (reflectivism vs. positivism). With the emergence of opposition to theoretical traditionalism, a range of new IR approaches has helped to move FPA from the analytical stagnation. New approaches to FPA have helped to connect traditional studies with International Relations. Attempts were made to answer level-of-analysis questions and to elaborate on dilemma of agency-structure. These new approaches suggested more complex and thorough view of foreign policy that “highlights the crucial interplay between structure and agency, emphasizing that events can neither be explained through top-down/systemic approach/pressures nor entirely through bottom-up individual decision making, in doing so, foreign policy underlines the crucial significance of a sphere of decision, choice and internationality within global politics” (Heywood, 2011, p. 128).
The most popular meta-theoretical approach to foreign policy is social constructivism. “Its core assumptions are that reality is socially constructed in the form of social rules and inter-subjective meanings and that this affects our knowledge” (Smith, Hadfield, Dunne, 2012, p. 121). There is a wide range of constructivist approaches. For the purposes of this analysis, the following are applied: “normative ideational” strand represented by North American constructivism. The school of North American constructivism emphasizes the role of “social norms” and “identities” in constructing international politics and determining foreign policy outcomes and is dominated by “positivist” scholars who are interested in “uncovering top-down/deductive mechanisms and causal relationships between actors, norms, interests and identity” (Checkel, 2008, p. 72). Positivist/rationalist strand can be attributed to Nicholas Onuf, Alexander Wendt, Emmanuel Adler, Michael Barnett, John Ruggie, Friedrich Kratochwil, Peter Katzenstein, Matthew Hoffmann, Martha Finnemore, and others.

This strand of constructivism focuses on strategic interactions in which the participation of actors is based on their given identities and interests and attempt to realize their preferences via strategic behaviour (Mahdi, 2010, p. 150). Constructivists such as Wendt attempt at connecting systemic and national levels of analysis, and view processes and foreign policy as interplay between different levels of analysis. Region or sub-region can also be introduced into the analysis as sub-systemic factors independent from the external factor of the system. Constructivists seek to answer how foreign policy is created and performed; how national identity, social reality and institutions impact changes in foreign policy; how internal and external factors, their interplay and perceptions impact foreign policy directions. Foreign policy is characterized by dualism: the interplay of two different powers, i.e. internal values, norms, actors that advocate for those norms, seek their institutionalisation and continuity in foreign policy, and the external impact, i.e. international, regional, global values and those of neighbouring states, as well as their expectations towards each other.

Constructivism defines foreign policy in terms of dynamic relations between structure and actors. Social reality is changing in terms of time and space, that means that identity, ideas, values, norms and institutions
are constantly changing. Ideas are perceived as institutionalised collective experiences. Values, norms and their institutionalisation, socialisation, introduction, continuity and change are inseparable from collective identity. “The states’ constructed identities, shared understandings and socio-political situation in the broader international system which to a large extent determines their interests and the foreign policy practices to secure them” (Behravesh, 2011). Constructivists analyse institutional structures that create the basic elements of international society as well as national political system. Those institutional structures impact priorities and identities of actors, institutionalise norms and values, and guarantee their inclusion into political agendas.

**National Identity: Boundaries and Change**

Collective identity is usually defined negatively. It means, for example, that a person is considered Lithuanian inasmuch as he/she is not Greek or Russian, and we know ourselves as *we* because we are separate from *them*. When defining identity, we also define boundaries between *we* and the Other, while the other/others in foreign policy can mean foreign, unknown, strange, etc. Distinction between *we* and *them* is of crucial importance in foreign policy, since we use it to identify (based on interests, common historical experiences, cultural factors and values) our friends and unfriendly neighbours; in this context, we draw and constantly redraw boundaries of amity/enmity. We define boundaries in terms of external amity and enmity relationships. Delineation of friend vs. unfriendly neighbour is changing in time, space, in the context of relations with other national identities. As E. Adler and M. Barnett (1998, p. 38) noticed, *we-ness* is constituted through a combination of permissive material power conditions and proximate ‘ideational’ power conditions such as magnetic attraction, legitimacy, and moral authority that become embedded in specific state actors.

As noted by Bruce Cronin (1999, p. 18), “identities provide a frame of reference from which political leaders can initiate, maintain, and structure their relationships with other states”. National identity is usually created, while state identity is constantly changing in the context of
internal and external dynamics. Internal impact on changes depends on political leaders, institutions, national interests, etc. Xavier Guillaume (2002, p. 14) notes “that national identity, resulting from a dialogical framework composed of the international system and the domestic environment, is a form among others – such as ‘interests’ or ‘power’ – that state agency takes in international relations”. M. Castells (2010, p. 7-8) distinguishes three types of identity change/formation: “(1) legitimizing identity of the civil society that generates identity, (2) identity as the sign of resistance – various types of protest, (3) project identity: construction of new types of identities – creation of new social structures”. “Legitimizing identity generates a civil society; that is, a set of organizations and institutions, as well as a series of structured and organized social actors, which reproduce, albeit sometimes in a conflictive manner, the identity that rationalizes the sources of structural domination” (Castells, 2010, p. 8).

Goff and Dunn (2004, p. 237-239) distinguish 4 dimensions of identity: alterity, fluidity, constructedness, and multiplicity, they all reveal constant dynamic nature of identity, as identities change, overlap are constructed and fluid. E. Zutter (2007) suggests adding fifth dimension to Goff and Dunn’s set: “relational dimension of identity, while an agent enacts and produces her identity in practice, identity does not exist in social isolation, it depends on others, not as boundary defining, but as recognizing of one’s identity”. G. Miniotaite (2006, p. 162) notes that “the analysis of national identity in relation with foreign policy is the most interesting in the context of change”. Practices of identity change are performed by defining norms, values inside the state and taking into account the processes that take place outside, and by this act the other (unsuitable) norms are rejected, and positive, suitable ones are included into foreign policy agendas. As Maria Malksoo (2006, p. 278) emphasizes, “the politics of becoming is thus apt metaphor for capturing the never-ending process of collective identity production and reproduction”.

According to William Bloom (1990, p. 79), “the national identity is dynamic, therefore describes the social-psychological dynamic by which a mass national public may be mobilised in relation to its international environment”. In Lithuania, for example, national public was
mobilised while striving for states' sovereignty and independence in the January of 1991: while opposing the Soviet regime and trying to maintain and strengthen independence, the public was mobilised for referendum on the approval of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania (25 October, 1992), which served as an expression of the nations’ will and internal legitimization of the country, as well as the referendum (10-11 May, 2003) on the state’s accession to the EU. These are the focal points for the state’s survival and existence. The third one also marks the determination of Lithuania’s geopolitical orientation. Rhetoric of change encompasses processes when actors seek to establish/re-establish new boundaries or replace the old ones. “Mass national public mobilizes it will when it perceives either that national identity is threatened, or that there is the opportunity to enhance national identity” (Bloom, 1990, p. 79). Here, we can see how elements of national identity can be transformed into national interests.

**Identity and National Interest**

So-called North American rationalist strand of constructivism pays great attention to national interests, their interplay with the identity as well as norms and values. They are concerned how national interests are constructed, changed and how they are communicated to the public, included in and/or excluded from foreign policy agendas. Karl Schonberg (2007) notices that “definitions of identity are thus crucial to understanding the ebb and flow of international politics for constructivists, since actors comprehend their own self-interest in large part through their assessment of their own identities in relation to those of others in the system”.

Identity as well as national interests are fluid and are constantly changing. This dynamics is determined by social, historical factors as well as internal-external interplay. “Foreign policy, firstly, is an instrument for building bridges amongst states; secondly, states deal with social construction that shapes national identity, the construction of identity substantially informs what is defined as the national interest” (Wicaksana, 2009). Isacoff and Widmaier (2003, p. 178) emphasize
that “the reification of mass interests itself obscures the need to operationalize the interplay between not only systemic understandings and domestic interests, but also between elite and mass discourses”.

“According to constructivist assumption, [national] interest is determined by state identity which is depending on historical, cultural, political, and social backgrounds” (Mahdi, 2010, p. 151). It goes without saying that elite decisions, public opinions, national identities matter as much as historical memories, cultural and social factors, while national interests are created, recreated and changed. “Identities are the basis of interests, actors do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations” (Behravesh, 2011).

Moreover, external factors may have great impact on changes of national interests, or on creation of new ones. For example, Lithuania decided to apply for membership in NATO in January, 1994; this interest and initiative originated from the Lithuanian Parliament, was supported by the public, and delivered by the President. It was driven by the fact that foreign (Russian) army left the Lithuanian territory few months ago (1993, September); on the other hand, it was driven by outside factors: NATO itself had started to elaborate ideas of partnerships with Post-Soviet states and potential opportunities of expansion. Thus, this combination of internal-external interests has led to Lithuanian membership in the Alliance. Jutta Weldes (1996, p. 280) emphasizes the interplay of internal and external factors when defining the concept of national interest:

*National interests are social constructions created as meaningful objects out of the intersubjective and culturally established meanings with which the world, particularly the international system and the place of the state in it, is understood. More specifically, national interest emerges out of the representations or, to use more customary terminology, out of situation descriptions and problem definitions through which state officials and others make sense of the world around them.*

This definition shows a very close interplay of national identity and national interests. William Bloom (1990, p. 83) defines national interest as “part of national identity … capable of triggering national mass mobilization to defend or enhance it”. Similarly, Wicaksana (2009) argue
that “dual process of articulation and interpellation is of central impor-
tance in understanding the construction of identity and the national
interest in foreign policy”. Therefore, it would be wrong to claim that
“national interests and material objectives of state actors are totally
overlooked in the interaction and policy-making process” (Behravesh,
2011). According to Jutta Weldes (1996, p. 276), it is “through the con-
cept of national interest that policy-makers understand the goals to be
pursued by a state’s foreign policy, it thus in practice forms the basis
for state action; second, it functions as a rhetorical device through
which the legitimacy of and political support for state action are gen-
erated“. “The national interest thus has considerable power in that it
helps to constitute as important and to legitimize the actions taken by
states” (Weldes, 1996, p. 276). In Lithuanian case, NATO membership
was legitimized (internally and externally) by the letter of the President
to NATO Secretary General Manfed Wörner, driven by internal and
external processes, and supported, more or less, by the public.

**Internal-External Interplay in the Constructivist Analysis**

Constructivist studies of FPA provide a bridge between internal and
external factors and make it possible to study their interplay. “It is usual
to think about foreign policy in terms of national (internal) factors,
decision-making processes, and the interplay of institutional, cultural
and societal factors that shape foreign policy” (Kaarbo, 2003, p. 155), and
their results. As it was mentioned above, constructivism extends inter-
nal boundaries of analysis and includes external factors in it. According
to the major part of definitions, “FPA refers to a complex, multilayered
process, consisting of the objectives that governments pursue in their
relations with other governments and their choice of means to attain
these objectives” (Kubalkova, 2001, p. 17).

Foreign policy is studied in a wider context of internal processes
within the state, structures, institutions, and historic memories, per-
ceptions of amity/enmity with regard to international processes/actors
(global, regional, sub-regional neighbouring states), external impacts
and outcomes; the construction of internal and external expectations
with regard to one or the other nation state. “Constructivism shares the assumption that agents and structures are mutually constitutive, we ought not to privilege one at the expense of the other, although different constructivists do naturally tend to emphasize one or the other” (Houghton, 2007, p. 28).

Constructivism in FPA provides the possibility to connect internal processes ongoing within a nation-state with international processes. According to D. Campbell (1992), “foreign policy is the field of study, uniting different levels of analysis – international and national”, and the analysis of areas where international and national sub-fields (such as human rights, regional and international regimes, regional identity, etc.) interplay. V. Kubalkova (2001, p. 20) states that “foreign policy encompasses the complicated communications within governments and amongst its diverse agents, plus the perceptions and misperceptions, the images of other countries, and the ideologies and personal disposition of everyone involved; any comprehensive analysis cannot begin at a state or institutional level, but must consider the domestic factors that change and shape state identity”.

D. Campbell (1992, p. 44) perceives national systems as subordinated to international one, but “these systems and subsystems exist independently of, and prior to, any relationship that results from their joining by the ‘bridge’ of foreign policy; that bridge is consciously constructed by the state in an effort to make itself part of the larger system and to deal with the dangers and uncertainties that larger system holds for its own security”. A. Wendt also argued on interdependency between national and international levels of analysis (elaborated on agency-structure dilemma), but he does not define the determining level (Houghton, 2007, p. 30). Constructivists usually emphasize the interdependence, but not argue which level tends to dominate; they agree that domination is based on particular circumstances. Xavier Guillaume (2002, p. 14) highlights that “national identity, resulting from a dialogical framework composed of the international system and the domestic environment, is a form among others – such as ‘interests’ or ‘power’ – that state agency takes in international relations”. However, he does not expand on whether internal or external factors should dominate in case of collision of interests.
To sum up, all social structures including states can be defined as a process. States exist in an environment that is social and material at the same time, this leads to an argument that material structures have social context, social environment and they are evolving (and constantly changing) within this environment. Social interactions change values and norms of leaders, nations, national identities and institutions, which leads to the changes in national interests. A dualism as a feature of foreign policy reveals intersection of two forces: on the one part, internal norms, values, and actors advocating for their priorities in foreign policy, on the other part, external impacts, i.e. international values, global, regional, expectations of neighbouring states vis-à-vis one or the other nation state. This dualistic interaction results in constantly changing national foreign policy agendas and priorities. Nations have to take into account internal dynamics as well as evaluate and respond to external processes, and this response is usually reflected in the agendas of national foreign policy. They are strongly interrelated with the national interest-setting process and connected to national identities.

National Identity, Interests and Change in the Lithuanian Foreign Policy

This part of the article will overview the dynamics of the Lithuanian foreign policy, distinguishing national interests, their change in the light of national identity, values and norms, as well as taking into account national and international dynamics. The changes of national identity and interests can be observed in the perspective of time. Four periods that reflect the dynamics of the Lithuanian foreign policy can be distinguished during this 21st year of Lithuanian independence. These periods reveal the change in priorities of the foreign policy as well as dynamics of national interests, values and identity in the context of interplay of internal and external factors.
Table 2. Periods of the Lithuanian Foreign Policy and Dynamics of the National Identity. (Made by the author).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOVEREIGNTY</strong></td>
<td><strong>INTEGRATION</strong></td>
<td><strong>EUPHORIA</strong></td>
<td><strong>PRAGMATISM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in UN,</td>
<td>EU and NATO.</td>
<td>Looking for the role</td>
<td>Specialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE, CoE, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>and identity within</td>
<td>and Sub-regionalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competing visions</td>
<td>Clear vision direction</td>
<td>Idea of regional</td>
<td>Ideas of subregional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of FP, national interests not institutionalized.</td>
<td>of FP (NATO, EU, good relations with neighbours).</td>
<td>leadership.</td>
<td>cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definintion of main</td>
<td>Addition of elements of</td>
<td>Socialisation within</td>
<td>Prioritization of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elements of national</td>
<td>regional identity:</td>
<td>EU and NATO;</td>
<td>energy security,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identity.</td>
<td>Central and Eastern</td>
<td>promotion of</td>
<td>cyber security,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ectnic identity.</td>
<td>European countries.</td>
<td>democracy outside.</td>
<td>nuclear safety,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region: Baltic states,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavians.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forces in Lithuanian</td>
<td>V-10 group, seeking</td>
<td>Lithuanian FP</td>
<td>Presidencies (EU,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>territory</td>
<td>support from outside.</td>
<td>direction.</td>
<td>OSCE, NB8, etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first period can be described as legitimisation of civil society and nation state; it can be dated from 1991 to 1994. For national interests and identity to be developed, the most important are the first years of independence, as the state strives for its sovereignty. During this period, it is difficult to identify specific national interests and priorities of foreign policy except from opposition to former Soviet bloc and strive for international recognition. The state has to legitimize itself from the inside, for example, by creating representative institutions, drafting the constitution and, finally, appealing for the public support via referendum. It, furthermore, has to seek and gain external recognition from the international community (Lithuanian membership: 1991 UN, 1991 OSCE, 1991 ILO, 1993 Council of Europe, etc.). Numerous ideas of foreign policy competed in Lithuania during this period; however, it was not formally agreed on them and they were not institutionalised yet. As mentioned by G. Miniotaite (2007, p. 179), “in 1991, Lithuanian political elite was considering several options of
security: neutrality, security alliance of small states, and membership in military alliance”. It was also a time when “the presence of Russian troops prevented Lithuania from taking the western security policy direction” (Miniotaite, 2006, p. 163).

The elements of national identity were exceptionally important during the first period of the state-building process. Lithuanian national identity was being constructed and institutionalised as an ethnic one, based on historical heritage of statehood. The occupational forces (which have not left Lithuania until autumn of 1993) prevented the state from choosing and institutionalising its foreign policy direction. Retreat of foreign forces encouraged Lithuania to take on the transatlantic direction in the beginning of 1994. This was the beginning of the new period of the Lithuanian foreign policy; and the time of shaping the main directions and priorities of the state as well as starting to integrate into western institutions.

The second period (1994-2004) was more dynamic and significant in defining the main foreign policy directions. Lithuania's membership in NATO was the first institutionalised priority of the foreign policy. It was perceived as fundamental national interest that had to fulfill security needs of the state. In his letter to NATO GS Manfred Wörner (4 January 1994), President A. Brazauskas (1994) stated that “Lithuania seeks cooperation with NATO and expects future membership in the Alliance”. It was a sign of Lithuanian determination to choose pro-western orientation.

During this period, Lithuania sought to attribute itself to strong regional structures of security and economic cooperation, which could grant the state a secure and free environment to live in. The elements of national identity shaped priorities of the state. Previous attempts at survival evolved into the concept of “back to Europe”, and in 1996, Lithuania applied for membership in the EU. Moreover, Lithuania has established good relations with the neighbouring states as a national interest (expressed, for example, in the Law on Fundamentals of National Security, 1996). This interest can be seen as an attempt to prove international community the predictability and non-confrontational nature of the country. This particular interest remained included in the national foreign policy agenda throughout the following periods.
Membership in NATO and the EU as well as good relations with the neighbours were three key national interests defined and institutionalised during the second period of the foreign policy evolution. This was the period of transition, when the country attempted to integrate itself into the western society. Integration was seen as a “one way” process, it was at the very core of the Lithuanian existence, it has ended the resistance and “sovereignty-building” period. It was a crucial time for the state’s security direction to be determined, which encouraged the attempts to perform well while making national homework in order to become fully-fledged member of the Western security community.  

In the Lithuanian National Security Strategy (2002), “sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic constitutional order, human rights, peace and welfare” were defined as the essential national security interests. In addition to primary interests in this document are defined as: “global and regional stability, peace and democracy in the Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Baltic States, etc.”, “transnational challenges such as terrorism, organised crime, illegal trade of arms, drugs, illegal migration and spread of pandemics” were also identified. This demonstrates the main sub-regional orientation towards the Central and Eastern European countries, while the Baltic States remained of secondary importance. During this period, Lithuanian identity has gradually started to shift towards the Central European sub-region. During the period of integration, Lithuania actively strengthened its Central and Eastern European part of identity.  

Trying to promote cooperation with Central European countries integrated into NATO, Lithuania has initiated Vilnius 10 Group. Ministers of foreign affairs of nine Central and Eastern European countries met in Vilnius in May 2000. At the meeting, the countries expressed their firm commitment to NATO, declared that their objective “to integrate into the institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community emanates from readiness to assume [their] fair share of responsibility for the common defence and to add voice to the debate on [their] common future” (Vilnius Group statement, 2000). Two years later, in 2002, NATO

---

1 Initial group that met in May, 2000, it was consisted of 9 countries, Croatia joined this group later.
Summit in Prague invited these countries to become members. In this context, the visit of the USA president G. W. Bush to Vilnius in 2002 was of symbolic importance, and his statement at Vilnius Town Hall ensuring that Lithuania is a part of transatlantic area, and affirmation that “anyone who will choose Lithuania as an enemy would also become the enemy of the US” was substantial element and sign of an external support, assurance and security guarantee for Lithuania.

Lithuania has actively engaged in integration processes; the EU integration was more technical, while NATO integration was more political in nature. Nevertheless, it was quite difficult to define subsequent national priorities and interests after obtaining membership in NATO and the EU. Lithuania was mostly concerned about the integration process itself, and focused mainly on technical and normative elements of it. It was exceptionally enthusiastic about the value-based enlargement of transatlantic security area. The country demonstrated its attitudes in initiatives such as Vilnius 10 Group. “Vilnius 10 Group and early involvement in the EU Neighbourhood Policy has laid down the Lithuanian ambitions to attribute itself as a ‘centre of regional cooperation’”(Miniotaite, 2007, p. 167). It tried to pool Central and Eastern European countries aspiring to integrate into transatlantic institutions, encouraged their cooperation, and those attempts were successful. Later the same approach was employed when encouraging the Eastern European countries to integrate.

In 2004, Lithuania became a member of NATO and the EU. This year ends the second period in the evolution of the Lithuanian foreign policy. Once fundamental and vital national interests were sucessfully secured, the state faced new challenges and opportunities. Lithuanian statesmen had to figure out new objectives, directions and priorities of foreign policy. The new vision of foreign policy was presented by acting President A. Paulauskas in Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations and Political Science, in May 2004. Later in the year Lithuanian parliamentary parties agreed on the fundamental foreign policy goals and objectives for the period 2004-2008. This agreement was based on the ideas expressed by A. Paulauskas.

New Lithuanian foreign policy as well as national interests had strong normative basis. A. Paulauskas mentioned normative princi-
ples, for example, he stated that “achieving a strong position in the European Union and NATO [was], certainly, a highly important goal for our state, but we should also promote and safeguard our values” (Paulauskas, 2004); at the same time, he emphasized that “we should not abandon our efforts to develop the principles of solidarity and good neighbour relations and to promote a dialogue between cultures and civilisations“ (Paulauskas, 2004). Thus, normative principles such as “development of solidarity, good neighbourhood, and dialogue between civilisations” (Paulauskas, 2004) were distinguished and emphasized. In their agreement, political parties also emphasized that “Lithuania should become active and attractive centre of interregional cooperation, expressing Euro-Atlantic values, spirit of tolerance and cooperation, uniting cultures and civilisations” (Agrement of Lithuanian political parties on the key foreign policy goals and objectives for 2004-2008). This period of foreign policy may be labelled as the normative one. It institutionalised a range of transatlantic values and norms, and directed national foreign policy agenda accordingly.

The new directions of foreign policy were related to an attempt to develop the idea of Post-Soviet Eastern European countries as the centre of regional gravity, while maintaining the spirit of Vilnius 10 Group, and (with the encouragement from outside) to become a supporter of democratisation and integration of these countries into the western institutions. Lithuanian foreign policy leaders took on this role enthusiastically. Later, the idea of regional centre with an exceptional focus on eastern neighbourhood and NATO “open door” policy was criticised, since “it paid too much attention to the eastern dimension rather than aiming at better integration into different western institutional structures; instead of wasting energy to engage its eastern neighbours Lithuania should focus on reducing its dependence on imports from Russia and developing an effective transportation system linking Lithuania to Western Europe” (Smith, 2005, p. 54-55).

During this period, Lithuanian European and transatlantic identities were being strengthened, Lithuania was socialising within the EU and NATO. It was looking for its role in regional institutions, made attempts to become an important player in international security arena, actively participated in NATO operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, and
promoted integration of Eastern European countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova). At the same time, NATO and the EU viewed Lithuania (together with two other Baltic countries) as “a single issue state” (for example: Šešelgyte, 2010; Malksoo, 2006). As argued by some authors, “after achieving membership in the EU [and NATO], the policy of the Baltic States towards Russia have returned to a more confrontational line that had to be suppressed in the course of seeking membership” (Malksoo, 2006, p. 279). “More confrontational political discourse of the Baltic States towards Russia is a result of a deeper integration into the western organisations, the EU and NATO and this discourse cannot be seen as a shared EU stand. Even though the Baltic States are in many ways distancing themselves from Russia, they are not succeeding completely in security terms” (Kværnø, Rasmussen, 2005, p. 91). Maria Malksoo argues that this was “partly due to the fact that Russia [had] not let herself be disturbed by the Baltic States’ full-fledged membership of the key Euro-Atlantic organizations, and continuously [attempted] to discredit the Baltic States in the eyes of their western partners and allies” (Malksoo, 2006, p. 279).

Finally, the fourth period started in 2010; it was shaped by pragmatism and specialisation. While the third one could be labelled as a period of transition and adaptation, the last one reveals projection and articulation of national interest in the EU and NATO. In May 2010, the last Vilnius 10 Group meeting was held. It symbolically ended the integration phase of the Lithuanian foreign policy and was followed by its further changes. The new period was characterized by an internal and external push for specialisation, cooperation at sub-regional levels.

The idea of “regional centre” was gradually disappearing from political rhetoric of Lithuanian leaders; it naturally evolved and was overshadowed by other sub-regional priorities. Country still attempted to maintain the direction and promotion of Eastern Neighbourhood, while developing sub-regional orientation towards Nordic countries. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Ažubalis (2012) noticed, “two directions of the Lithuanian foreign policy, i.e. northern and eastern, do not conflict but rather complement and strengthen each other”. A. Ažubalis (2012) also added that “Lithuania’s strategic goal of mobilising democratic countries in Eastern Europe remains unchanged; we contribute
greatly to the consolidated effort that keeps Eastern Partnership countries, especially Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, on their path towards reform”. However, the Minister also expressed Baltoscanadian ideas, pragmatic and smart interests to cooperate more with Scandinavian countries, to coordinate positions and support each other in the EU and NATO. When discussing the priorities of foreign policy, candidate to the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Linkevičius (2012) recognized the northern countries and good neighbouring cooperation with Poland, Russia and Belarus to be in tune with the existing direction of the country’s foreign policy, and emphasised cooperation through regional formats such as the EU and NATO.

Lithuania also paid more attention to the specialisation of its foreign policy, prioritising specific issues such as energy security, information security, cyber and nuclear proliferation, etc. As, for example, A. Ažubalis (2012) noted, “I know that by working together we will strike a positive balance, not only in Northern, Central and Eastern Europe, but also in the Lithuanian energy sector, economy, people’s wallets and mood. This is the essential goal of a policy which is oriented toward an ethical neighbourhood, smartness in the region, balance in Europe and responsibility in the world”. So-called soft security issues are balanced with hard ones, as state maintains and emphasizes security priorities such as collective defence, NATO’s visibility via Baltic Air Policing, and Baltic Defence Plans.

**Concluding Remarks on the Dynamics of Perceptions of Self and the Other**

The category of we is not constant, it changes in time, while going from one period of Lithuanian foreign policy to the other. During the first period (1991-1994), the threats and national interests were not defined directly, there rather were indirect connotations towards former Soviet Union (and its army that was still present in the country), amity defined with the Baltic and Scandinavian countries. Russia was perceived as the Other, as a successor of the former Soviet Union with its army on the Lithuanian territory; it limited the state’s sovereignty
and weakened its independence. As M. Šešelgyte (2010, p. 28) notices, “while Russia has become part of Lithuanian national identity as the Other, the major threat for the survival, the USA has definitely gained the status of we, the best ally and prosecutor”. During the integration into the Euro-Atlantic region, the geography of we extended to Western Europe, Central and Eastern European countries as well as to the USA. This transformation was driven by the pragmatic desire to become part of the Western security community. During the third period, Lithuania extended we to Post-Soviet Eastern European countries that joined the EU and NATO; during the fourth period, strengthening of we-ness with the Nordic/Scandinavian countries was observed.

The perception of Russia as the Other differed during each period: as Lithuania underwent the process of integration into the EU and NATO, Lithuania and the other Baltic countries softened their rhetoric vis-à-vis Russia; however, different reaction from the Russian side prevented them from excluding Russia from the list of the Other. As S. Nies (2003, p. 91) notices, “the Russian government tried to influence the progress of integration by strengthening its ties with the Baltic states, for instance by means of the CFE treaty, the border treaty, or also by staging open protests to western integration”. In May, 2004 (beginning of the third period), while reflecting on the national interests, the acting President A. Paulauskas stated that Lithuania must be at the forefront of the EU-Russian relations and emphasized that “in order to defend our national interests and to avoid situation where we are made an item of trade or where other states pursue their interests at our expense”. From the very first years of independence, Russia was seen as the Other, but this perception has changed from more direct reflection to less direct one, as (during the last period) Lithuania was seeking energy independence, taking care of nuclear safety, expressing its concerns vis-à-vis military build-up in Kaliningrad Region, etc.

As Ulrich Beck noted, “it is a different kind of state, paradoxically, in order to fulfil their national interests, nation-states must de-nationalize, and internationalize; so doing, they break the mold of the nation-state based on the assimilation of sovereignty and autonomy” (Castells, 2010, p. 364). It would be wrong to argue that Lithuanian national identity was weakened by the EU identity, but integration and membership
in NATO and the EU surely changed Lithuania as well as its national identity. As it was emphasized by the acting President A. Paulauskas (2004) in his speech in Vilnius University, “we need to build such identity and develop such forms of civil co-operation which will help us remain strong after a qualitative transformation of the state. This is the primary goal that our foreign policy and our relations with the EU and NATO should target”.

During the first year of independence, greater attention was paid to cooperation of the Baltic States. Recently, however, a shift has been made towards the Baltic region and Nordic countries. The part of Baltic in our identity is getting smaller; the perception of Post-Soviet tends to disappear. The perception of we is more segmented and overlapped, at the same time we is reinforced by Nordic and Baltic identity, while maintaining strong support for the Eastern European countries as part of Lithuanian national interests.

**Literature:**


MINIOTAITĖ, G., JAKNIŪNAITĖ, D. (2001) Lietuvos saugumo politika ir identite-
tas šiuolaikinių saugumo studijų požiūriu. Politologija. 3 (23). P. 21-43.
Foreign Policy Identity of Lithuania Constructed in the Lithuanian Mass Media After 2009

Introduction

Lithuania has a unique location, being at the crossroads between the East and West. This gives Lithuania both advantages (more opportunities in international relations) and disadvantages (difficulties while choosing the most beneficial vectors and instruments of foreign policy). In the changing international environment, Lithuania is also reconsidering its foreign policy and identity: its role in the international arena, national interests, relations with other countries and international organizations.  

A number of different actors take part in this process: the President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Parliament of Lithuania, the country’s interest groups and mass media.  

Mass media is an institution that not only presents news and facts, but is also considered to be one of the actors of foreign policy that might influence the process of shaping foreign policy of a country and society’s perception of foreign policy. In Lithuania, the media’s role in the country’s political processes is rather significant. According to the polls that were carried out by “Vilmorus” in 2012, Lithuanians have more confidence in the Lithuanian mass media than in political institutions shaping and implementing Lithuania’s foreign policy (except

---

1 After regaining independence, up until 2004, Lithuania’s main priority was integration into the EU and NATO developing close relations with the US; after 2004 up until 2009, Lithuania was trying to become the leader of the region, demonstrated value-based anti-Russian foreign policy. Since 2009, Lithuanian officials started stressing the importance of pragmatic foreign policy and Northen foreign policy vector.
for the institution of the President): 37% of Lithuanians trusted the Lithuanian media, while only 6% of them trusted the Parliament or the Government of Lithuania (14%). Therefore, an assumption can be made that Lithuania’s mass media is an important factor shaping Lithuanians’ perceptions about the country’s foreign policy and its identity. Here the question arises, what kind of identity of the Lithuanian foreign policy does the Lithuanian mass media construct? What threats to Lithuania are stressed? Which international actors are perceived as allies and which as adversaries? With which international actors Lithuania has the most in common? What are Lithuania’s interests and role in international relations, according to the Lithuanian mass media?

Therefore, the purpose of this article is to analyse what kind of identity of the Lithuanian foreign policy is constructed in the Lithuanian mass media after 2009.

The research object (Lithuanian foreign policy identity constructed by the Lithuanian mass media) determines the choice of constructivism as a principal theory to analyse the Lithuanian foreign policy identity, since the identity is one of the most important notions in this theory. Constructivists claim that patterns of foreign policy and international relations can be best explained through the analysis of ideas about and perceptions of international relations, paying particular attention to the analysis of identities of different actors in international relations.

Based on constructivist notion that international actors’ identity is defined by describing self and its relations with others, several research tasks were set:

- To analyse self in the Lithuanian foreign policy identity constructed by the Lithuanian mass media.
- To analyse Other in the Lithuanian foreign policy identity constructed by the Lithuanian mass media.

The main research method applied in the research was qualitative content analysis: articles from the selected Lithuanian mass media sources were analysed. The necessary data were gathered from mass

---

media monitoring made by “Mediaskopas”. Articles from the 5 largest Lithuanian newspapers were chosen for the analysis: “Lietuvos rytas”, “Lietuvos žinios”, “Respublika”, “Vakaro žinios” and “Veidas”. All the articles mentioning Lithuania’s foreign policy during the period between 2009 and 2011 were selected. The period between 2009 and 2011 was chosen for a certain purpose: in 2009, Presidential elections in Lithuania were held leading to the changes in the Lithuanian foreign policy. Political institutions that were shaping Lithuania’s foreign policy started stressing the need for pragmatic foreign policy, necessity to develop relations with Scandinavian countries – something that was unusual in Lithuania’s foreign policy before. Therefore, there was an interest to find out whether the notions about Lithuania’s foreign policy expressed in mass media changed as well.

The article consists of several parts. The first part describes the connection between the identity and foreign policy. The second part analyses self in the Lithuanian foreign policy identity constructed by the Lithuanian mass media. The third part of the article provides the analysis of Other in the Lithuanian foreign policy identity constructed by the Lithuanian mass media.

Identity and Foreign Policy in the Context of Constructivism

The approach chosen for this article to analyse Lithuania’s foreign policy identity constructed by the Lithuanian mass media during the period between 2009 and 2011, derives from the constructivism, a theory of international relations that focuses its attention on ideas and perceptions while explaining international relations and foreign policy choices. Constructivists, unlike realists and liberals, assume that there is no objective reality; there are no given enemies or friends. According to constructivists, everything is constructed and depends on perception: foreign policy choices depend on ideas and identities shared by decision-makers.\(^3\)

\(^3\) Berg and Ehin, 2009, p. 2.
Foreign policy in this article is viewed as a set of strategies used by governments of states to guide their actions in the international arena that includes both their general objectives and means of achieving these objectives. In order to define identity, suggestions by Alexander Wendt, Paul Kowert, Jeffrey Legro, and James D. Fearon are used. According to J. D. Fearon, to answer the question “what is identity?” is like to answer the question “who are you?”. In other words, identity is how a certain actor defines who he is (Fearon 2009). P. Kowert and J. Legro define identity as “prescriptive representations of political actors themselves and of their relationships with each other” (Kowert and Legro, 1996, p. 453). A. Wendt described identity as sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of the others (Wendt, 1994). David J. Galbreath, Ainius Lašas and Jeremy W. Lamoreaux also add that identity manifests itself in public discourse and that relationship between identity and discourse is rather straightforward (Galbreath, Lašas and Lamoreaux, 2008, p. 18-19). Thus, several features of identity can be derived from the definitions above: identity is constructed, it comprises two basic elements – perception of self and perception of others, identity is manifested in public discourse. Therefore, in the context of foreign policy of a certain country, identity should be perceived as the country’s perception of self identifying its own interests, goals based on norms, values and beliefs, relations with other international actors, and the perception of other international actors the country is developing relations with in terms of values, beliefs, and interests.

Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane argue that the role of foreign policy identity is twofold: foreign policy identity might be seen in foreign policy discourse expressed by the country’s officials and it might be influencing foreign policy decisions (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p. 18). Here, the role of mass media in the process of shaping foreign policy is important. As one of the actors that are able to participate in and to influence foreign policy decision-making process, mass media

---

5 The process of foreign policy formation might involve a number of actors that influence foreign policy-making decisions: head of the state, ministry of foreign affairs, ambassadors, parliaments, interest groups, citizens, military industrial complex. Mass media is among such actors as well.
can do so by expressing views on a certain country as itself and on other international actors – thus, constructing the identity of certain country.

Thus, the article is also based on the ideas expressed by Piret Ehin and Eiki Berg that foreign policy identities are constructed, not natural or essential; they are relational and involve references to various significant others (world countries or international organizations); and third, identities have a discursive, narrative structure (Berg and Ehin, 2009, p. 2). This article analyses foreign policy identity constructed by mass media.

Self in the Lithuanian Foreign Policy Identity Constructed by the Lithuanian Mass Media

Based on the analysis of articles, all the notions concerning self in the Lithuanian foreign policy can be divided into three groups: perception of Lithuania’s role in international relations, perception of Lithuania’s foreign policy goals and national interests, and the opinion on ways of shaping and implementing the Lithuanian foreign policy (pragmatism vs. value-based foreign policy). While defining self in the Lithuanian foreign policy identity, Lithuanian mass media devoted the biggest attention to describing Lithuania’s role in international relations (15 articles), while the discussion on such elements of self in Lithuania’s foreign policy identity as Lithuania’s foreign policy goals, national interests and pragmatism versus values constituted respectively 12 and 6 articles. Lithuania’s officials responsible for shaping the Lithuanian foreign policy periodically underline that Lithuania’s national interests and foreign policy goals are stable and have not changed since 1992. Therefore, it can be stated that the Lithuanian mass media was mainly focused on constructing the most changing elements of Lithuania’s foreign policy identity.

---

6 „Veidas“, 2011.
Table 3. Elements of self in the Lithuanian foreign policy identity constructed by the Lithuanian mass media, 2009-2011. (Made by the author on the basis of data received from mass media monitoring by “Mediaskopas”).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of self in the Lithuanian foreign policy identity</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of total articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Lithuania’s role in international relations</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Lithuania’s national interests and foreign policy goals</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of base/foundation of Lithuania’s foreign policy: pragmatism vs. Values</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perception of Lithuania’s role in international relations. The image of Lithuania’s role in international relations constructed in the Lithuanian mass media, is inconsistent: about half of the analysed articles present Lithuania as non-influential country (53.3%), while the other half of the analysed articles view Lithuania as an influential actor of international relations (46.7%). The disparity between the two groups of perceptions is not substantial. However, the perception of Lithuania as non-influential actor of international relations slightly prevails.

Table 4. Perception of Lithuania’s role in international relations constructed by the Lithuanian mass media, 2009-2011. (Made by the author on the basis of data received from mass media monitoring by “Mediaskopas”).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception of Lithuania’s role in international relations</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of total articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania is a small and non-influential country</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania is isolated country</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania is a small country that has enough leverage to be influential</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania is an important actor in international relations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the articles that present Lithuania as not important actor in international relations, two groups of perceptions can be found: the perception of Lithuania as a small and non-influential country (40% of
all articles) and the opinion that Lithuania is in a worse position than non-influential country – in some of the articles (13.3% of all articles), Lithuania is presented as isolated country.

In some articles, Lithuania is perceived as isolated country, viewing its efforts to be the subject, but not the object of international relations as not fruitful. Some actors of the Lithuanian mass media (“Lietuvos žinios“ in particular) explain such a position of the country in international relations as a result of Lithuania’s power resources – more specifically, lack thereof. While other authors claim that Lithuania itself should be more active. Thus, according to the Lithuanian mass media, Lithuania’s isolation in international relations is determined by both the lack of diplomatic initiative from Lithuania and the lack of power.

The other part of articles analysed, however, constructs different image of Lithuania’s role in international relations. According to some of these articles, not only does Lithuania have enough leverage and potential to be important actor in international relations, it actually is the subject and not the object of international relations. “Veidas” claims that Lithuania is an important player in international relations, situated in strategical geopolitical location. Other sources of the Lithuanian mass media (for example, “Lietuvos žinios”) point out that Lithuania is influential actor in international arena because of its membership in the European Union and NATO, and advanced technologies. Hence, 46.7% of the analysed content in the mass media do not view Lithuania as a country facing lack of power that would cause problems gaining position in international relations.

Differences of the image of Lithuania’s role in international relations constructed by the Lithuanian mass media were not consistent during the analysed period. Significant shift can be noticed when comparing the image of Lithuania’s role in international relations constructed in mass media in 2009 and the image constructed in the Lithuanian mass media in 2010 and 2011. In the articles of 2009, Lithuanian mass media

---

7 “Lietuvos žinios“, 2009c.
8 “Lietuvos žinios“, 2009b.
9 Veidas, 05-10-2009.
10 „Lietuvos žinios“, 2009c.
presents Lithuania as an important player in international relations having enough of possibilities to implement its national interests and foreign policy goals and equal rights with other actors of international relations. According to “Veidas”, Lithuania is a safe, rich country that has made a huge progress.11 According to “Lietuvos žinios”, Lithuania is able to influence events in international arena and, politically, is equal to Russia because of its membership in the EU and NATO.12 The content of mass media analysed points out that Lithuania has leverage in international relations and in relations with its neighbours not only because of the membership in both the EU and NATO, but because of its geopolitical position as well. According to “Lietuvos žinios”, Lithuania could be an influential country, because it is a centre between the East and West.13 The articles of the Lithuanian mass media published between 2010 and 2011 give completely different image of Lithuania's role in international relations. On the one hand, Lithuania is presented as a small, non-influential country that does not have much power to influence decision-making in international relations. On the other hand, the lack of initiatives in the Lithuanian foreign policy itself is emphasized. According to “Lietuvos rytas”, Lithuania refuses to be a principled actor in international relations.14 In “Respublika’s” point of view, Lithuania’s foreign policy is spineless, its foreign policy is like a stepdaughter in international relations, i.e. other countries do not take into account Lithuania’s interests.15 The only source of Lithuanian mass media that mentions activity in Lithuania’s foreign policy is “Veidas”. According to “Veidas”, Lithuania actively participates in international relations when solving issues of energy dependency and isolation in the transport field.16 However, this image is not dominant.

To sum up perception of Lithuania’s role in international relations constructed in the Lithuanian mass media, it can be stated that the constructed image is conflicting and unstable. This raises a question,
whether an element of Lithuania’s foreign policy identity such as perception of the country’s role in international relations exists at all.

**Lithuania’s national interests and foreign policy goals.** In the field of Lithuania’s national interests and foreign policy goals presented by the Lithuanian mass media, several contradictory trends can be noticed. Part of the analysed articles of the Lithuanian mass media perceive Lithuania’s foreign policy as calculated and having clear national interests and foreign policy goals (75% of all articles). 25% of the analysed articles view Lithuania’s foreign policy as unclear one.

Table 5. Perception of Lithuania’s national interests and foreign policy goals constructed by the Lithuanian mass media, 2009-2011. (Made by the author on the basis of data received from mass media monitoring by “Mediaskopas”).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception of Lithuania’s national interests and foreign policy goals</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of total articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania’s national security interests and foreign policy goals are unclear</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania’s foreign policy is moderate and calculated. National interests and foreign policy goals are:</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Energy independence</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Active eastern policy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• More active relations with France and Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Constructive relations with Russia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Economic diplomacy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The prevailing image of Lithuania’s foreign policy in the field of national interests and foreign policy goals constructed by the Lithuanian mass media, is that Lithuania’s foreign policy is moderate. Lithuanian mass media articles that create the latter image point out five key foreign policy goals of Lithuania: to ensure energy independence, develop active foreign policy in the East and West, and develop active economic diplomacy. Energy independence as a foreign policy goal of Lithuania received attention in more than 55% of the analysed articles. During
the period between 2009 and 2011, Lithuanian mass media emphasized the need to reduce the country’s energy dependency on Russia as the most important national interest of Lithuania. This notion can be found in almost all of the analysed sources of the Lithuanian mass media (“Veidas”, “Lietuvos rytas”, “Lietuvis žinios”, and “Vakaro žinios”). Hence, Lithuanian mass media views this foreign policy goal as the most important one.

As to the Eastern policy of Lithuania, two trends can be observed: the need to develop constructive relations with Russia and the need to implement active foreign policy in the East as a whole. This notion indicates that the Lithuanian mass media sees the East in a broader sense, rather than Russia alone, and thus claims that Lithuania’s foreign policy should not be limited to relations with Russia. When discussing about the Western vector of Lithuania’s foreign policy as one of the key vectors, Lithuanian mass media emphasizes relations with France and Germany in particular. Thus, the description of the Western vector of Lithuania’s foreign policy perceived by the Lithuanian mass media is more precise and shows newly developed importance of this foreign policy vector.

While identifying some of the most important foreign policy goals of Lithuania, some articles in the Lithuanian mass media shape rather negative image of Lithuania’s national interests and foreign policy goals. Overall, according to some of the sources of the Lithuanian mass media, Lithuania’s foreign policy lacks clarity (when defining foreign policy goals and vectors). “Lietuvos rytas” refers to the Lithuanian foreign policy as one having a “poker face” or sees it as a riddle. However, the latter image is not dominant. This image conflicts with the perception expressed in some of the articles that Lithuania is an important actor in international relations, having enough leverage to achieve its goals (about 46% of articles). Thus, on the one hand, Lithuanian mass media argues that Lithuania is undecided about its foreign policy goals; on the other hand, that same Lithuanian mass media depicts Lithuania as a country that successfully implements its foreign policy and plays an important role in international relations.

17 „Lietuvos rytas“, 2010b.
18 „Lietuvos rytas“, 2010f.
Certain differences can be noticed among the sources of the Lithuanian mass media as well: “Lietuvos rytas” tends to present Lithuania’s foreign policy as unclear (all the articles perceiving Lithuania’s foreign policy as unclear were found in this newspaper), while “Lietuvos žinios” constructs quite the opposite image.

Pragmatism vs. values in Lithuania’s foreign policy. Pragmatism vs. values as a base of Lithuania’s foreign policy form the third element of self in the Lithuanian foreign policy identity, discussed in the analysed Lithuanian mass media (similar discussion arose in the rhetoric of Lithuania’s political institutions responsible for shaping and implementing Lithuania’s foreign policy).

Table 6. Perception of pragmatism and values in Lithuania’s foreign policy constructed by the Lithuanian mass media, 2009-2011. (Made by the author on the basis of data received from mass media monitoring by “Mediaskopas”).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception of pragmatism and values in Lithuania’s foreign policy</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of total articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania’s foreign policy is pragmatic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania’s foreign policy is based on values</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania’s foreign policy is neither pragmatic, nor based on values</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysed articles of the mass media did not present unanimous position towards pragmatism and values in Lithuania’s foreign policy. Lithuanian mass media’s perception of the basis of Lithuania’s foreign policy was divided into three equal groups (33.33% of the analysed articles each). Some mass media sources presented Lithuania’s foreign policy as pragmatic one. For example, “Lietuvos rytas” emphasized that Lithuania’s foreign policy lacks values and viewed this situation as a negative thing.19 Other media sources, for example, “Respublika”, emphasized that Lithuania’s foreign policy was based on values

19 „Lietuvos rytas“, 2010f.
criticizing this kind of a choice.\textsuperscript{20} The third group of sources, for example “Lietuvos žinios”, claims that Lithuania has not yet decided whether to develop foreign policy based on values or to implement pragmatic foreign policy. According to “Lietuvos žinios”, Lithuania is not able to develop pragmatic foreign policy (lacking resources, etc.), but is not sure what/whose values are acceptable for her either.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, the image of Lithuania’s foreign policy in the field of pragmatism vs. values constructed by the Lithuanian mass media is confusing.

In summary, it can be stated that Lithuanian mass media’s perception of \textit{self} in Lithuania’s foreign policy is inconsistent. Lithuanian mass media does not have a consistent attitude towards either Lithuania’s role in international relations or the pragmatism and values in the Lithuanian foreign policy. Perception of Lithuania’s foreign policy goals, however, is rather clear. Although, at times, it conflicts with the claim of the Lithuanian mass media stating that Lithuania is an important actor in international relations. Therefore, \textit{self} in the Lithuanian foreign policy constructed by the Lithuanian mass media balances between extremities.

\textbf{Other in the Lithuanian Foreign Policy Identity Constructed by the Lithuanian Mass Media}

Lithuania’s foreign policy identity in the context of other international actors constructed in the Lithuanian mass media was analysed by viewing Lithuania’s relations with twenty different actors of international relations: 18 countries and 2 international organizations.

The analysis of the Lithuanian mass media articles indicates several trends regarding Lithuania’s foreign policy. First, Lithuanian mass media demonstrates that Lithuania develops diplomatic relations with countries from various regions in the world. Countries not only from Europe, but also from Central Asia (for example, Kazakhstan), Caucasus (for example, Azerbaijan), and East Asia (for example, China) are included in the list of international actors mentioned. Second, despite the

\textsuperscript{20} „Respublika“, 2009b.  
\textsuperscript{21} „Lietuvos žinios“, 2010c.
variety of international actors mentioned, the greatest attention was paid to either neighbour states such as Russia (26.83% of articles), Poland (8.13% of articles), Belarus (5.69% of articles) or international actors that have major impact on Lithuania like the EU (17.07% of articles) and the United States (7.31% of articles) (see Table 5). Third, Lithuanian mass media makes a distinction between common values in foreign policy and actor’s interests in foreign policy linking foreign policy identity with the former. Thus, according to the Lithuanian mass media, Lithuania shares the same foreign policy identity only with those international actors that possess similar values in foreign policy: some international actors declaring the same foreign policy interests as Lithuania do not have the same values and, in such case, do not possess the same foreign policy identity as Lithuania.

22 In the analysed Lithuanian mass media articles, Scandinavian countries were discussed as one entity.

Table 7. Countries and international organizations mentioned in the Lithuanian mass media over the period between 2009 and 2011 in relation to Lithuania. (Made by the author on the basis of data received from mass media monitoring by “Mediaskopas”).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of total articles</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of total articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26.83</td>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17.07</td>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>14.</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>19.</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>20.</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

123 100
Therefore, on the basis of notions expressed in the analysed Lithuanian mass media articles all the international actors mentioned can be divided into four groups: international actors that pose a threat to Lithuania, international actors that do not pose a threat to Lithuania, but do not share similar interests either, international actors that share similar interests, but not values with Lithuania, and international actors that share both similar interests and values with Lithuania.\textsuperscript{23}

Table 8. Categories of countries and international organizations mentioned in the Lithuanian mass media over the period between 2009 and 2011 in relation to Lithuania. (Made by the author on the basis of data received from mass media monitoring by “Mediaskopas”).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of total articles</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of total articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Same values</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26.83</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No threats, but no similar interests either</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Similar interests, but not values</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**International actors perceived by the Lithuanian mass media as a threat to Lithuania.** On the basis of the analysed articles, it can be said that two of the mentioned international actors fall into this category of international actors: Russia and North Korea. Russia is an international actor most often mentioned in the Lithuanian mass media during

\[23\] This categorizing was made on the basis of ideas, expressed in the analysed Lithuanian mass media articles.
the analysed period, meanwhile North Korea is among the most rarely
mentioned international actors.

Russia’s image constructed by the Lithuanian mass media during
the period between 2009 and 2011 is consistent: Russia is perceived as
a threat to Lithuania. In the analysed articles, Russia is referred to as an
“unfriendly country”, “complicated neighbour” or is openly presented as
a threat. According to the Lithuanian mass media, Russia seeks to iso-
late Lithuania’s economic and information space from the West, where
Lithuania was trying to get integrated into since the restoration of its
independence in 1991, manipulates Lithuania through its energy depen-
dency on Russia in order to secure its own interests. Sources of the
Lithuanian mass media emphasize the power asymmetry in Lithuanian-
Russian relations and Russia’s efforts to “humiliate” Lithuania while
using this factor. According to “Lietuvos rytas”, Russia plays a game
with the aim of showing “low-rank countries” such as Lithuania their
ture position in international relations. Thus, Lithuanian mass media
depicts Russia as a dangerous threat that might harm Lithuania’s for-
eign policy interests in a number of different ways.

Although Russia’s image constructed by the Lithuanian mass media
is consistent, opinions of the Lithuanian mass media about possible
measures of dealing with this kind of threat and the proposed Lithuania’s
foreign policy directions (pragmatic foreign policy vs. value-based for-
eign policy) differ. Majority of the analysed Lithuanian mass media artic-
les (“Lietuvos rytas”, “Lietuvos žinios”, and “Veidas”) express negative
point of view towards initiatives of Lithuania’s President and Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to seek constructive relations with Russia after 2009
and to implement pragmatic foreign policy in this field. These mass
media sources view this kind of foreign policy as unduly obedient,
undignified and not giving necessary results: “Lietuvos rytas” claims
that “Lithuania has obediently bowed its head before the Kremlin, which
affects its rulers as adrenaline of a hunt affects a wolf.” Whereas daily

24 „Lietuvos rytas“, 2010a; „Lietuvos rytas“, 2010c.
26 „Lietuvos rytas“, 2010c.
27 „Nuolankiai prieš Kremlį nulenku galva jo valdovus veikia kaip vilką
medžioklės adrenalinas.“ „Lietuvos rytas“, 2010a.
paper “Respublika” constructs quite the opposite view of the model suggested for Lithuania’s relations with Russia. Even though “Respublika” presents Russia as a threat to Lithuania, it also claims that a new page in Lithuania’s relations with Russia should be turned, encouraging mutual trust and constructive foreign policy.

Therefore, some inconsistencies can be observed in Russia’s image constructed by the Lithuanian mass media. On the one hand, Russia is demonized and perceived as a serious threat in all of the analysed Lithuanian mass media sources. On the other hand, some of the Lithuanian newspapers (for example, “Respublika”) do not question foreign policy position of responsible Lithuania’s decision-makers to seek constructive and friendly relations with Russia and see it as a positive thing.

North Korea is another country viewed by the Lithuanian mass media as a threat to Lithuania. However, in the analysed Lithuanian mass media articles, North Korea was mentioned only once (in daily paper “Vakaro žinios”), without discussing this international actor in detail, but simply expressing an opinion about a possible threat posed by this country to Lithuania’s security. Thus, a conclusion can be made that Lithuania’s mass media perceives Russia as an actor posing greater threat to Lithuania than North Korea.

International actors that do not pose a threat to Lithuania, but do not share similar interests either.

The group of international actors that do not pose a threat to Lithuania, but do not share either similar interests or values, consists of such listed countries as Germany, France, and China. Although France is Lithuania’s strategic partner (since 2009), the image of Lithuanian-French relations constructed in the mass media does not reflect this type of relations. France is not described as a threat to Lithuania. However, Lithuanian mass media does not perceive the existing relations as warm, and claims that foreign policy interests of Lithuania and France differ. For example, according to “Lietuvos žinios“, Lithuanian-French relations have never been good. Germany falls within the same category.

---

28 „Respublika“, 2010a.
29 „Lietuvos žinios“, 2010b.
Lithuanian mass media’s perception of Lithuania’s relations with Germany is more sceptical than the perception of Lithuania’s relations with France. According to the analysed articles, although interests of France differ from those of Lithuania, Lithuanian-French relations remain active, while Germany is not interested in developing relations with Lithuania at all. China does not receive much attention in the Lithuanian mass media (1 article) and is mentioned only episodically. The analysed Lithuanian mass media articles define China’s role in Lithuania’s foreign policy, but do not stress its importance or its possible threat to Lithuania’s national interests. On the basis of given descriptions (or, more specifically, a lack thereof) an assumption can be made that China is not a threat, but does not share similar interests with Lithuania either. Thus, although the Lithuanian mass media indicates that Lithuania develops foreign policy relations with great powers, it also argues that the aforesaid great powers do not share the same interests with Lithuania or are not interested in establishing such relations at all.

International actors that share similar interests, but not values with Lithuania. According to the analysed Lithuanian mass media sources, Lithuania shares the same interests with Poland, United States, Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

In this category of countries, the major attention is paid to Poland and the United States (Table 6). In the Lithuanian mass media, Poland is perceived as an international actor whose partnership with Lithuania is necessary in order to ensure its security. According to “Lietuvos žinios” and “Respublika”, Lithuania needs political alliance with Poland and shares similar interests in the energy sector. However, Lithuanian media argues that Lithuania’s and Poland’s foreign policy is based on different values. According to “Lietuvos žinios”, “Lithuania should not be guided by Poland’s values.” This image (Lithuania’s foreign policy position in relation to Poland) remained stable during the analysed period. However, the image of Poland’s position towards Lithuania

---

30 „Lietuvos rytas“, 2010b.
31 „Respublika“, 2009a.
32 „Lietuvos žinios“, 2011a.
slightly changed over the years. In the mass media articles of 2009, Poland was perceived as a country declaring its partnership with Lithuania. While in 2010 and 2011, Lithuanian mass media presented Lithuanian-Polish relations as collapsing\(^{33}\) (while stressing that Lithuania should develop constructive relations with Poland because they share common interests such as desire to ensure energy independency).

In the Lithuanian mass media sources, the US is perceived as Lithuania’s strategic partner, ally and the main guarantor of Lithuania’s security. The emphasis on Lithuania’s interest in relations with the US was present throughout the entire analysed period. However, Lithuanian mass media was not discussing relations of Lithuania and the US in terms of values. Therefore, an assumption can be made that the Lithuanian mass media creates an image of the US as an international actor whose interests (rather than values) are of greatest importance to Lithuania. The image of the pattern of relations between Lithuania and the US constructed by the Lithuanian mass media, nevertheless, was changing during the period of analysis. In 2009, these relations were described as excellent\(^{34}\). However, in 2010 and 2011, the analysed newspapers noticed problems in relations between Lithuania and the US, stressing that the main factors adversely affecting these relations were both Lithuania’s imprudence and the position of the US as well\(^{35}\).

In the analysed articles, Georgia and Ukraine are perceived as countries that share similar interests with Lithuania (special emphasis is placed on mutuality of the interests), pointing out that these interests do not lay in the economic field\(^{36}\). According to the Lithuanian mass media sources, Lithuania should develop relations with Georgia, because the latter needs Lithuania’s support, just like Lithuania once did, while Ukraine is strategically important for Lithuania and is a strategic partner as well\(^{37}\). The question of similar values and beliefs shared by these countries and Lithuania is not addressed. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (in

\(^{33}\) „Lietuvos rytas“, 2010g.
\(^{34}\) „Lietuvos žinios, 2009c.
\(^{35}\) „Veidas“, 2010a.
\(^{36}\) „Veidas“, 2009b.
\(^{37}\) „Lietuvos rytas“, 2010d.
the energy sector) are the only mentioned countries that share similar economic interests (but not values) with Lithuania.

Thus, on the basis of the analysed articles, it is safe to argue that the Lithuanian mass media articles construct an image of Lithuania’s foreign policy identity, where two groups of interests are important: national security interests (and these are similar to interests of Poland, the United States, Georgia, Ukraine) and economic interests (these are similar to the interests of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan). Lithuanian mass media pays more attention to the first group; therefore, an assumption can be made that Poland, the United States, Georgia and Ukraine are more important to Lithuania’s foreign policy than Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

International actors that share both interests and values with Lithuania. Only two actors from the list of mentioned countries can be indicated as countries with the same interests and values as Lithuania: Latvia and Estonia. Therefore, the sources of the Lithuanian mass media argue that Latvia and Estonia play the most important role in Lithuania’s foreign policy identity, because they share the same interests, values and beliefs. All of the analysed newspapers emphasize the need of greater coordination of these multilateral relations.

Other international actors that are difficult to categorize. This group of international actors includes entities whose image in the Lithuanian mass media is inconsistent, and international actors whose interests and values are not described.

Three international actors belong to the above group: the EU, Belarus and Scandinavian countries. The image of the EU constructed in the Lithuanian media is ambivalent. Some of the analysed sources present the EU as a threat to Lithuania’s foreign policy interests. For example, “Respublika” compares membership in the EU to “velvet occupation”. “Vakaro žinios“ argues that membership in the EU brings more harm to Lithuania than benefits. Some of the newspapers argue

---

38 „Lietuvos rytas“, 2011.
39 „Respublika“, 2010b.
that the EU offers a lot of benefits to Lithuania (for example, “Lietuvos rytas”, “Lietuvos žinios” claim that Lithuania-EU relations are based on profit). None of the opinions prevails. However, both groups of mass media sources agree that there are no common values and/or identity between the EU and Lithuania in terms of foreign policy.

The analysed Lithuanian mass media articles give inconsistent view of the Scandinavian countries as well. “Veidas” argues that Lithuania and Scandinavian countries share common foreign policy interests40, while “Lietuvos žinios” claims that Scandinavian states and Lithuania have opposing interests41. It is impossible to determine which one of the constructed images prevails, inasmuch as the Lithuanian mass media does not pay much attention to the Scandinavian countries and the proportion of the articles constructing each image is 50 to 50 percent.

In the Lithuanian mass media, Belarus is presented as a country with which Lithuania does not share common values or identity in the field of foreign policy. Belarus is portrayed as an international actor, in which Lithuania has interests. However, Lithuanian mass media does not devote any attention to the interests of Belarus. Therefore, it is difficult to assess, whether Belarus and Lithuania share similar interests in the image of Lithuanian foreign policy identity constructed by the Lithuanian mass media. Only the interests of Lithuania regarding Belarus are described. According to “Lietuvos žinios”, it is in Lithuania’s interests to make sure that Belarus is stable and predictable42. The same source of mass media also argues that stable Belarus would increase the security of Lithuania while serving as a buffer state43.

The analysed Lithuanian mass media articles sporadically mention Moldova and Spain, without assessing their interests or values. There was one mention of Austria referring to the conflict between Lithuania and Austria in 2011, when Austria released Michail Golotov, where the country was ironically called “the enemy of Lithuania”44. Thus, Lithuanian mass media perceives Austria as a country that has interests.

---

40 „Veidas“, 2009b.
41 „Lietuvos žinios“, 2010c.
42 „Lietuvos žinios“, 2010d.
43 „Lietuvos žinios“, 2010a.
44 „Lietuvos žinios“, 2011b.
opposite to those of Lithuania, but does not refer to Austria as a threat to Lithuania.

NATO does not fall within any of the above categories and the Lithuanian mass media gives consistent image of this international actor: the analysed sources discuss NATO only in terms of its benefit to Lithuania, without mentioning the position of NATO towards Lithuania. Authors of all of the analysed articles concerning NATO argue that by being a member of NATO Lithuania gains more security. Thus, NATO is perceived as an international actor whose activities are beneficial to Lithuania.

Conclusions

The article discusses an image of the Lithuanian foreign policy identity constructed by the Lithuanian mass media after 2009. The paper shows that the Lithuanian foreign policy identity constructed in terms of self is inconsistent: there is no clear image of either Lithuania’s role in international relations or values vs. pragmatism in Lithuania’s foreign policy. Lithuania is portrayed as both an important player in international relations (due to its geopolitical position, membership in NATO, the EU and advanced technologies) and as non-influential small country that lacks power and does not put enough effort to change the situation. The image of pragmatism vs. values in Lithuania’s foreign policy is even more divided than the image of Lithuania’s role in international arena, and balances between the notions that Lithuania’s foreign policy is based on values, pragmatic and that it is neither pragmatic, nor based on values.

The image of Lithuania’s foreign policy identity constructed in terms of Other is rather clear. According to the Lithuanian mass media sources, a number of international actors are important to Lithuania’s foreign policy identity. Authors of the Lithuanian mass media sources believe that, when shaping and implementing Lithuania’s foreign policy, the greatest attention should be paid to Russia, which is presented as the main threat to Lithuania and is mentioned in the greatest amount of articles, and to the Baltic States (Latvia and Estonia), because these states are
the only ones that share not only similar interests with Lithuania, but common values and beliefs as well. Poland, the United States, Ukraine, and Georgia affect Lithuania’s foreign policy identity through mutual interests in the security field. Judging by the amount of attention given to them, such international actors as the European Union, Belarus and NATO also play an important role in Lithuania’s foreign policy identity constructed by the Lithuanian mass media. However, it is impossible to clearly identify their role in the constructed identity, since Lithuania’s mass media describes only Lithuania’s interest in this kind of relations. Thus, in the image of Other in Lithuania’s foreign policy identity constructed by the analysed media sources, countries of the Baltic Sea Region\textsuperscript{45}, the United States, the EU and NATO constitute the most important part.

\textbf{Literature:}


\textsuperscript{45} The article uses the broad definition of the Baltic Sea Region that includes all the countries bordering the Baltic Sea and Belarus, Norway.
Monitored media sources:


Could Lithuania be a Regional Leader After 2004? A Semantic Problem

After 1991, Lithuania has set itself the objective of integrating into the European Union and NATO. This “geopolitical revolution” was a dramatic change because the country refused all the alliances and projects that could keep Vilnius under the influence of Russia after the fall of the USSR. However, this policy had also its unintended consequences such as severing the links between Lithuania and Belarus. Lithuania’s will to be a “regional actor” finds its source in both the need for Lithuania to demonstrate that it was not just a State in search of Western security guaranties but also an exporter of western standards, and the rethinking of Lithuanian past.

However, this “Lithuanian neighbourhood policy” – to paraphrase the European Neighbourhood Policy – was viewed as particularly strong after 2004 in several important speeches, but the first signs of it became visible since the late 1990s. In its project of regional action, Lithuania faced several difficulties. First of all, other actors in the region claim a part of Lithuania’s historical legacy. Vilnius also faces the task of finding its own way in a regional environment mainly shaped by the EU, Poland and Russia. Then, the Lithuanian diplomacy is also struggling to give a name to the region in which it wants to play a leading role. In his History of the Peloponnesian Wars, great Greek historian Thucydides said that “the big states do what they want, the small do what they must”, but it is clear that small states can do more than suggested by neorealist accounts about international relations (Waltz, 2001). In this account of the “power of the powerless” (Havel, 1985), we will remain aware of the salience of symbolic and semantic questions in the Post-Soviet space.

For the purposes of the analysis, we will first look at the reasons why Lithuania wanted to appear as an exporter of standards and not just
a consumer of security guarantees. Then, we will see how this strategy fits in Lithuania’s will to present itself as the heir of an ancient history. In the third part, we discuss the difficulty for Lithuania to find a name to the region it wants to lead.

**Being Part of the West, but not a Periphery**

Dissident movements in the 1970s and Sajudis in the 1980s played a key role not only in accelerating the decomposition of the Soviet Union, but also in the definition of major foreign policy options after the independence. Not only the Sajudis rapidly converted itself to the idea of integration into NATO and the European Union¹, but the socialist politicians who returned to power in 1992 maintained these objectives at the heart of their strategy. Even if the President Brazauskas was not very active on the international stage, he maintained the original objectives of ensuring the departure of the Russian troops (in 1993) and to join NATO (Park, 2005). He was heavily influenced by the constant activism of the former President Landsbergis – then in the opposition – who travelled a lot and was promoting a policy of rapid integration into the West.

However, the Lithuanian strategy – and, more generally, the Baltic strategy – of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures raised the ire of Moscow and a relative scepticism of Europeans and Americans (Asmus, 2002, p. 158). Certainly, the United States (Bohlen, 1992) and the Nordic countries (Bildt, 1994) have played a decisive role in the departure of Russian troops from the Baltic States: Lithuania in 1993 and Estonia and Latvia in the following year, but Washington was reluctant to undertake any commitment that could obstruct reformers’ action in Moscow. This caution about NATO enlargement was very widespread in the USA (Kennan, 1997). Influential people like Strobe Talbott, the chief adviser to Bill Clinton on Russia, was very reluctant to any action that could endanger the Russian strategy of the White House (Christopher, 2001, p. 274). Despite the consensus reached in Vilnius (Asmus and Vondra, 2005),

¹ The constitution of the Republic of Lithuania forbids any alliance with Eastern countries and the installation of troops from these countries.
all the efforts of Lithuanian diplomats in Western capitals and pressure from Lithuanian American lobbies on the Congress and the Republican Party, it seems that in 1996 (Perry, 1996) Lithuania – like Estonia and Latvia – was not viewed as sufficiently influential to be included in the first enlargement of NATO by Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

On the one hand, this non-inclusion is linked to Washington’s desire to preserve its already tense relationship with Moscow. However, in the West, the Baltic States still had an image of more or less Russophobic States (Andréani, 1998). The refusal of NATO to consider the Baltic States in the first wave of enlargement tends to reinforce the fear of a “new Yalta” (David and Levesque, 1999), by which the Baltic States would be included in a “Russian zone”. Under the influence of the European Union and NATO, Vilnius decides to demonstrate that Lithuania is not a State that asks for security guaranties, but a State that assumes responsibilities. Thus, Lithuania strengthens its participation in external actions of NATO and especially in the former Yugoslavia through the Baltic Battalion (Sapronas, 1999). In addition, it seeks to appear as a meeting place between Central Europe and Eastern Europe by organizing several forums since 1997. Poland and Lithuania proposed a first summit of States of Central and Eastern Europe in Vilnius. The idea was to demonstrate the constructive attitude of the Baltic States in the region, including with Russia. The heads of States or governments of Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Ukraine and Russia (Goble, 1997) met for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union. At the conference, Russia reiterates its proposal to offer security guarantees to its Baltic neighbours who politely declined while reaffirming their desire to enter the European Union and NATO. The meeting was much less tense than expected and participants said they wanted to cooperate with both Russia and the West.

During the same period, Moscow’s policy seems to take a new turn, at least in words. Primakov took the reins of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the presidential elections of 1996. For him, the reasons why Central European countries want to join NATO are twofold: identity-based (willingness to be assimilated to the West) and institutional (desire to consolidate their political regimes) (Primakov, 2004, p. 131–132). The proposed Russian guarantees are part of a broader strategy
vis-à-vis the Baltic States: such an influential think tank as the “Council for Foreign and Defence Policies” (SVOP) published a report on this issue in October, 1997 (Anon, 1997). In this document, it noted that the Baltic States enter the European institutions at an accelerated pace: “to become candidates took them two years when it took six for Central European states”. According to the report, the process of the EU accession has positive effects, particularly on the integration of Russian-speaking, even if the EU should be more exacting in addressing the problem. The report analyses the obstacles to the normalization of relations between Russia and the Baltic States among them, “the military who bemoan the loss of the ports of the Baltic, ultranationalists, criminal networks and the proponents of the creation of new Russian ports in the Saint-Petersburg.” The SVOP emphasizes that it is the lack of trust mechanisms and aggressive Russian policies that feeds the desire to join NATO: only a policy of detente could prevent them from being included in the second enlargement. “Ideally, the Baltic States should reach the status of Finland with modern military and very close to NATO.” Russia tries a new policy of reaching out to the Baltic States, although a number of statements and events raise occasional questions as to the sincerity of this policy change. Baltic governments do not change priorities, but welcome, at least publicly, a positive change in the rhetoric of Moscow, claiming that in this case there is no more objection to their joining the EU and NATO. The Vilnius Summit was a proof that the Baltic States understand that better relations with Moscow can only speed up their accession to Euro-Atlantic institutions. It was also an attempt of Lithuania to present itself as a centre rather than as an Euro-Atlantic periphery. From the point of view of Washington, this strategy is also very appreciated when the State Department seeks to rely on the narrative of the Hanseatic League to promote a new model of cooperation in the Baltic (Browning, 2001).

Picking Up the Thread of History

While Lithuanian history is little known in Western Europe, it should be noted that the Lithuanian diplomatic strategy is also a perpetual attempt
to nationalize the past. Indeed, the reference, which gives meaning to
the attempt to emerge as a centre has its roots in the history of the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This was not only a very powerful state
in Europe in the Middle Ages, but the central reference of Lithuanian
history for centuries despite its gradual dilution in the Republic of the
Two Nations (Davies, 1981). In the case of Lithuania, the struggle for
independence from the Soviet Union has its roots in the memory of the
independent republic after 1918, but also in the very idea that Lithuania
is the heir of an ancient State. Territorially, the Grand Duchy has cove-
red contemporary Lithuania, Belarus and parts of Ukraine. Therefore it
is naturally thought of as the heart of the region formed by the three
states. However, the legacy of the Grand Duchy is widely disputed in
the region. On the one hand, Poles tend to deny the legal autonomy of
the Grand Duchy in the Republic of the Two Nations (Kiaupa, 2002).
On the other hand, Belorussians say that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
has more to do with contemporary Belarus because of geography and
language issues. Of course, different actors constantly manipulate these
academic, yet also political, debates. However, this historical reference,
even challenged, remains useful to understanding how Lithuania defi-
nes the region it wants to lead.

It is within this framework that Lithuania attempted to portray
itself as a “regional power” since its accession to the European Union in
2004. Indeed, this date probably marks a shift from Lithuania promoting
regional cooperation due to Western pressure to Lithuania involved in
regional cooperation despite Western pressure. 2004 marks a turning
point in Lithuania’s foreign policy (Jonavicius, 2006). After a first speech
by the acting President Arturas Palauskas given in May 2004 at Vilnius
University, in which he claimed to see Lithuania “as a regional leader
and Vilnius as a regional capital city”, this idea has become quite popu-
lar in the political discourse in Lithuania. One should pay attention to
the fact that the regional situation was so very different from what it
is today: the euphoria of the enlargement of the European Union and
NATO in April and May 2004 was still fresh in the minds, and “colour
revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine let people hope that the EU would
play a central role in the democratization of its new neighbourhood.
Moreover, the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus was particularly
involved in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (Anon, 2004) by playing a mediating role.

However, since 2007, we witnessed a very significant reflux of the colour revolutions in the Eastern neighbourhood (O’Beachan and Polese, 2009) and the relationship between Vilnius and Warsaw deteriorated due to tensions over minority language rights. In this context, the possibilities of the Lithuanian diplomats in the country’s neighbourhood have considerably decreased. Therefore, Lithuania refocused its actions on Belarus, which is not part of the European Neighbourhood Policy and undergoes sanctions from the European Union for non-compliance with human rights and accusations of electoral fraud. The Lithuanian strategy is, therefore, to play the good cop vis-à-vis Belarus as opposed to Brussels playing the bad one. However, this strategy has been crowned with little success to date. The most spectacular action was the invitation of the President Lukashenka to Vilnius in September 2009, taking advantage of a temporary lifting of the EU sanctions in the second half of the year. Not only did the President of Belarus take the opportunity to criticize European politics; this visit also made no significant improvement of relations between Vilnius, Minsk and Brussels. In addition, relations deteriorated further due to the action of a Swedish NGO that flew over the territory of Lithuania in July 2012 in order to “bomb” Belarus with teddy bears. This action has led to a deterioration of ties between Minsk and Vilnius.

All these tensions transform the possible bilateral shared history between the two countries into a symbolic battlefield. Not only do Belorussians claim that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was mainly Belorussian, but they also say that Vilnius should be a Belorussian city. Thus, if Vilnius is to be a “Strasbourg in the East”, we must not forget that Strasbourg has become a symbol of Franco-German union in a very particular Post-World-War-II context, but also under the pressure of the Cold War. In a climate of tensions between neighbours, a city such as Vilnius could quickly become a dividing issue. Lithuanian neighbourhood policy is, therefore, relatively weak, as uniting symbols cannot be used because of political tensions.
The Region with No Name

The final important element in assessing the ability of Lithuania to become a regional player relies on very symbolic issues. The region in which Vilnius sees itself as an actor does not have a name (Perchoc, 2011). One of the effects of the enlargement of the European Union and NATO is the strengthening of physical barriers between areas that were relatively open before 1989. Back then, one could move to Belarus and Ukraine freely from Vilnius, but not to Warsaw. Today, the situation is reversed and the names are missing to describe a region that has no geographical or symbolic reality. “Eastern Europe”, “Eastern Central Europe”, and “Central Europe” denote different regions which could include Lithuania, Belarus, Poland and Ukraine. The inability to bring out an imagined community beyond the Schengen border, as was the case with the Visegrad Group in the 1990s, is a strong semantic challenge for the Lithuanian diplomacy.

Diplomatic resources of Lithuania are relatively small and it must deal with the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe. At the same time, there is a lack of common understanding of the past that could be used for building a new region where Vilnius could be an important player. Still, the will of Lithuania to make use of its geographical position to foster and to influence EU policies toward Belarus and Ukraine is a very good example of what a small State can do within the EU system. And the upcoming Lithuanian presidency of the EU in 2013 shall most certainly be a key moment to see if Vilnius is able to do so.

Literature:


Social Memory and Identity of Ethnic Russians in Latvia

Introduction

More than twenty years have passed since Latvia restored its independence in 1991, providing an opportunity to reflect on various social and political processes and to evaluate them. Latvia has overcome tremendous challenges to restore democracy and can serve as an example for many countries; nevertheless, there are certain problems with inter-ethnic relations that exist even after Latvia’s accession to the European Union and NATO. So far, relationships between Latvians and Russians received the greatest attention and were studied in the context of the integration process; in addition, several important studies on national identity and its constituent dimensions have been published recently. One of these dimensions, i.e. the social memory, is addressed in this article.

In previous years, Ilga Apine (2008) has been studying identity of Russians living in Latvia using ethno psychological approach. In addition to I. Apine’s work, Leo Dribins (2007) has helped to understand aspects of the Russian identity in the context of the social integration process. In his study “National Identity of the Russian Minority (1995-2003)”, sociologist Aivars Tabuns (2006) indicated a dangerous trend in the identity of the Russian minority in Latvia, namely, the nomadic sentiment that does not allow them to build roots in a new land, thus cohesion of the society is difficult to achieve. Identities are under constant development, affected by external actors in this globalization era. Since 1991, Latvia has been evolving as an open country, providing media and interest groups with freedom of action. Unfortunately Russia, the neighbouring country with a lack of democracy, misuses this policy to promote specific interpretation of history and, sometimes, even
undemocratic values with agency of media in Latvia. This phenomenon was discussed in the research “Manufacturing Enemy Images? Russian Media Portrayal of Latvia” led by Nils Muiznieks (2008) and in the study “The Humanitarian Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy towards Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Baltic States” led by Gatis Pelnens (2010) the Centre for East European Policy Studies (ed. G. Pelnens).

During the recent years, a number of studies on different dimensions of national identity (including social memory) were published within the Latvian National Research Programme “National Identity”. Within this programme, Martins Kaprans and Vita Zelce (2010) carried out a study “Identity, Social Memory and Cultural Trauma” that explored the underlying reasons for certain contemporary social and political problems in Latvia. Research of social memory was a key area covered in the publication by Advanced Social and Political Research Institute of University of Latvia: “Latvia. Human Development Report 2010/2011: National Identity, Mobility and Capability.” It is rather challenging to overcome political consequences in the integration process, therefore, studies on national identity indicate a sphere, where the politicians still have to work hard to ensure development of Latvia as a free, democratic and prosperous country. When summarizing several papers, Kaprans and Zelce (2010, 2011) indicated that there are significant problems affecting national development and national identity; those were mainly related to different perceptions of the past and future of the country across various ethnic groups. Similarly, different ethnic groups in Latvia have diverse perceptions of geopolitical identity, groups’ self-segregation, ethnic stereotypes and ethnic segregation of political parties (Kaprans, Zelce, 2010, 2011).

The above-mentioned issues did not emerge in 1991, rather, the origin of these problems lies in much earlier times. The previous Census, which was carried out in 2011, showed that population of Latvia consists of 59.9% of Latvians, 27.4% of Russians, 3.5% of Belorussians and 9.6% of other nationalities (The Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 2011). It is important to note that, prior to the Soviet occupation, the Census of 1935 showed that 75% of all Latvian residents were ethnic Latvians and only about 10% were Russians (The Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 2011). Dramatic demographic changes occurred due to the Soviet
occupation, the World War II and deportations of the population by the Soviet authorities and centralized immigration from other Soviet republics to Latvia. Therefore, the issue of disloyalty to home country and identity problems of the Russian minority in Latvia are rooted in the crimes against the occupied territories by the Soviet central authorities. Unfortunately, Russian foreign policy in the 21st century does not help to solve these issues; rather, it raises tensions in ethnic relations using media and compatriot policy. It should be noted that the Latvian political elite has not paid sufficient attention to the promotion of social integration, but rather has left the process to evolve on its own.

The official position of the Republic of Latvia on identity and community integration issues was published in the “National Identity, Civil Society and Integration Policy Guidelines (2012 - 2018).” The guidelines stated that “[...] it is in the interests of Latvia and its people to deepen the community uniting Latvian identity by enhancing it taking into account the contemporary context of globalization, as well as to expand it so that it can integrate ethnic minorities and immigrants” (Ministry of Culture of Republic of Latvia, 2011). Thus Latvia has set the path to promote the Latvian identity and to foster inclusion of Russians and other ethnic groups. We have to hope that this paper and the aforementioned national identity studies would serve as a source of knowledge for those politicians and officials who will face the decisions to achieve the official goals. This paper aims at illustrating the identity problems of the Russian minority that are associated with social memory, assessing Russia’s role in the handling or resolution of this issue, as well as determining whether the Russian minority’s social memory has changed after Latvia’s accession to the European Union. The scope of this paper does not allow an in-depth study of the issue, thus it merely serves as an attempt to set the trends and indicate directions for the future research.

Social Memory and Identity

In the early childhood already, when any individual uses the expression “I, myself” for the first time, one sets the limits for the outside world and claims a unique personality. After several individuals who have at
least one common feature join to form a group, they refer to themselves as “we”; the choice to belong to a particular group is largely determined by individual's decision. This is particularly important in youth, when individuals are looking for a sense of belonging, self-worthiness and support from peers. These processes, individual and group self-identification are a subject matter of psychology, sociology, and political science. Research on identity saw an upswing in the past decades of the previous century. Many researchers emphasize that identity is socially constructed using language as a tool. This view is supported by constructivism, one of the most common approaches employed for the purposes of studying identity, which states that identity is not given or created, it is rather a continuous process where monolithic structures are replaced with variability, and “discursive work” takes place constantly (Kaprans, Zelce, 2010).

According to Alexander Wendt, individual’s identity is shaped by perceptions of oneself and others. Identity is similar to a role, relatively stable awareness and expectations about oneself (Zehnfuss, 2002, p. 14). National identity is one of particular individual’s identities. It is an individual’s sense of belonging to a certain national, governmental community (Zepa, 2011b, p. 15). Studies on identities apply knowledge and methods from various spheres. Research logic requires large volumes divided into smaller sectors, so it is not surprising that theorists distinguish several dimensions of national identity. For example, Montserrat Guibernau (2007) distinguished psychological dimension, culture, geographical origin, historical memory and political dimension. In his work “National Identity” Anthony D. Smith (1997) named the following components of a nation: a common territory, historical memories and myths, a common culture, a common economy, unified laws, rights and responsibilities. British scientist David Miller (1999) noted that a national community is formed by participants’ confidence and mutual recognition of certain communities, the historical continuity, “active identity” in the form of joint decision-making and achievement of goals and sense of territorial belonging.

One can observe that researchers’ opinions on what is an integral part of identity largely coincide. In this context it is important to note that all of the above-mentioned national identity researchers mention
the role of social memory. Academic history may differ from certain society’s historical memory, which sometimes is passed on from generation to generation without intermediation of scientific books. Historical events, wins and losses serve as an argument for future generations to achieve certain objectives. Historical memory, which includes stories, legends and myths on a nation’s and territory’s past, is an important unifying force for a community. George Schöpflin wrote that myths might have multiple functions; those who recognize certain beliefs that are encoded in myths simultaneously adopt a particular perception of the world that is reflected in the myth; this creates an affiliation to the group that fosters the myth (Schöpflin, 2000, p. 83).

Myths help to simplify creation of a group and its principles, establishing a more accessible understanding of the group. If the group’s origin and existence is historically complex and ambiguous, then myths would assist to reduce this complexity by explaining the origins of the group through an example (Schöpflin, 1997, p. 25). In cases when the state and the nation are exposed to certain challenges, myths make it possible to explain the causes of failure and to maintain unity of the nation if myths contain vision on the nation’s future (Cepuritis, Gulbis, 2012, p. 16).

Martins Kaprans and Vita Zelce, exploring relationships between national identity, history and social memory, wrote that “the selection and use of those aspects of history, in which victories interweave with other experiences – that is what shapes the collective memory of the nation. These transcendental moments from the past allow members of the community to increase their self-value, convincing them that they are outstanding in specific areas and that they are unique” (Kaprans, Zelce, 2011, p. 39). Historical myth can be formed selectively by picking those cases of successes and losses from the history that fit the need of contemporary society’s consolidation. Like any other identity factor a myth proposes partition between us and them; crossing a border may lead to a confrontation with another myth. In case of Latvia this is particularly relevant in the context of contemporary Russian policy on history matters.
Warring History

When researching contemporary Latvian and Russian identity, it is essential to note that in 1991 there was a shift in status of Latvians and Russians. In the Soviet Union Russians could consider themselves as the majority, but Latvians had minority status; in the independent Republic of Latvia Latvians have become the majority and ethnic Russians – the minority (Zepa, 2011b, p. 18). Latvians, however, often do not feel as the majority, partly due to the fact that the Latvian language as a state language has not fully regained its rightful position. Already in the last years of the Soviet Union many historical aspects were reviewed; Mikhail Gorbachev had launched glasnost’ – implementation of openness. However, the restoration of independence has not eliminated key differences of social memory of Latvians and the Russian minority. Brigita Zepa (2011b) pointed out that the Russian minority’s collective memory was being formed during 70 years of the Soviet Union’s existence. Three new generations lived through this period, which was sufficient to maintain informal continuity of these memories. At the same time, Latvians still have memories of the independent Republic before the Soviet occupation in 1940.

Vita Zelce (2009) indicated that the collapse of the USSR created a crisis in the minds of all Russian people; moreover, in the minds of Russians living outside the Russian Federation this crisis was perceived with great amplification. Their new status was illegal aliens, who immigrated under the Soviet occupation. For many Russians living in Latvia it was difficult to recognize the Soviet occupation as a fact; as it would, to a certain extent, make them undertake the moral responsibility for indirect participation in crimes against Latvia (Kaprans, Zelce, 2010, p. 17). After 1991, the Russian minority remained distant from the Latvian culture and history. V. Zelce (2009) stated that the Soviet history, which included falsification of the Latvian past and concealment of repressions of the occupied lands and people by the Soviet authorities, as well as the history that has been created in modern Russia still served as the main instrument for retaining the Russian memory.

Leo Dribins (2007) wrote that the social integration process was significantly affected by historical conditions that had their roots in
our recent past. They have also created a fragmented and contradictory understanding of the Latvian contemporary history. Divergent views on history continue to hamper the ethnic integration process in Latvia; this was also confirmed by a study carried out by the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences (BISS) in 2005 “Ethno-Political Tension in Latvia: Looking for Solution to the Conflict”; here, it was stressed that in Latvia ethnic conflicts were based on language policy and divergent interpretations of history (Zepa, et al., p. 17).

Significant differences exist between Latvian and Russian assessments of the World War II; Latvians associate it with occupation by the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and the subsequent Soviet re-occupation and loss of independence, while a great number of Russians living in Latvia associate World War II with a pride of the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War. Latvians perceive Russian enthusiasm about celebration of the 9th of May as an act of denial or even acquittal of Stalin’s crimes. The two rememberance days: the 9th of May, i.e. the Victory Day, and the 16th of March, i.e. Remembrance Day of the Latvian Legion, rive people in Latvia, inasmuch as rememberance days and public holidays are essential means of commemoration that may strengthen or weaken the national symbols. In 2008 a study titled “A Quantitative and Qualitative Study on Current Aspects of Social Integration and Citizenship” (ACKonsultacijas Ltd., 2008) reported a survey on citizens’ and non-citizens’ attitude towards the Victory Day celebrations. This study showed that no other event was celebrated so inconsistently within the Latvian society than the so-called Victory Day. If we observed attitudes towards the celebration of this day in the context of nationalities, it would follow that it is mostly celebrated by ethnic Russians (54%) and only 5% of Latvians (ACKonsultacijas Ltd., 2008). In the book “Resistance against Integration of Society: Causes and Consequences”, a survey was published where pupils in Latvia were asked: “Did the Soviet Army re-occupied Latvia in years 1944-1945?”. Approval rates among native Latvian pupils were 82%; while among Russian pupils only 18% (Dribins, 2007, p. 41). These rates indicate significant divergence of perceptions of historical events between the Latvian and Russian pupils.

Similarly to the celebration of the 16th of March, i.e. Remembrance Day of the Latvian Legion, celebration of the 9th of May, i.e. the Victory
Day, has become part of political agenda. Political potential of the celebration of the Victory Day was discovered in the second half of the 1990s. More and more often, CIS officials and pro-Russian politicians in Latvia began to visit the Victory Monument in Riga and other memorial site devoted to the World War II (Locmele, Procevska and Zelce, 2011). Initially, the main celebration was organized by the party “For Human Rights in the United Latvian” (FHRUL); Later, together with the growing political weight of the alliance “Harmony Centre” (HC) the main organizers of the festival changed as well. FHRUL had to give up the politically lucrative status of being the host of the event to the party “Harmony Centre”. In the beginning of June, 2008, an association titled “9.maijs.lv” (9.may.lv) was founded and registered; several notable figures took part in it, including Nils Usakovs, leader of the party “Harmony Centre” and the current mayor of Riga, while the Chairman of the Board of the association is Vadims Baranniks, head of the Legal Department of the “First Baltic Channel” and member of the Riga City Council (HC). The organization was founded to organize celebrations of the 9th of May and activities to support veterans of the World War II. According to the information on its website, the association is supported by the “First Baltic Channel” (FBC) (9 may, 2012). During pre-election periods FBC usually provides extensive advertising for Nils Usakovs and his party “Harmony Centre”.

Given the fact that majority of Latvians perceive the events that took place on the territory of Latvia in 1944-1945 as the restoration of the Soviet occupation, activities of “9.maijs.lv” cannot be viewed as attempts to promote social peace. Significantly, the Security Police of Latvia reported that the march in May 9th, 2008, which was approved by the Administrative District Court, had a destructive nature and indicated that it was aimed at dividing the society. Representatives of the “Latvian” party either do not take part in the celebrations of the Victory Day or commemorate those who fell in the World War II on the 8th of May, i.e. the day that is celebrated as the end of war in the Western world.

As to the World War II, there is a significant difference between ethnic groups in the assessment of the Soviet period. In 2010, a survey reported that 42.2% of Latvians and 71.2% of Russians viewed the Soviet
times in Latvia as positive (Kaprans, Zelce, 2011, p. 43). In the recent years, nostalgia for the Soviet era has been gaining strength, this was noted by both Kaprans and Zelce and researchers Cepuritis and Gulbis (2012), who stated in their study “Latvian Foreign Policy Myths: The European Union and Russia” (2012) that this phenomenon was observed not only within the Russian minority, but also in part of ethnic Latvians.

Processes and debates around the 9th of May suggest that attitudes towards the significance of the beginning and end of the WWII in the Latvian history differ significantly across ethnic groups in Latvia. For Latvians, recognition and remembrance of the Soviet occupation is an essential part of the social memory and is also associated with the continuity doctrine of the Republic of Latvia, while a large part of the Russian minority failed to empathize with the Latvian cultural trauma and to accept the new political reality; this forms a hindering factor for the unity in the society. In addition, inclusion of the 16th of March and the 9th of May into the political agenda has exacerbated the discussion on historical truths. Improvement is also hindered by the official position of Russia on the history of its own neighbouring countries.

Russia’s Role in the Construction of Identity

Researchers Martins Kaprans and Vita Zelce (2011) pointed out that attitudes of the Russian minority in Latvia towards the World War II were similar to those of Russians living in Russia, and these views denied compassion for other nations’ suffering, rights to seek for historical truth and victory of justice; “Russia’s policies vis-à-vis the history cultivate a situation in which the harm that was inflicted by the war upon Russia’s own people and others, the responsibility of the Soviet regime for unleashing the war, aggressive foreign policy of the USSR and the repressions that occurred within the Soviet Union are all pardoned in the name of victory itself. This creates an eternal gap between the Russian speakers and Latvians when it comes to evaluating the experience of the past and maintaining social memories” (Kaprans, Zelce, 2011, p. 46).

Similar attitudes towards historical issues in Russia and Russians living in Latvia remained from the Soviet era, but that is only part of
the reasons. Since the first Presidency of Vladimir Putin already, Russia’s history policies focused on reanimation and amplification of the Soviet positions for a range of historical issues. Unfortunately for Latvia, one of these issues was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the subsequent occupation of the Baltic States. Although Putin has said that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was condemned in Moscow shortly before the collapse of the USSR, in practice the state’s policy of history justified the pact as with a need to avert the Second World War and to extend the buffer zone for the Soviet Union. This position is consistent with the treatment of these issues in the Soviet era. In the 21st century Russia’s power elite has chosen the victory in the Great Patriotic War along with Orthodoxy as a shaping factor for the nation. The Victory Day or the 9th of May was meant to become the day for the manifestation of national pride. Unfortunately, several historical aspects come into conflict with views of Latvian historians and Latvian social memory. Most of Latvians perceive entry of the Soviet troops in Latvia from 1944 to 1945 as the re-occupation and a lasting symbol of the loss of freedom.

During Putin’s second presidency and the subsequent Medvedev’s presidency, particular attention to the enhancement of Russia’s historical viewpoint increased even more. In 2005, the 60th Anniversary of the Victory was celebrated in Russia on an unprecedented scale. The Ribbon of St. George as the symbol of the Victory Day of the Great Patriotic War travelled from Moscow to the neighbouring countries along with large Russian-speaking population, including Latvia. As Russia’s compatriot policy suggests distribution of Russia’s historical perspective within the Russian diaspora abroad, the pomposity of the 9th of May celebrations was brought to Latvia as well. Russian foreign policy document “Program for work with compatriots living abroad 2012 – 2014” proposes to provide support for the 9th of May celebrations outside Russia (RUVEK, 2012). The 9th of May is being promoted in Latvia by the media as well; towards the end of Vladimir Putin’s first presidency, a massive production of television broadcasts and movies on topics associated with the World War II was resumed with the state support. Using strategic communication Russia’s interpretation of the World War II supports certain stereotypes on the power-controlled TV channels, which are very popular among Russians living in Latvia.
In May, 2009, under the aegis of the President a commission was set up to fight against falsification of history that undermines Russia's interests. In the same year interpretation of history became a national security issue, namely, protection of Russia's specific historical perspective was incorporated into the National Security Strategy until year 2020. One of the sections of this strategy titled “Culture” states that “attempts to revise views on the history of Russia [...] reinforce the negative impact on the national security from cultural perspective” (SCRF, 2009). If any risk or threat to the national security is defined in the document, preventive measures will certainly follow, thus it can be said that history in Russia has been securitized. The strategy also indicates the prevention tools, namely, “national security institutions should cooperate with civil society institutions” (SCRF, 2009) and a unified “humanitarian and information-telecommunication space should be developed in the CIS countries and neighboring regions” (SCRF, 2009). It is not difficult to see that the “neighboring regions” include the Baltic States; in practice, protection of the Russian political values leads to an offensive approach towards the Latvian information and cultural space.

In reality, cooperation with institutions of civil society is being implemented as an inclusion of non-governmental organizations in Russia's foreign policy affairs. On the 14th of March, 2012, during a meeting with non-governmental organizations that were involved in Russia’s foreign policy, Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that “it is the essential task to mobilize Russian and European NGOs to identify specific facts on Nazi glorification [...]” (MFA of RF, 2012). In this event Lavrov mentioned that materials gathered by non-governmental organizations should be used in the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council.

Historian Ainars Lerhis (2011) pointed out that perception of the country’s history was merely one out of many Latvian national identity-related factors that Russia was trying to distort or modify according to its preferences. Lerhis indicated that current economic difficulties were being confronted with the “stable” and “secure” era of Soviet life. When addressing the Russian-speaking population in Latvia, Russia uses its existing motives to consolidate people; these motives can be characterised as the big nation’s “rise from the knees” in the field of culture,
language, religion, etc. These emphasize victories and achievements of the past and draw focus to the assurance of favourable developments, triumphs and achievements in the future. Russians are reminded that, together with Russia, they are the “winner nation” and they can overcome current difficulties and achieve their goals only with the help of Russia (Lerhis, 2011).

On March, 2012, in response to Russia’s initiative to promote the “correct” history in Latvia, Edgars Rinkevics, the Latvian Foreign Minister, had to decide on declaring two Russian historians, Alexander Dyukov and Vladimir Simindej, as undesirable persons (persona non grata), and including these Russian citizens in the list of foreigners who are prohibited from entering Latvia. In the context of securitization of history it should be noted that the Historical Memory Fund, in which both of these two gentlemen were taking part, has issued biased books about Latvian history in cooperation with the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS). Director of RISS is Leonid Resetnikov, former general of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (RISS, 2012). Yet another example is the Russkiy Mir Foundation, established in 2007, that financed materials reflecting Russia’s specific position on history matters; these materials were distributed in Russian language schools in Latvia. The Moscow House in Riga owned by the Moscow City Council regularly hosts events that are dedicated to history matters and promote certain Russia’s myths about the Second World War and other historical events related to Latvia.

Distribution of specific historical interpretations in Latvian through the media and Russian compatriot organizations are not a coincidence, but part of Russia’s foreign policy. In addition to history, tensions in Latvia are also created by other topics encompassed in the compatriot policy, such as the Russian language, compatriots’ rights and spirituality. Whichever of these topics are brought up by implementators of Russia’s compatriot policy and NGOs supported by them in Latvia, all of them result in political claims against the laws on the Latvian language and citizenship. Russia’s political activities on history matters interfere with the establishment of similar views of Latvians’ and the Russian minority, thereby preventing social integration and social peace, which are necessary for normal and democratic development of a country.
Social Memory Before and After the Accession to the EU

An individual can have many different identities that can overlap and be organized in a hierarchy, where the individual emphasizes specific identity and perceives the other as less significant. Likewise, the European identity should not make other identities exclusionary. Even before joining the EU, Latvia began to integrate into external Europe, not only economically, but also in terms of social memory. The historical dimension of the European democratic experience is associated with the slogan “never again”, referring to the Holocaust and wars in Europe, such as the Second World War. Historian Walter Nollendorf pointed out that three different cultural memories about the Second World War and its aftermath could be observed in Europe today. Western Europe was dominated by the memory of the Nazi occupation and the Holocaust, Russia by the memory of liberation and victory myths, but the people of Eastern Europe recalled the suffering that had gone through both the Nazi and the Communist regimes. These different memories had occurred not only due to the different experiences of war and occupation, but also as a result of the influence of communist regime's suppression policy targeted at the national memory culture (Cepuritis, Gulbis, 2012, p. 43).

Vita Zelce (2009) indicated that in 1998 Latvia started to work on policies of history matters. She argues that the change in this field was needed to join the European Union and NATO. Looking at the past and remaining a victim had to be replaced with a perspective focused on the future. Like other European nations, Latvians had to assess their involvement in the Holocaust responsibly; therefore, Latvian historians and politicians drew attention to the key element of the rather European social memory. It is essential to note that the Republic of Latvia as a country cannot be blamed for taking part in the Holocaust, because at the time of those crimes Latvia was occupied by Nazi Germany.

In 1998, the Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis started consultations with the leading Latvian historians to identify possibilities of creating European-style vision of the Latvian history (Zelce, 2009, p. 46). The presidential initiative was followed by the establishment of the Latvian Commission of Historians, whose primary mission was to explore the
topic of “Crimes against humanity during the two occupations: 1940-1956” with particular attention to the Holocaust (Zelce, 2009, p. 46). Brussels’ requirements on knowledge of the Holocaust and its integration into the Latvian collective memory contributed to qualitative growth of this topic (Zelce, 2009, p. 50). Kaprans and Zelce (2011) indicated that, in the Eastern Europe, after the fall of the Iron Curtain in the 1990s, personal moral responsibility for the Holocaust and the admission of involvement in the Holocaust of countrymen initially increased the level of bitter memories, sometimes creating a confrontation between significance of remembrance of our and their victims. Moreover, there was overall bitterness about the Western indifference for Latvian past sufferings felt throughout Latvia. For some Latvians it was hard to accept, because at that time, the Soviet atrocities and deportations had not gained so much international attention as the Holocaust.

Sometimes, activists from Russian organizations and Russian-speaking media in Latvia deliberately distribute false stereotypes about all Latvians as anti-Semites. The First Baltic Channel (FBC) broadcasting about 80% of programs from the Russian channel ORT and being very popular among Russian speakers in Latvia was caught disseminating biased information in this context. On March 16, 2012, during the legionary walk to the Freedom Monument to lay flowers, a dispute arose between the organizers of the event and MEP Tatjana Zdanoka, because the politician desired to lay a wreath in memory of the Soviet soldiers directly during the Legionnaires’ event. The FBC news edited the scene and included a sentence “Jews have no place here.” Although the organizers of the event did not say the words, they were attributed to the organizers. The purpose of this deliberate falsification was to discredit Latvia, stating that it is bringing to life Nazism and anti-Semitism.

Russia’s myths on “the powerful winner country” go “cross-border” and compete with Latvian views on the occupation of Latvia. In order to reduce the opportunities for the Baltic States to remind about the Soviet troops as the occupation forces in the Baltics, Russia tries to discredit Latvia as a country where Nazism is being revived. Typically, such activities are implemented through so-called Russian compatriot organizations in Latvia and power-engaged Russian historians, whose activities receive informational support from the Russian-speaking media.
The main objective of this policy is to prevent Latvia from reminding the international community about the crimes of the Soviet Union against the Baltic countries before and after the World War II.

Both individual and collective identities are subject to a continuous process of change, but there is no conclusive data that the Russian minority’s social memory would undertake significant change due to Latvia’s accession to the European Union in 2004. In any case, since the accession to the EU the Russian perspective on the World War II and the Soviet period has not changed significantly. Survey data indicate that the Russian minority’s attitude towards the Soviet occupation in 1940 has not changed significantly compared with the periods prior and after 2004. Brigita Zepa analysed national identity and historical memory and compared Russian attitude towards the Soviet period in 2000 and 2010. In 2000, 60% of Russian respondents viewed the Soviet impact on Latvia as a positive development, while 58% said so in 2010 (Zepa, 2011a, p. 28). Over the recent years, more euroscepticism and nostalgia for the Soviet period began developing in Latvia, which tend to be linked to the recent economic crisis and effects of Russia’s informational influence. Kristine Kruma pointed out that Latvian scepticism could be attributed to a result of complex combination of factors: “The EU was designed to overcome the consequences of the Second World War, while Latvia was out of this process. So Latvians believe that Europe is an external force that historically has “betrayed us” or, at best, is a self-interested partner (not a friend)” (Cepuritis, Gulbis, 2012, p. 56).

This paper focuses on the social memory as part of identity; however, during the assessment of the effects of the European Union on the Russian identity, the dimension of territorial affiliation should be taken into account as well. In 2010, in a survey tasked with exploring national identity, people were asked about their attitudes towards a certain place, area. Usually, respondents mentioned their connection to different cities, including Latvia, 82% and 78% of all respondents respectively. Noticeably less people identified themselves as Europeans (21%) or Baltic people (20%), or felt that they belonged to Russia (15%) (Zepa, 2011a, p. 21). The survey showed that young people and those planning to leave Latvia formed the majority of those who identified themselves as Europeans. Thus, the opening of borders after 2004 and opportunities
to work in several EU countries kept pace with individuals’ feeling of belonging to Europe. Comparing the territorial sense of belonging between Latvians and Russians, the survey showed that the greatest difference was in the attitude towards Latvia and Russia. 83% Latvians and 73% Russians living in Latvia recognized close ties to Latvia, while close ties with Russia were indicated by 33% of Russians and only 3.6% of Latvians (Zepa, 2011a, p. 21). There were no significant differences between Russians and Latvians with regard to the European identity; in both groups, about 20% felt connected to Europe; however, there were slightly more Latvians who felt like Europeans (Zepa, 2011a, p. 21).

Accession to the European Union contributed to greater attention to the Holocaust commemoration topic in Latvia and to the shaping of future driven attitudes towards history matters, while Western Europe gradually acquired a more realistic picture of the Soviet repressions in Russia and its neighboring countries due to the effects of national narratives of new member countries. This two-way exchange of information and assessment contributed to a common development. As to the European identity formation, Latvian officials and their colleagues in Brussels should think about ways of encouraging Latvian residents to say “we, Europe” rather than “there, in Europe.”

Conclusions

National identity studies have both a scientifically theoretical value and practical necessity, which is associated with political necessity to promote an inclusive society in countries where national issues had been put on hold during the Soviet period. Soviet authorities advocated for “people’s friendship”, which was to some extent a fiction, maintained with a threat of retaliation. After 1991, many unarticulated problems resurfaced, and most of them remain unsolved.

Within the Latvian National Research Programme “National Identity”, a number of studies have been carried out with a focus on different dimensions of national identity, including social memory as an important, integral part of the identity. In Latvia, such research is particularly timely, because of the warring commemorations: different
views on the Second World War and the Soviet period between Russian and Latvian people. For Latvians, the Second World War brought a loss of independence for half a century, while part of Russians view it as a source of nation's power and pride. Unfortunately, self-isolation of ethnic groups, ethnic division of political parties, and Russia's History Policy still serve as an obstacle to finding solutions to the problems.

Russia's compatriots' policy and media presence in Latvia promote maintenance of divergent views on history between Latvians and Russians. Since the second term of presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russia's foreign policy is being updated with so-called humanitarian direction, which includes Russian compatriots living abroad as a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives. Moreover, protection of specific interpretation of history is included in Russia's National Security Strategy, leading to securitization of this field. Media environment in Latvia is divided, and ethnic Latvians and the Russian minority live in different informative spaces. Russia's state-controlled TV channels maintain various stereotypes of Latvia, and give false representation of processes in Russia, thereby deceiving a large part of society in Latvia.

Accession to the EU has had a positive impact on the research of Holocaust in Latvia; however, it has failed to eliminate the gap between Latvian and Russian perspective on historical events. There is a persistent scepticism and growing nostalgia for the Soviet era in Latvia. Informational influence of Brussels is noticeably weaker than that of Moscow. Latvian politicians are advised to think about development of the European identity through greater amounts of up-to-date information on the EU developments. To form a unified social memory in Latvia, it is necessary to ensure that curriculum for schools teaching in both Latvian and Russian language is the same; a discussion should be brought up on the need to use Latvian as the language of instruction in all state-funded schools. “Latvian” political parties should address not only their electorate, but also ethnic groups that will not necessarily ensure votes in elections in short-term.

Significant improvements are necessary in order to support the improvement of quality of the Latvian national media and to ensure access to it throughout the country. Furthermore, a second thought should be given to deciding on whether or not to restrict broadcasts
of those Russian state-controlled TV channels in Latvia, which are dealing with propaganda of anti-democratic, anti-NATO, anti-EU and anti-Latvian values. It is impossible to change the past, but it is possible to act today, so that the entire society in Latvia, i.e. Latvians, Russians and other nationalities, could finally be united and live together in European, democratic, prosperous and secure country.

Literature:


Building Democracy and Economy
*Through Europe: Slovenia and the EU*

**Introduction**

In an article published in the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* in 2003, Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitrij Rupel meaningfully expressed the problems the Slovenes would deal with after becoming a EU-Member State in May 2004. The Slovenes, he wrote, “...express the concern that small nations may lose their national identity in the European Union ... Such thoughts are in part the result of negative experiences in multinational state formations that Slovenia has belonged to in the past, from imperial Austria to monarchist and then communist Yugoslavia” (Rupel, 2003, p. 207). Nevertheless, according to Rupel, the existence of a “European identity ... lag[ging] behind national identities” and the basic values of “pluralism” and “subsidiarity of identities” should not only ensure but also strengthen each EU-Member State and nation. On the one hand, each Member State and nation should support common European life by drawing on its own historical experience. On the other hand, the respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, social justice, and the commitment to peace grounding the EU should guarantee equal opportunities and the formation of a common constitutional-patriotic framework.

But what did Rupel’s words mean in practice? As the majority of East Central European nations, the Slovenian nation was historically founded on linguistic affiliation. Nonetheless, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Slovenes were among the main supporters of the Yugoslavian idea especially in terms of the transformation of the Habsburg Empire
into a tri-partite political entity (Gabrić, 2005; Godeša, 2006; Pervošek, 2005; Rogel, 1977; Salvi, 1971). In the course of the 20th century, after the First World War had eventually caused the implosion of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the Slovenes became officially represented both in monarchic and socialist Yugoslavia, but had a chance to create their own nation state just after the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. In fact, it was only in the post-Tito's era, when the political system of Yugoslavia proved to be unable to ensure the balance among Yugoslavian Republics, and when Milošević militarism arose dominant, that the idea of the Slovenian nation state grew up to the secession from Yugoslavia in 1990 (Höpken, 2002).

Since the late 1980s, the Slovenian national discourse has increasingly underlined a two-folded tendency. On the one hand, the public discourse has constantly underscored the distance of the Slovenian nation state and of the Slovenian nation form the Socialist/Yugoslavian heritage. Yugoslavia has often been used as a negative paradigm used in order to stress the diversity of Slovenian national discourse in comparison to the former Yugoslavian nations. In this respect, not only has the existence of a particular historical and cultural relation between Slovenia and the Central European (Habsburg) tradition been reminded as an issue of geopolitical importance, but the link with Central Europe has also been understood as a veritable index of civilization as opposed to the negative image of the Balkans, where the wars fuelled in the 1990s. To be specific, the Central European tradition the Slovenes appealed to constitutes a cluster of ideal-typical values related to liberal democracy and is in striking contrast to the supposed illiberal Western Balkan heritage (Judah, 2009; Rupnik, 2011; Šabič and Brglez, 2002; Todorova, 1997; Todorova and Gille, 2010). On the other hand, the linguistic identity got strengthened as a major element of the Slovenian national discourse (Pleskovic and Sachs 1994; Grdina, 2003; Čepić, 2010). Although the linguistic rights of official minorities are recognized and special plans for their development are guaranteed, the importance of the Slovenian language as a political issue is confirmed by the existence of a special Department for the Slovenian Language under the Ministry of Culture with a number of specific supervisory and educational tasks (Republic of Slovenia. Ministry of Culture, 2013).
Accession to the EU was thus seen in the mainstream political discourse as a means to strengthen both of the Slovenian national discourse pillars through the two principles Rupel mentioned in his article, i.e. European liberal democracy and subsidiarity, which would enable Slovenia, in terms of civilization, to leave the Balkans and join Europe. In the next pages, I will briefly discuss and try to understand whether the aforesaid goals have been consolidated in the Slovenian discourse since the accession of Slovenia to the EU in 2004. In particular, I will try to understand to what extent the Slovenes consider democracy a value linked to the EU and how they perceive “subsidiarity of identities.” The analysis is based on the data of Eurobarometer.

**Between the Old and New Slovenia**

Although the path from Socialism to market economy and democracy is usually characterized as a success story, the transition in Slovenia has not been free of problems and repercussions for the economy and society. Between 1991 and 1993, Slovenia's industrial output declined significantly, inflation raged at about 549.7% in 1990, 117.7% in 1991, and 207.3% in 1992. In December 1993, unemployment reached 15.1%. From 1994, Slovenian economy recorded a meaningful shift. After falling for three years, the GDP started growing at a healthy pace reaching growth rate of 4.2% in 2004. Even unemployment, which represented one of the hardest challenges for Slovene population in the 1990s, dropped to 10.1% by 2005. As the figures of Slovenian macroeconomics improved, in 2003, the country’s per capita GDP reached USD 9,500, putting the country at a robust 72% of the EU average (Fink-Hafner and Ramet, 2006). On the whole, the Slovenian economical transition was considerably short and did not lead to a serious economic crisis which was ridden out in the 1990s and early 2000s.

In the field of politics, the transition was also gradual. Apart from the ten-day conflict with the Yugoslav Federal Army in June 1991 that represented the most visible side of federal Yugoslavia breakout, the changes in the political scenario remained far from becoming traumatic and transition from one-party to multiparty political system ended
virtually without oppositions. The transition was made easier because of the specific cultural background of Slovenia. Even though most of the liberal values are generally associated with Western democracy, the Slovenian transition occurred in a context in which the respect for some liberal values was present even prior to the fall of Yugoslavia. As Denica Fink-Hafner and Sabrina P. Ramet have pointed out, in Yugoslavian times already, the Republic was well-known for its particular sensibility towards human rights which differentiated Slovenia quite strongly from other Yugoslavian Republics. In the 1980s, minority groups such as gays and lesbians took active part in the protest against Socialist order. Among other things, Socialist Slovenia also had a specific attitude towards death penalty which was never applied in the Republic (Fink-Hafner and Ramet, 2006). Nonetheless, the first steps of the new democratic state did not seem to go towards the consistent recognition of civic values as a ground for the new order. In 1991, when the Slovenian State declared its independence, 18,305 residents of Slovenia that had Yugoslavian citizenship became foreigners in their own country. After more than 20 years, the destiny of these “erased” people remains unresolved. Moreover, growing conflicts in Yugoslavia intensified the feelings of social distance of the Slovenes from the Croats, Serbs, and Muslims, and the transformation of such former companions into a dangerous Other. On the other hand, changes in the legal system and the development of private entrepreneurship strengthened individualism that turned out to be soon accepted as a norm of contemporary life profoundly changing people’s Weltanschauung (Rose and Makkai, 1993).

The EU as a Framework for Subsidiarity

In the framework of systemic and mental changes that had been observed over more than ten years, on the eve of the accession of the country to the EU, the main concern of the people of Slovenia was unemployment. Even if since the early 1990s its level had diminished by 5%, unemployment was depicted as one of the most visible collateral effects of the new state and consumption economy. Social insecurity was counterbalanced by constant growth in importance of values such
as family, friendship, and secure family life that constituted a psychological bulwark against fears caused by the transition (Čeplan, 2006). The EU membership, which according to official data was considered a positive change by 40% of the surveyed population (43% among the new EU member states, NMS) while as many as 44% could express no position on the matter (33% among NMS), was mostly perceived as a means of fighting against internal problems (European Union. European Commission, 2004a, p. 14). Therefore, it is not surprising that in spring 2004 interviewed Slovenes stated that the three actions the EU should follow in priority were fighting against poverty (62%), fighting against unemployment (62%), and maintaining peace and security in Europe (European Union. European Commission, 2004b, p. 33). What is interesting to notice here, however, is that the EU and the development of common policies were seen in a particularly positive way. The Slovenians were among those who attached the greatest significance to common currency (82%), common foreign (76%), and security policy (78%). The perception of the EU as a means to tackle home problems is confirmed by later data. In comparison to Autumn 2003, after joining the EU the number of Slovenes that considered themselves to be Europeans to any extent dropped dramatically by 9.3% while the identification with nationality only grew from 31% to 42%. Even if the shift can be explained in psychological terms and was common to all of NMS, in the case of Slovenia the striking difference between declared self-identification and trust in common EU policy reveal the widespread opinion about the subsidiary nature of the EU (European Union. European Commission, 2004a, p. 8–11.).

Like the transition, the first years of Slovenia's membership in the EU can be described as a success story. Between 2004 and 2006, Slovenia experienced an economic boom with an average economic growth by nearly 5%. In 2007, Slovenian economy expanded by almost 7% (European Union. European Commission, 2012c). Among other positive effects, economic growth pushed down unemployment rate which in September of 2008 reached 6.3%, i.e. the lowest rate in the history of independent Slovenia. In addition, Slovenia was the first post-socialist country to enter the Eurozone in 2007. The successes in the field of economics had a very strong effect on citizens’ self-identification.
On the one hand, the EU-membership was perceived as one of the main catalysts of the country’s economic prosperity. In 2006, as many as 30% of the interviewed people associated the EU with economic prosperity in general, but the reference to the Slovenian case was undeniable. In a similar context of growing sense of social security, however, the feelings of fear towards the EU as a menace to cultural and national identity was still relatively high. In fact, even if only 37% of the Slovenes indicated the EU as a major reason for the “loss of our cultural identity,” the percentage remained considerably higher than in other NMS (on average 30%) (European Union. European Commission, 2006a, p. 299). The perception of the EU as an instrument of political economy rather than the element of a process that would potentially change the destiny of the nation state as such remained stable (52% of the interviewed considered the EU a positive influence to their home economic situation, as many as 82% were in favor of the introduction of Euro as the new national currency) (European Union. European Commission, 2006a, p. 301, 313). This is supported by the percentage of the Slovenes fearing the lack of sovereignty the construction of the EU implies which was attested at 45% (NMS average 43%) (European Union. European Commission, 2006a, p. 231-51). Until the wave of economic growth reached its peak, the pro-European position of the Slovenes continued to grow in momentum. In 2007, the positive attitude towards the common European currency reached the record level of 91%. Moreover, the percentage of the Slovenes in favor of common European foreign and security policy grew up to 82% and 88%, respectively (European Union. European Commission, 2007, p. 408-10). Nonetheless, the attachment to the EU was found to be low: 16% respondents declared they feel “very attached,” 39% “attached,” and 32% “not very attached” to the EU (respectively 15%, 43%, and 28% among NMS). Meanwhile 64% and 33% respondents declared they are “very attached” and “attached” to Slovenia, respectively (European Union. European Commission, 2007, p. 435-7).

Peculiar attitude of the Slovenes towards the EU as a subsidiary means for the development of the nation state appears even more striking if observed in the context of the global economic crisis that hit the country in 2008. Slovenian industrial production fell by 8% in
2009. Unemployment rates began growing again and reached 13% in 2012. Regardless of worsening economic conditions, in 2012 83% of the Slovenes surveyed expressed a positive opinion about the Euro, 74% were in favor of a common foreign, and 83% in favor of a common security policy (European Union. European Commission, 2012b, p. 4). The Slovenes’ confidence in the common European currency even during the economic crisis appears to be impressive. According to the survey carried out in 2011, 63% of interviewed Slovenes completely disagreed that overall the Euro caused the economic crisis, while it reached an average of 51% in the EU-27, and 50% in the Eurozone alone. In 2011, Slovenian support for stronger economic coordination among all EU Member States reached 82% (European Union. European Commission, 2011a, p. 15). In this regard, the crisis simply supported the belief of the people of Slovenia in the EU as a subsidiary framework for home economy. It is, thus, not surprising, that in 2012 30% of the interviewed Slovenes considered that economy and boost growth (EU-27 average 22%) should be the task of the EU and 35% improving the standard of living of all EU citizens (EU-27 24%), and 15% the protection of European citizens against the negative effects of globalization such as the relocation of industries and jobs (EU-27 11%) (European Union. European Commission, 2012a, p. 92–3).

Even if the principle of subsidiarity is clearly mirrored in the Slovenes’ attitudes, it would be difficult to agree with the statement that in the opinion of the Slovenes the EU represents a mere help for the future of the Slovenian nation state. The sense of attachment to the EU, as we have seen earlier, has remained low. The psychological process of self-protection, however, does not mean that Slovenes are not in favour of a stronger integration of their nation state into the EU. In this regard, the Slovenes demonstrated to be among the main supporters of a larger and much more integrated EU. In fact, not only did the Slovenes demonstrate strong support for the common European currency, but also expressed confidence in the process of EU transformation into a political unit. In 2006, the Slovenes demonstrated very high rates of support for the European constitution (80%) that considerably exceeded the EU average (66%) (European Union. European Commission, 2006a, p. 102). In addition, the Slovenes appeared to be among the
most convinced supporters of the benefits that the enlargement could bring. Between 2005 and 2008, the rates of respondents in favour of the EU enlargement in Slovenia ranged between 79% (2005) and 67% (2007), which represented the highest rates in the entire EU (European Union. European Commission, 2005, p. 155; European Union. European Commission, 2007, p. 120). Therefore, the EU enlargement seems to be an inevitable process of political convergence in which the nation state is not a unit menaced by integration and enlargement, but a nucleus for psychological security.

**Democracy: Between the Nation State and the EU**

Even if, on the one hand, the people of Slovenia primarily associated the EU with subsidiarity in the field of economy, one cannot forget the EU grew as a political project based on human rights and values of democracy. Along with free market economy, the democratic ideological substratum characterized quite strongly the pro-European discourse in the post-communist area, where the EU was widely represented as the antithesis of and the antidote to socialist statehood. The EU was actually represented and functioned in public discourse as a stimulus for integration through the focus on trauma. It is not surprising that only after joining the EU, the Slovenes considered the EU a guarantee for democracy or, to be precise, considered the integration into the EU a way to improve the quality of Slovenian democracy. In particular, the Slovenes seem to understand the level and quality of democracy in their own country not only as influenced but also proportionally changing in relation to the quality of democracy in the EU. On the one hand, the EU has been constantly perceived as a model of democracy in which the quality of democracy is constantly higher than in Slovenia itself. Only after joining the EU in 2004, the level of quality of European and national democracy appeared to the Slovenes quite similar. 43% of the surveyed Slovenes confirmed that they were satisfied with the way in which democracy functioned in their country. The figures of the Slovenes satisfied with the way democracy functioned in the EU was only one point higher (44%), while the rates of dissatisfaction reached
55% for national and 38% for the EU democracy, respectively. However, one should keep in mind that even if the figures of satisfaction with democracy turned to be lower than the average in EU-15 (54% at the national level, 43% at the EU level), the rates of Slovenes’ satisfaction with the way home democracy functioned substantially encompassed the average of NMS (24% at the national level, 44% at the EU level) (European Union. European Commission, 2004a, p. 230–2). The relative self-confidence in the functioning of national democracy seems then to confirm several things. On the one hand, the Slovenes considered their State to have accomplished a meaningful path towards democracy and felt the need to further continue such process. On the other hand, they felt that democratic process could be best implemented within the framework of the EU. Such understanding of the relation between the development of democracy at national and the EU level explains quite clearly why in later years the level of satisfaction with national democracy changed in constant relation with the satisfaction with the level of democracy in the EU. The highest rates of satisfaction were reached after Slovenia joined the Eurozone and while Slovenian economy was experiencing its (short) economic boom. In 2006, as many as 65% of the surveyed Slovenes claimed to be satisfied with the way democracy functioned in the EU, while at a national level the figure increased up to 54% (European Union. European Commission, 2006a, p. 47–9). The rise of economic crisis and rapid deterioration of the Slovenian economy were reflected in the fall of satisfaction with democracy at both levels. According to the data of 2010, only 37% of the interviewed were satisfied with national democracy (62% were unsatisfied), while the percentage fell a little bit less in the case of the quality of democracy in the EU (51% declared to be satisfied, 42% to be unsatisfied). Since the EU democracy continued to be viewed as a model for national democracy, the rates of satisfaction with democracy in the EU have remained constantly higher. In this respect, it should be noted that the economic crisis was associated with a fall in the quality of democracy in a much stronger way than in many other EU Member States. It is striking to notice that while the satisfaction of the Slovenes with democracy at both levels had been constantly higher than the EU-average since 2004, in 2010 it appeared considerably lower than the EU-27 average
(53% declared to be satisfied at the national level, 54% at the EU level) (European Union. European Commission, 2009, p. 75–6). Evidently, the crisis had a major impact on the public opinion of Slovenia because of the major degree of confidence in the EU as the framework for the transformation of the State. The confidence in the Euro and strengthening of the common currency area are necessary steps even during the crisis; as mentioned before, it seems clear that particularly low rate of satisfaction with democracy does not express a lack of confidence in the EU. On contrary, it demonstrates regret experienced by the citizens in relation to the limited decision-making capabilities in the field of economics, lack of political power demonstrated at the national and EU levels, as well as the lack of representation in political institutions. The rate of confidence in the main EU institutions seems to confirm this interpretation. In 2006, as many as 73% of respondents from Slovenia (the highest rate among the EU Member States) expressed their confidence in the European Parliament and the European Commission (European Union. European Commission, 2006b, p. 135–8). Although the confidence in both institutions fell considerably, the rates of confidence constantly remained higher than the average of EU-27. In the autumn of 2011, while the average rates of confidence in the European Parliament and the European Commission fell by, respectively, 41% and 36%, the confidence rates in Slovenia reached 43% and 40% (European Union. European Commission, 2011b, p. 57–8). Democracy, therefore, was once more understood in a technocratic way, not only as a sum total of ethical values, but also as a technique to govern the European Res Publica and, thus, to enable the improvement of institutional work at the national level.

**After the Crisis: Overcoming Subsidiarity?**

As it was noticed before, the Slovenes considered the EU to be not only a specific help for policy making, but also a model for democracy. The economic crisis influenced the self-perception of the Slovenes and their values, but the figures of Slovenes believing the Euro to be the cause of the crisis remained relatively low. But what did it really mean? What
was the specific impact of the crisis on the perception of the relation between Slovenia and the EU? Was Slovenian pro-Europeanism paradoxically strengthened by the crisis?

Opinion polls recorded in 2011 revealed that, on the one hand, the confidence in the EU fell to 38% (in 2006, it reached 66%). Confidence in the EU, however, remained higher than the EU average (34%), while for the first time the figure of respondents declaring their lack of confidence (56%) exceeded the EU average (55%) (European Union. European Commission, 2011b, p. 46). On the other hand, the aforesaid data seem to demonstrate a much more general trend related with the crisis than the actual dissatisfaction with the EU. In fact, rather similarly to the other EU countries, the Slovenes expressed their approval of the EU coordination that could help to sort out the financial crisis. The absolute majority of the Slovenes (72%) considered the EU “important” or “fairly important” (18%) in overcoming the financial and economic crisis and preparing for the next decade through increased support for research and development policies, and turning inventions into products. The EU average remained considerably lower (60% and 25%, respectively). Similar rates of confidence in the EU were expressed in terms of the enhancement of the EU’s higher education system (69% “important”, 21% “fairly important”), the development of e-economy within the EU (63% “important”, 22% “fairly important”), the support for economy that uses less natural sources and emits less greenhouse gases (84% “important”, 12% “fairly important”), the promotion of entrepreneurship and development of new skills (88% “important”, 8% “fairly important”), the modernisation of labour markets (94% “important”, 4% “fairly important”), assistance to the poor and socially excluded, creation of opportunities to enable them to play an active part in the society (91% “important”, 6% “fairly important”) (European Union. European Commission, 2011b, p. 77–110). Moreover, a stronger coordination of economic and financial policies among the countries of the euro area was supported by 81% of the respondents (on average, 75% in the EU). The number of respondents in favour of the introduction of Eurobonds was considerably low (48%), but, again, higher than the EU-average (44%) (European Union. European Commission, 2011b, p. 156).
On the whole, although the economic crisis weakened the overall confidence of the Europeans (and the Slovenes) in the EU, the Slovenes expressed their strong belief that the EU is not only the main space enabling the country to overcome the economic crisis, but is also the main actor which may further the improvement of economical and social structures in the European space. The necessity to improve the role of the EU as a factor of modernization implicitly confirms that the people of Slovenia, though still being linked to the nation state as a psychologically “close” entity, recognize the unavoidable centrality of the EU as a basis for the further existence and transformation of the nation state itself.

Conclusions

As demonstrated above, the words of the Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Rupel about the meaning of the EU said about 10 years ago proved to be true only to a certain extent. On the one hand, even if Slovenia managed to solve the problems of nation state building rather quickly and successfully in the 1990s, a sense of social insecurity remained alive among the citizens. In this respect, the data collected by Eurobarometer show that respondents from Slovenia understood the accession to the EU as a two-folded means of dealing with real and psychological problems of transition from socialism to liberal market economy and democracy. The EU is viewed as an economic and political structure in which nation states can exist through the principle of subsidiarity. On the other hand, even if, as Rupel put it, the Slovenes looked at the EU as a help for state building, the fear of loss of the “national identity” turned out to be less pronounced than the Minister had hypothesized. The level of attachment to Slovenia surely remained constantly higher than that to the EU. Nevertheless, the Slovenes viewed the development of the EU integration process (political integration, monetary integration, etc.) as an essential framework for the development of the new Slovenian state itself. Although the rates of confidence in the European institutions, the Euro, and the EU in general experienced changes directly related to the changes of
the economic situation, the Slovenes expressed their confidence in the process of integration constantly higher than the EU average. Thus, even if the Slovenes appeared much more enthusiastic about their membership in the EU when Slovenia’s economy was growing stronger and the European consciousness of the Slovenes got considerably weakened by the deepening economic crisis, today the Slovenes remain linked to the EU in a much stronger way than the majority of the citizens of most of the EU Member States. Like the Minister Rupel believed, the Slovenes still consider the EU a necessary pillar of their own national democracy, economic growth, and, last but not least, social security, rather than a menace to their “national identity”.

Literature:

Andrea Griffante


Factors of Cleavages

Political landscape in the Republic of Moldova is not divided according to ideological factors only as it is the case in several countries in Western Europe. The separation “left-wing/right-wing” can hardly give a comprehensive explanation of the existing divisions. We can even say that the ideological factor (for example, more or less market economy) is the last one which should be taken into consideration when analysing the politics of the Republic of Moldova. In this regard, one example should be reminded: the Party of the Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) supported the European integration when it was ruling in Chişinău (2001-2009), and especially since 2003. One can express doubts as to how sincere this communist involvement in the European integration was. Nevertheless, this example shows the ideological flexibility of large majority of political parties acting in the Republic of Moldova. This fact does not allow us to analyse Moldovan politics in terms of ideological factors only.

Very important, but still not the exhaustive one, is the separatist factor. There are two separatist regions in the Republic of Moldova: Transnistria and Găgăuzia (Solak, 2009). They both refused obedience to Chişinău at the time of the USSR breakdown. While Găgăuzia was granted with a special status and became an autonomous region finally recognizing the authority of the Republic of Moldova, Russian-speaking Transnistria – supported by the Russian army – won the civil war in 1992 and from this period remained de facto independent from the government in Chişinău. Several attempts to solve this “frozen conflict”, like the “Kozak Plan” in 2003 (Filip, 2011, p. 269;
Cioroianu, 2009, p. 345-348; Kosienkowski, 2010, p. 121), did not change the situation¹.

A History Full of Meanders

Therefore, the Transnistrian issue is not the unique factor for understanding political cleavages existing in the Republic of Moldova. In fact, the Republic of Moldova’s mainland has its own “internal” cleavages, while the Transnistrian issue is only one of many features within “domestic” politics. It seems that the crucial question concerns the identity of the Republic of Moldova’s citizens (Zgureanu-Gurăgață, 2006, p. 96). Who are they? Can they be considered Romanians, Russians, Bessarabians or Moldovans? The Republic of Moldova has its roots and draws its name from the former Principality of Moldavia, settled in the 14th century. The problem is that in 1812, this principality was divided along the Prut river: the Western part was taken by the Ottoman Empire, while the Eastern part (the so-called “Bessarabia”) – by the tsarist Russia. Eventually, the Western part joined Wallachia (1859) and created Romania (Zdaniuk & de Zuniga, 2013, p. 307-308). Therefore, today’s Republic of Moldova includes only part of the Principality of Moldavia, and the term “Moldovan” refers to both people living in the Republic of Moldova and those in the North-Eastern part of Romania. This is why the expression “citizens of the Republic of Moldova” seems to be more relevant than merely “Moldovans” or even “Bessarabians”².

¹ Neither an articulation of ideological and separatist factors makes the situation clear. The PCRM’s example is once again relevant. Despite the fact that from 2001 to 2009 both leaders of Chișinău (Vladimir Voronin) and Tiraspol (Igor Smirnov) were former soviet apparatchiks, no solution for the conflict was found during this period. Even Voronin, born in Transnistria, considering himself a communist, using soviet symbols, speaking better Russian than Romanian, was not able to deal efficiently with the Transnistrian issue (Cimpoeșu, 2010, p. 362; Nantoi, 2013, p. 23).

² At the origin, the term “Bessarabia”, coming from the prince of Wallachia Basarab, was only concerning the Southern part of the region located between Prut and Dniester rivers. In 1812, the tsarist authorities called “Bessarabia” all annexed territories laying between Prut and Dniester. Today, not all of Bessarabia belongs to the Republic of Moldova. Its Northern and Southern part were included in 1940 by Stalin in
Can, therefore, the citizens of the Republic of Moldova be considered “Romanians” and their language “Romanian”? Such a point of view can be found in Romania and within its political elite. According to a famous expression, the Republic of Moldova is supposed to be “the second Romanian state”. For this reason the citizens of the Republic of Moldova can apply for Romanian citizenship and get a Romanian passport in accordance with a simplified procedure (Iordachi, 2012; Parmentier, 2007, p. 116). However, no other steps have been taken by the Romanian authorities to “unify” the Republic of Moldova with the “motherland”.

In the Republic of Moldova a strong feeling of Romanianism appeared at the end of the USSR period, especially during the Perestroika. At this time, intellectuals initiated a wave of protests which eventually culminated with the huge anti-Soviet demonstrations on the streets of Chişinău, with the reintroduction of the Latin alphabet in 1989 and the creation of the Popular Front of Moldova led by pro-Romanian Mircea Druc. These events encouraged the separatist movements in both Transnistria and Găgăuzia, as local population did not want to join the Romanian state. The fear of Romanian “nationalism” is used by the separatist propaganda in Găgăuzia and in Transnistria up to this day. But the unionist idea was not commonly shared even among “core” Bessarabians. The parliamentary elections of 1994 gave the majority of votes to the anti-unionist agrarians led by Mircea Snegur. Therefore, the elections of 1994 can even be considered the beginning of “Moldovanist” project focused on the Republic of Moldova’s statehood. At the same time, as Bessarabia was Russian or Soviet territory for almost two centuries (Constantin, 1995, p. 17-19), a strong Russian/Soviet influence is observed at cultural, political and economic levels.

the Ukrainian SSR and are today part of independent Ukraine. On the other hand, Transnistria has never been a part of the Principality of Moldavia or Bessarabia, so “Transnistrians” are not “Bessarabians” (except for those from the town of Bendery located on the west bank of Dniester). See: Kastory, 2002. Some authors consider the name “Bessarabia” is older than the name of prince Basarab. See: Țurcanu, 2010.

Unionism

All of the foregoing allows us to identify three main political projects for the Republic of Moldova. The first one is the unionist idea, according to which Bessarabia was illegally annexed by Russia in 1812 and again by the Soviet Union in 1940. Therefore, Bessarabians belong to the Romanian nation while Bessarabia should join the Romanian state. For unionists, the Republic of Moldova is an artificial state, being the heir of the Stalinist Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (RASSM) established in 1924, and the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (RSSM) established in 1940 after the invasion of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (Petrencu, 2006, p. 33; Micu, 2011, p. 256). The point is that Bessarabia has never included Transnistria, so it is not clear whether a union with Romania should include Transnistria as well.

The party with the closest views to unionism seems to be the Liberal Party (PL) led by Mihai Ghimpu. This politician was born in a family sharing anti-Soviet ideals. His brothers were involved in anti-Soviet movements, while Mihai Ghimpu himself was an active figure during the national revival of 1989. Ghimpu’s nephew Dorin Chirtoacă – also an activist of the PL – is the mayor of Chişinău. In 2009-2010, Mihai Ghimpu acting as speaker of the Moldovan Parliament was the Acting President of the Republic of Moldova. In 2013, during the political crisis after the collapse of the Alliance for European Integration, part of PL members led by Ion Hadârcă tried to take over control of the party. This group, including 7 members of the Parliament, voted on May, 2013, for the new government led by Iurie Leanca, while Mihai Ghimpu remained out of the new coalition. Since 2009, PL’s score during different elections varied from 10% to 15%, which is far from the majority.

Soviet Moldovanism

The political landscape of the Republic of Moldova is rather dominated by “Moldovanists” (Oleksy, 2012, p. 128) who aim to strengthen the Moldovan statehood. Moldovanists are, however, highly polarized and can hardly be viewed as a single, homogeneous, clearly-oriented
political group. This is why two more political projects can be identified within the “Moldovanist” banner. One of them, on the opposite of unionism, can be referred to as the “Soviet Moldovanism”, which itself is very heterogeneous. In the Republic of Moldova’s “mainland”, it has usually been represented by the PCRM and its leader Vladimir Voronin. The communists believe that the Moldovans are a distinct nation and are not Romanians (Danero & Verschueren, 2009, p. 110-111). The origin of Moldovan nation comes not from the RASSM or the RSSM, but from the Principality of Moldavia, while the most famous historical leader is Stefan the Great who ruled the principality between 1457 and 1504 (Murgescu, 2012, p. 35-42).

The name “Soviet Moldovanism” is used, because its ideological content is very similar to the Soviet historiography. During the USSR’s rule, the authorities tried to emphasize the difference between Moldovans and Romanians. According to Soviet propaganda, Romanians were considered “occupants”, while the Soviet Union “liberated” Bessarabia from Romanian “fascists” in 1940 and again in 1944 (Бабилунга, 2010, p. 100-108; Grossu, 1987, p. 23). Therefore, strong anti-Romanian attitudes constituted one of the pillars of RSSM identity (Beșleagă, 2008). This feature was, however, a great paradox, as since 1944-1945 Romania has been a communist country too, which was recognizing, unless until Nicolae Ceaușescu’s arrival to power in 1965, the Soviet leadership. Thus anti-Romanian’s hatred was viewed as a friendly force, not an enemy.

There is no objective answer as to whether Moldovans from Bessarabia are indeed a distinct Moldovan nation, because this question is the essence of the political and scientific dispute. There are no doubts, however, that Moldovans from Bessarabia are not the unique heirs of the former Principality of Moldavia. First of all, today’s Republic of Moldova includes less than a half of Principality of Moldavia’s territory. The largest, Western part of that Principality, lays in Romania. The Romanian territory also includes the most important cities of the Principality, former capitals Suceava, Iași (Jassy) and, last but certainly not least, the grave of Stefan the Great (in the Putna monastery). In Romania, other Moldovan historical characters are also considered

---

4 See also from anti-Romanian perspective: Степанюк, 2006, p. 431.
Romanians\textsuperscript{5}. People in Western (Romanian) Moldova consider themselves to be both Moldovans and Romanians. Therefore, there are Moldovans in Romania and Moldovans in Bessarabia.

This leads us to the next paradox: if Moldovans are supposed to be a distinct nation, then Western (Romanian) Moldova should join the Republic of Moldova in order to create a Greater Moldova. This is exactly the slogan of marginal political groups like the Party “Moldova’s Patriots” (P“PM”), led by Mihail Garbuz, a radical opponent to any integration into Romania (e-democracy.md, 2014a). During different demonstrations, the P“PM” often uses a banner with the slogan: “Long live Greater Moldova!” written in Romanian, but using the Cyrillic alphabet (!) (Mediafax.ro, 2012). Without a doubt, such slogans can hardly be identified as realistic, but they are also a political trap. Neither the Principality of Moldavia, nor interwar Romania has ever included Transnistria. So if, according to the ethnic criteria, there is a distinct Moldovan nation, having its roots in the former Principality of Moldova, then the Republic of Moldova can not claim for the reintegration of Transnistria.

The PCRM avoids this trap using several political discourses. The one used by “Moldovanists” emphasizes the differences in relation to Romania. While in relation with Transnistria and Russia, the Moldovan communists use rather an “international” discourse (Danero, 2013, p. 11). According to the PCRM, it is the only one party to protect national minorities from “Romanian nationalism”. Here is appearing a next characteristic point of “Soviet Moldovanism”: close ties with Soviet/Russian heritage and culture. The PCRM leader Vladimir Voronin was born in Transnistria and up until 1989 worked as apparatchik in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Voronin speaks both Romanian and Russian, but prefers to speak Russian. His discourse is very attractive for the Russian-speaking minority, which is estimated to be about a third of the population, mostly in cities and towns. This figure is a consequence of the Soviet period when people from different Soviet republics were moved to RSSM and vice versa. This part of

\textsuperscript{5} Among them, the poet Mihai Eminescu (1850-1889), the poet and politician Vasile Alecsandri (1821-1890), the politician Mihail Kogălniceanu (1817-1891) or marshal Alexandru Averescu (1859-1938) can be mentioned.
the population, well educated, often former apparatchiks of the Soviet state structures, is not willing to learn Romanian (Кожокару, 2004, p. 23-24) and votes for the PCRM because this party does not intend to limit the importance of the Russian language.

Yet another feature seems to be very important. Communist Party’s voters are not only Russian-speakers living in cities but also Moldovan peasants who are afraid of any obedience to any larger country or any domination of Moscow or Bucharest. They want to keep a distance both from Russia and Romania. As it has been demonstrated by Charles King, unlike the intellectuals, the attitudes of the average population during the national revival in the 1980s were not dominated by unionist slogans (King, 2002-2005, p. 145-146). This population was predominantly rural, the RSSM “bourgeoisie” being rather Russian-speaking (Fruntașu, 2002, p. 189-190). The only part of the Soviet establishment dominated by ethnic Moldovans was directors of kolkhozes, like first Moldovan president Mircea Snegur (Crowther, 1994, p. 345). The PCRM was able to catch the peasants’ votes at the end of 1990s, when the Republic of Moldova’s average citizens were tired of political instability and economic collapse. As noted by Dan Dungaciu, once it took power in 2001, the PCRM could look attractive for poor people as it was providing them with basic but vital things, like sending pensions in time (Dungaciu, 2011, p. 230).

However, Vladimir Voronin’s russophilia was not strong enough to solve the Transnistrian problem. An agreement based on the Russian “Kozak Plan” was about to be signed in 2003. At the very last moment Voronin decided, however, not to sign it. For this reason Voronin lost Vladimir Putin’s trust and since this moment no agreement could be found. In this regard, even two “Soviet Moldovanisms” can be identified: the first one represented by the PCRM in the Republic of Moldova’s mainland and the second one represented by Transnistria with the “official” name “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic”. As mentioned before, communist Voronin and communist Smirnov were not able to find any common ground.

---

6 As the “Soviet Moldovanism”, in the sense of an international community of Russian-speaking persons can also be considered the political discourse of Mihail Formuzal, the leader of autonomous Găgăuzia. See: Ангели, 2010, p. 298-300.
In 2014, an important split occurred in the PCRM. Three most radical politicians: Mark Tkaciuk, Grigore Petrenco and Iurie Muntean were removed from the PCRM’s Central Committee (Unimedia.info, 2014). These politicians were considered the most pro-Russian ones. According to Grigore Petrenco, PCRM’s leader Vladimir Voronin made an agreement with pro-European politicians and betrayed the ideals of the party. Under such conditions, a new organisation gained an important popularity among the “Soviet Moldovanists”. This organisation, called “Party Motherland”, was created very recently (September, 2014) by Renato Usatîi – a young and unpredictable activist who spent a large part of his life in Moscow. It is unclear whether the PCRM will retain the votes of all “Soviet Moldovanists”. Renato Usatîi can become their new leader and promote the pro-Russian vector in the Moldovan politics. It should be noted that Grigore Petrenco decided to run for MP seat under the umbrella of “Party Motherland” (e-democracy.md, 2014b).

European Moldovanism

Finally, the last political discourse existing in the Republic of Moldova can be referred to as the “European Moldovanism”. Its main aim is to integrate the Republic of Moldova into the European Union and to use the European integration as a framework for a modern, democratic and prosperous state. For the “European Moldovanists”, the population of the Republic of Moldova speaks Romanian, while being a distinct political nation – the “citizens of the Republic of Moldova”. In fact, the European integration seems to be the best solution to avoid the identity’s trap. The European integration allows to jump over different ethnic or political sensibilities, allows to build a modern, pro-European, Moldovan statehood. Therefore, the aim is to focus all the population on a common statehood project with – as the outcome – a pro-European, Moldovan nation with people speaking different languages.

---

7 On the notion of “civic nation”, not an “ethnic” one, in the Republic of Moldova, see: van Meurs, 2004, p. 142.
Among the “European Moldovanists” are two richest oligarchs in the Republic of Moldova: Vlad Filat, leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM) (Dungaciu, 2011, p. 48), and Vlad Plahotniuc, leader of the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM). Filat is seen as the political heir of the former President Petru Lucinschi (1996-2001). Since 2009, Filat held a position of Prime Minister and led the pro-European coalition, named Alliance for European Integration (AIE). In April of that year, so-called “Twitter Revolution” took place in Chişinău, when young people expressed their objection to the official results of parliamentary elections, where the majority of votes was given to the PCRM for a third consecutive term. The results were nevertheless validated, but the communists received 60 votes in the Parliament, while 61 are required to elect a new president. This is where the communists, who were not included in the Parliament and were part of the opposition, stepped in (PCRM was unsuccessfully looking for the missing “golden vote”) and the Parliament was dissolved. The new elections gave a majority to opposition parties, which created the AIE and a new government, with Vlad Filat as the Prime Minister.

The new governing team engaged in important negotiations with the European Union in order to sign two agreements crucial for the future of the Republic of Moldova: the Association Treaty and the DCFTA Agreement (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area), which in fact was included in the first one. The final version of the agreement was accepted in the autumn of 2013, during the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (Oleksy, 2013, p. 57-64; Данный & Машкауцяну, 2011, p. 228-229). In June 2014, the agreement was signed, while in November 2014 it was ratified by the European Parliament (The European Parliament, 2014).

Vlad Filat’s political credo was considered exactly Moldovanist and Europeanist. Filat aimed to strengthen the Republic of Moldova’s statehood. He was not supporting unionist slogans and, when he became Prime Minister, he emphasized the European Integration, rather than the union with Romania. Amazingly, the AIE government had disagreements with the Romanian neighbour. Romanian President Traian Băsescu did not want, for instance, to sign a border treaty with the Republic of Moldova. He argued that such a document would “legalize
ex post the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact”, since according to this document the Soviet Union occupied Bessarabia in 1940. A border treaty was necessary, however, for the Republic of Moldova, because such a document was required by the European Union. Finally a common declaration was signed in November, 2010, by the Prime Minister Vlad Filat and the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Teodor Baconschi (Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, 2010), i.e. not by the Prime Minister of Romania (at that time: Emil Boc). On the other hand, a common meeting of governments of Romania and the Republic of Moldova was held in Iași in March, 2012. Eventually, further joint Romanian-Moldovan projects were successfully implemented. It seems that the most important one is the construction of gas pipeline “Iași-Ungheni” which allows supplying the Republic of Moldova with gas from Romania (Mediafax.ro, 2014).

Unlike the unionists, Filat does not take part in debates about recent history. In the PLDM’s discourse there is no assessment about the role of Russia and the Soviet Union in the evolution of Bessarabia during the last two centuries. There is no critical attitude towards Russian and/or Soviet influence. The PLDM does not support any action in the area of collective memory. As mentioned before, it is rather Mihai Ghimpu and the Liberal Party who try to commemorate the victims of the Soviet occupation in 1940 and of the following deportations of local population to Siberia in June, 1941\(^8\).

The leadership of Vlad Filat in the pro-European coalition suddenly ended in the spring of 2013. In March of that year, officially due to corruption accusation, a motion of no confidence has been passed by the Parliament. Eventually, the Constitutional Court decided that Filat could not be re-appointed as Prime Minister and asked for the motion of confidence. The PLDM started to vote on several resolutions and bills with the communists. For instance, the PLDM and the PCRM voted together for the removal of Marian Lupu (PDM) from

\(^8\) During his acting presidency, Ghimpu signed a decree according to which June 28\(^{th}\), the day of the Soviet invasion of Bessarabia in 1940, is to be considered the “Day of Soviet Occupation”. The decree was eventually invalidated by the Constitutional Court (România Liberă, 2010).
the position of the Parliament speaker. The electoral law was also modified and the independence of the Constitutional Court was restricted. Moreover, the Attorney General was removed from office on the basis of votes of the PLDM and PCRM. It is to be reminded that the Attorney General was appointed only one week before, also on the basis of votes of the PLDM (eventually, the Constitutional Court declared illegal the Attorney’s removal). Therefore, four years after the “Twitter Revolution” in Chişinău, the PLDM which led the opposition movement against the PCRM in 2009, voted on several bills with the PCRM (Unimedia.info, 2013). As mentioned above, after weeks of endless negotiations, a new pro-European government was established with Iurie Leancă as Prime Minister (also from the PLDM). This time, Vlad Filat was not appointed to any position in the Government.

Last but not least, one of the political parties present in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova is the PDM. This party officially has Marian Lupu as its leader, but it is well-known that the sponsor of the party and the main decision-maker is oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. The struggle between this politician and former Prime Minister Vlad Filat is the key to understanding the collapse of pro-EU coalition in the Parliament. On the other hand, it is difficult to define the PDM’s ideological characteristics. For several years, Marian Lupu has been an eminent member of the PCRM, which he left after the “Twitter Revolution”. It seems that the PDM is halfway between the “European Moldovanism” of the PLDM and the “Soviet Moldovanism” of the PCRM. But, again, ideological features are not as important as personal networks, thus the best option for the PDM would be to name itself the “Plahotniuc’s Party”.

The Linguistic Issue

One of the important cleavages in the Republic of Moldova is associated with the name of the language itself. In accordance with Article 13 of the Constitution (voted in 1994), the “State Language of the Republic of Moldova is the Moldovan language based on Latin alphabet”. In fact, the “Moldovan” language is the same as Romanian, with some regional differences and, generally, a different accent. It can be compared
to French used in France and in Belgium, or German being used in Germany and in Austria. There is, however, an important political issue connected to the name of the language. During the tsarist occupation of Bessarabia, Russian authorities were promoting Russian language (Colesnic-Codreanca, 2003, p. 16-20). Russian-speaking people from Russia’s mainland were invited to move to Bessarabia, especially to towns and cities where Russian-speaking population formed the majority. The local population, mostly peasants, did not have access to schools where the language of instruction was Russian anyhow. Due to these reasons, at the beginning of the 20th century, the national consciousness of the Bessarabian population was very limited (Petrescu, 2007, p. 130). Unlike in Romania, where the Latin alphabet was introduced, the Moldovan/Romanian in Bessarabia was written in old-Cyrillic. During the interwar period, Romanian authorities tried to develop both Romanian language and national consciousness in Bessarabia. The towns, however, remained mostly Russian-speaking, especially due to a high rate of Jewish population. On the Eastern side of the Dniester, in RASSM, the Bolsheviks argued that Moldovan is a distinct language from Romanian (Negru Gh., 2000, p. 14). This argument employed by several political groups up until now is supposed to emphasize the difference between Romanian and Moldovan nations. In order to deepen this difference, the “Moldovan” language in RASSM was written in Cyrillic\(^9\). During both tsarist and Bolshevik period, the authorities also tried to artificially include in Romanian/Moldovan several Russian or Ukrainian words. One of the aims was also to emphasize the difference between Romanian and “Moldovan” (Фурман, 2007, p. 280). This new “language” was, however, incomprehensible to average people.

Since 1940 and the creation of RSSM, and up to the fall of the Soviet Union, the Cyrillic alphabet and the name “Moldavian language” were used in the Soviet Moldavia. Despite this official difference between the Romanian and Moldovan languages highlighted by means of different alphabet, in practice the grammar and vocabulary used in the Soviet

---

\(^9\) In 1932, the Bolsheviks decided to reintroduce the Latin alphabet. Then in 1938, the MASSR came back to the Cyrillic one. See: Cazacu & Trifon, 2010, p. 169-175; Negru E., 2003; Шорников, 2007, p. 296-300.
Moldavia were slowly becoming more and more similar to those used in the classic Romanian\textsuperscript{10}. In 1989, on the wave of Perestroika, the Parliament of the RSSM decided to adopt the Latin alphabet, retaining the name of the “Moldovan” language. The Declaration of Independence adopted on August 27\textsuperscript{th} 1991 mentions the name of “Romanian” language, but as it was stated above, according to the Constitution the “State Language” has become “Moldovan”. It should also be kept in mind that the Latin alphabet was rejected in separatist Transnistria and one of the three “official languages” in Transnistrian “Moldovan” are written in Cyrillic\textsuperscript{11}.

The linguistic feature has several political outcomes, as there is no consensus about the language’s name among political parties. The communists, like separatists from Transnistria, believe that “Moldovan” is language different from Romanian. The only difference is that PCRM does accept the Latin alphabet, while Transnistria does not. In order to prove that Moldovan is not Romanian, in 2003, a famous “Soviet Moldovanist” Vasile Stati published a “Moldovan-Romanian Dictionary” – the first book of its kind in the country’s history. Eventually, during the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April, 2008, Vladimir Voronin, at that time President of the Republic of Moldova, refused to follow the translation of debates in Romanian, which was provided by host authorities, and was listening to the translation into “Moldovan” performed by his personal translator (Ziare.com, 2008; Eremia, 2003, p. 62).

PL and Mihai Ghimpu, on the contrary, believe that “Moldovan” is in fact Romanian, while Marian Lupu proposed a compromise: he suggested writing down in the Constitution that the state language is “Moldovan (Romanian)”. As to the PLDM, Vlad Filat is of a view that Romanian could be accepted as the state language (Evenimentul Zilei, 2011). Therefore, we can observe that the linguistic cleavage does not overlay the cleavage concerning the identity. The “Soviet Moldovanists” (PCRM, Transnistria) identify a distinct Moldovan nation and language.

\textsuperscript{10} This evolution was driven by new generations of intellectuals who, since the seventies, were very keen to rediscover the classic Romanian culture and mark their difference with the Russian-speaking, Bolshevik nomenclature.

\textsuperscript{11} In fact, Transnistria is mostly a Russian-speaking area. The “Moldovan” is used mainly in the countryside. There is only one weekly newspaper in “Moldovan”: “The Transnistrian Truth” (Адэвэрул Нистрян).
The unionists or the PL believe that both the country’s language and population are Romanian. However, Filat and, probably, the PDM hold that the nation is *Moldovan*, but the spoken language is *Romanian*.

On December 5th, 2013, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova issued an important verdict on the collision of the provisions of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. According to the Court, the Declaration of Independence is the founding document of the Republic of Moldova, thus even the Constitution can not interfere with the provisions of the Declaration. Therefore, the state language of the Republic of Moldova is Romanian (Curtea Constituțională a Republicii Moldova, 2013). The verdict is an important element of the legal framework; however, no important change in practice can be observed. The “Soviet Moldovanists” still reject the name of the Romanian language.

**Cleavages within Orthodoxy**

One more cleavage, again not overlaying the linguistic or identity ones, is associated with the religion or, to be more precise, subordination of the Church. Almost all people living in the Republic of Moldova, including Găgăuzia and Transnistria, are Orthodox. There are, however, two Orthodox structures (Popescu, 2004, p. 195): the Metropolis of Chișinău and all Moldova, being part of the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Metropolis of Bessarabia, belonging to the Romanian Orthodox Church. The former exists without any interruptions since the 19th century, even if the name was changed several times and even if between 1918 and 1944 it was part of the structure of the Romanian Orthodox Church. Due to such continuity, the Metropolis of Chișinău has the largest influence, while the Metropolis of Bessarabia was established in 1992 by a group of priests who were seeking to re-establish the canonical union with the Romanian Orthodox Church, i.e. a union which existed between 1918 and 1944. After several controversies and under the pressure from the Council of Europe, Moldova recognized the Metropolis of Bessarabia in 2002. The influence of the Metropolis of Bessarabia is proven to be much more limited than that of the Metropolis of Chișinău (Wierzbicki & Zdaniuk, 2010, p. 124-128).
As to the attitudes of politicians towards the two Churches, certain differences are observed. While, unsurprisingly, the PL leaders and unionists attend services at the Metropolis of Bessarabia, the PDL and PDM members recognize the Metropolis of Chişinău. It is also interesting to note that unlike the Metropolitan of Bessarabia Petru Păduraru, who does not appear at the official ceremonies of the State, the Metropolitan of Chişinău Vladimir Cantarean is invited to various important ceremonies. Moreover, the Patriarch of Moscow made several trips to the Republic of Moldova, while the Patriarch of Romania has never been invited.

In conclusion, we can argue that the Republic of Moldova is still seeking its national unity. Several cleavages – geopolitical, linguistic, and religious – serve as an important obstacle not only to national, but also to state consolidation. In the existing geopolitical context, these factors make the statehood of the Republic of Moldova very vulnerable. Under such conditions, no domestic factor is strong enough to unify the state and the nation. Therefore, it seems that the consolidation can only be driven by external factors. The two alternative options seem to be the European or the Custom Union. The shape of the Republic of Moldova’s statehood is still to be defined.

**Literature:**


---

12 The Patriarchs of Moscow are accused of geopolitical pressure in favour of Russia (Chircă, 2011, p. 193-194). See also: Малер-Матьязова, 2009, p. 139-144.


СССР. Материалы международной научно-практической конференции. Москва: Издатель Степаненко.
ДАННЫЙ, О. & МАШКАУЦЯНУ, М. (2011) Молдова в Европейской политике соседства: «место меж двух стульев». In: КОРОСТЕЛЕВА, Е. (ed.). Восточное партнёрство: проблемы и перспективы. Минск: ГИУСТ БГУ.
Authors

ANDRIUS ŠVARPLYS defended his PhD thesis “European Identity Formation in the European Union” in 2010. Currently he is a lecturer at Vytautas Magnus University (Kaunas, Lithuania), Department of Political Science. E-mail: a.svarplys@pmdf.vdu.lt

IEVA KARPAVICIŪTĖ is a lecturer at Vytautas Magnus University, Department of Political Science. In 2010 Ieva has defended PhD thesis “Analysis of regional security dynamics. Internal and external factors and their interplay“. She is an author of a number of scientific articles on Lithuanian foreign policy, regional security, and transnational security threats. Ieva is a member of editorial board of an peer-reviwed journal The Political Science Almanac. Email: i.karpaviciute@pmdf.vdu.lt

GERDA JAKŠTAITĖ is a lecturer at Vytautas Magnus University, Department of Political Science. She defended PhD thesis about the US-Russian relations under the title „Russia's Containment and Engagement Strategies in the Contemporary Foreign Policy of the United States and the Factor of Baltic States“ (in 2012) that was awarded by the Research Council of Lithuania. E-mail: g.jakstaite@pmdf.vdu.lt

PHILIPPE PERCHOC defended his PhD thesis “Re-devenir Européens: les politiques étrangères estonienne, lettone et lituanienne après la chute de l’URSS” [„European again? Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Foreign Policies after the Fall of the USSR“] in 2010. Currently he is a researcher at ISPOLE, Université Catholique de Louvain. E-mail: p.perchoc@gmail.com
ANDIS KUDORS is continuing his doctoral studies at the University of Latvia. Since 2006, Mr. Kudors has been executive director of the Centre for East European Policy Studies (CEEPS). He is a member of Foreign Policy Council at Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he had been Fulbright scholar at Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC from October 2014 till January 2015. E-mail: andis.kudors@appc.lv

ANDREA GRIFFANTE is a research fellow at Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania). After graduating at the University of Trieste (Italy) he obtained his PhD in History from the Lithuanian Institute of History in Vilnius. He has published about 20 scientific articles on East Central European history and societies and edited “Confini della modernità. Lituani, non lituani e stato nazionale nella Lituania del XX secolo” (Gorizia: ICM, 2010). E-mail: a.griffante@pmdf.vdu.lt

BARTŁOMIEJ ZDANIUK is a lecturer at University of Warsaw, Faculty of Journalism and Political Science. In 2000/2001 he was a fellow at Sciences Po Paris. In 2003 he defended his PhD thesis “French General Elections 1789-1914. The Problem of Choice’s Representativity”. For many years he has been being in charge of Erasmus Programme. More recently his research focuses on the issues of statehood in the Republic of Moldova. In 2014, he was a research fellow at the Alecu Russo State University of Bălți. The same year, during parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova, he served as Short Term Observer within the ODIHR OSCE observation mission. E-mail: bartlomiej.zdaniuk@uw.edu.pl
Tables

Table 1. The main topics of the Lithuanian public discourse in the field of construction of national collective identity, 2004-2011.

Table 2. Periods of the Lithuanian Foreign Policy and Dynamics of the National Identity.

Table 3. Elements of self in the Lithuanian foreign policy identity constructed by the Lithuanian mass media, 2009-2011.

Table 4. Perception of Lithuania’s role in international relations constructed by the Lithuanian mass media, 2009-2011.

Table 5. Perception of Lithuania’s national interests and foreign policy goals constructed by the Lithuanian mass media, 2009-2011.

Table 6. Perception of pragmatism and values in Lithuania’s foreign policy constructed by the Lithuanian mass media, 2009-2011.

Table 7. Countries and international organizations mentioned in the Lithuanian mass media over the period between 2009 and 2011 in relation to Lithuania.

Table 8. Categories of countries and international organizations mentioned in the Lithuanian mass media over the period between 2009 and 2011 in relation to Lithuania.
One might have noticed that all the contributions in this book deal with the attempts of former post-communist states to find the appropriate way to reconcile the nation-state building with Europe after achieving the EU membership in 2004. “Europe” has always been part of the cultural-political considerations related to the state’s and nation’s development. Most Central Eastern European countries analysed here in the book were characterized by some degree of backwardness, lack of democratization, delay of modernity, need for the Other, and inherited problems of national minorities. The actual membership in the EU and NATO did not automatically provide the solutions for problems of nation-building and consolidation. However, it provided good impulses for reconsidering the old issues in the new light. The most important lesson that could be drawn from these contributions is that European identity of the analysed countries and nations continues to play the major driving role for pro-European direction, however, Europe is usually seen not as the final and reached destination, but as the next step towards (a tool for) reconsidering national interests.