



Justyna Zajac

European Union Policy in the Mediterranean

An International Roles Theory Approach



Faculty of Journalism and Political Science University of Warsaw

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Content

Introduction	7
Chapter I. International roles theory	11
1. What is an ‘international role’?	11
2. Determinants of the state’s international roles.	13
2.1. The state’s position in international relations	14
2.2. The state’s international identity.	17
3. Typologies of international roles	19
4. The effectiveness of international roles	23
5. Conclusion	27
Chapter II. International roles theory and its application in analysing the EU’s policy	27
1. Can the EU play international roles?	27
2. The EU’s international position	28
3. The EU’s international identity	32
4. A typology of the EU’s international roles	39
5. Conclusion	40
Chapter III. The concept of the EU’s roles in the Mediterranean	43
1. Programme documents	43
2. The role of active player in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.	45
3. The role of promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament	48
4. The role of promoter of economic reforms and sustainable regional development	51
5. The role of propagator of democratic values, human rights and intercultural dialogue	52
6. Financial instruments for implementing EU’s roles in the Mediterranean	54
7. Conclusion	56
Chapter IV. The EU as an active player in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict	59
1. Diplomatic activity.	59
2. Supporting the creation of Palestinian state institutions.	66

3. Giving development and humanitarian aid to the Palestinians	72
4. Supporting the development of regional cooperation	83
5. Conclusion	86
Chapter V. The EU as a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament	89
1. Promoting confidence-building measures and partnership	89
2. Initiating and participating in activities to counter illegal immigration and organized crime	93
3. Promoting arms control in the region and creating a WMD-free zone . . .	97
4. Conclusion	100
Chapter VI. The EU as a promoter of economic reforms and sustainable regional growth.	101
1. Supporting reforms in the SEMCs and acting to create a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area	101
2. Promoting the economic integration of the Arab countries	101
3. Initiating and supporting sustainable development in the region	111
a. Energy	112
b. Transport	112
c. Tourism	112
d. Environmental protection	114
4. Conclusion	122
Chapter VII. The EU as a propagator of democratic values, human rights and intercultural dialogue	125
1. Propagating democratic values and human rights in the SEMCs	125
2. Promoting intercultural dialogue	131
3. Conclusion	137
Chapter VIII. The specificity of the EU's roles in the Mediterranean	139
1. The institutionalisation of relations with the SEMCs	139
2. The comprehensiveness of activities	142
3. The policy of conditionality	144
4. Multilateralism as a method of international actions	147
5. Conclusion	152
Chapter IX. The effectiveness of the EU's roles in the Mediterranean: the conflict between its declared, expected and performed roles	155
1. The rationality of the EU's concept of its roles	155
2. The degree to which the EU's concept of its roles was implemented. . . .	160
3. The level of acceptance for EU roles by the SEMCs	172
4. Conclusion	179
Conclusions	181
Bibliography	187

Introduction

The European Union's policy in the Mediterranean region has been of interest to many writers, as evidenced by the existing books and articles on the subject. The work of authors such as Roberto Aliboni, Richard Youngs, Fulvio Attinà, Fred Tanner, Dorothée Schmid, Antonio Marquina, Richard Gillespi, Laura Guido, Fouad M. Ammor, Annette Jünnemann, Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Martin Ortega, Stelios Stavridis, Mohammed Selim, Fouad Zaim, Stefania Panebianco and many others have contributed to expanding the body of knowledge on the European Union's involvement in its southern neighbourhood. The topic is also treated in works analysing EU foreign and security policy by, among other authors, Lisbeth Aggestam, Michael Smith, Ole Elgström, Karen Smith, Mario Teló, John McCormick, Ben Soetendorp, Christopher Hill, Knud Erik Jørgensen, Helen Sjursen, Christiane Lesquene, Ryszard Zięba and Stanisław Parzymies.

The aim of the present book is to analyse the European Union's engagement in the Mediterranean region through the prism of international roles theory: to analyse the conditions, types, specificity and effectiveness of the European Union's roles in the Mediterranean region in the years 1993-2010. The year 1993 is linked with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, which changed the shape of European integration and provided the basis for the emergence of the European Union. The year 2011, on the other hand, brought the events in the southern and eastern Mediterranean region called the Arab Spring. This year was also distinguished by the EU's serious internal problems, which called into question the future of European integration and the EU's international roles. The end of 2010 is thus a good point at which to appraise the EU's impact in the Mediterranean region and to draw conclusions for its future activities.

Applying international roles theory to an analysis of the EU's policies in the Mediterranean region would seem to be an unusually interesting approach. It will allow showing not only EU policy toward the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs), but also incorporating into the analysis

the expectations held of those state. The conflict between declared, performed and expected roles of the EU in the Mediterranean will help to explain lack of effectiveness of the EU's policy in the Mediterranean.

The main assumption is that the EU's policy toward its southern and eastern Mediterranean neighbours has been conditioned on its international position and international identity. The EU is spoken of as a global player, but its position in particular fields of international life varies. While the EU remains one of the world's most important players in international economic relations – in spite of the financial crisis in the euro-zone – yet in the political and military sphere its position is significantly lower. This is reflected in the roles it plays in the Mediterranean region and in the roles expected of it by Mediterranean countries that are not EU members. The EU's varied position in international relations also leads to a conflict between the roles it declares and those it performs.

The EU's international identity then has a major influence on the roles it declares and that other countries expect of it. Although the EU's identity is actually in a phase of formation, it is constructed on the basis of values such as dignity, freedom, equality, democracy, human rights, social solidarity and sustainable development, and these are reflected in the roles the EU declares. Another important element of the EU's international identity is its institutional system, which hinders it in playing an effective role in the international arena. In spite of its expansion, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was established by the Maastricht Treaty and developed in the treaty revisions, remains an intergovernmental policy with few significant elements of communitarisation and flexibility. After the Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 2009 the CFSP is still a 'common' policy only in name. Thus, although the question will not be addressed in the present book, it must be admitted that the interests of EU member countries have considerable impact on the EU's interactions in the Mediterranean region. In essence, the EU's international position and international identity limit its ability to perform effective roles in the Mediterranean area. There is a clear conflict between the roles it declares, those expected of it, and those it performs, as will be shown below.

The book contains nine chapters. In the first, I present the international rolestheory. In the second I consider the international roles theory and its application in analysing the EU's policy. In the third one chapter I discuss the concept of EU roles in the Mediterranean region, i.e., its declared roles. These are contained in documents elaborated by EU institutions, in particular, by the European Council, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission, and in documents adopted by the European Union and by countries participating in the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy. An analysis of the documents shows that the European Union has declared its intent to play the following roles: an active player in

resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict; a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament; a promoter of economic reform and sustainable regional development; and a propagator of democracy, human rights and intercultural dialogue. These roles have not been set forth explicitly, but from the tenor of the documents it is nevertheless clear that the names applied above fit EU intentions.

In chapters IV-VII I will show the empirical dimension of the declared roles. The European Union performs its general roles through partial roles. In the case of its role as an active player in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict these are the roles of a diplomatic actor, a participant in creating Palestinian state structures, a donor of development and humanitarian aid for the Palestinians and a promoter of regional cooperation. The role of promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament involves the particular roles of promoter of confidence-building measures and partnership, initiator and participant in combating organized crime and illegal immigration, and promoter of arms limitations and the creation of a Middle East WMD-free zone (chapter V). Another role, which will be discussed in chapter VI, is that of the EU as promoter of sustainable regional development and of market reforms in the economies of the Arab states. This role contains partial ones: the EU as promoter of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area and of the economic integration of the Arab states, and the EU as initiator and active participant in sustainable development in areas such as energy, transport, tourism and environmental protection. In chapter VII, I will present the European Union's role as a propagator of democracy, human rights and intercultural dialogue. In chapter VIII, I will contrast the specificity of EU roles in the Mediterranean region to the roles played by other external actors. This specificity is closely related to the identity of the European Union. Among the elements that distinguish the EU's role from that of other actors are: 1) a comprehensive approach containing political, economic, cultural and social actions; 2) the EU's institutionalization of its relations with partner states; 3) a policy of conditionality, understood as a dependency between granting aid, usually financial and/or technical, and the recipient's fulfilment of set conditions; and 4) the use of multilateralism as a mode of acting, i.e., with other international players. Chapter IX, the last, is an attempt to appraise the effectiveness of European Union roles. I have made the evaluation in light of three factors: the rationality of the EU's concept of its roles in the Mediterranean region; the degree of their realisation; and the level of their acceptance by the countries of the eastern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea.

CHAPTER I

International roles theory

1. What is an ‘international role’?

The idea of transposing international roles theory from sociology, psychology and anthropology onto the field of international relations emerged over 40 years ago. Introduced in the sixties and seventies by Kalevi Holsti, the international roles theory has been drawing increasing interest from scholars since the end of the Cold War.

The first scholars to embark on the subject were Kalevi Holsti, Carl W. Backman, Naomi B. Wish, Christer Jönsson and Ulf Westerlund.¹ In the 1980s, other researchers also focused on international roles theory. These included Stephen Walker and his team: James Rosenau, Margaret G. Hermann, Charles F. Hermann, Sheldon W. Simon, Eric G. Singer, and Valerie M. Hudson. The results were published in 1987 in a book entitled *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*. Research into international roles theory was also made by Ziemowit Jacek Pietraś, who wrote two books on the subject: one on international roles theory in the strict sense; the other on its applications in the study of China's foreign policy.² Despite the high quality of the analyses being produced, international roles theory did not have much impact on research into international relations until the end of the Cold War. As Marijke Breuning has correctly pointed out, the first studies devoted to this theoretical concept

¹ Kalevi Holsti, *National Role Conception In the Study of Foreign Policy*, 'International Studies Quarterly', Vol. 14, No. 3, September 1970, pp. 233–309; Carl W. Backman, *Role Theory ad International Relations: A Commentary and Extension*, 'International Studies Quarterly', Vol. 14, No. 3, September 1970, pp. 310–319; Naomi Bailin Wish, *Foreign Policy Makers and National Role Conceptions*, 'International Studies Quarterly', No. 4, Vol. 24, December 1980, pp. 532–554; Christer Jönsson, Ulf Westerlund, *Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis*, in: Christer Jönsson (ed.), *Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics*, St. Martin Press, New York 1982.

² Stephen G. Walker (ed.), *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*, Duke University Press, Durham 1987; Ziemowit J. Pietraś, *Pojęcie i klasyfikacja ról międzynarodowych*, UMCS, Międzyuczelniany Instytut Nauk Politycznych, Centralny Program Badań Podstawowych 11.10.2.2.1, Lublin 1989; Ziemowit J. Pietraś, *Międzynarodowa rola Chin*, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 1990.

were in large measure systemic in character; they concentrated on analyzing the influence of the international system's structures on states' international roles.³ Through its consideration of elements that were generally passed over in classic foreign policy, it allows a fuller analysis of interactions in international relations. It should be admitted, however, that in the above-mentioned book edited by Walker, the dependence between 'national attributes' and 'cultural norms' on the one hand and the roles of the state on the other were taken into account.

It is only with changes in the international order, when new theoretical approaches in the field of international relations acquired more room for development, that international roles theory also attracted growing interest on the part of researchers and was subjected to more intensive analysis. Since the nineties, several new publications on the subject have emerged and constructivism has given it new impetus, as international roles are closely related to identity, one of the constructivist paradigm's key objects of interest. Michael Barnett, Lisbeth Aggestam, Richard Adigbuo, Marijke Breuning, Sebastian Harnisch, Hanns Maull, Cristian Cantir, Juliet Kaarbo, Cameron G. Thies, should be mentioned as having made important contributions to the development of international roles theory.⁴

However in the field of international relations, as in the various fields of the social sciences, there is no single and universally accepted definition of an 'international role'. My premise is that **the international role is the actor's influence on other participants in international relations, as determined by domestic and external factors, including, most importantly, its international position and international identity.**

Many researchers consider the subject of an international role to be a state, treating the role as the equivalent of being an actor in international relations. Others, however, claim that international roles can be played not only by states, but also by non-state actors, including international organizations, trans-national corporations or pressure groups. Given their limited influence, individuals only rarely play important international roles. I agree with

³ Marijke Breuning, *Role research: genesis and blind spots*, in: Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, Hanns W. Maull (eds.), *Role Theory in International Relations. Approaches and analyses*, Routledge, London, New York 2011, pp. 18-19.

⁴ Michael Barnett, *Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: the Case of the Arab States System*, „International Studies Quarterly”, Vol. 37, September 1993, pp. 271-296; Lisbeth Aggestam, *Role Conceptions and the Politic of Identity in Foreign Policy*, „ARENA Working Papers”, WP 99/8; Cristian Cantir, Juliet Kaarbo, *Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory*, 'Foreign Policy Analysis', Vol. 8, 2012, pp. 5-24; Cameron G. Thies, *Role Theory and Foreign Policy*, in: Robert A. Denemark (ed.), *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, Vol. X, West Sussex, UK: 2010, pp. 6335-6356; Harnisch, Frank, Maull (eds.), op. cit.; Małgorzata Bielecka, *Role międzynarodowe państw*, in: Ryszard Zięba (ed.), *Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2004, pp. 177-192.

the idea that not only states can play an international role, but also other actors in international relations. However in next sections I will concentrate on international roles played by the state, claiming that this is still the most important actor in international relations.

2. Determinants of the state's international roles

A given actor's international roles are made up of a myriad of internal and international factors that determine such roles. The roles of the various actors in international relations have differing determinants. Factors shaping the international roles of states, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, trans-national corporations, and individuals are not the same. The determinants of the international roles of actors on the international stage may be similar, but their importance and essence will diverge.


In the case of a state, the international roles it plays are in large measure identical with the determinants of its foreign policy.⁵ In the literature there are many typologies and classifications of the factors that condition a state's foreign policy, however the most useful for the present analysis seems to be the typology proposed by two scholars: Józef Kukułka and Ryszard Zięba. They divide the determinants of a state's foreign policy into internal and external (international) and, within each of these categories, into objective and subjective factors.

Determinants a state's foreign policy according to Józef Kukułka and Ryszard Zięba			
Internal		External	
Objective	Subjective	Objective	Subjective
Geographical environment Population potential Economic potential Military potential Socio-political system	Perception of the international environment by a state and its society The state's foreign policy concepts Quality and active-ness of the state's foreign and diplomatic service	Evolutionary trends in the international environment Position of the state in the international relations system Structure and reach of international ties and international law in force	Perception of the state and society by international society Other states' foreign policy concepts Quality and active-ness of other states' foreign and diplomatic services

Source: Józef Kukułka & Ryszard Zięba, 'Ewolucja międzynarodowej roli Polski odrodzonej', *Studia Nauk Politycznych*, 1981, No. 4, pp. 80-81; Ryszard Zięba, 'Uwarunkowania polityki zagranicznej państwa', in: Ryszard Zięba (ed.), *Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2005.

⁵ Ryszard Zięba, *Uwarunkowania polityki zagranicznej państwa*, in: idem, op. cit., pp. 17-35; Stephen Walker, *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis: an Evaluation*, in: idem, op. cit., pp. 266-267; Daniel Colard, *Les relations internationales*, Masson, Paris 1987, pp. 48-73.

This typology, in modified form, can be used to analyze the conditions of a state's international roles. In this case, the greatest importance is attributed to two factors: the position of the state in international relations, and its international identity. Both determinants contain elements that we will examine further on. Additional factors include evolutionary trends in the international environment and the structure and reach of the state's international ties and of international law.



2.1. The state's position in international relations

The international role of a state is a dynamic expression of its position, provided the state uses that position actively. Just as a social position is not synonymous with a social role, so an international position is not synonymous with an international role. Social roles are closely connected with an individual's behaviour, and international roles with a state's international influence. The position of the state, however, influences the concept of its international roles and the possibilities of its implementation. What roles will be imposed on a state from outside also depends on a state's international position. The intensity of the roles played by the state, i.e., the frequency of its appearances, is also dependent on that state's potential and international position.

What is, then, the essence of a state's international position? It is the place the state occupies in the system of international relations. The only criterion that makes states equal to one another is formal and legal. It is obvious that in any other terms, states differ from one another and have different acting force in international relations. The position of a state on the international stage is conditioned by many factors. A state's potential is very important and is a function of internal factors: its geographical environment in the wide sense; its population potential; its economic, scientific, and technical potential; and its military potential. Political, historical and cultural factors, however, are also important.⁶

The geographical environment includes factors such as location, climate, area, land formation, water network and access to the sea, the nature of borders and natural resources. These factors affect the security of the state (area, state boundaries, land formation and the nature of its borders), its economic and commercial policies (water network, climate, land formation and natural resources) and, in consequence, determine to some extent the state's position on the international stage. A friendly neighbourhood is also important. While geopolitical theories linking geographical location with political position have lost some of their currency lately, they should not be underestimated in any analysis of a state's international role.

A similarly important element is the state's population potential, which includes the size of the population, its density, demographic growth, age structure, ethnic make-up, emigration and immigration numbers. In the past, a state's population and rate of demographic growth were an important source of its military power. Presently, given scientific and technical advances and the prohibition of aggression, a country's number of inhabitants does not play such an important role in the military context, but remains significant in economic and commercial terms. Similarly, the population's age structure and level of education are significant not only for the state's defence, but also for its economic, scientific, and technical development. The rate of demographic growth and the ethnic breakdown of the population are also important.⁷ Great ethnic diversity coupled with a strong sense of identity among various national groups may be unfavourable, because these groups may be disloyal toward the state and even exhibit separatist tendencies. Minorities and national groups can form strong lobbies that exert a large influence on a given state's international roles.⁸

⁶ Compare: Nami Bailin Wish, *National Attributes as Sources of National Role Conceptions: a Capability-Motivation Model*, in: Walker (ed.), op. cit., pp. 94–103.

⁷ See more: Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap de Wilde, *Environmental, Economic and Societal Security*, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen 1995.

⁸ Fiona B. Adamson, *Crossing Borders. International Migration and National Security*, „International Security’ Vol. 31, No. 1, Summer 2006, pp. 165–199.

A state's economic, scientific, technical and military potentials have an unusually important influence on its international roles. The economic factor has gained in importance as the processes of globalization and the demilitarization of international relations have progressed. The prohibition of aggression in international law does not signify, however, that a state's military potential has become unimportant. In practice, a state's large military potential, and especially its possession of weapons of mass destruction, reinforces its position on the international stage and increases the state's ability to play important international roles.⁹

Also important is a state's political system. In democratic countries, society has a much greater influence on forming foreign policy goals than in authoritarian and totalitarian countries and thus the international roles of such states are more predictable. Liberal international relations theory holds that democratic states are more peacefully predisposed toward other democracies, on the principle that 'democratic states do not fight one another.'¹⁰

Another factor in the building of a state's international position is the quality and activeness of its diplomatic and foreign service. Individual leaders, the organizational system of the foreign and diplomatic services, and the predispositions of the people employed at the ministry of foreign affairs are involved here. The influence of the character traits of foreign policy decision-makers is analyzed in detail by the behaviourist trend of thought in the study of international relations. According to research analyzing the decision-making process, the behaviour of the state is a reflection of the activeness of those who appear in its name. Behavioural scholars, such as Richard C. Snyder, Burton Sapin, and Margaret G. Herman, are seeking regularity and repeatability in the behaviour of states as a function of the influence of decision-makers and the manner in which they define their decision-making context.¹¹ The influence of individuals on the course of history is unique, but analyzing a state's policy and its international roles solely in terms of the traits,

⁹ On military factor in state's foreign policy see: Charles-Philippe David, *La guerre et la paix: approches contemporaines de la sécurité et de la stratégie*, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris 2000, pp. 247–266; Barry Buzan, Eric Herring, *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics*, Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder 1998; David W. Ziegler, *War, Peace and International Politics*, Sixth Edition, Harper Collins College Publisher, New York 1993.

¹⁰ See more: Michel W. Doyle, *Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs*, „Philosophy and Public Affairs', Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 1983, pp. 205–235; idem, *Liberalism and World Politics*, „The American Political Science Review', Vol. 80, No. 4, December 1986, pp. 1151–1169; Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton, University Press, Princeton 1993.

¹¹ Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, Burton Sapin; with new chapters by Valerie M. Hudson, Derek H. Chollet, James M. Goldgeier, *Foreign policy decision-making; revisited*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2002; Margaret G. Hermann, *Foreign Policy Orientations and the Quality of Foreign Policy Decisions*, in: Walker (ed.), op. cit., pp. 123–140.

personalities, behaviour and actions of its leaders should be avoided. This would be an excessive oversimplification.

The position of the state in the system of international relations is also affected by evolutionary trends in the international environment, i.e., processes that affect the actions of various actors in international relations and that are subject to internalization. In determining the behaviour of states, they consequently influence the states' declared and performed roles. They may also form the basis for roles imposed on a state. The degree to which these trends in the international environment affect the roles of a state is dependent on the state's position. A state with a strong position is rather the originator of new trends or, at least, contributes to their development, while a state with a weak position has no influence on changes in the international order, but is more exposed to their consequences. A state's position in international relations is an unusually important factor shaping its roles.

2.2. The state's international identity

The perception of a state by other actors on the international stage is also a very important factor in that state's international position and, in consequence, for its international roles. This perception is closely related to the state's international identity, i.e., the state's self-perception on the basis of its sense of distinctness in relation to others and the traits ascribed to it by other states. The 'international identity' of a state is made up of its 'internal identity', which determines the cohesiveness of its component parts, and its 'external identity', which constitutes its distinctiveness in relation to other states. The state's international identity is the result of feedback between a given state and other participants in international relations; it is a manifestation of the state's self-awareness in connection with its situation in the international environment.¹² The elements conditioning a state's international identity are primarily historical, cultural, spatial, geographical, economical, military, ideological and psychological in nature.¹³ A state's identity and its position are thus very closely related. In connection with the close interdependence between a state's self-awareness and its perception by other international entities, state image-building is an important element in maintaining or changing a state's international identity.¹⁴

¹² Stanisław Bieleń, *Tożsamość międzynarodowa Federacji Rosyjskiej*, ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2006, pp. 25–27.

¹³ Józef Kukułka, *Pojmowanie i istota tożsamości narodowej pod koniec XX wieku*, in: Stanisław Bieleń, Witold Góralski (eds.), *Nowa tożsamość Niemiec i Rosji w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 1999, pp. 11–15.

¹⁴ Józef Kukułka, *Postrzeganie międzynarodowe*, „Stosunki Międzynarodowe-International Relations” 1992, t. 16, pp. 91–103.

The constructivist trend of thought in particular pays great attention to the importance of identity in shaping a state's foreign policy. Alexander Wendt claims that the state's identity determines its interests and, therefore, its actions. He introduces a distinction between social identity, which has to do with the status, role or personality that the international community ascribes to a given state, and the state's collective identity, which has to do with the internal human, material and cultural factors making the state what it is.¹⁵ In Wendt's approach, internal factors are paramount, while Peter Katzenstein, concentrates to a greater degree on the importance of international norms in shaping a state's identity and interests.¹⁶

Based on their sense of identity, states shape their own hierarchies of values and the ensuing priorities of action. Such priorities form a polystrategy and affect international roles. Depending on the declared and realized international roles pursued by a state, it can be distinguished as a power, a leader, an ally, partner, client, satellite, member (in international organizations) or some other identity. In each case, we are dealing with a conflict or cooperative collision between the identity of a given state and the identities of other participants.¹⁷ According to Wendt, actors' different types of identity generate conflict, because states insist on their own understanding of international roles and don't want to alter them. He does not rule out the cooperativeness of international roles, however. This occurs in a situation where states strive to adapt and change in the international environment in keeping with their changing needs and interests, which inclines them toward compromise and cooperation.¹⁸ States, according to the premises of the constructivists, come to an understanding in a common communicative process consisting of argumentation, deliberation and persuasion.

It might be stated then, that the state's international identity is shaped by internal and external factors, and identities affect the choice of roles that

¹⁵ Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics*, „International Organization', 1992, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 391-425.

¹⁶ Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York 1996. More on constructivism in IR see: Karin M. Fierke, Knud Erik Jørgensen (eds.), *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*, Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe 2001; Emanuel Adler, *Seizing the Middle Ground. Constructivism in World Politics*, „European Journal of International Relations', 1997, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 319-363; Stefano Guzzini, *A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations*, „European Journal of International Relations', 2000, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 147-182; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, Stephen D. Krasner, *International Organization and the Study of World Politics*, „International Organization', Autumn 1998, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 645-685; Ted Hopf, *The Promise of Construction in International Relations Theory*, „International Security', Summer 1998, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 171-200; Antje Wiener, *Relazioni Internazionali e Costruttivismo: Puzzles e Promesse*, „Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica', 2007, Vol. XXXVII, No.1, pp. 25-54.

¹⁷ Bieleń, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

¹⁸ Wendt, *Anarchy is what States Make...*, pp. 395-421.

the state wishes to play. The roles' definition is reflected in the concepts behind the state's foreign policy, understood as an imagined, deliberated situation that should become real. These are in the nature of declared roles. In consequence, the identity of the state also implies the types of roles it plays and affects their specificity, i.e., their distinctness from the roles played by other states.

It should be noted, however, that the state is, to a degree, limited in the formulation and pursuit of its roles by international law. This pertains to both the bilateral and multilateral obligations undertaken by the state as well as peremptory, so-called *ius cogens*, norms. In keeping with the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*, states can not unilaterally absolve themselves from obligations undertaken earlier in concluded agreements, and *ius cogens* norms cannot be abrogated by any international agreement.

3. Typologies of international roles

In the literature, international roles are subject to various classifications and typologies. As Ziemowit Jacek Pietraś pointed out, two main approaches can be distinguished: the empirical, based on induction, and the theoretical, using deduction.¹⁹

In the empirical approach, researchers have mainly used the quantitative method of study. Kalevi Holsti analyzed the official pronouncements of leaders from 71 states during the period 1965-1967, and singled out 972 concepts of international roles. On this basis, he made a theoretical division singling out 17 main types of international roles. He also distinguished declared roles (role conception), expected roles (role prescriptions) and performed roles (role performance), stressing that declared roles have a greater impact on the ultimate shape of a state's actions than expected roles.²⁰ The studies initiated by Kalevi Holsti were continued by a team of researchers under the direction of Margaret and Charles Herman. In their analysis, they discerned six possible role orientations for a state's foreign policy: expansionist, actively independent, influence-guided, mediating/integrating, opportunist and developmental. Based on this typology, ten types of international roles were distinguished: the warrior, the conciliator, the defender of the faith, the giver, the caretaker, the liberator, the mediator, the policer and the promoter.²¹

Stephen Walker used a different method. He began with a theoretical classification of roles, which he then used to reinterpret empirical studies he had conducted earlier. As a result, he singled out six interna-

¹⁹ Pietraś, *Role międzynarodowe...*, p. 21.

²⁰ Holsti, op. cit., p. 239.

²¹ Margaret Herman, *Foreign Policy Role Orientations and the Quality of Foreign Policy Decisions*, in: Walker (ed.), op. cit., pp. 123-140.

tional roles: the consumer, producer, warrior, conciliator, provocateur and hegemon. He also presented an idea for linking the classifications of various international roles of states and showing the dependences between them in the form of a tree of international roles. He took into account various types of political processes (exchange and conflict), types of situation (cooperation, aid, confrontation and intervention), basic international roles and role concepts.²²

Lisbeth Aggestam, basing herself on the work of Kalevi Holsti, distinguished three types of roles: those expected by other players and groups (role expectation), those declared (role conception), and those performed, signifying the decisions and actions embarked on in foreign policy (role performance).²³

The most comprehensive classification was proposed by Ziemowit Jacek Pietraś.²⁴ With a slight modification of his classification, the following criteria of international roles can be differentiated:

- the subjective criterion – called the criterion of the role's creator or author. This criterion can be used to distinguish imposed roles, those expected by other actors in international relations, and roles chosen by the actor;
- the objective criterion – political, economic, cultural, military, ideological and other roles;
- the spatial criterion – also called the role's territorial range criterion, allows for the distinguishing of local, sub-regional, regional, supra-regional and global roles;
- the time criterion – having to do with the time perspective in which a given role is to be performed (this concerns declarative roles) and the time during which that role is truly performed (real roles). Short-term, medium-term and long-term roles can be singled out here;
- the attitude toward international reality criterion – this refers to revolutionary, innovative, conservative and reactionary roles. By expanding this classification, cooperative and hostile roles, saturated and unsaturated roles, active and passive roles, and intensive and non-intensive roles can be distinguished;
- the hierarchic criterion – makes it possible to single out main roles, which have an overall vision of the aims and means to be used by the state in their pursuit, and partial roles, which are an instantiation of the main roles. In the case of states, one main role concept and a number of partial ones are usually involved;

²² Stephen Walker, *Role Theory and the International System: A Poscripts to Walz's Theory of International Politics?*, in: idem (ed.), op. cit., p. 287–293. Stephen Walker, *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis: An Evaluation*, in: idem (ed.), op. cit., s. 258; Pietraś, *Role międzynarodowe...*, pp. 22–23; Bielecka, op. cit., pp. 188–189.

²³ Aggestam, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁴ Pietraś, *Role międzynarodowe...*, p. 25–26.

- the effective role criterion – in this case, the roles are divided into those that are declared and those that are performed. The declared roles do not always coincide with the performed roles. Performed roles are in fact the result of the declared, imposed or chosen roles. This means that performed roles are a kind of synthesis of several other international roles of a given political unit.

The actors in international relations, like individuals in a society, fulfil many roles simultaneously. In sociology, Robert K. Merton introduced the concept of 'role-set', *by which he meant that complement of role relationships which persons have by virtue of occupying a particular social status*. Role-set differs from 'multiple roles,' that refer to the complex of roles associated not with a single social status, but with the various statuses in which individuals find themselves.²⁵ In the case of international roles, it is a matter of states, and other actors in international relations, acting out the role set and multiple roles that result from a given participant's various positions in the objective and spatial sphere.

Playing several different roles at once could lead to conflict between them. In actuality, the actors try to undertake roles that are mutually consistent, but playing many roles simultaneously by one entity can sometimes lead to conflicting expectations and behaviours.

In the case of international roles, conflict can appear between various kinds of roles within the compass of one criterion or between roles differentiated according to various criteria. Conflict can occur between local, sub-regional, regional, supra-regional and global roles (the spatial criterion) and between short, medium, or long-term goals (the time criterion). A conflict of roles within the framework of the subjective criterion (the creative criterion or author's role), where there is a difference between the roles imposed or expected by the international environment and the roles chosen by the actor, is a fairly frequent phenomenon. The roles chosen by the actor do not always meet with understanding from the environment in which the actor is functioning, or the roles expected by the environment do not meet with the approbation of the actor for whom they have been formulated. In the case of a conflict between the imposed and chosen roles, the actor could: try to change the requirements of the international environment and in consequence the content of the imposed role; or to adapt to pressure and accept the role imposed by the international community. However, if the actor does not succeed in changing the expectations of the environment in which it functions, and is not in itself in a position to adapt to the expectations others have of it, it could find itself in international isolation – partial or complete.

²⁵ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, enlarged edition, The Free Press, New York 1968, pp. 422-23.

It can also happen that a conflict arises between various types of international roles, which are separated from each other according to varying criteria. For instance, a conflict could occur between subjective roles (political, economic, military or cultural) at various levels of spatial reach (local, sub-regional, supra-regional or global), or there could be a divergence in the roles expected of an actor – expectations of one sort might be formulated by its immediate surroundings, and other expectations might exist at the global level. A similar divergence can be observed in the case of varying kinds of roles in accordance with the criterion of relation to international reality and the spatial criterion. In addition to the above examples, there could be other configurations of conflict between international roles.²⁶ For example, Michael Barnett calls attention to the fact that a conflict in a state's international roles could come about through belonging to various international institutions. These could formulate opposing expectations for the state, which could lead to conflicts. Barnett considers that the neorealist claim that international institutions are formed by the interests of their member states is incomplete, because such institutions can also form the interests of their member states. A conflict of roles occurs when these interests are not clear.²⁷

4. The effectiveness of international roles

It is not a rarity that a declared role is not performed. In such case we talk about ineffectiveness of international roles.²⁸

The effectiveness of international roles is a phenomenon of considerable complexity. It is necessary to make a difference between 'effectiveness', understood as the realization of goals, and 'efficiency', understood as a realization of goals with a view to the costs. It is an unusually difficult task to appraise the efficiency of a given actor's role when it is understood as the cost-efficient realization of a goal. First, costs are hard to measure. There is no justification for limiting them solely to the incurred financial outlay. In the case of international actors, the non-material costs are equally important, and these are very hard to weigh. Second, in today's interconnected and interdependent world, a goal could be realized by many entities. It is thus hard to decide exactly to what degree the realization of an intention was the effect of activities undertaken by an international actor, and how much it was the result of many varying factors. Kalevi Holsti has said that

²⁶ F.e. Alvin Magid, *Review: Role Theory, Political Science, and African Studies*, „World Politics“, Vol. 32, No. 2, January 1980, pp. 311–330.

²⁷ Barnett, op. cit., pp. 292–293.

²⁸ Ole Elgström, Michael Smith (eds.), *Introduction*, in: idem, *The European Union's Roles in International Politics. Concepts and Analysis*, Routledge, London 2006.

declared roles do not always coincide with real roles because the conceptions of a role may change quickly, or may be contrary, unclear or unspecified; or because a state operates in a dynamically changing external environment and/or a heterogeneous internal environment, in which, for instance, there is a clear separation of opinions in society; or because a state's decision-makers may be able to bring about a radical change of policy without fearing negative domestic political consequences²⁹. I consider that there are three main factors determining the effectiveness of roles: 1) the reasonableness of the role's conception, 2) the ability and consistency involved in performing the role, that is, the degree of its realization, and 3) the level of support for a role by the other actors in international relations, and particularly among those affected by it.

Effectiveness is a functional aspect of rationality, which means that rationality is an original category in relation to effectiveness. A reasonable concept of a role should take into account the state's possibilities as an actor, and the circumstances in which it is operating. A reasonable appraisal of a state's possibilities should be based on a proper appraisal of its position, that is, a real estimation of its potential and ability to make use of it. It is also important to make an appropriate choice of means and methods, which depend not only on the state's potential in the broader sense, but also on the level of rationality in its decision-making process. According to the premises of rational choice theory,³⁰ individuals are sufficiently rational to choose the best manner of acting, regardless of the complexity of the situation with which they are dealing. Rational choice depends on calculating the benefits and losses following from a set action, with the reference system being the preferences of the actor making the decision: rational action is assessed by the criterion of maximizing benefit and minimizing losses. An effective decision-making process is one that allows for the selection of the most efficient means of achieving positive objectives. Favourers of rational choice theory assume that decisions are undertaken in conditions of full information. The rational action of a decision-maker consists in a real appraisal of a situation, and not on assumptions. In the case of international relations, this implies the necessity of possessing knowledge about the domestic conditions of the international entity and about international conditions: chiefly, the goals, actions, and possible interactions of other international actors and entities

²⁹ Zob. Holsti, op. cit., p. 304.

³⁰ E.e. Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Harper and Row, New York 1957; Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1960; Dennis C. Mueller (ed.), *Public Choice II*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K. 1989; James Alt, Kenneth Shepsle (ed.), *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K. 1990; Peter C. Ordeshook (ed.), *Models of Strategic Choice in Politics*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 1989.

of the international system.³¹ The competence and preparation of the persons responsible for making final decisions are unusually important. It can happen that decision-makers, under pressure from lobby groups, make decisions that are deleterious to the efficient realization of their declared roles.

An important role at the level of the rationality of the decision-making process is played by relations between particular administrative institutions within the state. A lack of harmonization and compatibility of actions, and sometimes even rivalry between various state institutions, could have a negative influence on realizing objectives. Furthermore, so-called limited rationality could occur. This means that due to a limited access to information, a limited amount of time, or limited abilities to process information, the rationality of decision-making could be subject to disturbance.³² How the decision-maker perceives the international environment is an important element. Where the assessment of phenomena and tendencies occurring in the international arena is impaired or there is a misperception, the undertaking and fulfilling of certain roles could turn out to be inappropriate, and consequently, their effectiveness would be small.

The support for the role of the actor by international society, and particularly the support of those affected by the role (that is, a convergence between the chosen and imposed role), is very important for the effectiveness of an international role. Other factors influencing the effectiveness of international roles are the changes occurring in the international system. Deepening internationalization leads to globalization and consequently to growing interdependency; it forces international entities to be more open to external factors and to consider them in the process of adopting and performing specific international roles. The growing network of cooperation and interdependency in international relations means that international society's support for a state's declared and performed role is unusually significant for the role's effectiveness. In the case of a lack of support, the level of effectiveness will be low. The exception would be the role played by a superpower, which is not much influenced in its decisions and their realization by the level of international support. In general, however, states and other international

³¹ See more: Richard W. Cottam, *Foreign Policy Motivation: a General Theory and Case Study*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1972; Stephen M. Walt, *Rigor or Rigor Mortis?: Rational Choice and Security Studies*, „International Security’, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring 1999, pp. 5–48.

³² Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Bounded Rationality*, MIT Press, Cambridge 1982; Herbert A. Simon, *Rationality in Psychology and Economics*, „Journal of Business’, 1986, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 209–224; Elinor Ostrom, *A Behavioural Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association*, „The American Political Science Review’, 1998, Vol. 92, No. 1, pp. 1–22; Terry M. Moe, *On the Scientific Status of Rational Models*, „American Journal of Political Science’, Vol. 23, No. 1, February 1979, pp. 215–243; Martin Hollis, Steve Smith, *Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making*, „British Journal of Political Science’, Vol. 16, No. 3, July 1986, pp. 269–286.

actors modify their roles under the influence of the dynamics of change in the international environment.

The effectiveness of international roles is measurable only a certain time after the role was declared or the process of its realization began. Thus the effect of roles with a short-term realization period will be more visible than the effect of medium or long-term roles. The interdependence of the effectiveness of particular roles is also not without significance. The effectiveness of one type of role influences the effectiveness of the remainder, as it entails the certitude that a given actor playing a given role is able to act effectively. This strengthens the actor's international position, and in consequence facilitates, to a greater or lesser degree, the realization of its other roles.

5. Conclusion

International roles theory began to appear at the turn of the sixties and seventies. It was based, in large measure, on research into social roles, which was happening chiefly in sociology, but also in some other areas of the social sciences. Since the nineties, with changes in the international order, the international roles theory has attracted growing interest and has been subjected to more intensive analysis.

The usefulness of role theory in research into international relations is indubitable. It fulfils three basic scientific functions: it is descriptive, explanatory and predictive. Undoubtedly international roles theory:

- allows for the complex analysis of the actions of international actors, through an interdisciplinary approach, which is unusually useful for the study of international relations
- combines various theories and approaches existing in the study of international relations, preventing the analysis from being closed into a 'stiff framework'
- combines various levels of analysis of the foreign policies of states and other entities in international relations
- submits the domestic and external factors influencing the behaviour of the entities of international relations to analysis, showing the interdependence between the actions of the actors in international relations and the system within which they operate allows for the use and combination of various research methods.

International roles theory and its application in analysing the EU's policy

1. Can the EU play international roles?

During the Cold War, states were considered to be the main actors playing international roles, although scholars who departed from the state-centric theoretical approach assumed that other participants in international relations could also be important: for instance, international organizations, transnational groups or individuals. With the growth in the international position of the European Communities, and the creation of the European Union on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty, international roles theory also began to submit the activities of such specific actor of international relations to analysis. In accord with the Maastricht Treaty, the basis of the European Union was formed by the European Community (formerly the European Economic Community); the European Coal and Steel Community, which in July 2002 was included in the European Community; the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom); and the 'policies and forms of cooperation' of the second and third pillars of the Union, i.e., the Common Foreign and Security Policy and cooperation in judicial and internal affairs. The amendments introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty left only police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the third pillar, while the remaining affairs were included in the competencies of the European Community. The Treaty of Lisbon, which has been in force since December 1, 2009, eliminated the pillar structure of the European Union, leaving only a few areas of cooperation on the basis of inter-governmentalism. In addition, the Treaty strengthened European Union institutions, equipping the EU with new bodies for foreign policy and security and giving it an international legal personality. As a result, the EU was able to strengthen its identity as a comprehensive international actor.

For many years, the European Union's legal nature, which was in dispute among experts, had a fundamental influence on its international roles. However, the EU's ability to act internationally, to represent itself in international relations, and to conclude international treaties made it an

international actor, capable of participating in international life and of playing international roles.³³ The application of international roles theory in analysing the impact of the European Union can be found, among other places, in the publications of Marika Lerch,³⁴ the articles of Rikard Bengtsson and Ole Elgström,³⁵ in the collective work edited by Ole Elgström and Michael Smith.³⁶ Many researchers consider the European Union to be an actor in international relations and use the category of 'role' to study its international interactions, referring limitedly to international roles theory or treating the concept as synonymous with EU foreign policy.³⁷

As in the case of states, the EU's international roles are determined by two types of factors: domestic and international. Like states, the EU can potentially fulfil various roles – although due to the limited means it currently has at its disposal, not all are in fact possible. The key elements of the EU's international roles are its international position and its international identity.

2. The international position of the EU

The European Union, in spite of battling an internal crisis in the last dozen or so months, occupies a central position in Europe and a key position on

³³ E.e. Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, Routledge, London 1999, pp. 15–45. Ryszard Zięba, *Unia Europejska jako aktor stosunków międzynarodowych*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2003; pp. 239–244; Stanisław Parzymies, *Unia Europejska jako uczestnik stosunków międzynarodowych*, in: idem (ed.), *Dyplomacja czy siła? Unia Europejska w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2009, p. 21.

³⁴ Marika Lerch, *The Important Role of Roles: a Theoretical Framework for Understanding the External Identity of the European Union*, Paper presented to panel on "Identity and Foreign Policy in Europe", ECPR Fourth Pan-European International Relations Conference, Canterbury 2001.

³⁵ Rikard Bengtsson, Ole Elgström, *Conflicting Role Conceptions? European Union in Global Politics*, "Foreign Policy Analysis", No. 8, 2012, pp. 93–108.

³⁶ Elgström, M. Smith (eds.), op. cit.

³⁷ See: David Allen, Michael Smith, *Western's Europe Presence in the Contemporary International Arena*, „Review of International Studies”, Vol. 16, no. 1, 1990, pp. 19–37; Christopher Hill, *The Capability – Expectation Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role*, "Journal of Common Market Studies", Vol. 31, No. 3, 1993, pp. 305–328; Michael Smith, *Negotiating New Europe's: the Roles of the European Union*, "Journal of European Public Policy", 2000, Vol. 7, Issue 5, pp. 806–822; Michèle Knodt, Sebastiaan Princen (eds.), *Understanding the European Union's External Relations*, Routledge, London 2003; Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen, Brian White (eds.), *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*, Sage, London 2004; Karen Smith, *European Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, Polity Press, Oxford 2003; Bretherton, Vogler, op. cit.; Brian White, *Understanding European Foreign Policy*, Palgrave Mcmillan, Basingstoke 2001; Mario Telò (ed.), *The European Union and Global Governance*, Routledge, London 2009; Jan Orbie (ed.), *Europe's Global Role. External Policies of the European Union*, Ashgate, Aldershot 2008; Ryszard Zięba, op. cit.

the world scale. This position has grown systematically since the beginning of the nineties, on the basis of the changing international situation and the EU's economic and scientific-technical potential, deepening integration and international attractiveness.

The end of the Cold War diametrically changed the international order. The strategic dialogue of the United States with the USSR (then with Russia) and the democratic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe contributed to building a multicentric international order. The international position of the Chinese People's Republic began to grow markedly, as did that of the coalescing European Union with time. Multicentrism was accepted by the victor country in the Cold War – the United States. In the nineties, the programme documents of the American administration emphasised that the new international order would be a multipolar one, which the United States would strengthen through a multilateral approach dependent on cooperation with its allies, partners, the United Nations and regional organizations.³⁸

In 1993, when the EU appeared in the international arena, it was as an entity comprising 12 countries extending over an area of 2,354,800 square kilometres (excluding France's overseas departments). In 2010 it was a grouping of 27 countries, with a combined area of 4,242,000 square kilometres.³⁹ In 1993, the 12 EU countries were inhabited by around 360 million persons, while after the EU expansion in 2007 this number grew to 495 million, constituting 8% of the world's population. The EU's population potential in 2007 placed it third in the world, after China (with 1,322 million persons, or 20.5% of the world's population) and India (1,130 million, or 17.4% of the world's population); its population was larger than that of the USA (300 million, or 4.7% of the world's population). However, the EU's demographic potential is characterized by low natural growth (0.16% in 2007) and the ageing of its population. According to expert estimates, by 2025 the number of persons of productive age could fall by 18% in comparison to the beginning of the 21st century, and the number of persons of post-productive age will double: from 24% to around 50%.⁴⁰

The strengthening of the EU's position has also resulted from the development of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Since 1993, the Maastricht Treaty has undergone an essential evolution. The Amsterdam Treaty

³⁸ In practice, however, from the moment of engaging in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995, the United States began to reveal a tendency to unilateral activities characteristic of the role of 'leader of the free world' or 'world policeman'. This tendency was maintained during President Clinton's second term (1996-2000) and reached its apogee during the presidency of George W. Bush (2000-2008).

³⁹ Eurostat: <http://www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat> (June 2009). In *The Word Factbook*, published by the CIA – 4, 324,7 square kilometers, <http://www.cia.gov> (June 2009).

⁴⁰ *Fading the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment, Report from the High-Level Study Group Chaired by Wim Kok*, Luxembourg, November, 2004, p. 13.

of 1997 established, among other bodies, the Office of the High Representative for CFSP, and added the Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue missions, peace missions, peacekeeping, battle operations in crisis situations, including peacemaking and peace enforcement) to the EU's missions. Cooperation in foreign policy and defence was strengthened by decisions of the European Council during meetings in Cologne and Helsinki in 1999. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was created on their basis, and transformed under the Lisbon Treaty into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Since 2003, the European Union has been conducting civilian and military missions outside the territories of its members.⁴¹

In spite of its growing participation in peacekeeping and international security in the years 1993-2010, the European Union has yet decidedly given way to the United States. While the EU has not fulfilled either a leading or a hegemonic role, it has been active and has occupied an important international position in connection with the roles of France and Great Britain, which are permanent members of the UN Security Council, and the influential position of other countries, above all, Germany.

The European Union's economic position has been much more significant. Its economic potential – although varying between the countries of Western Europe and the newly accepted members from Central Europe – is based on modern production and the development of services. According to IMF data, the EU's gross domestic product (measured by purchasing power parity – PPP) grew in the years 1993-2008 from 7.6 billion USD to over 15.3 billion USD, constituting a growth of over 100%, and the growth rate in the EU in the years 1993-2008 amounted to an average of 2.6%, only 0.4% less than in the United States. After the expansions in the years 2004 and 2007, the EU became the world leader in terms of macro-economic indicators. In 1993, the share of the EU, with around 8% of the world's population, in gross world product was 26.1%, while in 2008 it was 22%. By comparison, the US's share was respectively 22.9% and 20.6%.⁴² In the years 1993-2009, the EU was also the leader in world trade. According to the WTO, the EU's share in world exports in 2008 amounted to 41%. It considerably exceeded that of China (with a 9.1% share) and the United States (with 8.2%), while the share of the countries of North Africa and the Middle East amounted to around 6% and were the result of exports of crude oil and natural gas. In imports as well, the EU was first in the world; its share in 2008 was 38.8%, considerably exceeding the USA (with a 13.5% share) and China (7%), while the share of the countries of North Africa and the Middle East was only 4.5%.⁴³

⁴¹ See more: Ryszard Zięba, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa 2005.

⁴² *World Economic Outlook, 1993–2009*.

⁴³ *International Trade Statistics 2009*, WTO, Geneva 2009.

The EU's strong position in international economic, financial, and scientific-technological relations have allowed it to play a growing role as a provider of economic, development and humanitarian aid to developing countries. According to data of the OECD, the European Union has been the world's largest donor of development aid; its share (the EU as a whole and its member countries) in the entirety of net development aid divided among all the world's countries exceeded 50% (in 2007, it amounted to around 70%).⁴⁴ In 2009, the EU and its member states together contributed around 55% of the total humanitarian aid to countries suffering from natural disasters and humanitarian catastrophes. In the years 1993-2006, the budget of the Directorate-General of the European Commission for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) rose from 606.6 million ecu/euros to 671 million euros. In 2007, 134 million euros were designated for humanitarian aid in Middle Eastern countries.⁴⁵

One of the EU's weaknesses in the economic sphere has yet remained its large dependence on supplies of crude oil and natural gas, particularly from the countries of North Africa and Russia. In 1972, the Western European countries used over 700 million tonnes of energy, predominately crude oil, of which only around 20 million tonnes were not imported.⁴⁶ Until 1972, Europe's use of its own energy resources did not exceed 11% of the whole, while the rest of its energy was imported, chiefly from the region of the Middle East and North Africa. Initially, in the fifties and sixties, Middle Eastern crude oil was accessible at low prices to the importing countries, as it cost only a dollar or two a barrel. Cheap crude oil was the main factor stimulating the development of the Western European economy, which had a general annual growth rate of 5%.⁴⁷ The situation changed in the seventies. After the Yom Kippur War (the Ramadan War) in October 1973, the Arab members of OPEC placed an embargo on the supply of crude oil to the West, in return for the European Communities' undecided and ambiguous stance on the war. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the growth of tensions between Iran and Iraq led to another oil crisis in the middle of the eighties, and the sharp rise in energy prices in 1986 caused an economic recession in the countries of the EC.⁴⁸ In 1995, the European Union imported around 9.5 million barrels

⁴⁴ *Aid Targets Slipping out of Reach*, OECD Development Assistance Committee, November 10, p. 6.

⁴⁵ <http://ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

⁴⁶ Peter R Odell, *Energy: resources and choices*, in: David Pinder (ed.), *Western Europe: challenge and change*, Belhaven Press, London 1990, pp. 19-34.

⁴⁷ Tomas Weyman-Jones, *Energy policy in the European Community*, in: Stelios Stavridis, Elias Mossialos, Roger Morgan, Howard Machin (eds.), *New challenges to the European Union: policies and policy-making*, Dartmouth, Aldershot 1997, pp. 545-567.

⁴⁸ Michael A. Toman, *The economics of energy security: theory, evidence, policy*, in: Allen V. Kneese, James L. Sweeney (eds.), *Handbook of natural resource and energy economics*, Vol. III, North-Holland, Amsterdam 1993, pp. 1165-1213; Robert H. Connery, Robert S. Gilmour (eds.), *The national energy problem*, Academy of Political Science, New York 1974, pp. 111-121.

of crude oil every day, of which every two million came from North African countries. The main suppliers were Algeria and Libya,⁴⁹ and the main recipients were France, Italy and Spain. These countries are the most dependent on energy supplies from North Africa; by the nineties, Algeria covered around 70% of the entirety of Spain's natural gas needs.⁵⁰ The energy dependence of countries importing oil and gas is continually growing. It is estimated that the dependence of the Southern European countries on foreign energy supplies will grow from 68% in 2006 to 73% in 2025.⁵¹ The prognosis implies the need to seek alternative sources. Research into renewable energy sources has been ongoing for years, but for the moment the share of such sources in energy production is not large. If the trend does not change, the use of this type of energy in 2025 will hover within the bounds of 3-4.2% of the total energy use in the countries on the northern coast of the Mediterranean Sea.⁵²

The European Union also occupies a very high position in international cultural relations. In the years 1993-2010, the European Union was an attractive civilisational centre and a model for successful and comprehensive integration.⁵³

3. The international identity of the EU

Defining the European Union's international identity is a difficult task.⁵⁴ For many years, philosophers, sociologists and political scientists have pondered the questions: What is the European Union? What is Europe? And can we speak of a 'European identity'? Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande wrote: 'the process of Europeanization – due to its success! – reached a critical limit when it had exhausted the reserves of political energy for nation-state semantics and a vision of Europe [...] It is a matter of [...] rethinking Europe anew.'⁵⁵ This view is currently accepted by many scholars.⁵⁶

⁴⁹ Michel Chatelus, *L'énergie en Méditerranée: espace régional ou marché mondial*, „Monde arabe: Maghreb Machrek”, Décembre 1997, p. 20.

⁵⁰ John Calabrese, *Beyond Barcelona: the Politics of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, „European Security”, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1997, p. 91.

⁵¹ *The Blue Plan's sustainable development Outlook for the Mediterranean*, United Nations Environment Programme, Mediterranean Action Plan, Blue Plan Sophia Antipolis, July 2008, p. 11.

⁵² Ibidem.

⁵³ Zięba, *Unia Europejska jako...*, pp. 245–247, 263. See also: Lars-Erik Cedermann (ed.), *Constructing Europe's Identity: The External Dimension*, Lienne Rienner, Boulder CO 2001.

⁵⁴ It is necessary to distinct: European identity and EU identity. More on it see: Thomas Risse, *Social Constructivism and European Integration*, in: Antje Wiener, Thomas Diez (eds.), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004, pp. 159–176.

⁵⁵ Ulrich Beck, Edgar Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2007.

⁵⁶ F.e: Anthony Giddens, *Europe in the Global Age*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2007; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Peter Katzentsein (eds.), *European Identity*, Cambridge University Press,

Considerations on the topic of the EU's international identity are based on various methods. Some thinkers, like Ole Wæver⁵⁷ and Jean Raux, compare the identity of the EU with the identities of its members.⁵⁸ Chad Damro derives the EU's international identity from its opposition to the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and territoriality.⁵⁹ On the other hand, Jan Zielonka considers that the European Union, as a neo-medieval imperium, is characterized by its pluralism of identity and it is this which differentiates it from the states of the Westphalian imperium, which possess a clear identity.⁶⁰ Karen Smith claims that the EU's international identity appears in the conditionality of its interactions with third states. Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman claim that considerations on the EU's international identity must encompass three questions: 1) the history of the European integration process and EU principles; 2) perceptions of the EU; and 3) the EU's form of representation in the international arena.⁶¹ John McCormick points out that Europeans were always better at self-definition in regard to non-Europeans than in relations among themselves.⁶²

Attempts to confirm the identity of the European Union as an international actor aiming to act as a cohesive entity have been repeated beginning with the Maastricht Treaty through the EU's successive revision treaties.⁶³ The ambition to play a global and comprehensive role as an international actor

Cambridge 2009. Compare: Riva Castoryano (ed.) *Quelle identité pour l'Europe ? Le multiculturalisme à l'épreuve*, second edition, Presses de Sciences-Po, Paris 2005.

⁵⁷ Ole Wæver, *The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-sovereign Security Orders*, in: Morten Kelstrup, Michael Williams (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community*, Routledge, London 2000.

⁵⁸ Jean Raux, *L'identité internationale de l'Union européenne*, Paper presented to group on *Federalization of the Union: Myths and Realities?*, Contributions to the meeting of the 6–7 July 2000, Intergovernmental Conference 2000, <http://www.consuniv.org/docs/Raux6juillet.doc> (June 2009).

⁵⁹ Chad Damro, *Building an International Identity: the EU and Extraterritorial Competition Policy*, "Journal of European Public Policy", Vol. 8, No. 2, 2001, pp. 208–226.

⁶⁰ Jan Zielonka, *Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006.

⁶¹ Ian Manners, Richard G. Whitman, *The "Difference Engine": Constructing and Representing the International Identity of the European Union*, "Journal of European Public Policy", Vol. 10, No. 3, 2003, pp. 380–404; Ian Manners, Richard G. Whitman, *Towards Identifying the International Identity of the European Union: A Framework for Analysis of the EU's Network of Relationships*, "Journal of European Integration", Vol. 21, No. 3, 1998, pp. 231–249.

⁶² John McCormick, *Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction*, Fourth Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke 2008, p. 24.

⁶³ See more: Jörg Monar, *The European Union's Foreign Affairs System after the Treaty of Amsterdam: A 'Strengthened Capacity for External Action'?*, "European Foreign Affairs Review", Vol. 2, Issue 4, Winter 1997, pp. 413–436; Fraser Cameron, *Building a common foreign policy: do institutions matter?*, in: John Petersen, Helene Sjursen (eds.), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?: Competing visions of the CFSP*, Routledge, London 1998, pp. 68–76; Ben

was also reflected in the European Security Strategy of December 2003 and in the report on its effects accepted five years later by the High Representative of the CFSP, Javier Solana.

The European Union's international identity is in the formation phase, both in terms of 'internal identity', constituting the cohesiveness of the EU as a whole, and of 'external identity', signifying its separateness from other international entities. It is forming on the basis of the constitutional values and norms of the EU, and simultaneously being influenced by internal aims, principles and foreign policy methods. These include human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, respect for human rights, social solidarity and balanced development. These values have repeatedly appeared in documents of the European Communities/Union. As early as December 1973, the ministers of foreign affairs of the member states of the European Communities clearly stated that these are the fundamental elements of European identity. They were confirmed in the key constituting documents of the European Union: in the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty, the Treaty of Nice, and the Lisbon Treaty. They were also contained in the seven chapters of the European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights, adopted in 2000. These values, which in essence concern internal relations, find an application in the EU's foreign policy. They shape the norms of the EU's behaviour to other countries, and in consequence, influence the variety of international roles declared and performed by the EU.⁶⁴

The Lisbon Treaty was of real importance for the EU's ability to play the role of a comprehensive global actor. This new treaty expanded not only the CFSP's instruments for external action, but also legally sanctioned the ESDP, which had been developing for ten years. This latter policy, constituting an integral part of the CFSP, was transformed into the CSDP. The possibilities for stronger cooperation in all matters of the ESDP were extended. The existence of a European Defence Agency was approved; it became possible to introduce permanent structural cooperation among the countries best prepared militarily, and the range of crisis response operations was broadened (article 43). A *casus foederis* was set, on the model of military alliances, obliging the EU member countries to render all possible aid in the case of armed aggression against any of them (article 42, para. 7).

The EU's international identity is also revealed in the specificity of its foreign policy:

Soetendorp, *Foreign policy in the European Union: Theory, history and practice*, Longman, London 1999, pp. 68–82; Ryszard Zięba, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2007, pp. 56–60.

⁶⁴ Sonia Lucarelli, Ian Manners, *Conclusions. Valuing Principles in European Union Foreign Policy*, in: idem, (eds.), *Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy*, Routledge, London 2006.

- the institutionalization and regulation of relations: that is, the creation of institutional mechanisms of cooperation through the signing of international agreements and support for international regimes
- the comprehensiveness of the policy considered by the EU to be necessary for resolving existing problems, which, although varying in nature, are closely related to one another. This principle is very much connected with the strategy of prevention: that is, actions undertaken to prevent the appearance of problems constituting a danger to security in the broad sense
- the ‘policy of conditionality’, understood as making assistance, usually financial and/or technical, dependent on the recipient’s fulfilment of certain conditions. In the case of the EU, it is rather positive in nature: that is, exercising influence on partners through dialogue and partnership and not through negative methods (for instance, sanctions)
- multilateralism: that is, the development of international cooperation and joint activities with other international actors to realise declared roles
- the legality of its activities, respecting the norms of international law and acting in accord with the spirit of the UN Charter and the resolutions of the CSCE/OSCE.⁶⁵

The above values, norms, principles and methods of proceeding in the EU’s foreign policy influence the specificity of its international roles. In principle, in its cooperation with other countries of the world, the EU addresses, along with economic affairs, issues of democracy, good government, respect for human rights, the shaping of relations through cooperation, and environmental protection. It tries to inculcate these by institutionalizing comprehensive mutual relations (often making steps in this area dependent on the partner’s progress in other spheres – the policy of conditionality), through cooperation with other international actors (multilateralism) and by respecting the norms of international law. The specificity of the European Union’s approach consists in treating these in combination; in the case of other international actors, this rarely happens.

One of the factors shaping the EU’s international identity is also its specific institutional mechanism, which clearly distinguishes it from the states.⁶⁶ In the years 1993-1999, when the Maastricht Treaty was in force, the body entitled to lead the Common Foreign and Security Policy was the EU and its member countries (article J.1.2), but under the Amsterdam Treaty this

⁶⁵ More on this issue in the chapter VIII. Compare: Sonia Lucarelli, *Interpreted values*, in: Ole Elgström, Michael Smith (eds.), *The European Union’s Roles in International Politics. Concepts and Analysis*, Routledge, London 2006.

⁶⁶ See more: Simon Hix, *The Political System of the European Union*, Macmillan, Houndmills 1999.

provision was changed. The EU gained exclusive right to conduct the CFSP. The range of EU security matters included in the CFSP was also extended, through the added statement that it was a matter of protecting the territorial integrity of the EU and its external borders. In actuality, these two spheres cannot be treated as entities of international relations, like countries, yet their inclusion in the text of the EU Treaty indicated progress in shaping the EU into an independent actor, which could play various international roles. In practice, the EU plays an international economic role, using the instruments of community policy. Under the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, these instruments were placed in the European Community, that is, in the first pillar of the Union. The other roles were formed by the CFSP, which at that time constituted the second pillar of the EU. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the foreign policy of the EU is still intergovernmental in nature, although it does not constitute a separate EU pillar.

The system of institutions representing the EU in external relations, and also having competencies within the CFSP, is of permanent, fundamental significance. In the years 1993-2009 the following institutions were decisive in the EU's international roles: the European Council, the Council of the European Union and its organs (the Permanent Representatives of the Member States – COREPER, and the Political and Security Committee – COPS), the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, the High Representative for CFSP, the European Commission, and the Presidency (the Office of the President), which changes every six months. This last body was supported by a 'troika' composed of representatives of the present, past and future presidency. The representative of the European Commission also participated in it. Such a four-person institution functioned at all levels: the Councils, the Policy Committee, the heads of missions and working groups.⁶⁷ An important role was also played by the bodies working on behalf of the European Security and Defence Policy, operating within the framework of the Council and General Secretariat and independent agencies (the European Defence Agency, the EU Satellite Centre, and the EU Institute for Security Studies). A certain role was also played by the European Parliament.⁶⁸

In the European Union, the principle of the homogeneity of the institutions of all three pillars has been adopted, and this has facilitated the administration of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The secretariat for the CFSP was directly subordinated to the Presidency (the Office of the President). For ten years, since the reforms introduced in 1999, this was the

⁶⁷ Florika Fink-Hooijer, *The CFSP of the EU*, „European Journal of International Law”, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1994, p. 186.

⁶⁸ See more: Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, *The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making System of the European Union*, „European Foreign Affairs Review”, Vol. 7, Issue 3, Autumn 2002, pp. 257–282.

Directorate General for External Economic Relations and Politico-Military Affairs (DG E). A department for Middle Eastern and Mediterranean affairs operated within its framework. Under the Amsterdam Treaty the office of High Representative for the CFSP was established and combined with the function of Secretary General of the EU Council. From 1999 to 2009, this position was held by a Spanish diplomat, the former secretary general of NATO (1995-1999), Javier Solana. The High Representative represented the EU in matters of the CFSP, including defence policy, but the EU was additionally represented by an EU commissioner for foreign relations. The commissioner was the representative of the European Commission on External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy. This position was filled by, among others: Leon Brittan (1995-1999), Chris Patten (2000-2004) and Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2004-2009). The existing division of functions between various institutions indicated the dualism of the EU's representation, which weakened the effectiveness of its international roles. One attempt at an institutional resolution to the problem was the Amsterdam Treaty's introduction of a new construction of the EU's 'troika', which in practice consisted of a representative of the Presidency (the head of government or minister of foreign affairs), the High Representative for the CFSP, and the commissioner for external relations (or even the head of the European Commission). The premise of the Amsterdam Treaty's reorganization was to ensure the EU's diplomatic unity by departing from the idea of representing the EU as a coalition of countries.

Given the intergovernmental nature of its foreign policy, the European Union did not have any specialized diplomatic or foreign service comparable to that of its member countries. The common foreign policy, called 'external relations' to the end of the last decade, was conducted by the commissioners responsible for external relations. The most important of these was the Commissioner for External Relations. The commissioners had a specialized bureaucracy. The diplomatic representation of the European Communities had been assured (by the European Commission) by establishing diplomatic facilities (delegations) in countries maintaining official relations with it. These delegations represented the European Communities because only the European Communities had legal personality. The entire specialized bureaucracy of the European Commission working on external contacts is, and has been, engaged in negotiating agreements with foreign partners: trade, aid, association, accession and other agreements. This bureaucracy is formed of highly qualified employees, capable of conducting negotiations that are often long and tedious. Although the quality (in terms of qualifications) of the EU's foreign relations staff is high, yet the non-transparent organizational and competency structure and the member countries' lack of clear will to increase the EU's international diplomatic presence has resulted in not very high levels of activity, particularly in political and

security affairs. This has been negatively reflected in the effectiveness of the EU's international roles.⁶⁹

The Lisbon Treaty introduced important institutional changes to EU structures. For EU and CFSP external relations, giving legal personality to the EU, establishing new institutions, and broadening the previous competences were of fundamental significance. The European Council's position was strengthened, as it gained the power to 'give the Union the necessary impulses for its development and [to define] the general political orientations.' The political representation of the EU in CFSP affairs was strengthened by establishing the Office of the President of the European Council. The president is chosen by that institution for a period of two and a half years (article 15). As a legislative institution, the Council of the European Union – to this time – makes its decisions on the basis of unanimity (with certain exceptions for a qualified majority). Nevertheless, it has been provided that the European Council may decide, unanimously, to expand the field of decisions taken by a qualified majority (article 31 of the TUE). In matters of the CFSP, this institution meets in the configuration of a Foreign Affairs Council (article 16). The CFSP is conducted by a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy appointed by the European Council. The position combines the previous functions of High Representative for CFSP affairs and Commissioner for External Relations. The High Representative will simultaneously be entrusted with the function of Vice President of the European Commission and chair of the Foreign Affairs Council. He is responsible for ensuring the consistency of the EU's external actions and for the coordination of other aspects of the Union's external activities (article 18). In addition to the member states, the High Representative has the right to initiate legislation (article 30). The High Representative's mandate is also supposed to be strengthened by the European External Action Service. This department is to cooperate with the diplomatic services of the member states and is composed of employees of the competent departments of the Secretariat General of the Council and Commission and of personnel delegated from national diplomatic services. The organization and functioning principles of the European External Action Service have been entrusted to the Council's decision. The Council will decide in such matters at the application of the High Representative, after consulting with the European Parliament and obtaining the agreement of the Commission (article 27). In spite of having evolved, political and security cooperation remain at the intergovernmental level, and the member states of the EU retain sovereignty in this area. The

⁶⁹ Compare: Alessandra Mignolli, *The EU's Power in External Relations*, „The International Spectator”, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3, July-September 2002, pp. 109–112; Nanette A. E. M. Neuwahl, *A Partner with a Troubled Personality: EU Treaty-Making in Matters of CFSP and JHA after Amsterdam*, „European Foreign Affairs Review”, Vol. 3, Issue 2, Summer 1998, pp. 178–186.

result is that the EU is still treated by the majority of the world's countries as an inconsistent, heterogeneous and not very credible actor.⁷⁰

4. A typology of the EU's international roles

Scholars of political science and international relations have distinguished over a dozen international roles pertaining to the European Union: a civil power,⁷¹ a normative power,⁷² a structural power,⁷³ a global actor,⁷⁴ a leader in sustainable development and a model of successful and comprehensive integration, the largest participant in world trade, the largest donor of development aid, the largest donor of humanitarian aid, an active diplomatic actor, a stabilizer of the peace and international security, an attractive civilisational centre and a promoter of European cultural values,⁷⁵ a 'traditional power' with a regional range of action, an 'environmental stabilizer', i.e., an actor of supra-regional action, a source of emulation and influence of global reach, co-defining the principles, traits and evolution of the international order,⁷⁶ a neo-medieval power,⁷⁷ a global intervener, a regional pacifier, a mediator in conflicts, a bridge between the rich and the poor, a leader of the global economy,⁷⁸

⁷⁰ On external perceptions of the EU see: Sonia Lucarelli, Lorenzo Fioramonti (eds.) *External perceptions of the European Union as a global actor?*, Routledge, London 2010.

⁷¹ François Duchêne, *Europe's Role in World Politics*, in: Richard Mayne (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*, Fontana, London 1972, pp. 32–47; Karen E. Smith, *The End of Civilian Power Europe. A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?*, „The International Spectator”, Vol. XXXV, No. 2, 2000, pp. 11–28; Jan Orbie, *Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates*, „Cooperation and Conflict”, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2006, pp. 123–128, Mario Telò, *L'Europa potenza civile*, Laterza, Rome, Bari 2004. Compare: Hedley Bull, *Civilian Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?*, „Journal of Common Market Studies”, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1982, pp. 149–170; Nicole Gnesotto, *L'Europe politique a-t-elle un avenir?*, in: Nicole Gnesotto, Michel Rocard (eds.), *Notre Europe*, Robert Laffont, Paris, 2008, pp. 303–330.

⁷² Ian Manners, *Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?*, „Journal of Common Market Studies”, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002, pp. 235–258. See also: Adrian Hyde-Price, „Normative” Power Europe: A Realist Critique, „Journal of European Public Policy”, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006, pp. 217–234.

⁷³ Stephan Keukeleire, *The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor: Internal, Traditional and Structural Diplomacy*, „Diplomacy and Statecraft”, Vol. 14, 2003, p. 46.

⁷⁴ Zięba, *Unia Europejska...*; Bretherton, Vogler, op. cit.; Mario Telò, *Introduction: the EU as a Model, a Global Actor and an Unprecedented Power*, in: idem (ed.), *The European Union and Global Governance*, Routledge, London 2009, pp. 1–40; Christopher Piening, *The European Union in World Affairs*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder 1997, p. 196.

⁷⁵ Zięba, *Unia Europejska...*

⁷⁶ Kuźniar, *Międzynarodowa tożsamość...*, pp. 25–44.

⁷⁷ Zielonka, op.cit.

⁷⁸ Christopher Hill, *Closing the Capability – Expectations Gap?*, in: John Peterson, Helene Sjursen (eds.), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?: Competing Vision of CFSP*, Routledge, London 1998; pp. 34–36.

a promoter of human rights and democracy.⁷⁹ Some scholars have also considered the possibility of the European Union's role as a superpower.⁸⁰ Currently, the discussion is still ongoing about the EU's potential role as a military power.⁸¹ This rich catalogue does not exhaust all the international roles played by the European Union. In the case of the SEMCs, the EU has adopted the following roles: an active player in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict; a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security, and disarmament; a promoter of economic reforms and sustainable development; a propagator of democracy, human rights and intercultural dialogue.

5. Conclusion

With the growing significance of non-state participants in international relations, international roles theory, which was used during the Cold War chiefly to study the international interactions of states, began to be more used in analysing the activity of other international actors, including the European Union. The role of this specific actor in international relations is influenced in large degree by its international position and identity. The idea of liberalism lying at the basis of European integration quickly spread into other areas of social life. In consequence, the European Union is oriented in its policies not only by the ideas of free market economics, but also by such principles as cooperation, peaceful coexistence, dispute resolution by peaceful means, democracy, human rights, intercultural dialogue and sustainable growth. These principles were contained in the declaration of European identity adopted within the framework of the European Political Cooperation in 1973, and have been confirmed by successive constituting documents of the EU.

The nature of the instruments the EU has at its disposal for its foreign policy is also essential. These are primarily non-military means. In spite

⁷⁹ Elgström, Smith (eds.), op. cit.

⁸⁰ Johan Galtung, *The European Community: a Superpower in the Making*, Allen & Unwin, London 1973; Richard G. Whitman, *From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the EU*, Macmillan, London 1998; John McCormick, *The European Superpower*, Palgrave, London 2007. See also: Andrew Moravcsik, *Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain*, "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 82, No. 4, 2003, pp. 74–89; Katie Verlin Laatikainen, *Pushing Soft Power: Middle Power Diplomacy at the UN*, in: Katie Verlin Laatikainen, Karen Smith (eds.), *The EU at the UN: Intersecting Multilateralism*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills 2006, pp. 70–91.

⁸¹ See more: Parzymies, *Unia Europejska...*, pp. 33–38; Henrik Larsen, *The EU: a Global Military Actor?*, „Cooperation and Conflict”, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1991, pp. 283–302; Stelios Stavridis, „Militarising” the EU: the Concept of Civilian Power Europe Revisited, „The International Spectator”, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, 2001, pp. 43–50; Adrian Treacher, *From Civilian Power to Military Actor: the EU's Resistible Transformation*, „European Foreign Affairs Review”, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2004, pp. 49–66.

of the systematic development of the ESDP, which was changed under the Lisbon Treaty into the CSDP, the European Union still remains a 'civil power', lacking a significant military component. The effectiveness of its external actions, particularly in the sphere of foreign policy and security policy, are not furthered by its institutional system, which weakens the international roles it plays. In spite of having been expanded, the CSDP, which was established by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and then developed in the revision treaties, remains an intergovernmental policy with insignificant elements of communitisation and flexibility (for instance, the Amsterdam Treaty's introduction of constructive abstention from voting).⁸² This weakness arises from the frequently divergent interests of the member states, which prevent the adoption of a common, consensual position for the effective realisation of joint activities. Due to the EU's intergovernmental nature, its roles in the Mediterranean region largely result from the interests of its member states.⁸³

⁸² See more: Antonio Missiroli, *CFSP, defence and flexibility*, „Chaillot Paper”, No. 38, February 2000.

⁸³ See more: Michelle Pace, *The Politics of Regional Identity: Meddling with the Mediterranean*, Routledge, New York, London 2006.

CHAPTER III

The concept of the EU's roles in the Mediterranean

1. Programme documents

The concept of the EU roles in the Mediterranean region in the years 1993-2010 was reflected in the documents composed jointly by the EU and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs), in those adopted unilaterally by EU institutions, and in the declarations and statements of representatives of the EU and its member countries. These roles were not explicitly articulated, but they were unambiguous.

The most important agreements worked out and mutually adopted by the EU and SEMCs include:

- the Barcelona Declaration of 28 November 1995, which initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process), and succeeding documents adopted in this forum of cooperation, including an action plan agreed upon on the programme's tenth anniversary, 28 November 2005;
- the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, which was adopted in Paris on 13 July 2008 and initiated the Union for the Mediterranean.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ See more: Daniela Schwarzer, Isabelle Werenfels, *The Union for the Mediterranean: A Missed Opportunity*, "SWP Comments", Berlin, April 2008; Michael Emerson, *Making Sense of Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean*, "CEPS Policy Brief", No. 155, March 2008; Ilan Greilsammer, *Sarkozy Mediterranean Union Plan: a View from Israel*, "Bitterlemons. International.org", Edition 27, Vol. 6, 10 July 2008 (<http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/>, June 2009); Claire Spancer, *Europe and Mediterranean: Eyeing Other Shores*, "The World Today", July 15, 2008; Roberto Aliboni, Fouad M. Ammor, *Under the Shadow of 'Barcelona': From the EMP to the Union for the Mediterranean*, „EuroMeSCo Paper”, No. 77, January 2009. On Union for the Mediterranean: Rosa Balfour, Dorothée Schmid, *Union for the Mediterranean, disunity for the EU?*, "European Policy Centre. Policy Brief", February 2008; Denis Bauchard, *L'Union pour la Méditerranée: un défi européen*, "Politique étrangère", No. 1, 2008, pp. 51-64; DMITAR BECHEV, KALYPSO NICOLAIDIS, *The Union for the Mediterranean: A Genuine Breakthrough or More of the Same?*, "The International Spectator", Vol. 43, No. 3, September 2008, pp. 13-20; Gonzalo Escribano, Alejandro Lorca, *La Unión Mediterránea una unión en busca de proyecto*, "Documento de Trabajo", No. 13, 2008; Jean-François Jarmet,

Table 1. Main documents containing the concept of EU roles in the Mediterranean region

Name	Entity accepting the document	Date of acceptance
<i>Barcelona Declaration</i>	The EU and Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the Palestinian Authority, Israel, Turkey, Malta, Cyprus	November 1995
<i>EU Common Strategy for the Mediterranean Region</i>	European Union	June 2000
<i>EU Neighbourhood Policy</i>	European Union	June 2004
<i>EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East</i>	European Union	June 2004
<i>Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit on the Mediterranean</i>	EU and Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Libya, Turkey, the Palestinian Authority, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Mauretania, Monaco, and also the UN, the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council, the League of Arab States, the African Union, the Arab Maghreb Union, the Organisation of Islamic Conference, the African Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, the World Bank, the Alliance of Civilisations, the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures	July 2008
<i>Conclusions from the meeting of the European Council</i>	European Union	Various dates
<i>Decisions of the EU Council and European Commission</i>	European Union	Various dates

The most important documents adopted unilaterally by the EU include:

- the *Common Strategy of the European Union on the Mediterranean Region*, adopted by the European Council at the meeting in Santa Maria da Feira on 19 June 2000;

The Political and Economic Challenges of the Union for the Mediterranean, “European Issues”, No. 93, 25 March 2008; *Union pour la Méditerranée: le potentiel de l’acquis de Barcelone*, “ISS Report”, Institute d’Etudes de Sécurité de l’UE, n° 03, Novembre 2008.

- the *European Neighbourhood Policy* (ENP), adopted by the European Council at the meeting in Brussels, on 17-18 June 2004;
- the *Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East*, adopted by the European Council at the meeting in Brussels on 17-18 June 2004;
- conclusions of the European Council;
- documents accepted by the Council of the European Union and the European Commission.

All the documents indicate that the EU has striven to fulfil the role of an active diplomatic player in the Middle East peace process: a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament in the region; an initiator of market reforms in SEMCs and of sustainable regional development; and a propagator of democratic values, human rights, and intercultural dialogue. With the aim of playing these roles effectively, the EU adopted two basic financial instruments: the MEDA programme (1995-2006) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI – as of 1 January 2007).

2. The role of active player in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict

According to the EU strategy, playing effective roles in the Mediterranean region requires a long-term and just resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As was emphasised by the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, establishing peace in the Middle East is unusually important for the EU on account of the strong political, economic, and cultural ties existing between Europe and the Middle East. From the political viewpoint, Europe is part of the Mediterranean region and has its own interests there. Historically and geographically the Middle East lies in Europe's immediate neighbourhood and thus for the EU's own security a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is imperative. In comparison with the political and security needs, the economic interests involved seem less substantive. The cultural factor, however, is important. Historical ties allow the EU to play a positive role in creating intercultural dialogue. The EU has an opportunity to change the potential 'clash of civilisations' foretold by Huntington into a 'dialogue of civilisations'.⁸⁵

The European Union recognizes the principle of a two-state solution, i.e., the creation of an independent, democratic Palestinian state, living side-by-side with Israel and its other neighbours. The EC/EU has been

⁸⁵ *The Evolution of European Common Foreign and Security Policy Conference in the Helmut Kohl Institute for European Studies on January 11, 1998*, <http://consilium.europa.eu> (June 2009).

supporting the right of the Palestinian nation to self-determination from the time the European Council accepted the Venice Declaration in June 1980. In March 2007, Javier Solana, the High Representative for CFSP stated that ‘the European Union has never abandoned the Palestinian people and never will.’⁸⁶ However, the EU has not declared its support for the postulate of the Arab States and Palestinians that the Palestinian state capital should be created in East Jerusalem. It considers rather that all disputed issues should be regulated during peace negotiations.⁸⁷ Since the seventies, it has maintained that Israel should withdraw from the territories occupied during the Six Day War in 1967 (with slight modifications, if necessary). These changes must occur, however, in accord with the provisions of UN Security Council resolutions nos. 242, 338, 1397, 1402 and 1515, and with respect for the principles of the Middle East peace process begun at the Madrid peace conference in 1991. The EU emphasises that Israel’s policy of building Jewish settlements on the West Bank, in East Jerusalem, in the Gaza Strip and on the Golan Heights is illegal under international law and constitutes a serious obstacle to peace. The EU has thus repeatedly called for Israel to cease building such settlements on occupied territory and has opposed the building of a wall separating the Palestinian autonomous territories from Israel.⁸⁸ At the same time, the EU has been promoting the principle of ‘land for peace’, recognizing the right of every state in the region to live in peace and the right of the State of Israel to act in protection of its citizens. However, it clearly emphasises that such actions must be in accord with international law. Furthermore, the EU has not proposed any solutions to the question of the Palestinian refugees. It supports a just and feasible resolution to the issue and declares that it will respect the agreement reached between the Israeli and Palestinian sides. It simultaneously stresses the fact that since 1971 it has been providing large support to the Palestinian refugees through UNRWA.⁸⁹

In the opinion of the European Union, achieving lasting peace in the Middle East requires comprehensive action. Peace talks must occur not only between representatives of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, but also

⁸⁶ *Summary of speech by EUHR Solana on the current international situation and the role of the EU, Brussels, 29 March 2007*, <http://www.europa-eu-un.org> (June 2009).

⁸⁷ *L’avenir de Jérusalem, Conférence à Casablanca, 24 Février, 1999*, <http://consilium.europa.eu> (June 2009).

⁸⁸ *EU, EC: Declaration on the Construction Plans for Har Homa-Jabal Abu Ghneim, Brussels, 27 February 1997*, European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation with the support of the European Commission, <http://www.medeainstitute.org> (June 2009); *UE, CE: Déclaration sur l’extension de colonies peuplement sur le plateau du Golan, 28 Août 1998*, European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation with the support of the European Commission, <http://www.medeainstitute.org> (June 2009); *EU’s Solana shocked at Israeli settlement growth*, “Haaretz”, January 22, 2007.

⁸⁹ *EU Positions on the Middle East Peace Process*, <http://ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

between Syria and Lebanon.⁹⁰ In regard to the conflicts between Israel and Syria and between Israel and Lebanon, the EU has repeatedly emphasised the need for full implementation of UN Security Council resolutions nos. 425 and 426.

The document in which the EU set forth the entirety of its role in the process of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is the EU action strategy for the Middle East, drawn up by the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, and the Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, in November 2007. In this document, it is emphasised that achievement of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East is a strategic goal of the European Union. The Union committed itself to:

- support the Parties in their bilateral peacemaking efforts
- support the United States government in its facilitation efforts
- ensure the active involvement of the Middle East Quartet in the run-up to the international meeting and in its follow-up
- continue cooperation with Arab partners in advancing the Arab Peace Initiative⁹¹
- sustain its high levels of assistance to the region and accompany the political process with a shift to post-conflict support in due time.

Because the EU considers that only an independent, democratic and well-governed Palestinian state will provide a safe neighbourhood for Israel, the EU is committed to helping the Palestinians create state structures and to granting them the necessary material aid. It has ensured that its activities are conducted in cooperation with the Palestinian government and concentrate on supporting:

- the establishment of a modern and democratic police force, in full cooperation with the US Security Coordinator. Aid for the police is supposed to be complemented by wider support for the rule of law, including help in creating efficient judiciary and penal systems.
- comprehensive institution building and good governance, including intensification of activities in East Jerusalem in the areas of health, education and the judiciary
- sustained growth of the Palestinian economy, including credit guarantees, vocational training and trade
- the sustainability of Palestinian Autonomy finances, including by support for development and recurrent public expenditures, as well as for the generation of adequate revenues

⁹⁰ *Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit...*

⁹¹ *Statement on the Arab Peace Initiative by HRH Prince Saud al Faisal Chairman of Arab Peace Initiative Committee Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia in His Meeting with EU Ministers, Brussels, 14 Mai 2007*, <http://www.mofa.gov.sa> (June 2009); *M. Mohamed Benaïssa: le Maroc joue pleinement son rôle dans le cadre du comité de suivi de l'initiative arabe de paix, Le Caire, 5 September 2007*, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009).

- emergency and humanitarian aid for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, by ensuring that their basic needs are met (for instance, supplies of fuel, electrical power and potable water).⁹²

As is always stressed in EU documents, resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is treated as a strategic goal of EU policy. However, it is advanced as a goal that is independent of other programmes, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Union for the Mediterranean or the European Neighbourhood Policy.

3. The role of promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament

The idea of political and security cooperation between European states and the southern and eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea appeared in the seventies of the 20th century. In July 1974, at a meeting between representatives of the League of Arab States and representatives of the European Commission and European Council, the Euro-Arab Dialogue was initiated.⁹³ However, toward the end of the seventies, the talks were frozen and consequently no important decisions were made at that forum. The European states returned to the idea of intensifying cooperation in this area toward the end of the eighties. Spain and Italy proposed holding a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), patterned on the CSCE, which had been in existence since 1975. The idea was accepted by France and Portugal, but the remaining countries of the European Communities, and the United States, reacted to the idea with reserve.⁹⁴

Since that initiative did not come to realisation, in 1990 the countries of Southern Europe put forward a new proposal. After the creation in February 1989 of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), five southern European countries (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain) proposed to the members of the AMU (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauretania) the establishment

⁹² *Statebuilding for Peace in the Middle East: an EU Action Strategy. Joint Paper by EU High Representative Javier Solana and EU Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner*, S378/07, November 2007, p. 378.

⁹³ Bichara Khader, *L'Europe et le monde arabe. Voisins, Cousins*, Publisud, Paris 1992; pp. 91-139; Saleh A. Al-Mani, *The Euro-Arab Dialogue. A Study in Associative Diplomacy*, Frances Pinter, London 1983; David Allen, *The Euro-Arab Dialogue*, "Journal of Common Market Studies", Vol. XVI, No. 4, June 1979, pp. 323-342.

⁹⁴ On CSCM see more: José-Luis Buhigas, *Una política de seguridad para El Mediterraneo*, „Revista Española de Defensa”, No. 29/20, 1990, pp. 78-85; Victor Yves-Ghebali, *The Geographical Dimension*, in: Victor Yves-Ghebali, Brigitte Sauwerwein, *European Security in the 1990s: Challenges and Perspectives*, New York, UNIDIR – United Nations, Geneva 1995, pp. 124-129.

of close cooperation. In consequence, in October 1990 the “5+5 Dialogue” was initiated. The Rome Declaration, adopted by the ministers of foreign affairs of the ten countries, states that one of the forum’s main goals is to create, in the western part of the Mediterranean basin, a sphere of stability and security, which could gradually be expanded to the entire Mediterranean region. Although the dialogue concentrated on political and security affairs, the development of cooperation between entrepreneurs, private investors, cultural and scientific institutions was adopted as a functioning mechanism. Although the meetings of the forum occur, they have not worked effectively. The main reason is the lack of agreement between the countries of North Africa. It is even said that the “5+5 Dialogue” should be written as 5+(1+1+1+1+1).⁹⁵

Alongside the idea of the CSCM and the establishment of the 5+5 group, Egypt initiated the creation of a Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (called the Mediterranean Forum). In July 1994, in response to this proposal, representatives of five southern European countries and five southern Mediterranean countries met in Alexandria. During the meeting, a document was accepted on the necessity of creating an institution for matters of ‘stability, peace, security and self-sustaining development throughout the region.’ However, the exclusion from the forum of Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Syria limited its role and significance. Only the Barcelona Conference in 1995, which established the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, managed to produce broader cooperation with the Mediterranean countries, including in political and security affairs.

Among all the various aspects of political and security cooperation, three have greatest importance for the European Union: 1) the lack of a cooperation mechanism in the region; 2) illegal immigration; and 3) international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this connection, in the years 1993-2010, the EU declared that it would assume the following roles: promoter of confidence-building measures and partnership in the region; initiator and active participant in combating illegal immigration and organized crime; and promoter of arms limitations in the region and the establishment of a WMD-free zone.

In the Barcelona Declaration, the countries inserted a provision to establish the Euro-Mediterranean pact, a kind of mechanism for preventing the outbreak of conflicts. It was to encompass, among other matters: the development of regional and trans-border cooperation, confidence-building measures and the introduction of a code of conduct for states. The necessity

⁹⁵ Jean-François Courtillière, *Une politique de l’Europe latine en Méditerranée occidentale*, “Défense Nationale”, Vol. 48, No. 4, April 1992, pp. 103-119; Emily B. Landau, Fouad Ammor, *Regional Security Dialogue and Cooperation in the South*, “EuroMeSCo Paper”, October 2006, No. 48; Said Haddadi, “The Western Mediterranean as a Security Complex: A Liaison between the European Union and the Middle East”, *Jean Monnet Working Paper in Comparative and International Politics*, JMWP, No 24, November 1999.

for introducing such methods was repeated in successive documents of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership forum and unilaterally by the EU. Since 1995, the EU has also gradually developed its concept of the role of initiator and participant in combating illegal immigration and organized crime in the Mediterranean region. In a document adopted in April 2002 at a ministerial conference of the EMP in Valencia, it was decided to add cooperation in the area of justice and domestic law to the previous programme. The document contained guidelines concerning cooperation in the area of internal security, particularly in combating drug trafficking, organized crime, terrorism and illegal immigration.

It was announced that a mutual position would be worked out on countering terrorism (reactivating a network of contact points). This document was discussed in detail in December 2003 at the sixth Euro-Mediterranean summit and then, in Naples in November 2005 cooperation in countering terrorism was strengthened: the sides agreed and accepted the *Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism*. The parties bound themselves to act together in combating international terrorism through measures to prevent money and arms from being obtained for later use in terrorist attacks. In order to achieve these goals, they set forth detailed guidelines for action: observation of all the UN conventions pertaining to countering terrorism, the commitment not to support terrorists and the transfer of information on terrorist groups.

In November 2007, during the tenth Euro-Mediterranean conference in Lisbon, it was decided to open a fourth basket in the EMP under the heading: migration, social integration, justice and security. Detailed guidelines in the matter of immigration were adopted during the first Euro-Mediterranean meeting of ministers, which took place in Algarve a couple of weeks later.

Repeatedly, in EU documents, in the declarations of its representatives and in documents mutually adopted by the EU and Mediterranean partner states, the problem of weapons of mass destruction has appeared. In the Barcelona Declaration, the EU committed itself to counteract the spread of weapons of mass destruction and to observe its obligations under international law in this respect, as well as to work toward establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. In addition, the EU has expressed its conviction that the Declaration's signatories must take practical actions to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological arms, as well as conventional arms, and also the need for the Mediterranean partners to sign and ratify the international agreements on weapons of mass destruction: the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Similar commitments appeared in later documents.

4. The role of promoter of economic reforms and sustainable regional development

The European Communities' engagement in the economic development of the SEMCs and of the entire region has been obvious since the seventies. In October 1972, the European Communities initiated the Global Mediterranean Policy and within this framework began to treat the Mediterranean region as a whole. In fact, a cooperation agreement had been signed earlier with certain North African countries (i.a. in 1969 with Tunisia and Morocco), but each country was then treated separately, and not the region in its entirety. In April 1976, the renegotiation of cooperation agreements with the North African countries was concluded and a year later the same kinds of agreements were signed with the Mashriq countries: Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and in 1978, Lebanon.⁹⁶ However, economic cooperation encountered a number of serious problems. The planned opening of a Mediterranean free trade area for industrial products never came to pass. The European Community adopted the New Mediterranean Policy only in December 1990. This initiative was intended to create horizontal cooperation and expand it to such areas as transport, energy and telecommunications.

The EU confirmed its engagement in the economic development of the southern and eastern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea in the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995 and in the annual declaration 10 years later. Activities to promote economic and financial reforms in the Arab countries were announced, including developing cooperation in key areas for economic development, i.e., in industry, agriculture, energy, transport, telecommunications, education, technology, and environmental protection, and in support for reform activities undertaken by the countries of the region.

An important element in the Barcelona Declaration was the idea of creating, in 2010, a free trade area for industrial products within the territory of the EU and partner countries. The realisation of this goal was to facilitate the Euro-Mediterranean association agreements concluded between the EU, its member states and the remaining member countries of the Barcelona Process. Successive EU documents setting forth EU activities in regards to the Mediterranean region repeat these goals. In the annual declaration signed in November 2005, a 'road map' outlining a plan for achieving the aim was adopted. In addition to industrial products, the creation of a free

⁹⁶ Fadi S. Hakura, *The Euro-Mediterranean Policy: the Implications of the Barcelona Process*, „Common Market Law Review”, 1997, Vol. 34, p. 338; *The European Community and the Mediterranean: Study on the Consequences of the Process of Enlargement Both for the Mediterranean Zone and for the Definition of a Global and Forward-Looking Policy of the Community Towards the Mediterranean Basin*, Commission of the European Communities, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 1984, pp. 39–53; Christopher Piening, *The European Union in World Affairs*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder 1997, p. 73.

trade area for agricultural goods, fish products and services was also included. Implementation was to occur in two stages. The first was to involve the gradual liberalisation of trade in agricultural and fish products, with the reservation, however, that certain products could be excluded from the free trade area and certain other products would be included over time and asymmetrically. The second stage was to involve a gradual liberalization of services, taking into account the provisions of the protocol adopted at the meeting of trade ministers in Istanbul in 2004. The free trade area's inclusion of agricultural goods, fish products, and services was an important element in the development of the Barcelona Process. These items' omission from the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 evoked sharp criticism from the SEMCs and accusations that the EU was treating the Euro-Mediterranean partnership instrumentally. It should be noticed, however, that the EU countries reserved the right to exclude the most sensitive products from the free trade area.

Improving living conditions in the Mediterranean region is not possible without increasing economic cooperation between the countries of the region. The EU has thus declared its support for developing regional cooperation between the Arab countries. At a ministerial meeting in Naples in December 2003, it was decided that attention should especially be concentrated on three North African states: Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The EU has also declared its support for regional initiatives adopted by the League of Arab States and for the Agadir Agreement.

In the declaration adopted in November 2005, the EU committed itself to promoting South-South regional integration through the *Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Protocol on Cumulation of Origin* and supported the intended entry into force of the Agadir Agreement by the end of 2005 at the latest.

The necessity of increasing regional cooperation was also set forth in the European Neighbourhood Policy. In appraising the achievements to date of the ENP in December 2006, the EU emphasised that enhanced economic cooperation between the SEMCs is in the common interest of the EU and its neighbouring countries. The EU confirmed its engagement in promoting the ENP, stating that in the long term it could become the Neighbourhood Economic Community (NEC).

5. The role of propagator of democratic values, human rights and intercultural dialogue

The idea of promoting democracy in the Arab countries has been clear in the EU's foreign policy concepts since the end of the eighties. In November 1989, the European Commission presented a proposal entitled: *Towards a New Mediterranean Policy*, in which emphasis was placed, for the first time, on the significance of democratic values and human rights. In June 1991,

the European Council, meeting in Luxembourg, stressed the importance it attached to the observance of human rights and the rule of law, and in November of this year, the EU Council adopted operational guidelines in regards to countries striving for democracy.⁹⁷ In actuality, the guidelines mainly concerned the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but before long they began to be applied to the Arab countries. In June 1992, among the six basic goals of the EU's foreign policy were strengthening democracy and human rights, including those of national minorities.⁹⁸ These aims were reflected in the provisions of the Barcelona Declaration, the conclusions of successive Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conferences, and in other documents setting forth EU policy on the Mediterranean region. The EU's main goals in this respect have been:

- promoting the basic values recognized by the EU and its member countries, such as: human rights, democracy, good governance and transparency
- acting to increase political pluralism and create conditions for free political activities, including free and unhindered elections
- promoting abolition of the death penalty in accordance with EU guidelines
- supporting member countries' activities to accelerate the education of women and to include them in the labour market, to establish gender equality, and prevent all forms of discrimination against women
- facilitating citizens' participation in the decision-making process, largely through decentralisation of authority
- ensuring free speech and facilitating the operation of independent media outlets and increasing access to information for all citizens
- ensuring equal access to education at all levels for girls and boys and the completion by all children of at least elementary education; reducing the illiteracy rate
- reducing the difference in educational levels between the member states of the EMP through the application of international teaching standards.

Since the development of democracy is not possible without an active civil society, the EU has declared its support for non-governmental groups in the Arab countries, for increasing the role of civil society, and for developing Euro-Mediterranean inter-societal cooperation, including creating cooperation between institutions of higher learning and local authorities.

⁹⁷ *Declaration on Human Rights, Conclusion of the Luxembourg European Council, 28–29 June 1991; Resolution of the Council and of the Member States Meeting in the Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development, 28 November 1991* (URL < <http://aei.pitt.edu/>, June 2009).

⁹⁸ Michael Smith, *European Union External Relations*, in: Michael Cini (ed.), *European Union Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, p. 240.

6. Financial instruments for implementing EU roles in the Mediterranean

To perform the roles in the Mediterranean region that were broadly outlined in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EU created a financial instrument called the *Mesures d'Accompagnement* (MEDA). It was similar to the PHARE and TACIS programmes for Central European countries and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The instrument was suggested in June 1995 and its legal basis was regulation no. 1488/96, which was adopted by the EU Council in July 1996. According to the provisions of the programme, its goal was financial support for the premises of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.⁹⁹ In the years 1996-1999, 3.424 billion euros (originally, the transfer of 4.850 billion ECU was spoken of) was allocated. Then, after experience with the functioning of MEDA I, the EU decided that changes were necessary. On 27 November 2000, the EU Council, on the basis of regulation no. 2698/2000, strengthened the role of the European Commission and rationalised the planning of expenditures. In November 2000, the participants of the fourth Euro-Mediterranean conference decided to allocate the sum of 5.35 billion euro¹⁰⁰ for the continuation of the MEDA programme (called MEDA II).

On 1 January 2007, the MEDA programme (like TACIS) was changed into the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The original intention of the EU was to create a mechanism supplementing the extant programmes of financial support by the additional aim of improving cooperation on the external borders of the EU, i.e., a mechanism to supplement the MEDA programme (and TACIS). Such suggestions are to be found in the communications of the European Commission of July 2003.¹⁰¹ However, as a result of a broader reform in the manner of financing the EU's foreign policy, a year later the Commission proposed expanding the use of the instrument to other spheres of activity: in other words, to replace the existing programmes with a single programme, significantly simpler in operation.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ *MEDA programme*, <http://europa.eu/scadplus> (June 2009). See also: Patrick Holden, *Partnership Lost? The EU's Mediterranean Aid Programmes*, „Mediterranean Politics”, Vol. 10, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 19–37.

¹⁰⁰ *MEDA – Financial and technical measures to accompany the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, “Système Euro-Méditerranéen d'Information sur les savoir-faire dans le Domaine de l'Eau”, <http://www.semide.net> (June 2009).

¹⁰¹ *Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument. Communication from the Commission*, Brussels, 1 July 2003, COM (2003) 393 final.

¹⁰² *Financial Perspectives 2007–2013. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament*, Brussels, 14 July 2004, COM (2004) 487 final; *Proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the Council laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument*, Brussels, 29 September 2004, COM (2004) 628 final.

Table 2. EU expenditure commitments in the MEDA programme for the SEMCs and for the development of regional cooperation (in million euros)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total MEDA I	Total MEDA II
Algeria	0	0	41	95	29	30	60	50	42	51	40	66	165	339
Egypt	0	75	203	397	11	13	0	78	104	159	110	129	685	593
Jordan	7	100	10	8	129	15	20	92	43	35	58	69	254	332
Lebanon	0	10	86	0	86	0	0	12	44	18	27	32	182	133
Morocco	30	0	236	219	176	141	120	122	143	152	135	168	660	980
Syria	0	13	42	0	46	38	8	36	1	53	22	22	101	180
Tunisia	20	120	138	19	132	76	90	92	49	22	118	71	428	517
West Bank and Gaza Strip	3	20	41	5	42	97	0	100	81	73	80	92	111	522
Total bilateral commitments	60	337	797	743	650	409	298	582	505	562	590	649	2 587	3 596
Regional commitments	113	33	114	66	145	160	305	29	110	135	145	168	471	740

Source: *European Commission. Europe Aid*, <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid> (June 2009)

The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was also considered for inclusion in the new mechanism. After almost two years of discussion between EU institutions and the member countries, it was decided to eliminate the MEDA and TACIS programmes and create one instrument in their place, the ENPI, to increase and facilitate financial assistance to the countries neighbouring the EU. The EIDHR remained, however, as a separate mechanism.

The legal basis of the ENPI is regulation no. 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and EU Council of 24 October 2006. For the period 2007-2013, the ENPI budget was set at 11.18 billion euros, of which a minimum of 95% was allocated to national and regional programmes that 'deal with assistance to one partner country or address regional and sub-regional cooperation between two or more partner countries, in which Member States may participate.' The remaining 5% was allocated to 'cross-border cooperation programmes, which deal with cooperation between one or more Member States and one or more partner countries, taking place in regions adjacent to their shared part of the external border of the Community' (Article 29). Trans-border cooperation is to be developed not only through greater financial input but also through simplified mechanisms of implementation. This type of cooperation is to be jointly financed by the ENPI (530 million euros in 2007-2013) and the Regional Development Fund (590 million euros in 2007-2013).¹⁰³

7. Conclusion

The EU's concept of its roles in the Mediterranean region in the years 1993-2010 appeared in the documents adopted mutually by it and its partner countries, (chiefly within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership / the Barcelona Process) and unilaterally by EU institutions, in particular by the European Council, the Council of the EU and the European Commission.

An analysis of the agreements reached at the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership forum and expressed in the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit on the Mediterranean Region, the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region of June 2000, the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and Middle East of June 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy initiated in June 2004, and many conclusions of European Council and EU Council meetings, indicate that the EU has striven to play several roles simultaneously in the Mediterranean region. The most important have been the following: 1) an active player in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, 2) a promoter of peace, confidence-building measures, and disarmament in the region, 3) an initiator

¹⁰³ Egidio Canciani, *European Financial Perspective and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument*, „Mediterranean Yearbook”, 2007, pp. 148–152.

of economic reforms and sustainable regional development, 4) a propagator of democracy, human rights and intercultural dialogue.

The EU's assumption of its declared roles has to be facilitated by financial instruments. In 1995, the EU created the MEDA programme, which functioned until 2006, and was then replaced by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.

CHAPTER IV

The EU as an active player in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict

1. Diplomatic activity

The first joint appearance of the Western European countries in regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict occurred in the seventies, within the framework of the European Political Cooperation. From the beginning of the decade, the European Community adopted several documents: the Schuman document (13 May 1971), the declaration of 6 November 1973, the London declaration (29 June 1977), and the Venice declaration (13 June 1980).¹⁰⁴ In the last-mentioned document, the EU clearly signalled that it wanted to play a more significant role in the Middle East, emphasising that 'the traditional ties and common interests linking Europe and the Middle East oblige [the members of the EC] to play a special role' in striving for peace in the region.¹⁰⁵ However during the eighties the EC did not undertake any significant actions in this regards.

It was the end of the the Cold War, with the new developments in European integration that allowed the EC/EU to play more significant role. During all the summits, the leaders of the EU member countries addressed themselves to the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They called on the sides for an end and for the establishment of a lasting and just peace, and expressed support for all steps in that direction. Such postulates were also found in the declarations of the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament and the representatives of EU institutions and member countries. In the nineties, when peace talks were underway between representatives of Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Lebanon, the EU expressed its satisfaction and supported the process. After the outbreak of the 2nd Intifada in September 2000 and the breakdown of the peace process, the EU leaders repeatedly called for an immediate end to the fighting and a return to the negotiating table; they called

¹⁰⁴ Justyna Zajęc, *Polityka Unii Europejskiej w regionie śródziemnomorskim*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2002.

¹⁰⁵ *Déclaration du Conseil: Proche-Orient – Moyen-Orient (Venise, 12–13 juin 1980)*, „Documents d'Actualité Internationale”, n° 29–30, 21–28 juillet 1980, pp. 594–595.

on the Palestinian groups to stop their attacks and on the Israeli authorities to refrain from acts of repression. During the war that took place in the summer of 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah forces operating in the southern territory of Lebanon, the EU repeatedly urged the parties to the conflict to agree to an immediate ceasefire, supported the UN in its peacemaking efforts,¹⁰⁶ and called upon Israel to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and on Syria not to interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs. The EU supported the actions of the Lebanese government in establishing a Special Tribunal for Lebanon on the basis of UN Security Council resolution no. 1664. It also declared its support for the initiative of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel and President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority to renew the peace process.¹⁰⁷ The EU reacted critically to the events at the end of 2008, urging Hamas and the Israeli government to cease military action at once and return to peace talks.¹⁰⁸ On 17 January 2009, the leaders of four countries – Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Prime Minister Sylvio Berlusconi, Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy wrote a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, in which they committed themselves to all possible actions to stop the supply of illegal arms to the Gaza Strip.¹⁰⁹

From the beginning of the eighties, the European Community has constantly expressed support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. As was written in the Venice Declaration of June 1980, the Palestinian nation must have the acknowledged possibility of 'full realisation of its right to self-determination', and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) should be included in the peace negotiations.¹¹⁰ This postulate has been repeated by the EU many times. One of the most important documents on the issue was the Berlin declaration – adopted by the European Council in March 1999 – in which the leaders of the 15 clearly recognized the right of the Palestinians to possess their own state. Three years later, in June 2002, at a summit in Seville, the European Council appealed for the rapid convocation of an international conference on security issues and on the political and economic questions involved in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, in order to reach an agreement and implement the principle of two states: Palestinian and Israeli.

¹⁰⁶ *EU response to the conflict in Lebanon*, Brussels, 8 August 2006, MEMO/06/306.

¹⁰⁷ *Brussels European Council Meeting: Presidency Conclusions, 14–15 December 2006*, „Press Release”, Brussels (12.02.2007) 16879/1/06, Annex II: *Declaration on Lebanon*.

¹⁰⁸ *EU Presidency Statement on the current situation in Gaza*, 7 January 2009, <http://www.eu2009.cz> (June 2009).

¹⁰⁹ *Statements by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and the European leaders in Jerusalem following meeting with Egyptian President Mubarak in Sharm el-Sheikh*, 18 January 2009, <http://www.mfa.gov.il> (June 2009).

¹¹⁰ *Déclaration du Conseil: Proche-Orient – Moyen-Orient (Venise, 12–13 juin 1980)*, Documents d'Actualité Internationale, n° 29–30, 21–28 juillet 1980, pp. 594–595.

In this context, the EU has repeatedly condemned Israeli actions.¹¹¹ It has strongly criticized the policy of building settlements on territories taken in the 1967 war, considering it a violation of international law and an impediment to the creation of an independent Palestinian state. According to information published on 15 December 2008 by the British newspaper *The Guardian*, the EU drew up a secret report in which it accused the Israeli government of taking actions to annex East Jerusalem: these included the expansion of Jewish settlements to the territory, a policy of building permits which discriminated against Palestinians and the demolition of existing houses.¹¹² The leaders of the EU have also condemned Israel's construction of a wall sealing off the Palestinian territories and were critical of retaliatory acts committed by the Israeli authorities against the Palestinians¹¹³.

In addition to verbal reactions, the EU is also providing good offices and advices. In the years 1993-2010, it did so through its Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process, its High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security, politicians of its member countries, and through the participation of EU representatives in international structures engaged in working to end the conflict.

The position of Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process was created on 25 November 1996 on the basis of an Council joint action

¹¹¹ *Palestine in the UK. On the sidelines of the Palestine Investment Conference in London*, Gamal Essam El-Din interviewed both Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and British Minister of State for the Middle East and North Africa Bill Rammell, "Al Ahram", No. 927, 25-31 December 2008, pp. 25-31.

¹¹² Even though Palestinians constitute 34% of the inhabitants of Jerusalem, only 5-10% of the entirety of the city budget is allocated for the development of areas in which they live. The Israeli authorities annually issue only 200 building permits to Palestinians, which means Palestinians often build illegally. These buildings are later demolished by Israel. It is estimated that since 2004, around 400 houses have been demolished, and a further 1,000 are slated for destruction. In the EU's opinion, such actions by Israel can not be justified on security grounds and only display a desire gradually to annex East Jerusalem, which remains an object in the conflict with the Palestinians. Rory McCarthy, *Israel annexing East Jerusalem, says EU*, "The Guardian" 7 March 2009. See also: *Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on possible house demolitions in East Jerusalem*, "Council of the European Union", Brussels, 12 March 2009, 7484/1/09 REV 1 (Presse 61), p. 32.

¹¹³ During a visit to Israel in January 2009, the EU delegation to the Middle East, which included the foreign affairs ministers of the Troika – Karl Schwarzenberg of the Czech Republic, Carl Bildt of Sweden and Bernard Kouchner of France – and the Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, criticized Israel for its disproportionate response to Hamas' rocket fire. Also President Nicholas Sarkozy, on a visit to the Middle East, also condemned the Israeli authorities' disproportionate reaction to Hamas' activities and stressed that military means would not resolve problems in the Gaza Strip. *Peres: Europe needs to open its eyes*, "The Jerusalem Post", January 6, 2009; *Syrian President Bashar al-Assad meets French counterpart in Damascus*, "Al-Masakin News Agency", January 9, 2009.

(96/676/CFSP). This decision was a continuation of the Council's stance, expressed in a declaration of October 1996, that the EU was ready to play an active role in promoting peace in the Middle East, in accord with its interests in the region. The former Spanish ambassador to Israel, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, became the first EU Special Representative. He was appointed for a year (to 25 November 1997) and his mandate included:

- working to establish and maintain close contact with all the parties to the peace process, other countries of the region, the United States and other interested countries, as well as relevant international organizations, in order to work with them in strengthening the peace process
- observing the peace negotiations between the parties, and being prepared, upon request, to provide the European Union's advice and good offices
- contributing where requested to the implementation of international agreements reached between parties, and engaging with them diplomatically in the event of non-compliance with the terms of these agreements
- engaging with signatories to agreements within the framework of the peace process in order to promote compliance with the basic norms of democracy, including respect for human rights and the rule of law
- submitting reports to EU institutions and recommending the best mode of proceeding for the EU in the peace process
- monitoring actions by either side that might prejudice the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.

Moratinos' mandate was extended each year for another 12 months, on the basis of Council of the EU decisions of 22 July 1997 (97/475/CFSP), 26 November 1998 (98/608/CFSP), 17 December 1999 (1999/843/CFSP), 14 December 2000 (2000/794/CFSP), 19 November 2001 (2001/800/CFSP) and 10 December 2002 (2002/965/CFSP). The range of his competence was modified, however. In the autumn of 1998, it was broadened to include security affairs, which were to be discussed within the EU-Palestinian Permanent Security Committee, active from April 1998. In December 1999, the Council decided that Moratinos should be aided in his activities by the Secretary General/High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, and in December 2000, that the Special Representative should work to increase regional leaders' understanding of the EU's role.

In June 2003, Moratinos resigned and by a Council decision of July 14 his place was taken by a Belgian diplomat, Marc Otte. His mandate, like that of Moratinos, was extended several times: 28 June 2004 (2004/534/CFSP), 2 January 2005 (2005/99/CFSP), 20 February 2006 (2006/119/CFSP), 15 February 2007 (2007/110/CFSP), 18 February 2008 (2008/133/CFSP), 19 February 2009 (2009/136/CFSP), and 22 February 2010 (2010/107/CFSP). Otte's mandate was also adapted to the changes occurring in the Middle East and in EU policy. In February 2006, the Council of the European Union decided that in addition to the position's previous duties, Otte would also

undertake to: increase the EU's role in preventive measures and crisis management; pay special attention to factors having implications for the regional dimension of the peace process; monitor implementation, by the parties to the conflict, of the 'road map' proposed by the Middle East Quartet in April 2003; initiate and develop EU activities in the area of security; support, should the need arise, the heads of missions of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah, established respectively in November and December 2005; and ensure the coherence of EU policy in the Middle East. For this purpose the activities of the Special Representative are to be coordinated with the activities of the High Representative for CFSP, the President of the EU and the European Commission.

In February 2008, the EU Council also decided that the Special Representative should contribute to implementing EU policy in the field of human rights, in particular in regard to women and children living within territories affected by conflict. He should also engage in broader cooperation with the US representative, the European Commission and other international actors. In February 2010, his mandate was again extended.

The activities of Miguel Moratinos and Marc Otte in the Middle East have been positively appraised. The first representative, who had initially been overshadowed by the American envoy, Dennis Ross, gradually strengthened his position and made the EU's presence in the Middle East more visible. He also took part in the peace negotiations. In 1997, he contributed to the signing of the Hebron Agreement, in 1998 to negotiating the Wye River Agreement; in both cases he encouraged the Palestinians to adopt a more conciliatory attitude toward Israel. Not coincidentally, after the signing ceremony for the Wye River Agreement, the president of the Palestinian National Authority, Yassir Arafat, travelled to Austria to meet with leaders of the 15, gathered at a summit in Pörschach.¹¹⁴ Marc Otte was also very active.¹¹⁵

In addition to the Special Representative, the High Representative for CFSP provides good offices and mediation as well. At a meeting in Stockholm in March, 2001, The European Council authorised Javier Solana to make close contacts with 'all parties' to the conflict for the purpose of convincing them to return to the negotiating table. However, the proceedings of the EU representative did not bring about a breakthrough in the conflict. The only political activity the EU could undertake was to urge Israel and Palestine to seek a lasting peace based on UN Security Council resolutions nos. 242 and 338.

Apart from activities of the Special Representative and the High Representative for CFSP the EU is also a member of international structures

¹¹⁴ Miguel Ángel Moratinos, *The evolution of European Common Foreign and Security Policy Conference in the Helmut Kohl Institute for European Studies on January 11, 1998*, <http://consilium.europa.eu> (June 2009).

¹¹⁵ Giovanni Grevi, *Pioneering Foreign Policy: The EU Special Representatives*, „Chaillot Paper”, No. 106, October 2007.

seeking political resolutions to the conflict. In 1991, it took part in the Madrid Conference, although its role there was not large. The most important non-regional actors were then the United States and the Soviet Union, however gradually, the EU's position and role have been strengthened. Since 2002 it has been a member of the Middle East Quartet (with the US, Russia and the UN) and within this framework it is trying to persuade the parties to the conflict to find a solution. In April 2003, in the name of the Quartet, President George W. Bush presented a 'road map' providing three stages on the way to ending the conflict. The road map was positively received by the Arab states, particularly Jordan. A few weeks after its announcement, in June 2003, the Jordanian authorities organized talks in the town of Akaba between Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel and Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority, with the participation of President George W. Bush as well. King Abdullah supported the proposal of the Middle East Quartet, emphasizing that it would mean a guarantee of security for Israel from the side of all the Arab countries, and for the Palestinians, the end of the occupation, the possibility of creating their own state, and the promise of freedom and development. In a speech given in Davos in January 2004, at the 34th annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, he expressed the conviction that the road map would lead to peace.¹¹⁶

In spite of declaring support for the Middle East Quartet, the states of the region were in reality critical of its activities; in their opinion it has been inadequate to the situation. The Quartet has attached rather too much weight to procedural questions, avoided the key issues of the conflict, and has not taken the proper steps that would lead to a final resolution. In order to achieve peace in the Middle East, the external actors taking part in the peace process absolutely need to treat the sides to the conflict equally. The main complaint appearing in statements of representatives of the Arab states, and directed chiefly toward the United States, has been the Quartet's too harsh treatment of the Palestinians and too lenient approach to the Israelis.

Since the 'road map' was not implemented, in November 2007 the US organized a peace conference in Annapolis. Its participants included Prime Minister Ehud Olmert; President Mahmoud Abbas; members of the Middle East Quartet (the UN and Russia, in addition to the US and EU); members of the League of Arab States (including Syria and Saudi Arabia); the members of the G-8; and other countries and representatives of international organizations. Olmert and Abbas agreed upon the text of a joint statement in which they committed themselves to conducting intensive negotiations to achieve a peace agreement by the end of 2008.¹¹⁷ The goal was not reached.

¹¹⁶ *Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process*, <http://www.mfa.gov.jo> (June 2009).

¹¹⁷ *Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at Annapolis Conference, November 27, 2007*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov> (June 2009).

In December 2008, Israel began a military attack on the Gaza Strip in alleged response to recurrent rockets fired into Israeli territory from there.

Despite the EU's engagement in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab countries and Israel consider that the diplomatic role of that actor has not been large. Even if the EU's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict has been generally in accord with the expectations of the Arab states, they often underlined that the EU policy often limited to rhetoric, which has not entailed any effective action¹¹⁸. They have repeatedly urged the EU to play a more decided role in the Middle East peace process;¹¹⁹ they have stressed that the EU should pay more attention to the factors that negatively affect the Arab-Israeli conflict, i.e., Jewish settlements, Israeli violence in Islamic holy places in Jerusalem and attempts to change the demographics in Jerusalem¹²⁰ and have appealed to the EU to react to the violation of Palestinian rights by the Israeli authorities occupying the Palestinian territories,¹²¹ and to a clearer differentiation between international terrorism and the nation's right to resist the occupying powers.¹²² The Arab states have not infrequently also expressed the hope that in cooperating with the other members of the Middle East Quartet, the EU, as the best candidate for the role, would become the honest broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including in stabilizing the situation in Lebanon.¹²³

¹¹⁸ *Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process*, <http://www.mfa.gov.jo> (June 2009); M. Belkhadem appelle à tenir compte du plan arabe de paix, *Conférence euro-méditerranéenne des ministres des Affaires étrangères*, 29–30 novembre 2004, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2009); *Le Maroc réitère sa solidarité avec le Liban et appelle à un arrêt immédiat des agressions israéliennes*, Rabat, 11 août 2006, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (styczeń 2009 r.); *Massacre de civils libanais à Qana : déclaration du ministère des Affaires étrangères d'Algérie*, 30 juillet 2006, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2009); *His Majesty King Abdullah II Address to the World Economic Forum's (WEF) 34th Annual Meeting*, Davos, Switzerland, 23 January 2004, <http://www.jordanembassyus.org> (June 2009.); *Le Maroc condamne devant le conseil de sécurité l'escalade militaire israélienne*, New York, 1 July 2006, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009.); M. Belkhadem appelle à tenir compte du plan arabe de paix. *Conférence euro-méditerranéenne des ministres des Affaires étrangères*, 29–30 novembre 2004, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2009); *Final communiqué of the Thirteenth Arab Summit Conference on the Intifadeh*, 27–28 March 2001, http://www.mideastweb.org/arab_summit_2001.htm (June 2009).

¹¹⁹ *Egyptian-European Policies*, "Egypt State Information Service", <http://www.sis.gov.eg> (June 2009).

¹²⁰ Foreign Minister for European Affairs, Ambassador Fatma Al Zahraa Etman, and Assistant Foreign Minister for Arab Affairs, Ambassador Abd El Rahman Salah, held a meeting with European Ambassadors in Cairo on October 28th, <http://www.mfa.gov.eg> (June 2009); Dina Ezzat, *More than Washington's underwriters?*, "Al Ahrām", No. 522, 22–28 February 2001.

¹²¹ *A Report on the visit of the President of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering*, February 28, 2008, <http://www.mfa.gov.eg> (June 2009).

¹²² M. Belkhadem: *il faut éviter l'amalgame entre terrorisme et résistance légitime à l'occupation*, 28 novembre 2005, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2009).

¹²³ *Egyptian-European consultations on the situation in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories*, 24 July 2006, <http://www.mfa.gov.eg> (June 2009); *Egypt and Finland explore the situation in the region*, July, 27, 2006, <http://www.mfa.gov.eg> (June 2009).

They have emphasised that the EU was established on the basis of universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it rests on democracy and the rule of law. Such principles should also direct it in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹²⁴ Understandably, Israel's position toward the EU's diplomatic role has been entirely different. It has criticized the EU for its pro-Arab stance and for favouring the Palestinians, and thereby of not maintaining its neutrality in resolving the conflict.¹²⁵

Being aware of the limitations of its diplomatic role, the EU has been striving to strengthen it, but simultaneously acknowledges the key role of the US¹²⁶ and UN. At the same time, it has been playing a leading role in the process of creating the state structures of the Palestinian autonomous territories and has been one of the largest donors of development and humanitarian aid to Palestinians.¹²⁷

2. Supporting the creation of Palestinian state institutions

Since the EU holds the position that peace in the Middle East will not be possible until an independent Palestinian state, recognizing the state of Israel, will be created it has thus been actively working to establish the public institutions that will be the foundation for the effective functioning of the future Palestinian state. To this end, the EU has been:

- supporting the development of democracy in the Palestinian autonomous territories; the European Commission was the largest international institution supporting the independent Palestinian Election Commission in conducting free and democratic presidential and parliamentary elections
- working to create an efficient and transparent system of government
- strengthening state structures and the rule of law; undertaking actions on behalf of strengthening the Palestinian system of justice and institutions of domestic security, i.e., to a large degree, the Palestinian police
- providing technical assistance to the authorities of the Palestinian

¹²⁴ M. Taieb Fassi Fihri: *le Maroc appelle au soutien du peuple Palestinien dans les négociations avec les israéliens*, Fes, 5 avril 2008, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009).

¹²⁵ Zob. np. *Reactions by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Sharon on the EU statement on Jerusalem*, 25 March 1999, <http://www.mfa.gov.il> (June 2009); Peres: *Europe needs to open its eyes*, "The Jerusalem Post", January 6, 2009; Sharon Pardo, *Between attraction and resistance: Israeli views of the European Union*, in: Sonia Lucarelli, Lorenzo Fioramonti (eds.) *External perceptions of the European Union as a global actor?*, Routledge, London 2010, pp. 70–86.

¹²⁶ Justyna Zając, *Środki i metody oddziaływania USA w bliskowschodnim procesie pokojowym (1991–2000)*, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2004.

¹²⁷ Miguel Ángel Moratinos, *The Evolution of European Common Foreign and Security Policy Conference in the Helmut Kohl Institute for European Studies on January 11, 1998*, <http://consilium.europa.eu> (June 2009).

Authority in managing public finances, including taxes and duty revenues;

- supporting improvements in trade policy; advising in matters of export and import procedures.¹²⁸

The EU played the largest role in monitoring the elections conducted in the Palestinian autonomous territories. On the basis of an EU Council joint action of 19 April 1994 (94/276/CFSP) and a decision of that institution on 25 November 1995 (95/403/CFSP) the EU created an Election Team, whose task was to direct a group of 300 observers sent to supervise elections to the Palestinian Council, which were organized in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration of Principles of November 1993.

The EU also helped conduct the succeeding elections in 2005 and 2006, spending 20 million euros for the purpose.¹²⁹ In December 2004, in response to an invitation from the Palestinian Central Elections Commission, the EU sent an Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The mission numbered 237 persons from 19 member countries of the EU and was aided by experts from Canada, Norway and Switzerland. It was headed by the former prime minister of France, MEP Michel Rocard. The Mission's aim was to support and monitor the process of general presidential elections, which occurred after the death of Yassir Arafat, in the Palestinian autonomous territories. The observers evaluated that the elections took place in accordance with international standards and without interference and the Palestinian authorities' contribution to the conduct of these elections were positive. They emphasised, however, that as a result of the enduring occupation of the Palestinian territories, and the violence and lack of freedom of movement, the elections were not entirely free.¹³⁰ Similar conclusions were presented by observers of the elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006. The EU mission, which was headed by MEP Véronique de Keyser of Belgium, began in December 2005 and lasted until February 2006. In total, the mission had 190 persons from 23 EU countries, Norway, Switzerland and Romania.¹³¹ In spite of the deficiencies and shortcomings of the elections, their democratic nature was not questioned, and yet the EU quickly withdrew its recognition for the government created by Hamas, which had received the largest number of votes (58%). Javier Solana stated that the EU could not recognize a govern-

¹²⁸ *European Neighbourhood Policy – the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Brussels, 3 April 2008, MEMO/08/213.

¹²⁹ *European Commission Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, <http://www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

¹³⁰ *West Bank and Gaza. Presidential Elections, 9 January 2005*, "European Union Election Observation Mission. Final Report", <http://ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

¹³¹ *West Bank and Gaza Strip. Palestinian Legislative Council Elections, 25 January 2006*, "European Union Election Observation Mission. Final Report", <http://ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

ment that had not renounced violence as a method of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, did not recognize the State of Israel and did not accept the existing peace agreements and the obligations arising from them.¹³² In accordance with the Middle East Quartet's position presented in March 2006,¹³³ three months later the EU suspended its aid programme to the Palestinian Authority, while maintaining its aid to Palestinian society (TIM).

For the purpose of creating a democratic, effectively functioning political system in the Palestinian autonomous territories, the European Commission also heads a Governance Strategy Group, which advises the Palestinian Authority on government reforms such as public administration, transparency and implementation of the rule of law.¹³⁴

Since 2003, the EU has also taken an active part in creating a justice system and an internal law enforcement service. For this purpose, it created the programme 'Strengthening the Judicial System' within whose framework, in December 2005, the Sayeda project was set up.¹³⁵ Its task was to train judges, prosecutors and other personnel working in judicial institutions, as well as to develop the Palestinian Judicial Institute.¹³⁶ The EU committed itself to provide technical assistance and help with the substance of the site, and gave 3.7 million euros for the purpose.¹³⁷ In 2009, the parties decided to extend the programme for another three years with a similar budget (Sayeda II). Within the programme 'Strengthening the Judicial System', the EU also supported the creation of a data bank of court rulings, to be an integral part of the Legal and Judicial Data Bank created by the Institute of Law at Birzeit University.

In addition, the Palestinian autonomous territories have been participating in a regional programme financed by the EU - the Euromed Justice Programme. Its main goal was to organize training for lawyers. In the years 2004-2008, the EU gave 8.5 million euros to strengthen the Palestinian justice system, of which: 3.75 euros for technical assistance; 2.4 million euros

¹³² *Middle East Peace Process: Speech by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy appearance before the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 5 April 2006*, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/solana> (June 2009).

¹³³ *Statement by Middle East Quartet, 30 March 2006*, "United Nations – Secretary General", SG 2110, PAL/2043, <http://www.un.org> (June 2009).

¹³⁴ *United Nations Development Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People*, <http://www.papp.undp.org> (June 2009).

¹³⁵ *Speech by Mr. John Kjaer, European Commission Representative in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, on the occasion of the celebration of the "SEYADA" judicial empowerment programme*, <http://www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

¹³⁶ Palestinian Judicial Institute was responsible for an implementation of programmes in a framework of the *Palestinian Reform and Development Plan*.

¹³⁷ *EU-funded Seyada project supports launch of new internet website for the Palestinian General Prosecution to improve the legal community and the public's awareness of activities of the judiciary and the general prosecution in Palestine*, "Press Release", Ramallah, 23 March 2009, <http://www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

for equipment and infrastructure; 2 million euros for the regional project Euomed, and 350,000 euros to create the data bank.¹³⁸

A major role was also played by the EU in creating the Palestinian police. In April 1994, a few months after signing the first Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, the Oslo Accord, the EU adopted Joint Action 94/276/CFSP, which premised support for the creation of a Palestinian police force. These activities intensified along with the EU's closer cooperation within the ESDP framework. At a meeting of the European Council in June 2004, the readiness of the EU to aid the Palestinian Authority in strengthening the rule of law, and particularly in improving police activity, was confirmed. Consequently, in January 2005 the Council created the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) within the framework of the office of the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Project, Marc Otte. EU COPPS' goal was to advise the leadership of the Palestinian police and ministers of internal affairs. On 1 January 2006, the office took the form of a mission conducted within the framework of the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL-COPPS). It was located in Ramallah and in Gaza and its main goal was to strengthen the rule of law and to improve security in the Palestinian territories. The length of the mission was originally set for three years, but in November 2008, the Council decided to extend it until the end of 2010. Its numbers grew continually: from 13-15 persons in 2007 to 41 in 2009. The first head of the mission was Jonathan McIvor, who was replaced in 2007 by Colin Smith, and since 2009 the position has been held by Paul Kernaghan. All three are British.¹³⁹

In the years 2006-2008, the EUPOL COPPS mission concentrated on two issues: 1) expanding the ability to act (infrastructure, logistics, computers, equipment, training) of the Palestinian police, whose operability considerably decreased after the outbreak of the 2nd Intifada; and 2) training for the Palestinian police force in monitoring street demonstrations while maintaining democratic principles. Gradually, the mission also began to get involved in the Palestinian Authority's efforts to reform the judicial system, prison management and implementation of the rule of law. All the activities were undertaken in cooperation with the US Special Coordinator, to ensure compatibility.¹⁴⁰ In the years 2008-2010, the EU supported the development of the Palestinian Civilian Police by working to improve: investigative

¹³⁸ *Laying the Foundations for a Viable and Democratic State: Empowering the Judicial System*, "European Commission Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip", <http://www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

¹³⁹ *EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)*, <http://ue.eu.int> (June 2009).

¹⁴⁰ *Press Conference by Collin Smith, Head of the EU police mission in the Palestinian Territories EUPOL COPPS, Brussels, 28 November 2008*, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu> (June 2009).

procedures, information technology and communications, police infrastructure and logistics, the justice system, the decision-making process, to ensure that activities accord with democratic principles.

In addition to EUPOL COPPS, the EU also had a mission to monitor border traffic at Rafah, on the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (the EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah – EU BAM Rafah). The decision to establish the mission was taken on the basis of a joint action of the Council of 12 December 2005. It was closely connected with the agreement on Gaza Strip border traffic signed in November 2005 by Israel and the Palestinian Authority.¹⁴¹ After a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army agreed, upon the Palestinians' fulfilment of certain conditions, to open the border crossing to facilitate the flow of persons and goods. It was decided that implementation of the agreement would be supported by the Middle East Quartet's Special Envoy for withdrawal affairs, and/or the US Security Coordinator and that the EU would support the Palestinians in organizing a border and customs service at the Rafah border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. In letters sent to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs successively on 20 and 23 November 2005, the Palestinian Authority and Israel asked the EU to establish a mission supporting the Palestinians at the border crossing in Rafah.

The Council of the EU gave EU BAM Rafah the following tasks:

- monitoring, controlling and evaluating the Palestinian Authority's implementation of the agreement concluded with the Israeli government
- developing the Palestinians' abilities to manage the border crossing
- contributing to creating understanding and ties between the Palestinian, Israeli and Egyptian authorities in all matters pertaining to the functioning of the border crossing in Rafah.

The mission was to last for 12 months but was twice extended: on the basis of the Council decision of 13 November 2006 (2006/773/CFSP), its mandate was extended to 24 May 2007, and again by the Council decision of 23 May 2007 (2007/359/CFSP) to 24 May 2008.

After Hamas won the parliamentary elections in 2006, the border crossing in Rafah was temporarily closed. Due to the growing tension in the Palestinian autonomous territories and an outbreak of conflict between the Palestinians – with Hamas' consequent assumption of control over the Gaza Strip – the crossing was permanently closed on 9 June 2007. A few days later the EU suspended the operations of EU BAM Rafah, and the mission's numbers were sharply reduced. However, it was ready to operate should the circumstances allow.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ *Agreement on Movement and Access*, 15 November 2005 oraz *Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing*, 15 November 2005, "Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs", <http://www.mfa.gov.il> (June 2009).

¹⁴² *European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah*, <http://www.eubam-rafah.eu> (June 2009).

In November 2008, a Frenchman, Col. Alain Faugeras, became head of the EU BAM Rafah mission, replacing an Italian, Gen. Pietro Pistolese, who had held the position since November 2005.¹⁴³ From 25 November 2005, when it was opened, until 9 June 2007, when it was closed, the border in Rafah was crossed by nearly 444,000 persons: around 230,000 persons went from Gaza to Egypt and 214,000 went from Egypt to Gaza. The role of the EU mission consisted in monitoring and controlling the proper functioning of the border crossing and the legality of the crossings. The mission served also as a forum facilitating cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli officers, and was intended to produce a gradual increase in mutual trust.

The EU has also worked to support the Palestinian Authority in countering terrorism within its territory. On the basis of an Council Joint Action of 29 April 1997, the EU-Palestinian Permanent Security Committee was established. Its main goal was to increase the ability of the Palestinian authorities to counter terrorism. The programme was to train security personnel and to give supplementary training to police units. The EU simultaneously decided that the cooperation programme would be suspended if the Palestinian Authority: 1) did not fully cooperate in its implementation; 2) did not introduce the human rights protections necessary for its realisation; and 3) did not allow the EU to make periodic reviews of the outcome of implementing the programme. The EU named Nils Eriksson as its representative to supervise and help implement the programme. His mandate, along with the programme's operation, was extended by Council decision of 13 April 2000.

Eriksson's mandate expired in May 2002, and the programme of cooperation with the Palestinian Authority in countering terrorism was not extended.

The EU also supported the Palestinian Authority in creating an efficiently functioning public finance sector. From 1995 it provided schooling in the area of internal auditing and advisory services in regard to managing and controlling auditing in the public finance sector. It trained around 90 Palestinian bureaucrats, which made it possible to introduce legal regulations and create internal Palestinian controls. In the years 2000-2006, the EU gave the Palestinian Authority 6.6 million euros to reform the management of public finances, and 6.6 million euros to improve the revenue system. In addition, the Palestinian Ministry of Finance was granted 5 million euros to create a computer system that would facilitate the management of tax revenues. The EU also supported the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, by giving it 2.2 million euros to create a system of statistical data.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Javier Solana EU High Representative for the CFSP congratulates Alain Faugeras on taking Office as Head of Mission of EU BAM Rafah, 25 November 2008, "European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah", <http://www.eubam-rafah.eu> (June 2009).

¹⁴⁴ European Commission Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, <http://www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

After the Hamas party won the parliamentary elections in January 2006, the EU suspended its financial aid to the newly formed Palestinian government. However, in February 2007, after the formation of a Palestinian government of national unity (Hamas and Fatah), aid from the European Commission was renewed. In June 2007, the European Commission and the Palestinian Ministry of Finance signed a memorandum on ensuring technical assistance for the ministry in the form of training. The purpose of such training was to increase the ability of the Palestinian Authority to manage public finances in accord with international standards. For this purpose, the EU allocated 4 million euros to cover the costs of training the personnel of Ministry of Finance offices in Ramallah and Gaza by the international advising firm of Ernst & Young. The EU also began to implement programmes of technical assistance for Palestinian customs and tax services.

3. Giving development and humanitarian aid to the Palestinians

The EU is the largest donor of financial aid to the Palestinians. In 1971 the European Community transferred funds to UNRWA Aid for Palestinian Refugees. From that time, the EU has regularly and to an increasingly large degree supported Palestinian society financially. As Miguel Moratinos has emphasised, financial aid allows the Palestinians to survive and is simultaneously a factor restraining the intensification of violent attacks against the Israelis.¹⁴⁵

In October 1993, at an international conference in Washington, 2.4 billion dollars (for the period 1993-1997) was granted to the Palestinian Authority, which was to be established on the basis of the Oslo Accord of 1993. The EU granted the largest amount of funds. They amounted to 700 million ecus, of which:

- 444 million ECU in grants from the budget of the European Community
- 100 million ECU in the form of a loan from the European Investment Bank
- 156 million ECU in the form of UNRWA aid.

Among the 39 projects prepared in the years 1993-1997, the leading place was occupied by proposals pertaining to infrastructure development, the promotion of education, promotion of the private sector and humanitarian aid.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ Miguel Ángel Moratinos, *The evolution of European Common Foreign and Security Policy Conference in the Helmut Kohl Institute for European Studies on January 11, 1998*, <http://con-silium.europa.eu> (June 2009).

¹⁴⁶ *The Role of the European Union in the Middle East Peace Process and its Future Assistance to the Middle East*, Communication from the Commission, „Office for Official Publications of the European Communities”, Catalogue No. CB-CO-98-032-EN-C, Luxembourg 1998.

Table 1. Financial aid from the European Union and European Investment Bank to Palestinians in the years 1993-1997 (in million ecus)

SECTOR	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	TOTAL
Education	19.9	10.9	41.2	49.9	8	129.9
Strengthening state structures	1.5	1.5	2.5	3	5	13.5
Local authorities	–	–	15	15	20	50
Construction	–	10	–	–	–	10
Private sector	0.4	8.4	3.3	3.3	5	20.4
Health	3.35	2.7	13.27	8.3	5.2	32.82
Technical assistance	7.8	5	5	–	5	22.8
Agricultural assistance	1.9	0.02	0.5	1.3	1.5	5.22
Environmental protection/water	1.57	–	–	0.7	–	2.27
Police/countering terrorism	–	20	–	–	7.1	27.1
Elections	–	–	12.9	–	–	12.9
Aid for former prisoners	–	10	–	–	–	10
Vocational training	–	–	–	4.7	–	4.7
Human rights/democracy	0.3	0.32	1.5	3	1.5	6.62
Humanitarian aid	5.72	4.8	5.85	13.3	6.3	35.97
Permanent wastes	16.8	0.8	–	–	–	17.6
TV/Radio	2	–	–	–	1.5	3.5
Micro-projects	–	1	1	0.5	0.5	3
Projects promoting peace in the Middle East	0.1	2	4.5	1.8	–	8.4
Investments	–	–	0.25	0.1	–	0.35
Energy sector	–	0.5	–	–	–	0.5
Special Fund for the Ministry of Finance	–	–	–	–	25	25
Customs	–	–	–	–	1.2	1.2
Other sectors	–	–	–	0.7	–	0.7
UNRWA budget	24.1	31	32	34.1	35.3	156.5
European Investment Bank	–	–	–	86	14	100
TOTAL	85.44	108.94	138.77	225.7	142.1	700.95

Source: *The Role of the European Union in the Middle East Peace Process and its Future Assistance to the Middle East*, Communication from the Commission, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Catalogue No. CB-CO-98-032-EN-C, Luxembourg 1998.

The actual amount of aid far exceeded the amount originally intended. In the years 1993-1997, the EU transferred 1.68 billion ECU (716 million ECU additional funds from EU member countries and 270 million ECU in additional EC aid to the UNRWA budget) to the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian society (including Palestinian refugees).¹⁴⁷

Table 2. Financial aid from the European Community to Palestinians in the years 2000-2006 (in million euros)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	TOTAL
Direct support for the Palestinian Authority	90	40	120	102	90.25	76	–	518.25
Infrastructure	0.8	0.97	38.3	0	0	40.55	–	80.62
Creating state institutions	16.89	5.76	21.50	12	6	17	12	91.15
Support for refugees through UNRWA	40.24	57.25	55	57.75	60.65	63.67	64.41	398.97
Humanitarian and food aid	33.60	41.95	69.24	61.61	61.11	65.28	104	436.79
Civil society and the peace process	22.90	–	10	7.50	10	10	–	60.34
SMEs, East Jerusalem, human rights, non-governmental organizations	22.77	2.55	11.86	30.04	26.22	5.86	17.75	97.30
Support in emergency situations (individually and through TIM)	–	–	–	–	–	–	14.75	14.75
TOTAL	225.20	148.48	325.90	270.90	254.23	278.36	339.91	1825.23

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/palestinian_authority/ec_assistance/eu_support_pa_2000_2006_en.pdf (June 2009).

In sum, to 2001, the EU gave 3.47 billion euros in aid to the Palestinians (2.44 billion euros in aid to the Palestinians living on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and 1.03 billion euros to the UNRWA fund). In comparison with other regions in which the EU has been engaged, aid to the Palestinians took first place. It is estimated that in the years 1991-1995, the Palestinians received

¹⁴⁷ Ibidem. See also: Ben Soetendorp, *Foreign policy in the European Union: Theory, history and practice*, Longman, London 1999.

258.7 ECU per capita from the General Aid Budget, while 23.2 ECU per capita went to participants of the Lomé Convention and the Mediterranean region as a whole received 11.2 ECU per capita.¹⁴⁸

In the years 2000-2006, EU financial aid for the Palestinians amounted to 1.8 billion euros. A large part was given to continue the reform of public finances: increasing the transparency of the Palestinian Authority's public finances; gathering all the revenues of the Palestinian Authority into one account monitored by the International Monetary Fund; and strengthening the Palestinian Authority's internal and external abilities to control taxes. The EU also gave the Palestinians funds for: refugee aid, food aid, support for the health care sector, and aid for reforming the judicial system and building democratic institutions.

As a consequence of Hamas' victory in the elections in January 2006, the social and economic situation of the Palestinians significantly worsened since the Israeli government suspended the monthly transfer of revenues from foreign trade that it collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. Israeli restrictions on Palestinian movement from the Gaza Strip and West Bank onto Israeli territory considerably decreased Palestinian trade and income. At the same time, foreign donors reduced their aid. The EU as well ceased directing its financial aid to the Palestinian Authority. However, it did not stop financing Palestinian society. In June 2006 the European Commission, in cooperation with the World Bank, and at the request of the Middle East Quartet, created a new mechanism for transferring funds to Palestinians: the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM). Its aim was to provide direct aid to the Palestinian people, by passing the Palestinian Authority. This aid was granted by the European Commission, EU member countries and other donors.¹⁴⁹

Transfers of aid within the framework of the TIM took place in three tranches. In the first, the EU, its member countries and other donors transferred, through the intermediary of the World Bank (the Emergency Services Support Programme – ESSP) a sum of 59.25 million euros to finance the most urgent Palestinian health, educational and social needs. The second tranche was to ensure the Palestinians had access to electricity, health care and proper sanitary conditions. It was financed solely by the EU (131 million euros) and supervision over the issuance of funds was performed by a special TIM Management Unit. The third tranche, financed like the first by the EU, its member countries and other donors, had a sum of 425.7 million euros and was given directly to the most poverty-stricken and necessitous Palestinians in the form of cash.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ Justyna Zając, *Partnerstwo Eurośródlomowe*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa 2005, p. 96.

¹⁴⁹ http://www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu/en/tim/English_Website/tim_key_facts.pdf (June 2009).

¹⁵⁰ *Temporary International Mechanism: Overall Implementation Process*, 18 January 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations (June 2009).

In sum, within the TIM in the years 2006-2007 the European Commission gave Palestinians 455.5 million euros (107.5 million euros in 2006 and 348 million euros in 2007).¹⁵¹

Table 3. International financial aid for Palestinians within the framework of the Temporary International Mechanism (2006–2007)

In million euros	Tranche I	Tranche II	Tranche III
European Union	15.0	131.0	309.5
Australia	2.55	–	–
Austria	1.0	–	–
Belgium	2.5	–	–
Canada	–	–	5.65
Switzerland	1.5	–	–
Germany	–	–	40.0
Denmark	–	–	0.8
Spain	15.0	–	10.0
Finland	–	–	1.0
France	3.0	–	11.5
Greece	–	–	0.2
Ireland	–	–	2.0
Italy	2.3	–	–
Luxembourg	–	–	2.2
Malta	–	–	0.03
The Netherlands	–	–	18.87
Norway	2.6	–	5.95
Sweden	4.9	–	4.8
Great Britain	8.9	–	13.19
Total	59.25	131.0	425.69

Source: *Temporary International Mechanism: Overall Implementation Process*, 18 January 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations (June 2009).

In addition to the funds transferred within the framework of the TIM, the EU allocated 200 million euros for other aid programmes for Palestinians. These included: costs of medical treatment, psychological and social support,

¹⁵¹ *Temporary International Mechanism – TIM*, 18 January 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/occupied_palestinian_territory/tim/factsheet_tim_en.pdf (June 2009).

supplies of drinking water, construction of shelters for the population, and promoting employment. This activity was conducted in cooperation with UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent.

Table 4. EU support for Palestinians in 2007

Aid provided	In million euros
Temporary International Measure (TIM)	348.0
UNRWA	79.8
Food and humanitarian aid (ECHO)	76.3
Private sector	20.0
Creation of state institutions	5.7
Support for civil society	9.2
Social and health care projects in East Jerusalem	2.0
Support for peacemaking	7.5
Total	548.5

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/occupied_palestinian_territory/ec_assistance/eu_support_pa_2007_en.pdf (June 2009).

In February 2008, the EU decided to replace the Temporary International Measure with the PEGASE programme (*Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d'Aide Socio-Economique*), through which the European Commission provided support for the three-year Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP), presented in December 2007 by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad of the Palestinian Authority. The PEGASE programme was set up in consequence of the international conference that took place in December 2007 in Paris. Its goal was de facto support for the moderate Palestinian political party controlling part of the Palestinian West Bank and the peace process, which had been renewed at a conference in Annapolis in November of the same year. At the Paris conference, a delegation of 87 countries and international organizations decided to award 7 billion dollars of financial aid to the Palestinian Authority and the territory's inhabitants for three years, of which 3.4 billion dollars in 2008.¹⁵² More than half the sum came from the EU and its partner countries.

¹⁵² *International Donors' Conference for the Palestinian State: Pledges Recap*, 22 January 2008, France Diplomatie Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr> (June 2009).

Table 5. Division of international financial aid for Palestinians in 2008-2010

Year	Sum (in million USD)
2008	3.43
2009	2.12
2010	2.15
Total	7.71

Source: *International Donors' Conference for the Palestinian State: Pledges Recap*, 22 January 2008, "France Diplomatie Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes", <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr> (June 2009).

Table 6. Financial aid contributions of individual donors for Palestinians in 2008-2010

Donor	Sum (in million USD)	Percent of total aid
Europe (including the EU)	4093	53.1
North America	839	10.9
Arab countries	1524	19.8
Other countries	411	5.3
International organizations	843	10.9
Total	7710	100

Source: *International Donors' Conference for the Palestinian State: Pledges Recap*, 22 January 2008, France Diplomatie Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr> (June 2009).

The PEGASE programme was broader than the TIM.¹⁵³ With its funds, the EU supports reforms in four areas: state institutions, the social sector, the private sector economy and public infrastructure.


From 1 February 2008 to 31 January 2009, the EU and its member countries gave the Palestinian Authority and the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip over 55 million euros (409.2 million euros of direct aid within the framework of the PEGASE programme and over 131 million euros aid from fourteen EU member countries).¹⁵⁴ PEGASE included direct financial support: for vital social needs (for instance, fuel supplies); to the most necessitous Palestinian families (the quarterly payment of around 200 euros to the most impoverished and needy Palestinian families); for the Palestinian Authority

¹⁵³ *PEGASE Information Sheet*, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/occupied_palestinian_territory/tim/pegase_en.pdf (October 2008).

¹⁵⁴ *The European Union's PEGASE Mechanism: at the Service of the Palestinian Population, Open to all Donors*, Jerusalem, March 2, 2009.

for regulating state payments (transferring funds to pay state functionaries, retirees and pensioners); and for Palestinian entrepreneurs for regulating outstanding claims.

Pie Chart 1. Allocation of international aid for Palestinians in 2008-2010



Source: *International Donors' Conference for the Palestinian State: Pledges Recap*, 22 January 2008, France Diplomatie Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr> (June 2009).

In the course of twelve months, beginning with February 2008, direct financial aid to the Gaza Strip amounted to 218 million euros, of which almost half came from the PEGASE programme.

After Israel's military attack on the Gaza Strip in December 2008, the EU announced the set up of successive programmes to help in repairing the damages.¹⁵⁵ In January 2009, the European Commission decided to provide immediate aid in the amount of 3 million euros to meet the most basic needs of the civilian population affected by the Israeli action. In addition, it was decided to give 32 million euros in humanitarian aid for the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, 20 million euros aid for the West Bank and 6 million for the Palestinian refugees within Lebanese territory. In 2008, the European Commission gave over 73 million euros in humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, of which 56% to the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip.¹⁵⁶ In 2009, the European Commission gave 440 million euros in aid for the Palestinians, of which over half for the Gaza Strip.¹⁵⁷

The European Commission has also co-founded a guarantee fund for loans granted by banks to small and medium-size businesses. In December

¹⁵⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁵⁶ *Occupied Palestinian Territory. The desperate situation in Gaza*, <http://ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

¹⁵⁷ *European Union Pledges Support for Reconstruction of Gaza – Speech by Commissioner Ferrero-Ealdner*, 2 March 2009, European Union and United Nations. Partnership in Action, <http://www.europa-eu-un.org> (June 2009).

2005, the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Commission and the European Investment Bank signed an agreement with the Palestinian Authority to create the European-Palestinian Credit Guarantee Fund, directed by the German Development Bank (KfW). The donors agreed to transfer 29 million euros to the fund (14 million euros from the EC, 10 million from the European Investment Bank, and 5 million from KfW), as security for local banks granting loans to small and medium-size businesses that do not meet credit requirements. It is estimated that there are around 93,000 small and medium-size enterprises operating in the Palestinian autonomous territories. 90% employ fewer than 20 persons.¹⁵⁸ Five banks operating within the Palestinian autonomous territories joined in: Cairo Amman Bank, Bank of Jordan, Arab Islamic Bank, Housing Bank for Trade & Finance and Jordan Ahli Bank. Firms that hire less than 20 persons and have cash liquidity, but do not have the guarantees usually required by banks are eligible to apply for loans.¹⁵⁹ From September 2006 to December 2008, the foundation granted 667 guaranteed loans. All were repaid according to agreement. The largest number of loans were granted to enterprises operating in the northern region, encompassing Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarm, and Kaliya (290 loans), or expanding their activities in the trade sector (373 loans). Among the enterprises operating in the Gaza Strip, only one fulfilled the conditions necessary for receiving a loan. Among the sectors, the least number of loans was received by firms engaged in export/import (2 loans).

In addition to the above-mentioned programmes of financial support, the EU also provided funds for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Their basic needs included shelter, health care, psychological and social support, access to water and treatment plants, and protection of unregistered refugees.¹⁶⁰ The EU contributes to UNRWA, and is its largest donor. In the years 2003-2006, the EU (the European Commission and EU member countries) provided a further 246 million euro to the agency. Generally, the European Commission contributes a 27% share to UNRWA, and the total contribution share of the EU, i.e., of the European Commission and the EU member countries, is 58%. On 28 February 2007, EU Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner and UNRWA Commissioner Karen Koning Abu Zayd signed a joint declaration on the EU's support for that agency in the years 2007-2010 in the amount of 264 million euros. This sum was 7% more than in the preceding four years.¹⁶¹


¹⁵⁸ *German initiatives takes off: European Palestinian Credit Guarantee Fund Established*, Representative Office of the Federal Republic of Germany in Ramallah, Ramallah, 15.12.2005, Ref.: Pr 16/2005.

¹⁵⁹ *General Statistics Report. Third Newsletter, 31 December 2008*, European Palestinian Credit Guarantee Fund, <http://www.cfg-palestine.com> (June 2009).

¹⁶⁰ <http://ec.europa.eu> (October 2008).


¹⁶¹ <http://www.europa-eu-un.org> (October 2008).

Pie Chart 2. Geographical distribution of loans to Palestinian enterprises



Source: *General Statistics Report. Third Newsletter, 31 December 2008*, European-Palestinian Credit Guarantee Fund, <http://www.cfg-palestine.com> (June 2009).

Distribution by sector



Source: *General Statistics Report. Third Newsletter, 31 December 2008*, European Palestinian Credit Guarantee Fund, <http://www.cfg-palestine.com> (June 2009).

Table 7. Number of employees in enterprises receiving loans

Number of employees	Number of enterprises
1–5	500
6–10	109
11–15	35
16–20	23

Source: *General Statistics Report. Third Newsletter, 31 December 2008*, European-Palestinian Credit Guarantee Fund, <http://www.cfg-palestine.com> (June 2009).

European aid for Palestinian refugees was often provided in situations of intensifying crisis, as was the case in May 2007, when after heavy fighting between Fatah forces and the Lebanese army, the European Commission decided to allocate an additional 4 million euros of humanitarian aid for the Palestinian refugees living in the Nahr El Bared refugee camp in Lebanon. This money was used to meet the needs of the approximately 30,000 Palestinian refugees from this camp, who had been forced to flee to other camps in Lebanon as a result of the fighting. The funds provided by the European Commission were distributed with the active participation of partners in the region (UN agencies, NGOs, and the Red Cross).

The EU also grants humanitarian aid to the Lebanese population affected by the armed conflict that erupted between Israel and Hezbollah in July 2006. By the end of 2006, the EU had provided for this purpose 104 million euros (50 million from the European Commission and 54 million euros from EU member countries). The aid was provided for existential needs of the Lebanese.¹⁶² The aid the EU grants the Palestinian Authority was transferred through the EuroAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO), the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), and the European Commission Technical Assistance Office in Jerusalem.

It should be noted that for many years the EU's technical and financial support for creating state structures in the Palestinian autonomous territories was unconditional. The EU provided aid without any real enforcement of the implementation of the agreed-upon conditions, tolerating violations of democratic principles and instances of human rights transgressions. Fatah, which held power to the beginning of 2006, showed itself to be a badly corrupt party, and the funds provided by the EU were not expended in a transparent manner. The EU's stance in this context is surprising, as it did not create any control mechanisms and did not require transparent procedures for spending the funds as a condition of granting further financial aid. The opinion that a large part of the aid was transferred by the Palestinian authorities to the private bank accounts of the leaders and members of Fatah is not unfounded. Only in 2002 did the EU, in granting financial aid, place greater weight on making it dependent on the reforms conducted by the Palestinian Authority.¹⁶³

The role of the EU as a participant in creating the state structures and democratisation of the Palestinian autonomous territories acquired a new

¹⁶² *Emergency Humanitarian Aid for the Population of Lebanon affected by the Conflict*, "Emergency Humanitarian Aid Decision, European Commission Director-General for Humanitarian Aid – ECHO", ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/0200 oraz ECHO/LBN/BUD/2006/01000.

¹⁶³ See more: Anne Le More, *Killing with Kindness: Funding the Demise of a Palestinian State*, "International Affairs", Vol. 81, No. 5, October 2005, pp. 981-999; Nigel Roberts, *Hard Lessons from Oslo: foreign aid, the mistakes of the 1990s*, in: Michael Keating, Anne Le More, Robert Lowe (eds.), *Aid, diplomacy and facts on the ground: the case of Palestine*, Chatham House, London, 2005, pp. 19, 24.

dynamic with the set up of the operation EUPOL COPPS. The EU began then to participate actively in conducting reforms in the judicial and internal security sectors. This change was closely connected with the 2nd Intifada and the policy of President George W. Bush's administration toward the Palestinian autonomous territories. The frequent Palestinian terrorist attacks in Israel, and the blame placed on Yassir Arafat by Washington and Tel Aviv for the situation, forced the EU to increase its requirements concerning the democratisation of the Palestinian autonomous territories. Without proper steps, the Israelis would not agree to the renewal of peace talks, and the USA would not exert any pressure to make it change its position.¹⁶⁴ Basically, only the creation of the Temporary International Mechanism in 2006 made it possible more control the expenditure of the financial aid granted to the Palestinians.

4. Supporting the development of regional cooperation

The European Union has been a promoter of regional cooperation at the government and non-governmental levels. In the nineties, the EU played a significant role in the multilateral work groups created at the Madrid Conference in 1991, that were engaged in five areas: regional economic cooperation; potable water resources; environmental protection; the question of Palestinian refugees; and arms control. The aim was to create permanent cooperation among the countries of the region.¹⁶⁵ Many regional projects involving multilateral cooperation were financed or co-financed by EU funds. In 1995-1998, the EU allocated 31.6 million euros for projects supporting peace in the Middle East, and in 1999-2000 the sum was 21.73 million euros.¹⁶⁶

The EU took a particularly important position in the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG), which it led. The group was the largest of the five working groups in terms of the number of participants and of projects. In November 1993 REDWG created the Copenhagen Action Plan, which was updated in May 1996. Structurally and institutionally, REDWG differed from the other groups. The chief institutions of the group were the Assembly, the Control Commission, the Secretariat, and Sector and Subsector Commissions. These institutions were to provide the origins for future regional economic organization, and the Secretariat, which opened headquarters in 1995 in Amman, was to play a leading role in the insti-

¹⁶⁴ Daniela Pioppi, Nahalie Tocci, Karam Karam, *Domestic Politics and Conflict in the Cases of Israel, Palestine and Lebanon*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", No. 53, October 2006.

¹⁶⁵ See more: Joel Peters, *Pathways to Peace: the Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks*, European Commission, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 1996, pp. 46-60; Joel Peters, *The Arab-Israeli Peace Talks and the Barcelona Process: Competition or Convergence?*, „The International Spectator”, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, October-December 1998, pp. 63-76.

¹⁶⁶ Zająć, *Polityka Unii Europejskiej* ..., p. 92.

tutionalization of future economic cooperation in the region. At a meeting in Moscow in 2000 the group emphasised that the EU should play a leading role in creating economic cooperation in the region.¹⁶⁷ However, due to the intensification of the Arab-Israeli conflict after the outbreak of the 2nd Intifada in September 2000, there was then no return to cooperation within the framework of the multilateral groups established by a decision at the Madrid Conference in 1991.¹⁶⁸

Table 8. Examples of projects financed by the EU in the years 1995-1998

Sector	Project	Participating countries	EU financial contribution (in million euros)
Water resources	Projects to complete the creation of a data bank of the region's fresh water resources	Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan	3.9
Agriculture	Regional veterinary cooperation	Israel, The Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt	4.6
Municipal trans-border cooperation	Trans-border cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli regions (Jenin, Gilboa, Beit, Shean, Haifa) and the opening of an office in Jenin	Israel, The Palestinian Authority	3
Environmental protection	An initiative to control the desertification of the region's soil	Israel, The Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia	3
	ECOPEACE: a cooperative programme for the self-sustaining development of tourism involving protection of the natural environment in the Bay of Akaba and the Dead Sea basin.	Israel, The Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt	0.57
Regional economic cooperation	Establishment of a network of economic institutions working to prepare future economic cooperation and integration in the region	Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon	1

¹⁶⁷ *Middle East Peace Process Multilateral Steering Group Moscow, 31 January/1 February 2000*, „Report from the European Union”, 2001.

¹⁶⁸ Por. Miguel Ángel Moratinos, *European Union-Middle East: Developing Societies for Peace*, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre, Distinguished Lecture Series, 23 March 2000.

The EU also maintains the position that establishing permanent peace in the Middle East will not be possible without the development of cooperation at the social level. Thus it supports non-governmental organizations that work toward reconciliation and closer international ties. The EU, on the basis of its own integration experience, assumes that strong civil societies are in a position to influence the decisions of politicians, and that building cooperation, peace, and friendship between countries is not possible without rapprochement at the social level.¹⁶⁹

In the nineties, the largest enterprise in this sphere was the programme 'People to People', which was transformed into the EU Partnership for Peace Programme. Its main goal was to improve relations and build confidence between the Arab and Israeli societies through cooperation between the media and in the fields of culture, education, health, environmental protection and youth exchanges.¹⁷⁰ Within the programme, practical initiatives were taken to improve understanding and communication between the conflicted societies. The projects were realised independently by non-governmental organizations from Israel and the Palestinian autonomous territories, jointly by Israeli and Palestinian organizations, or in cooperation with the European Union and/or other countries – members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Each year, the European Commission decided to provide partial funding for no more than 15 projects. The sum of the co-financing could not be more than 80% of the entire costs of the plan and falls within 50,000-500,000 euros. A project could not last more than 36 months.¹⁷¹ In the years 1998-2007, the EU supported 138 projects, allocating to them 60 million euros.¹⁷² The most well-known projects included 'Building Business Bridges', 'Words Can Kill', 'Civic Action Groups for Peace and Social Justice', and 'Jerusalem: Overcoming the Obstacles to Final Status in Jerusalem'.¹⁷³

In the years 2007-2010, the EU allocated 10 million euros to the EU Partnership for Peace Programme.¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁷⁰ Zając, *Polityka Unii Europejskiej...*, pp. 97-98.

¹⁷¹ *EU Partnership for Peace Programme*, "The European Commission Delegation to Israel", <http://www.delisr.ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

¹⁷² *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Regional Co-operation: An Overview of Programmes and Projects*, European Commission, EuropeAid Cooperation Office, Brussels 2008, p. 18.

¹⁷³ *EU Partnership for Peace Programme*, "The European Commission Delegation to Israel", <http://www.delisr.ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

¹⁷⁴ European Commission, EuropeAid Cooperation Office, *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Regional Co-operation: An Overview of Programmes and Projects*, Brussels 2008, p. 18.

5. Conclusion

The EU maintains that without a just and permanent resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict it will not be possible to ensure peace, security and prosperity in the Mediterranean region. In order to realise this task, it undertakes several partial roles: active diplomatic player, participant in creating Palestinian state structures, donor of humanitarian and development aid for Palestinians, and promoter of the development of regional cooperation between adversary states and their societies.

In the EU's opinion, a permanent peace can be achieved only through the existence of two states, the Israeli and the Palestinian, which recognise one another. The EU emphasises that Israel should withdraw from the land occupied during the Six Day War in 1967 (with certain adjustments, if necessary). It opposes the construction of Jewish settlements on these lands and the wall separating Israel from the Palestinian autonomous territories, considering that they are in violation of international law. The EU is also critical of Israel's retaliatory actions against the Palestinians, considering that they are disproportionate in relation to Palestinian attacks on Israel. Simultaneously, it condemns all acts of terror that occur in the area of Palestine.

The EU has also provided good offices and plays the role of observer and mediator. It performs these tasks through its Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process, the High Representative for CFSP, decision-makers in its member countries, and international structures working toward Middle East peace. Since 2002, such an institution has been the Middle East Quartet, composed of the United States, Russia and the United Nations. The EU, in spite of the forwardness of certain countries (for instance, France) and the overshadowing nature of US diplomacy, was increasingly visible in the Middle East and was presenting its own international identity.¹⁷⁵

Since the EU's diplomatic role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is limited it thus has been trying to strengthen its role by other means. Believing that the best guarantee of peace in the Middle East will be the existence of an independent Palestinian state, it has intensively playing the role of participant in creating its structure. This appeared in its working toward the democratisation of the Palestinian autonomous territories through the creation of effective institutions of internal security and justice, and transparent and well-managed public finances. The EU is also the world's largest donor of development and humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. This aid includes direct support for the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian private sector, and Palestinian families that find themselves in dire humanitarian situations.

¹⁷⁵ Ben Soetendorp, *The EU's Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Building of a Visible International Identity*, "European Foreign Affairs Review", Vol. 7, Issue 3, Autumn 2002.

The EU and its member countries also make the largest share of payments to UNRWA.

The EU has been also playing the role of promoter of regional cooperation. In the nineties, it led the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG), which was established by a decision at the Madrid Conference in 1991. This structure was treated as being the starting point for future regional economic organizations. However, with the breakdown of the peace process in the autumn of 2000, its work was suspended. Since the nineties, the EU has also supported programmes for the development of inter-societal cooperation, such as: Partnership for Peace Programme, 'Building Business Bridges', 'Words Can Kill', 'Civic Action Groups for Peace and Social Justice', and 'Jerusalem: Overcoming the Obstacles to Final Status in Jerusalem'.

The EU as a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament

1. Promoting confidence-building measures and partnership

As Fred Tanner has observed in the nineties, the Mediterranean region is a very diverse area, which has no political culture for the peaceful resolution of disputes, or any regional cooperation mechanisms to counteract conflicts and their settlement.¹⁷⁶ Even though since the end of the Cold War the EU has been promoting confidence-building measures and partnership in the area, treating these as elements in the process of transforming the region into an area of peace and stability.

The most important undertaking in this field was the production of a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability. The idea was initially considered at the Barcelona Conference in November 1995,¹⁷⁷ and the first specific proposals were adopted at a conference in Stuttgart in April 1999. Participants in the conference set forth 'Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability'. It was decided that the Charter would be an instrument for implementing the principles of the Barcelona Declaration in the areas of peace and security. The Charter's most important functions were defined; these included strengthening peace and stability, promoting common values and principles, and engagement in the economic and social factors that could threaten the region's stability. It was agreed that to achieve these goals, it would be necessary to establish confidence-building measures

¹⁷⁶ Fred Tanner, *An Emerging Security Agenda for the Mediterranean*, "Mediterranean Politics" Vol. 1, No. 3, Winter 1996.

¹⁷⁷ Stephen C. Calleya, *The Euro-Mediterranean Process After Malta: What Prospects?*, "Mediterranean Politics", Vol. 2, No. 2, Autumn 1997, pp. 1-22; Fred Tanner, *The Mediterranean Pact: A Framework for Soft Security Co-operation*, "Perceptions", Vol. I, No. 4, December-February 1996/97, pp. 56-67; Alfonso Ojeda, *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, "Review of International Affairs", Vol. XLVIII, No. 1062, 15 November 1997, pp. 12-13.

and partnership,¹⁷⁸ to institutionalise political dialogue and take preventive measures. The Charter was to serve as an instrument in peacekeeping, but not in peacemaking. These proposals, although they were adopted at a Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference, produced negative reactions from the Arab partners. In their opinion, the project reflected a solely European viewpoint on security and overlooked the arguments of the Mediterranean partner states. The main points of criticism concerned the mandate and reach of the Charter, the strategy for creating an area of stability and security, the role of confidence-building measures in the region, and differences in the understanding of socio-cultural factors.¹⁷⁹

Shortly after the Charter project's initiation, the controversies were given added weight by the worsening situation in Israeli-Palestinian relations. In September 2000, the 2nd Intifada erupted, and in such circumstances, when the fourth Euro-Mediterranean summit took place in November 2000 in Marseille, the Charter was not adopted in spite of France's efforts to that effect. The summit participants agreed solely that work on such a document would continue. However, in the succeeding months, the situation became even more complicated. The tension between Israel and the Palestinians increased, and after the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001, relations between the Islamic world and the West worsened even further. During the fifth Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference, which took place in April 2002 in Valencia, the participating states did in fact draw up guidelines for cooperation in the matter of 'confidence-building measures', but a final version of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability was not adopted.

In spite of the lack of accord in this matter, the member countries of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreed on the need to strengthen the political dialogue – including on the issue of preventive diplomacy – and to elaborate the main line for future cooperation to increase partnership. For the first time in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, the question of dialogue on the subject of the European Security and Defence Policy appeared. It was discussed in detail at the sixth Euro-Mediterranean summit, in December 2003 in Naples. The purpose of the dialogue was considered to be exchange of information and consideration of the possibilities for cooperation in preventing conflicts and crisis management. Within the framework of the dialogue established in 2003

¹⁷⁸ At the Stuttgart ministerial meeting the term *Confidence Building Measures* was replaced by notion *Partnership Building Measures*. See more: Hans Günter Brauch, Antonio Marquina, Abdelwahab Biad, with the assistance of Peter H. Liotta (eds.), *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for 21st Century*, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke–London 2000, pp. 243–350.

¹⁷⁹ Compare: Roberto Aliboni, *Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, „Perceptions”, Vol. II, No. 4, December 1997 – February 1998, pp. 73–86; Laura Guazzone, *Who Needs Conflict Prevention in the Mediterranean?*, „The International Spectator”, Vol. XXXV, No. 1, January–March 2000, pp. 83–102.

in regards to the European Security and Defence Policy, the EU suggested the appointment of liaison officers and invited its Mediterranean partners to participate in military training and EU-led operations.¹⁸⁰

Dialogue on the subject of confidence-building measures between European states and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs) was also conducted within the framework of one of the working groups created at the Madrid Conference.¹⁸¹ The Working Group for Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS), which was active in 1992-1995, was principally engaged in matters of non-military security. The implementation of confidence-building measures in maritime matters was debated, as well as the subject of countries informing one another about plans to carry out military exercises, the creation of a regional communication centre, and the opening in the Middle East of three regional centres for security matters. These steps were supposed gradually to improve relations between the region's countries and to increase security. However, on account of the large differences between the group's member countries, there was no particular outcome from its work.¹⁸²

Another aspect of the confidence-building process and partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean region is civil defence, that is, the protection of civilians against the effects of natural and man-made disasters.¹⁸³ In 1996, the EU proposed the creation of a Mediterranean system of military cooperation and consultation in the event of natural catastrophes.¹⁸⁴ In the same year, Italy and Egypt initiated the first cooperation program in this area (the Pilot Programme for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean system of mitigation, prevention and management of natural and man-made disasters), which chief achievement was the creation of a cooperation network between experts engaged in disaster prevention and mitigation. The programme was the first manifestation of multilateral cooperation in the Mediterranean region in the

¹⁸⁰ Sven Biscop, *The European Security Strategy and the European Neighborhood Policy: A New Starting Point for a Euro-Mediterranean Security Partnership?*, Paper presented at the EUSA 9th Biennial Conference, Austin, Texas, 31 March – 2 April 2005, <http://www.irri-kiib.be> (June 2009).

¹⁸¹ On those groups see more: Dalia Dassa Kaye, *Beyond and Handshake: Multilateral Cooperation in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, 1991–1996*, Columbia University Press, New York 2000; Joel Peters, *Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 1996.

¹⁸² See more: Emily Landau, Tamar Malz, *Assessing Regional Security Dialogue Through the Agent/Structure Lens: Reflections on ACRS*, in: Zeev Maoz (ed.), *Building Regional Security in the Middle East: International, Regional and Domestic Influences*, Frank Cass, London 2004, pp. 155–179.

¹⁸³ Pedro Courela, *Civil Protection as a Euro-Mediterranean Project: the Case for Practical Cooperation*, „EuroMeSCo Paper”, No. 34, 2004.

¹⁸⁴ Fred Tanner, *The Euro-Mediterranean Security Partnership: Prospect for Arms Limitation and Confidence Building*, in: Álvaro de Vasconcelos, George Joffé (eds.), *The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, Frank Cass, London 2000, pp. 189–206.

area of disaster prevention.¹⁸⁵ It was characterised, however, by certain problems, which were the result of: the lack of a cohesive EU policy; the EU's complicated mechanism for granting aid to non-member states; the varied organisational abilities of the EU partner states in the area of civil protection, which influenced the effectiveness of disaster prevention or management, and also called into question the effectiveness of integration between SEMCs in the European Civil Protection Mechanism; and the lack of a clear definition, in agreements between the EU and UN, of the role of the Monitoring and Information Centre.¹⁸⁶

Gradually, civil protection gained increasing importance in EU policy on the Mediterranean region, in connection with the fact that the region's topography and climate favour the occurrence of numerous natural disasters. Among those that happen most frequently in the region are earthquakes, forest fires and floods.¹⁸⁷ Their negative consequences are endured not only by the inhabitants of the eastern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea, but also by its northern part. In July 2004, within the "5+5 Dialogue", France presented a proposal for strengthening security in matters of maritime and air security and civil protection. This initiative was to supplement the existing forms of cooperation within EU and NATO frameworks.¹⁸⁸ During a meeting of ministers of internal affairs in May 2006, a declaration was adopted in which the main goals were considered to be countering international terrorism and other forms of organized crime, combating illegal migration, and civil protection. This last point was more exactly defined at the successive meeting, which took place in May 2008 at Nouakchott. The participants displayed considerable interest in France's proposal to create a Civil-Protection College for the Western Mediterranean to increase the effectiveness of such activities.¹⁸⁹

In 2004, the EU and its Mediterranean partners created a 'bridging programme for natural and man-made disasters' (the Euromed Civil Protection

¹⁸⁵ *EURO-MED pilot project in the field of Civil Protection*, <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/prote/cpactiv/cpact10d.htm> (June 2009).

¹⁸⁶ *Mid-Term Evaluation Euro-Med Bridge Programme for the Prevention, Reduction and Management of Natural and Manmade Disasters 2005–2008. Final Report, August 2007*, Europe Aid/119860/C/SV/Multi.

¹⁸⁷ Courela, op. cit., p. 7; Hans Günter Brauch, *Natural Disaster in the Mediterranean (1990-2001): From Disaster Response to Preparedness*, in: Hans Günter Brauch, P.H. Liotta, Antonio Marquina, Paul Rogers, Mohammed Selim (eds.), *Security and Environment in the Mediterranean: Conceptualizing Security and Environmental Conflicts*, Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg 2003, pp. 863–906.

¹⁸⁸ Emily B. Landau, Fouad Ammor, *Regional Security Dialogue and Cooperation in the South*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", October 2006, No. 48.

¹⁸⁹ Niklas Bremberg, Ahmed Driss, Jakob Horst, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Isabelle Werenfels, *Flexible Multilateralism: Unlimited Opportunities? The Case of Civil Protection in the Mediterranean*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", No. 80, February 2009.

Bridge). At a meeting in Marseille in November 2008, the ministers of the member countries of the Union for the Mediterranean decided to continue the programme in the years 2008-2011 (the Euro-Med. Programme for the Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-Made Disasters). The programme's chief task was considered to be strengthening institutional abilities at the local and regional level in disaster prevention. This goal was supposed to be achieved through improving the understanding of threats and challenges appearing in the Euro-Mediterranean region, optimising reaction abilities, strengthening prevention methods at the local level, developing abilities to react to natural and man-made disasters and raising societal awareness about disaster prevention. The ministers also announced that steps would be taken to increase the security of maritime shipping.

2. Initiating and participating in activities to counter illegal migration and organized crime

The EU first took steps in the second half of the nineties to develop cooperation with the eastern and southern Mediterranean countries in preventing and combating illegal migration, as well as terrorism and other forms of organized crime.¹⁹⁰ These goals appeared in the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995, and were then repeated in other documents, such as: conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean conferences of foreign affairs ministers; the EU Common Strategy for the Mediterranean Region (2000), the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East (2004); and also within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Union for the Mediterranean.

In spite of its declarations, the EU's activity as an institution was relatively small in these matters. In the nineties, the European states used for these purposes the Western European Union, which created the EUROMARFOR and EUROFOR forces.¹⁹¹ As the SEMCs were not included, their distrust

¹⁹⁰ See more: Francesco Galli, *The Legal and Political Implications of the Securitization of Counter-Terrorism Measures across the Mediterranean*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", No. 71, September 2008, s. 11-15; Esther Barbé, *The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process*, „Mediterranean Politics", Vol. 1, No. 1, Summer 1996, pp. 25-42.

¹⁹¹ EUROMARFOR, or European Maritime Force, was the multinational Western European Union forces for the Mediterranean, composed of the maritime forces of France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and EUROFOR was the European Rapid Deployment Force, that is, the common land forces of France, Italy, Portugal and Spain as rapid reaction forces. They were created by a decision of the Western European Union's Council of Ministers at a session in Lisbon on 15 May 1995. See more: Admiral Francisco Rapallo, *EUROMARFOR and Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean*, in: Martin Ortega (ed.), *The Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue*, Institute for Security Studies – Western European Union, Paris, March 2000, pp. 29-32; Dereck Lutterbeck, *Policing Migration in the Mediter-*

was aroused, since they feared that the forces could be used for unilateral European intervention in the area. Actually, while the European Council did decide, in 1999 at a meeting in Tampere, to establish cooperation in internal affairs – i.e., the justice systems and greater border protections – the EU member countries acted independently in the Mediterranean region, using their national guards to counter illegal migration and organized crime.¹⁹²

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, the EU intensified its activities to prevent illegal migration and to combat organized crime. As Richard Gillespie has observed, these events contributed to the reformulation of the EU's priorities within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. International terrorism and the related phenomena of illegal migration became key issues of the Barcelona Process.¹⁹³ This change was reflected in the document adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference in April 2002 in Valencia, when the element of cooperation in the sphere of justice and internal affairs was added to the partnership. This aspect was discussed in detail at the sixth Euro-Mediterranean summit in December 2003. The strengthening of cooperation in this field did not proceed without difficulties, however. The EU tried simultaneously to force on the development of cooperation in all the baskets provided by the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, but met with discouragement from its partner countries.

A change took place after the terrorist attacks in Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005). Faced with the growing threat of Islamist terrorism, the EU began, with great dynamism, to introduce projects aimed at countering illegal migration, international terrorism and other forms of organized crime. It concentrated on institutional reforms of the security apparatus in countries on the eastern and southern coast of the Mediterranean and on strengthening the apparatuses' abilities to counter illegal migration and organized crime. These projects were bilateral in form (the EU and several partner countries). They were financed from the MEDA programme, and later by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. The bilateral projects involved, for instance, creating a system of radar control for the Moroccan border and increasing the ability of the Algerian police to prevent illegal migration. Euromed Justice and Euromed Police were multilateral projects according with activities within the framework of cooperation on internal affairs and the justice system. The main goal of Euromed Justice, which was begun in

anean, "Mediterranean Politics", Vol. 11, No. 1, March 2006, p. 68; Michael Pugh, *Europe's boat People: Maritime Cooperation In the Mediterranean*, "Chaillot Paper", No. 41, July 2000.

¹⁹² They do similar tasks as police forces, but in they are organized and equipped more as a military forces. See more: Dereck Lutterbeck, *Between Police and Military: the New Security Agenda and the Rise of Gendarmeries*, "Cooperation and Conflict", Vol. 39, No. 1, 2004, pp. 45-68.

¹⁹³ Richard Gillespie, *Reshaping the Agenda? The Internal Politics of the Barcelona Process in the Aftermath of September 11*, „Mediterranean Politics", Vol. 8, No. 2/3, 2003.

2005, was for the EU to help in introducing transparent and modern judicial systems through strengthening administrative abilities in the countries of the eastern and southern Mediterranean. After two years the programme was extended until 2011. 7 million euros was allocated for its implementation. Euromed Police was established in 2007 for a period of three years. Its aim was to increase cooperation between EU police forces and its partners on the eastern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean. It had a budget of around 5 million euros.¹⁹⁴

At the Euro-Mediterranean summit in November 2005, cooperation in countering terrorism was strengthened. The parties agreed upon and accepted the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism. It was a limited success, however, since the states were unable to define 'terrorism', or to determine what constituted legitimate and proportional actions against terrorism.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, the EU began to insist that in signing the agreement the associated Arab states should also sign clauses on their cooperation in countering terrorism. These appeared in the agreements with Algeria and Lebanon.

The EU began systematically to cooperate with its partner states in countering illegal migration. In January 2003 the French, British, Portuguese and Italian fleets began an operation to prevent illegal migration through the Straights of Gibraltar (Operation Ulysses). These countries, which were also NATO members, made use of the Active Endeavor operation initiated by NATO after the 9/11 attacks of 2001. The operation was formally established on 26 October of that year and is an element in the struggle with terrorism. Its task is to observe the situation in the Mediterranean Sea. Among the countries of SEMCs, Algeria, Morocco and Israel have announced their participation in the operation.¹⁹⁶ In 2004, the program MED. Migration was established. It involved EU aid to the SEMCs in resolving the problems that generate migration. It was extended until 2011, and the EU allocated 7 million euros to it.¹⁹⁷

During the ninth conference of foreign affairs ministers in Lisbon in 2007, it was decided to create a fourth basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The basket was to be entitled 'Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security'. Detailed guidelines were adopted during the first Euro-Mediterranean meeting of foreign affairs ministers on migration issues, which took place in November 2007 in Algarve. The EU's role in countering

¹⁹⁴ *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Regional Co-operation: An Overview of Programmes and Projects*, European Commission, EuropeAid Cooperation Office, Brussels 2008, p. 13.

¹⁹⁵ Galli, op. cit., p. 17.

¹⁹⁶ *Operation Active Endeavour*, <http://www.afsouth.nato.int> (June 2009).

¹⁹⁷ More on EU-Israel cooperation in a question of migration: Bruno Oliveira Martins, *Undocumented Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Israel*, „EuroMeSCo Paper”, No. 81, February 2009.

illegal migration gained new momentum when in June 2008 the European Commission published a communiqué entitled 'A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools' and at a meeting in October 2008 the European Council adopted the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum. At a meeting of member countries of the Union for the Mediterranean, it was agreed that questions related to illegal migration should be an integral part of a regional partnership and that countering this phenomenon required a comprehensive and balanced approach. Preventing illegal migration was so important for the EU that in 2003 it began to cooperate in this sphere with the regime of Muammar Kaddafi, in spite of its lack of formal relations with Libya.¹⁹⁸

The EU's strong measures to increase the importance of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and the struggle with illegal migration did not meet with the universal acceptance of countries on the eastern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea. Tunisia was one of the first countries to call on international society to organise a UN conference on countering terrorism, to adopt a code of conduct and to cooperate in countering terrorism, yet its engagement with the EU in this matter was limited.¹⁹⁹ Other Arab countries also reacted with considerable suspicion to the idea of cooperation.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ María Teresa Gil-Bazo, *The Practice of Mediterranean States in the Context of the European Union's Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension. The Safe Third Country Concept Revisited*, "International Journal of Refugee Law", Vol. 18, No. 3-4, 2006, pp. 492-508; Heiner Hänggi, Fred Tanner, *Promoting Security Sector Governance in the EU's Neighbourhood*, "Chailot Paper", No. 80, July 2005, pp. 75; Susan Kneebone, Christopher McDowell, Gareth Morrel, *A Mediterranean Solution? Chances of Success*, "International Journal of Refugee Law", Vol. 18, No. 3-4, March 2006, pp. 492-508.

¹⁹⁹ *Politique étrangère de Tunisie*, <http://www.changement.tn> (June 2009).

²⁰⁰ In the opinion of the Moroccan authorities, illegal migration, which the EU countries treat as a security threat, requires a wide array of countermeasures and also changes in EU policies toward Moroccan immigrants, to ensure their ability to assimilate with European society while preserving their identity and cultural difference. *Réponse de M. Taïb Fassi Fihri, Ministre Délégué aux Affaires Etrangères et à la Coopération, à une question d'actualité relative à l'immigration clandestine, à la Chambre des Conseillers*, 28 janvier 2003, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009); *Allocution de Mme Nouzha Chekrouni Ministre Déléguée Auprès du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Chargée de la Communauté Marocaine Résidant à l'Etranger lors de l'ouverture de la 2ème Conférence Ministérielle des Etats membres du Dialogue 5+5 sur la Migration en Méditerranée Occidentale*, Rabat, 22 octobre 2003, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009); *M. Bena ssa: Le développement économique du sud reste au coeur du dispositif de lutte contre le terrorisme*, Lisbonne, 19 mai 2004, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009); *Mme Nouzha Chekrouni appelle l'UE à un "dialogue serein" sur l'immigration*, Rabat, 12 avril 2005, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009); *Mme Nouzha Chekrouni: le combat de la migration clandestine ne devrait pas se limiter à la question sécuritaire*, Rabat, 8 avril 2006, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009); *Mme Nouzha Chekrouni estime que l'Europe doit revoir sa politique d'immigration*, Bruxelles, 16 avril 2004, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009).

3. Promoting arms control in the region and creating a WMD-free zone

The EU is deeply interested in the problem of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. For many years, it has supported the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and in the European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was mentioned as one of the five greatest threats to EU security. On the same day, the European Council adopted a Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In the Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe, and then in the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in December 2009, the EU member states decided to expand the Union's competences in the sphere of a common security and defence policy by, among other matters, disarmament activities conducted within the framework of the Petersberg tasks (article 43 of the TEU). As the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, said in an appearance before the European Parliament in March 2007, the EU has an opportunity to play a positive role in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The means of realising this policy are cooperation and dialogue, since that is the "European way" of doing things in foreign policy to at the beginning as one of which other countries and groups have great expectations. In the process the EU should also pay attention to maintaining a proportion between three elements: non-proliferation of WMD, disarmament and the transfer of technology²⁰¹.

The EU has been implementing this approach to the Mediterranean region, where it has been promoting arms limitations and the creation of a WMD-free zone. The necessity of taking action to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, as well as conventional arms, and the necessity of the Mediterranean partners' signing and ratifying the international agreements concerning WMD (the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) were contained in the documents setting forth the EU's cooperation with the SEMCs. Until 2010 Egypt and Syria did not ratify the Biological Weapons Convention or sign the Chemical Weapons Convention, and Israel did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and did not ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Israel and Egypt have still not ratified, in spite of signing, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and Syria is not a signatory.

It should be noted that the EU's promotion of a nuclear-free zone, within the framework of the Barcelona Process, pertains chiefly to the Middle East. This ensues from the fact that the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty,

²⁰¹ Summary of speech by EUHR Solana on the current international situation and the role of the EU, Brussels, 29 March 2007, <http://www.europa-eu-un.org> (June 2009).

called the Pelindaba Treaty, has been signed and is open for ratification. In addition, till the end of 2010 the situation in the Middle East, with the Arab-Israeli conflict, the destabilization of Iraq and the sense of threat from Iran, was considerably less stable than in North Africa. Although there were unresolved problems in that region as well, they did not constitute, in the opinion of EU representatives and EU member countries, such a large threat to international security. Algeria and Morocco do not possess weapons of mass destruction, and Libya, as a result of negotiations led by the United States and Great Britain,²⁰² agreed in December 2003 to cease work on acquiring WMD and to begin a slow process of normalising relations with the US, the EU and its member countries.

In the Middle East, Syria's policies and programme of developing chemical weapons were causes for concern.²⁰³ This question significantly hampered negotiations over an EU-Syria association agreement. Because Syria did not accept the agreement's inclusion of a clause on the non-proliferation of WMD, the negotiations were suspended after a few months. In the end, however, Damascus agreed to the EU's terms. In September 2004, the negotiations were resumed and a month later the text of the treaty was established. However, due to events that took place later, the association agreement was not signed.²⁰⁴

The EU's attempts to introduce a WMD-free zone in the Middle East were in accord with the desires of many Arab countries. The majority supported the League of Arab States' resolution no. 101 of 28 March 1994, which called for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the Middle East. One of the countries most engaged in promoting the idea was Egypt. On 1 July 1968 it joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty and on 12 October 1974 President Anwar Sadat presented an initiative to eliminate WMD from the Middle East. The aim was repeated by his successor, Hosni Mubarak. In April 1990 during a session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, he proposed the adoption of a resolution entitled: the threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. This resolution and succeeding projects submitted by Egypt called for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and the submission of all facilities that could serve to produce nuclear weapons to supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency.²⁰⁵ President Mubarak suggested that article 14 of UN Security Council resolution no. 687 on disarming Iraq should also be applied to other

²⁰² Great Britain action was undertaken without agreement with other EU member states. Richard Youngs, *Europe and the Middle East in the Shadow of September 11*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 2006, p. 136.

²⁰³ The main concerns suscite of policy of Iran in this regard, however this state is not an object of analisis in the book.

²⁰⁴ Youngs, op. cit., pp. 129–133.

²⁰⁵ *President Mubarak's initiative for establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free-zone in the Middle East*, 27 July 2006, <http://www.mfa.gov.eg> (June 2009).

countries of the Middle East and should be part of a comprehensive concept for creating a WMD-free zone in this region.²⁰⁶ According to the Egyptian president all the countries of the Middle East should be subject to the same principles applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency; none should be privileged in this respect. His motive in acting as it did was the fact of Israel's possessing nuclear weapons – the only such country in the Middle East. Egypt's chief expressly emphasised that for as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict was not resolved the possession of WMD did not ensure the security of any country in the region. Disarmament should be treated comprehensively and should include, in addition to nuclear arms, chemical and biological weapons and should occur simultaneously with the peace process. President Mubarak clearly indicated that for as long as Israel refused to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Egypt would not agree to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention or Biological Weapons Convention.²⁰⁷ At the same time, Cairo gave assurances that it did not intend to isolate Israel, but wished to maintain peaceful relations with it and to observe the binding international agreements. If Israel were to take steps to relinquish WMD (chiefly nuclear arms) Egypt would do the same in matters of chemical and biological weapons. It repeatedly urged international society, particularly the developed countries, not to increase Israel's nuclear potential.²⁰⁸

Egypt's actions in this sphere were supported by other Arab states, as was reflected in the statements of their representatives and the position of the League of Arab States. Thus, for instance, Morocco clearly supported the Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles adopted on 22 November 2002 by 93 states. Morocco's diplomatic representative, M. Omar Zniber, stated that his country had always maintained that the proliferation of ballistic missiles constituted a threat to regional and global security.²⁰⁹ In consequence, Morocco also supported disarmament in regards to chemical weapons²¹⁰ and called for work to be hastened on the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.²¹¹ In October 2006,

²⁰⁶ Dina Ezzat, *WMDs: Good and Bad*, "Al-Ahram", No. 645, 3 - 9 July 2003.

²⁰⁷ *President Mubarak's initiative for establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free-zone in the Middle East*, 27 July 2006, <http://www.mfa.gov.eg> (June 2009).

²⁰⁸ *Egypt and Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East*, "Egypt State Information Service", <http://www.sis.gov.eg> (June 2009).

²⁰⁹ *Le Maroc élu président de la conférence des états parties au code contre la prolifération des missiles balistiques*, Vienne, 22 juin 2006, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009).

²¹⁰ *M. Benaïssa réitère l'engagement du Maroc en faveur de la convention sur les armes chimiques*, Rabat, 14 juin 2007, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009); *L'universalité de la Convention CCW, un outil essentiel pour la résolution des conflits armés*, Rabat, 19 novembre 2008, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009).

²¹¹ *M. Mohamed Benaïssa souligne l'urgence de l'entrée en vigueur du traité d'interdiction des essais nucléaires*, New York, 22 septembre 2005, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009); *M. Taïb fassi Fihri réitère la disposition du Maroc à se joindre à toute initiative visant l'entrée en vigueur du CTBT*, New York, 24 Septembre 2008, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009).

the first international meeting devoted to preventing and combating nuclear terrorism was held in the capital of Morocco. During the meeting, the representatives of the Moroccan government stated that their country supported all the international agreements in the sphere of disarmament and non-proliferation of WMD.²¹²

4. Conclusion

In the year 1993-2010 the EU played the role of promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament in the Mediterranean region. Its engagement increased after the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995 and its chief undertaking was to promote the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability. The project of the Charter was adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference in Stuttgart in April 1999, but given considerable opposition from the Arab countries it was not finally accepted. In addition, the flare-up of Palestinian-Israeli relations in autumn 2000 caused discussions on the project to be suspended. At the same time, the EU promoted the development of cooperation in the area of civilian protection from the effects of natural and man-made disasters. This cooperation, however, has been developing slowly, on account of the differing interests of the EU and the SEMCs.

An unusually important place in the EU's activities in the Mediterranean region was taken by the question of preventing and countering illegal migration, international terrorism and organized crime. The EU has been observing the negative consequences of such phenomena since the beginning of the nineties, but its activity in this respect was limited. After the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States in 2001 and on mass transit vehicles in Madrid (in March 2004) and London (in July 2005), they acquired greater significance. At a Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting in Valencia in April 2002, it was agreed to add cooperation in the sphere of justice and internal affairs to the programme of cooperation; in November 2005 the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct in Countering Terrorism was adopted, and two years later a fourth basket was opened in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership under the title: Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security. In the region of Mediterranean, the EU has been also promoting arms limitations and the creation of a WMD-free zone. Its actions have been confined, however, to rhetoric. The countries of the EU, i.a. France, Germany and Great Britain have increased their supplies of conventional weapons to the states of North Africa and Middle East.

²¹² *La première réunion de l'initiative globale de lutte contre le terrorisme nucléaire à Rabat les 30 et 31 octobre, Rabat, 27 octobre 2006*, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009); *M. Omar Zniber: le Maroc appuie toutes les initiatives visant à limiter la prolifération des ADM, Vienne, 20 septembre 2006*, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009).

The EU as a promoter of economic reforms and sustainable regional growth

1. Supporting reforms in the SEMCs and acting to create a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area

The EU, being interested in the development of the SEMCs, has initiated and supported economic reforms. The Euro-Mediterranean agreements – bilateral association treaties signed by the EU and countries participating in the Barcelona Process – were among the most important instruments for realising this goal. By 2010 such agreements had been signed and entered into force with Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Algeria and Lebanon. The text of the association agreement with Syria was accepted in October 2004, but was not signed.

The EU signed the first association agreement with Tunisia, *de facto* a few months after the formal initiation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This agreement became the model for successive Euro-Mediterranean agreements. The guidelines for partner countries were also to be found in the action plans signed for a period of three to five years by the EU and partner countries within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The action plans encompass all aspects of cooperation: political, economic as well as social and cultural. A good deal of space is devoted to implementation of the association agreements and to more clearly defining the priorities in reforming the EU's partner countries. The plans are based on country reports, which are prepared earlier by the European Commission and concern the political, economic and social situation in each of the EU's partner countries. The action plans are closely connected with the achievements to date of the Barcelona Process. A state that has not signed an association agreement with the EU can not sign an action plan. In 2005, such plans were signed with Israel, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, and in 2007, with Egypt and Lebanon.

Table 1. List of Euro-Mediterranean association agreements

Country (by date of signing)	Date of signing	Date of entry into force
Tunisia	17 July 1995	1 March 1998
Israel	20 November 1995	1 June 2000
Morocco	26 February 1996	1 March 2000
The Palestinian Authority*	24 February 1997	1 July 1997
Jordan	24 November 1997	1 May 2002
Egypt	25 June 2001	1 June 2004
Algeria	22 April 2002	1 September 2005
Lebanon	17 June 2002	1 April 2006

* The agreement with the Palestinian Authority was signed on 24 February 1997. However, it was a temporary agreement (*Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Co-operation*). The chief goals of cooperation are considered to be creating appropriate forums for the entirety of the dialogue allowing the parties to increase their cooperation; creating the conditions for a liberalisation of trade; hastening balanced economic and social development between the EU and the Palestinian autonomous territories; contributing to the economic and social development of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; encouraging the development of regional cooperation, which will contribute to peace, stability and prosperity in the region; and promoting cooperation in other areas of interest to the parties. After the eruption of the 2nd Intifada, in September 2000, implementation of the agreement's provisions was mostly suspended. On 1 January 2005, the agreement was modified on the basis of an exchange of letters between the EU and the Palestinian Authority. The modification concerned the liberalisation of trade in agricultural products. See the 'Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement, 1 July 1997,' *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 187, 16 July 1997, p. 4.

Source: the author's own work on the basis of information from the EU internet site: <http://ec.europa.eu> (June 2010).

Table 2. List of action plans for the SEMCs within the framework of the ENP

Country	Date
Israel	11 April 2005
Palestinian Authority	4 May 2005
Jordan	2 June 2005
Tunisia	4 July 2005
Morocco	27 July 2005
Lebanon	19 February 2007
Egypt	6 March 2007

Source: <http://ec.europa.eu> (June 2010).

In 1993-2010 private sector development and growth in the competitiveness of goods produced were key to reforming SMECs economies, that were characterized by specialized production of goods of low-level technology and low value added, which makes them sensitive to external competition. The EU has thus been trying to help enterprises become more competitive with European and Asian producers. A large amount of time has been devoted to this issue at the biennial meetings between the ministers of industry of countries participating in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The first such meeting was held in Brussels in 1996. Succeeding meetings took place in Klagenfurt (October 1998), Limassol (March 2000), Malaga (April 2002), Caserta (October 2004), Rhodes (September 2006) and Nice (November 2008). One of this forum's most important initiatives was the adoption of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise at the meeting in Caserta in 2004. The Charter contains ten guidelines for supporting the advancement and optimal functioning of the private sector, including through the development of cooperation and exchange of experience between the EU members and SEMCs. To this end an institution was formed for regional dialogue on small and medium-size businesses' acquisition of funds,²¹³ education on entrepreneurship,²¹⁴ and activity in the textile and clothing industries.²¹⁵ Experts from SEMCs also participated in annual conferences, organized by the European Commission on improving conditions for the operation of small and medium-size businesses.

At the November 2008 meeting of ministers of industry an action plan for the years 2009-2010 was adopted. The plan premised the continuation and development of the previous undertakings, which were set forth in six points: implementation of the provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter of Enterprise; promotion of investment; facilitation of the trade in industrial products; transfer of technology; dialogue on the subject of developing the textile sector; and development of industry while respecting the natural environment.²¹⁶

Issues related to the origin of goods and the liberalisation of services and investment were also important in the economic development of the SEMCs and in the creation of a free trade area. Both questions were key subjects of the meeting of ministers of trade. The first such meeting took place

²¹³ *Access to finance for SME of the Middle East – North Africa Region. Experts Group Report*, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 20.2.2006.

²¹⁴ *Education for Entrepreneurship. Expert Group Recommendations*, European Commission, Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry, Brussels, 10.09.2006.

²¹⁵ *Textiles and Clothing in the Euro-Mediterranean Region*, <http://ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

²¹⁶ *Conclusions of the Conference of the Minister for Industry of the Union for the Mediterranean, Nice, 5–6 November 2008*, „International Network for SMEs – INSME”, <http://www/insme.org> (June 2009).

in Brussels in May 2001; the next were in Toledo (March 2002), Palermo (July 2003)), Istanbul (July 2004), Marrakesh (March 2006), Lisbon (October 2007) and Marseille (July 2008). During the meeting in 2002, the ministers proposed the extension of the pan-European system of cumulation of origin to all the countries participating in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In October 2005, the EU Council decided to include Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the cumulation of origin zone.²¹⁷ This decision was confirmed in bilateral agreements signed by the EU and individual partner countries. The pan-Euro-Mediterranean protocols concerning the rules of origin were to facilitate the documentation of the origin of goods within the framework of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, facilitate access to the common market for goods coming from the Mediterranean countries and simultaneously create better operating conditions for EU entities sending their goods to partners in the Euro-Mediterranean zone. With this aim, the provisions of the association agreements were modified²¹⁸ and various types of cumulation of origin were introduced: full, diagonal (multilateral) and bilateral.

In addition to the question of cumulation of origin, a considerable amount of time at ministerial conferences was spent on the subject of liberalisation of services, which has real importance for the proper functioning of a free trade area and for the economies of the SEMCs, whose service sector revenues constitute a large part of their gross domestic product (at the beginning of XXI century it was 50% in Egypt, Morocco and Syria, 60% in Tunisia, and over 70% in Jordan and Lebanon).²¹⁹ At the meeting in Palermo in 2003, the ministers decided to adopt a protocol containing guidelines for the realisation of this goal. It was accepted at the following meeting, in Istanbul in 2004. Two years later, at the meeting in Marrakesh, official negotiations were inaugurated between the EU and certain countries of the SEMCs in this matter. The EU began formal negotiations in 2008 with Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Israel in the matter of liberalising the services sector.

Reforming the economies of countries on the eastern and southern Mediterranean coast was also the subject of talks among ministers of finance. These meetings, which were named ECOFIN, had taken place four times by 2010: in Rabat (June 2005), Tunisia (June 2006), Porto (November 2007) and Brussels (July 2009). The ministers of finance set four priorities: 1) improvement of the investment climate for investors, creation of new jobs; 2) further trade liberalisation and intensification of trade; 3) improvement in the

²¹⁷ *Council approves new European-Mediterranean cumulation of origin zone*, Brussels, 12 October 2005, IP/05/1256.

²¹⁸ Agreement with Syria related to the Cooperation Agreement signed in 1977, that came into force in 1978.

²¹⁹ *Rezolucja legislacyjna Parlamentu Europejskiego z dnia 15 marca 2007 r. w sprawie utworzenia eurośródziemnomorskiej strefy wolnego handlu*, 2006/2173(INI). PE 380.733.

operation of public institutions and the management system; 4) improvement of macro-economic stability. In November 2008, a meeting of ministers of labour took place for the first time.

Multilateral programmes financed by the EU for Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian autonomous territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey were intended to help accelerate their economic development. The most important of these programmes were:

- ANIMA (Investment Promotion) – implemented in the years 2002-2007. Its aim was to promote investment in the SEMCs and to increase the effectiveness of the Mediterranean Investment Promotion Agencies. The EU allocated 3.97 million euros for the realisation of this programme. After it ended, the programme Invest in Med, with a similar range of activities, operated until 2008. The EU allocated 9 million euros for its operation until 2011.
- Euro-Mediterranean Quality – the EU allocated 7.26 million euros to this programme to raise the quality of goods produced in SEMCs. It operated in the years 2004-2008.
- MEDIBTIKAR operated in the years 2006-2009 and its purpose was the development of business innovativeness in EU partner countries. The EU allocated 7.25 million euros to it.
- FEMISE functioned in the years 2005-2009, and served to develop dialogue and socio-economic research through the financing of a network of research institutes and through advising the SEMCs on conducting reforms. Its realisation cost the EU 4.9 million euros.
- MED.-ADR, operating between the years 2005-2008, supported the SEMCs in adopting mechanisms for resolving trade disputes, in order to build an atmosphere of confidence in trade and thus to contribute to the development of South-South cooperation. The EU allocated 1.1 million euros to the programme.
- Euro-Mediterranean Market served to increase the effectiveness of administrative mechanisms in SEMCs, for the faster introduction of association agreement provisions intended to deepen economic cooperation. The EU allocated 9.2 million euros to it in 2002-2008.²²⁰

In the years 1996-2009, the EU allocated almost 30 million euros to its partner countries for implementation of the MEDSTAT programme, which supported the creation of databases.²²¹

The EU was also working toward the development of information societies in the partner countries. The first Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference on the subject took place in Dundalk (Ireland) in April 2005, and


²²⁰ *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Regional Co-operation: An Overview of Programmes and Projects*, European Commission, EuropeAid Cooperation Office, Brussels 2008, pp. 21–34.

²²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

the next in Cairo in February 2008. The ministers of the member countries of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership decided to hold meetings regularly every two years. This cooperation was supposed to lead to changes in the legislation of the Arab states²²² and the creation of an information network linking the member countries of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. A Euro-Mediterranean network of implementing bodies in the telecommunications sector (EMERG) was established. Its purpose was to harmonise the operating rules of the telecommunications market. This institution took on the tasks of the NAPT programme, which had been operating since 2001. In 1999-2007, the EUMEDIS programme also functioned for the purpose of developing information societies in the SEMCs, through the development of information and communications technologies. The EU allocated 65 million euros to the programme's realisation.²²³ The EU also financially supported such programmes as MAP-IT!, MED.-IST-portal, Medar, AVINCENNA Virtual Campus, EUMEDCONNECT, and CULTINAT.

The SEMCs could also take advantage of beneficial loans granted by the European Investment Bank. In the years 1995-2007 the bank allocated about 11.2 billion euros (in 1995-2002 - 5.2 billion euros and in 2002-2007 - 7 billion euros)²²⁴.

Chart 1. Loans granted by the EIB in 1995-2002 (in million euros)



Source: <http://europa.eu.int> (June 2009).

²²² The European Neighbourhood Policy does not commit its members to acceptance of the *acquis communautaire*, but nevertheless for these countries' full participation in EU programmes they should at least partially adapt their laws to EU laws. The harmonization of their legislation with EU law also enables the introduction of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area.

²²³ *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Regional Co-operation...*, p. 49.

²²⁴ Source: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/euromed/index_en.htm (June 2009).

In October 2002, the EIB established the FEMIP instrument (Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership) in accordance with instructions the European Council had issued in March of that year. FEMIP's main purpose was to accelerate economic reforms in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, the Gaza Strip and West Bank, through greater support for the private sector. Its specific aims were: direct support for foreign investment; granting of direct loans for private investors and setting up credit lines for small and medium-size businesses; support for high-risk investment through private equity investments; creation of advantageous conditions for the private sector through investment in human capital and infrastructure, to facilitate the development of trade cooperation in the region.²²⁵

Projects in the following sectors have been financed by the FEMIP mechanism: energy, transport and telecommunications, water management, public use (construction and renovation of hospitals, schools and other such buildings), industry, tourism and services. All projects that fulfil the appropriate criteria could receive FEMIP support in three forms: 1) loans, direct and indirect (i.e., credit lines); 2) private equity investments, to strengthen business capital structures and facilitate joint venture projects; and 3) technical assistance.

Table 3. Types of assistance granted within the FEMIP programme

Type of assistance		Aim	Beneficiaries
Loan	Lines of credit	To encourage the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, the EIB makes lines of credit available to its partners – commercial banks or development financing institutions, which then lend the funds to their own customers. To respond to the needs of local communities	SMEs
	Individual loans	To develop the economic infrastructure of the Mediterranean partner countries, paying particular attention to the expansion of the private sector and to the creation of a business-friendly environment.	Private and public sector promoters
Private equity		To promote the creation or strengthening of the capital base of productive businesses, particularly those established in partnership with EU-based companies.	SMEs Intermediate sized private enterprises Investment funds Microfinance institutions

²²⁵ FEMIP: an Instrument to Foster Economic Growth in the Mediterranean Region, „Working Group on Euro-Mediterranean Industrial Cooperation”, Rome, 2-3 October 2003, <http://www.insme.org> (June 2009).

Technical assistance	To improve the quality of FEMIP operations and their impact on development by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • strengthening the capacity of the Mediterranean partner countries and project promoters • financing studies and activities upstream aimed at consolidating directly and indirectly the expansion of the private sector. 	All FEMIP customers
Guarantees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • to stimulate the local capital market. • to mobilise additional resources to supplement scarce public capital resources. • to support sub-sovereign development. • to reduce foreign exchange risk. • to reduce government risk exposure. 	SMEs Large corporates Domestic banks Public sector promoters Sub-sovereigns

Source: European Investment Bank, <http://www.bei.org> (June 2010).

In 2004, a trust fund was created within the FEMIP framework for the purpose of providing direct financial support to the private sector in priority areas. The support is dual in nature: technical assistance and private equity support. Since 2006 it has also covered the costs of internships in the European Investment Bank for young persons from the countries covered by the FEMIP programme.

Table 4. Sums for financing projects in SEMCs from FEMIP funds, in the years 2002-2010

Country	Sum (in million euros)
Algeria	636
Gaza/West Bank	60
Egypt	3259
Israel	419
Jordan	359
Lebanon	578
Morocco	2506
Syria	1304
Tunisia	2679
Regional projects	150
Total	11950

Source: European Investment Bank, <http://www.bei.org> (October 2011).

From October 2002 to December 2010, FEMIP financed operations to the amount of around 12 billion euros. The largest numbers of projects were

financed in the energy sector (around 5.2 billion euros), transport and infrastructure (around 2.5 billion euros), industry (around 1.1 billion euros) and environment (around 1.05 billion euros).²²⁶

In May 2008, the EU also established the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF). It has been financed from two sources – the EU budget and direct financial contributions of EU member countries. The NIF served as an additional mechanism of support for investment in such sectors as transport, energy, environmental protection, etc., in countries neighbouring the EU, and for operations with a high financial risk undertaken by small and medium-size businesses. The NIF also functioned as a coordination structure for financial assistance from the EU and, independently, from the EU's member countries, for member states of the European Neighbourhood Policy, and is supposed to help increase the effectiveness of the EU's role in its neighbouring areas. For the years 2007-2013, the European Commission has transferred the sum of 700 million euros (half for the southern and eastern part of the ENP) to the NIF. The sum was increased by EU member countries' contribution of 37 million euros, which was transferred to a European Investment Bank fund created especially for this purpose in January 2009. The largest contributions for the years 2008-2010 came from Germany and France (over 10 million euros), Poland (3 million euros), the Czech Republic and Spain (over 2 million euros). Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania and Sweden transferred a million euros each to the NIF.²²⁷

All the EU's instruments of financial assistance – the MEDA, ENPI, FEMIP and NIF – support the economic reform of the SEMCs and the region's sustainable development, as will be discussed later in this book.

EU support for reform in the SEMCs has also occurred through the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange programme (TAIEX) and through 'twinning' – instruments which have proven themselves in the EU's expansion to Eastern Europe and which are being used in EU policy for the Western Balkans. TAIEX is a form of advising on harmonising legislation with the EU's *acquis communautaire*, usually by sending an EU expert to the country. In the 'twinning' programme, on the other hand, bureaucrats (at the central or local level) from EU member countries are sent to partner countries to work with local bureaucrats in preparing for implementation of the *acquis communautaire* in individual sectors. A consultation group was also established between experts from the member countries of the EMP. It met for the first time in March 1997 and since then meetings have taken place each year. The forum is informal, and its purpose is the exchange of experience and search for optimal solutions in accelerating the economic develop-

²²⁶ FEMIP Annual Report 2010, <http://www.bei.org> (October 2011).

²²⁷ Neighborhood Investment Facility, <http://ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

ment of North African and Middle Eastern countries, and producing closer cooperation between them and the EU.

The EU's activities in 1993-2010 to assist economic reform were positively, although not uncritically, accepted by the partner countries. At the Euro-Mediterranean conference in November 2005, Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Morocco prepared a joint document in which they urged the EU to support activities they were undertaking for economic development and modernisation, which were yet in accord with their national programmes and respected their countries' specific natures.²²⁸ The Moroccan authorities many times emphasised that they were striving for more intense economic cooperation with the EU,²²⁹ while simultaneously expressing the hope that the activities the EU would undertake would be comprehensive, as only such activities would contribute to improving Morocco's internal situation and EU security. Additionally, the EU was more than once asked to differentiate its relations between the Mediterranean countries, as Morocco desired acknowledgement of its more advanced status. Thus the project of the European Neighbourhood Policy was accepted by Morocco with satisfaction.²³⁰ After receiving the status of privileged partner (*statut avancé*) Morocco has expected to be received, like Norway and Switzerland, within the common economic area of the EU.²³¹ Among the EU countries, Morocco has closest ties with Spain and it treats these as a factor that could contribute to the dynamic development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.²³² Algeria has also expected its largest support to come from Spain.²³³

Similar expectations of the EU have been expressed by Jordanian decision-makers as well. Jordan, which wants to be an equal participant in the world

²²⁸ M. Belkhadem *le sommet euro-méditerranéen, une opportunité pour évaluer le processus de Barcelone*, 15 novembre 2005, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (October 2009).

²²⁹ M. Fassi Fihri *se félicite de la mise en place du programme d'appui à l'accord d'association Maroc-UE*, 12 mai 2004, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (October 2009).

²³⁰ M. Benaïssa: *La préservation du processus euro-méditerranéen, cadre de référence à toute initiative concernant la région méditerranéenne*, Dublin, 6 mai 2004, <http://www.maec.gov.ma>; M. Benaïssa: *la nouvelle politique de voisinage de l'UE rejoint la demande marocaine pour la mise en place d'une relation privilégiée avec l'Union*, Rabat, 28 mai 2004, <http://www.maec.gov.ma>; *Le Maroc appelle à la dynamisation du processus de Barcelone*, Londres, 30 juin 2004, <http://www.maec.gov.ma>; M. Benaïssa *affirme que la politique de voisinage de l'UE apporte une valeur ajoutée aux relations Maroc-UE*, Palma de Majorque, 9 octobre 2004, <http://www.maec.gov.ma>; M. Fassi Fihri: *Les "excellentes" relations Maroc-UE ne cessent de s'approfondir*, Rabat, 7 novembre 2007, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (October 2009).

²³¹ M. Taïb Fassi Fihri: *le Maroc et l'UE signeront prochainement un accord de libre-échange approfondi*, Le Caire, 3 novembre 2008, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (October 2009).

²³² M. Benaïssa: *La conférence sur l'Europe élargie, une occasion de souligner le rôle du Maroc et de l'Espagne dans le renforcement du partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen*, Assilah, 30 août 2004, <http://www.maec.gov.ma>; M. Fassi Fihri *souligne l'excellence des relations Maroc-Espagnoles*, Tanger, 4 août 2008, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (October 2009).

²³³ *Algerie – Espagne, Déclaration commune*, jeudi 24 février 2005, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (October 2009).

market, sees the EU as a means of attaining this goal. Representatives of Jordan have many times stated that it was the first of the Mashriq countries to sign an association agreement with the EU and this gives it the basis for further work on creating a good climate for the development of trade and investment. Cooperation within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was viewed positively as an activity that will generate economic prosperity in the Mediterranean. The EU, as has been repeated by Jordanian decision-makers, has been the key international actor granting aid to Jordan for the implementation of economic reforms and liberalisation.²³⁴

2. Promoting the economic integration of the Arab countries

The introduction of an area of peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean was not possible, in the EU's opinion, without increasing economic cooperation between the region's countries. The development of cooperation vertically (between the EU and the countries of the region) was insufficient; thus the EU has tried to play the role of promoter of economic integration between the Arab countries. This activity has officially met with a warm reception in these countries. They have repeatedly expressed their support for initiatives aiming to create inter-Arab cooperation.²³⁵ In November 2005, Algeria urged the EU to greater engagement in the development of integration between the countries of North Africa, particularly as the EU had large experience in such matters.²³⁶

The concept of Arab unity is not new. The idea of unity among the countries of North Africa emerged shortly after they achieved independence. However, the only unifying factor for Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria – liberation from French domination – proved too weak. It was only in February 1989 that these three countries, as well as Libya and Mauritania, signed a declaration creating the Arab Maghreb Union. At a meeting in Libya in 1991, an action strategy marked out three stages of integration: 1) the creation of a free trade area; 2) creation of a customs union; and 3) establishment of

²³⁴ His Majesty King Abdullah, Remarks at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm on October 8th, 2003, <http://www.mfa.gov.jo> (October 2009); His Majesty King Abdullah, Remarks at Matthiae-Mahlzeit Dinner Banquet in Hamburg, Germany on February 25th, 2005, <http://www.mfa.gov.jo> (October 2009); Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher address at the Crete mid-term Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on May 26th, 2003, <http://www.mfa.gov.jo> (October 2009).

²³⁵ Statement on the Process of Development and Modernization in the Arab World, Tunisia, May 23, 2004, <http://www.mfa.gov.jo> (October 2009).

²³⁶ Aide-Mémoire de l'Algérie sur le bilan de dix années de partenariat euroméditerranéen, 28 novembre 2005, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (October 2009).

a free market. Realisation of this goal, however, met with large problems.²³⁷ The lack of integration within the framework of the Arab Maghreb Union inclined some of its members to increase bilateral cooperation. In November 1997, Morocco and Tunisia initiated a project to work out the details of a free trade area by 2005, and in April 1998 Tunisia and Jordan signed an agreement on a customs area, with the intention of expanding trade and the development of cooperation between themselves. A few years later, in February 2004, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco signed the Agadir Agreement on creating a free trade area. In the years 2004-2008, the EU gave 4 million euros in technical and financial support (the Agadir Agreement-EU support project) and for the years 2008-2012 it decided to give the amount.²³⁸ Implementation of the agreement has been however much more complicated than assumption.

3. Initiating and supporting sustainable development in the region

In the EU's opinion, sustainable regional development will be possible only through an intensification of multilateral cooperation. It has been therefore trying to play an active role in the process and places particular emphasis on the development of cooperation in the areas of energy, transport, tourism and environmental protection.

3.1. Energy

The aim of developing energy cooperation is to expand the energy network, promote renewable energy sources and bring about necessary reforms, including legislative ones, in the energy sector in the SEMCs.

Since 1996 the Euro-Mediterranean energy forum has taken place regularly (Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conferences and meetings of general directors). The first Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting on energy was held in Trieste in June 1996. The succeeding ones took place in Brussels (May 1998), Athens (May 2003), Rome (December 2003) and Limassol (December 2007). An important step in developing energy cooperation was made at ministerial meetings in 2003 in Athens and Rome, when a programme called the 'Rome Euro-Mediterranean Energy Forum' (REMEP) for 2003-2006 was

²³⁷ Alvaro de Vasconcelos, *Intégration et coopération sous-régionale en Méditerranée*, „Euro-MeSCo Paper”, No. 13, Avril 2000; Messaoud Boudhief, *The Advantages of an Intra-Maghreb Free Trade Area*, „Mediterranean Politics”, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 121–132.

²³⁸ <http://www.enpi-info.eu/>, September 2010.

accepted.²³⁹ A decision at the fifth ministerial meeting in December 2007, inaugurated the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership, and the structures of REMEP were included in the succeeding action plan, adopted for the years 2008-2013. Its chief tasks were to bring about:

- the harmonisation and integration of the energy markets of the EU countries and its Mediterranean partners, as well as their legislation in this area; this aim requires the acceleration of reforms in the countries of the SEMCs and the creation of an energy network
- sustainable development of the energy sector, i.e., elaborating and introducing appropriate strategies of action, and creating the necessary institutional abilities to promote renewable energy in the SEMCs
- the promotion of investments that would facilitate the expansion of energy infrastructure while simultaneously avoiding degradation of the natural environment. Among the most important projects in this area were the Arab, Medgaz and Galsi pipelines.²⁴⁰

Developing energy cooperation with the countries of North Africa and the Middle East and creating an integrated Euro-Mediterranean energy market also takes place with the help of multilateral programmes financed with EU funds. The most important projects included:

- The Euro-Arab Mashreq Gas Market (EAMGM). This was a programme that operated in 2005-2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Its aim was the development of an integrated sub-regional gas market as an initial step toward integrating it with the EU gas market. The EU allocated 6 million euros for its realisation.
- Electricity Market Integration. This was a three-year programme which began in 2007. Its aim was the development of an integrated electricity market between Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, and between these countries and the EU. The budget for the programme was around 4.9 million euros.
- MED.-Energy Market Integration Project, a project which was set up in 2007 for three years. Its aim was to increase cooperation in the energy sector and to increase energy security. All the member states of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership participated. The EU has given 4.1 million euros for its realisation.
- MED.-Energy Efficiency in Construction. This project was realised in the years 2005-2008 by all the states participating in the Euro-Mediterranean

²³⁹ Ministerial Declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Forum, Athens, 21 May 2003, Ministerial Conference “Towards a new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on Investment Promotion, Infrastructure Financing and Energy Supply Security”, Rome, 1–2 December 2003, <http://www.climnet.org> (October 2009).

²⁴⁰ Ministerial Declaration on the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership adopted together with its annexes by Ministers at the conference in Limassol, Cyprus, 17 December 2007, <http://www.consilium.eu.int> (October 2009).

Partnership. The programme, which cost the EU 4 million euros, concentrated on the development of environmentally friendly technology, including a large use of solar energy.

In addition, for the period 2008-2009, the EU allocated 300,000 euros to improve legislation in the SEMCs in the energy sector.²⁴¹

In total, within the MEDA programme, the EU has spent 55 million euros on the realisation of regional projects in the energy sector. In addition, the European Investment Bank has granted loans of nearly 2 billion euros.

3.2. Transport

In order to improve the economic situation of the SEMCs, not only the private sector needs to be developed and function properly, but also the transport network needs to be developed. The costs of logistics and transport are very high, which has a disadvantageous effect on the price of export products and thus their competitiveness on the EU market. In this connection, the EU has been working to develop a Euro-Mediterranean transport network, based on modern cross-connections. Since 1999, meetings of the Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Transport have been held regularly for high-ranking state officials. The first meeting was on Malta in March 1999; the succeeding meetings were held in Brussels in June 2000, July 2002, October 2003, December 2004, July 2005, October 2005, May 2007 and December 2008.²⁴²

At the Barcelona conference that took place on the tenth anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, it was decided to intensify cooperation in the transport sector. A couple of weeks later, in December 2005, the first meeting of ministers of transport was held.²⁴³ In accordance with the recommendations of this forum, in May 2007, during the eighth meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Transport Forum, a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Transport Action Plan (RTAP) was adopted for the years 2007-2013. The plan described the actions necessary for developing the transport network and infrastructure, including maritime, land, rail and civilian air transport. Implementation was undertaken at the state level and monitored by the Euro-Mediterranean Transport Forum. The premise of the RTAP was elaborated on the basis of guidelines contained in: the *Blue Paper towards an Integrated Euro-Mediterranean Transport System*; the report by a group of high representatives on extending the main trans-European transport axes to neighbouring countries (*High Level Group Report on the Extension of the Major Trans-European Transport*

²⁴¹ *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Regional Co-operation*, op. cit., p. 41. See also: Richard Youngs, *Energy Security. Europe New Foreign Policy Challenge*, Routledge, London 2009, pp. 57-69.

²⁴² <http://ec.europa.eu> (October 2009).

²⁴³ *Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Transport. Ministerial Conclusions, Marrakech, 15 December 2005*, <http://ec.europa.eu> (October 2009).

Axes to Neighbouring Countries and Regions); action plans drawn up by the EU and individual SEMCs within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy; and also from experience with a programme that functioned in the years 2003-2007 (the Euro-Med Framework Transport Project), and regional projects such as SAFEMED²⁴⁴, the Euromed Transport Programme, the Euro-Med. Satellite Navigation (GNSS) Project, the Euro-Med. Aviation Project.²⁴⁵

The EU also financed other programmes for transport cooperation, such as Euromed Aviation, MEDA MOS GNSS I, INFRAMED, MEDA-Tent, Destin and Reg-Med.²⁴⁶

3.3. Tourism

The need to develop the tourist sector to improve the socio-economic situation of the SEMCs and for sustainable regional development was emphasised at Euro-Mediterranean conferences of foreign affairs ministers in Tampere in November 2006 and a year later in Lisbon. In consequence, in April 2008 Morocco held the first ministerial conference on the subject of tourism, where ministers of the EMP member countries announced that they would undertake the necessary activities to foster the tourist sector and decided to meet every two years.²⁴⁷

Concentrating attention on the need to develop the tourist sector within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was closely related with

²⁴⁴ SAFEMED (Maritime Safety and Pollution Prevention) was a project realised in 2006-2008 within the framework of the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Centre for the Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC), that was established in 1976. SAFEMED's aim was to unify legislation between the EU and its partners of the southern and eastern Mediterranean coast in the area of protecting the marine environment. The EU allocated 4 million euros to the project. *Euro-Med. Cooperation on Maritime Safety and Prevention of Pollution from Ships – SAFEMED*, <http://www.euromedtransport.org/345.0.html> (October 2009).

²⁴⁵ The **Euro-Med. Transport Programme** functioned in 2003-2008 and its goal was to expand the transport connections between EU member countries and EU partners on the eastern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean. The EU allocated 9.7 million euros to the programme's realisation. Motorways of the Sea-Transport Connections was a three-year programme begun in 2006 to establish Mediterranean marine highways. The budget for the project was 4.8 million euros. The **Euro-Med. Satellite Navigation (GNSS) Project** operated in the years 2006-2008. Work was done within its framework on a common policy for introducing a satellite navigation system in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. The EU allocated 4.5 million euros to the project. The **Euro-Med. Aviation Project** aimed to create a common Euro-Mediterranean air space and to increase cooperation in the sphere of air transport. It operated in 2007-2010. The EU, in accordance with its declarations, allocated 5 million euros to the project's realisation. *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Regional Co-operation...*, op. cit.

²⁴⁶ More: *Regional Transport Action Plan for the Mediterranean Region 2007-2013*, European Commission, Brussels 2007.

²⁴⁷ *Euro-Med. Ministerial Conference on Tourism. Agreed Conclusions, Fez (Morocco), 2-3 April 2008*, "Partneriat EuroMed", No. 71, 4 April 2008.

the decisions of the EU on implementation of a new tourism policy. These decisions were made in 2006 and 2007. In 2005 the European Commission had put forward a proposal to concentrate EU efforts, for the purpose of revivifying the Lisbon Strategy, on two basic tasks: ensuring stable economic growth and creating a larger number of jobs. It was recognized that the sector that could most effectively contribute to reaching these two goals was tourism, as it encompasses many different services and occupations, and influences other sectors such as transport, construction, trade and many branches producing products related with vacation tourism or ensuring services related with vacation trips or business. In March 2006, the Commission published a communiqué entitled 'The EU's New Tourism Policy: Toward a Stronger Partnership for European Tourism', and in October 2007 it adopted an Agenda for balanced and competitive European tourism.²⁴⁸ The communiqué marked the implementation of an action plan to improve Europe's competitiveness as the most attractive tourist destination.

3.4. Environmental protection

The EU is actively working to protect the natural environment in the Mediterranean region, since industrial, shipping and household pollution, the loss of open spaces and the destruction of coastal eco-systems pose serious threats to the security of EU countries,²⁴⁹ and the actions the UN has taken, since the seventies, to protect the Mediterranean Sea have not brought the desired results.

The Short and Medium-Term Priority Environmental Action Programme (SMAP) was adopted in Helsinki in November 1997, at the first meeting of ministers of the environment of states participating in the Barcelona Process. Water management, waste management, management of coastal areas, the struggle with soil desertification, reduction of the amount of pollution, and hot spots, i.e., very urgent problems, were designated the most important areas for action. A second ministerial meeting took place in July 2002 in Athens. The functioning of the SMAP in the years 1997-2001 was thoroughly discussed and decisions were taken to improve it.

SMAP was implemented in three stages, beginning in 1998. The first pool of projects was reviewed in 1998/1999, the next in 2000, and the third in 2005. In the first two stages the projects were multilateral in nature; in the

²⁴⁸ *Komunikat Komisji. Odnowiona polityka turystyczna UE. Ku silniejszemu partnerstwu na rzecz turystyki europejskiej, Bruksela, 12 marca 2006 r. oraz Komunikat Komisji. Agenda dla zrównoważonej i konkurencyjnej turystyki europejskiej, Bruksela, 19 października 2007 r., KOM (2007), <http://eur-lex.europa.eu> (October 2009).*

²⁴⁹ Urs Luterbacher, *Degradation – Environment, Climate Change, and Kyoto Protocol*, in: *Disasters, Diseases, Disruptions: a New D- driver for the EU*, „Chailot Paper”, No. 83, September 2005.

third phase a majority of projects were implemented independently by the EU's partner countries. The projects chiefly involved the integrated development of the Mediterranean Sea coast. The EU allocated the largest sum for financing in the second phase (around 21.5 million euros). In the first phase the sum was around 5.6 million euros and in the third it was 6.6 million euros. By 2008, the largest number of projects within the SMAP programme had been realised in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria and Lebanon. The majority of the funds were granted to projects for municipal waste water treatment: around 60% of the total (the most in Morocco – 100%, Egypt – 83% and Tunisia – 74%).²⁵⁰

In addition to the SMAP, the EU also financed other programmes designed to protect the natural environment. Among these an important place is occupied by programmes concerning drinking water. The EU's activities to introduce rational water management in the Mediterranean region started at the beginning of the nineties. In May 1990, at the initiative of the European Commission, Algeria organized the first Mediterranean conference on the subject of water. At the conference, a declaration was adopted which emphasised the necessity of working out a common strategy for water management. In October 1992 in Rome a second conference took place on the issue. The states then adopted the Mediterranean Water Charter, in which they committed themselves to take measures concerning the management of fresh water. The first ministerial conference of EMP member states on the subject of water was held in Marseille in November 1996. There it was decided to establish a Euro-Mediterranean information system concerning know-how in the water sector (EMWIS). At a second conference, which was held in Turin in October 1999, the Action Plan on Local Water Management was adopted. Realisation of the goals set forth in the plans furthered the Euro-Mediterranean Regional Programme for Local Water Management ('MEDA Water'), adopted for the years 2003-2008. The Programme concentrated on nine consortiums, composed of non-governmental organisations, universities and government institutions of EMP member countries. The EU allocated 40 million euros to the programme. Within it, projects were implemented relating to water desalination and purification, efficient use – including water efficiency and reuse – and decentralised intakes for potable water.²⁵¹

²⁵⁰ <http://www.smap.eu> (June 2009).

²⁵¹ *Euro-Mediterranean regional water projects*, <http://www.medawater-rmsu.org> (October 2009).

Table 5. Projects realised within the SMAP programme

	Project	Participating States	Date project began	Duration (in months)	Total cost (in thousand euros)	Financial participation of the EU (in thousand dollars)
	Promoting sustainable use of cultivated land through the introduction of organic farming	Egypt, Tunisia Turkey	October 2003	29	1157.5	910.3
S M A P I	Management of the coast between Amsheet in Lebanon and Latakia in Syria	Lebanon, Syria	November 2000	46	1611.3	1401.1
	Protecting the diversity of ecosystems	Lebanon, Morocco Tunisia, Turkey	November 2000	37	1397.8	1117.8
	Regional programme for solid waste management	Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia	December 2000	37	113.7	902.1
	Mediterranean programme for managing municipal wastes	Jordan, Egypt Cyprus	December 2000	30	908.4	720.8
	Programme to shape community awareness of rational water use	Israel, Jordan, Palesti- nian Authority	December 2001	44	703.7	561.0
	Project promoting strategies for combating soil desertification of drought-stricken land	Morocco, Tunisia	September 2002	58	4308.3	3446.6
	Creating a system to introduce a pro- gramme for combating soil desertification in North African countries	Morocco, Tunisia	January 2002	48	1969.9	1438.9
S M A	Regional programme for the development of protected marine and coastal areas in the Mediterranean	Algeria, Cyprus, Malta, Morocco, Israel, Syria, Tunisia	February 2002	36	2191.1	1748.3

P II	Combating air pollution in cities	Lebanon, Morocco, Cyprus	April 2002	48	2549.3	2020.7
	Creating an integrated system for managing wastes emerging in the olive-pressing process	Jordan, Lebanon, Syria	January 2005	36	2196.7	1738.4
	Management of solid wastes in Maghreb and Mashriq countries	Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Palestinian Authority	February 2003	48	6000.0	5000.0
	Management of two watersheds in the Jordan river basin in Jordan	Jordan, Palestinian Authority	January 2003	36	4950.4	3881.7
	Implementation of a programme of photovoltaic water pumping in the Mediterranean countries	Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia	December 2001	48	2935.7	2291.0
	Integrated management of natural resources in the Nador area in Morocco	Morocco	January 2006	36	734.0	580.0
S	Integrated management of the eastern Mediterranean coast	Lebanon	January 2006	36	1108.6	924.0
M A	Integrated management of the coast in the Port Said environs	Egypt	December 2008	36	1874.9	1499.9
P	Integrated management of the area around Lake Mariut in Egypt	Egypt, Spain, France, The Netherlands	December 2008	36	779.4	598.9
III	Integrated management in two regions in Tunisia: Kroumirie-Mogods and Grand Sfax	Tunisia	January 2006	30	1563.4	1241.4
	Integrated management of the Algerian sea coast	Algeria, Italy	January 2006	24	985.6	785.5
	Development of wetlands in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia	Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia	January 2006	36	1214.3	971.4

Source: Author's own work on the basis of the official SMAP website at: <http://www.smap.eu> (June 2009).

Table 6. Projects realised within the MEDA water programme in 2003-2008

Name	Countries from which partners coming	Goal	EU financial support (in million euros)
ADIRA	Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, Greece, Spain, Germany	Not developing new desalination technologies, but to adapt existing concepts from various suppliers for use with renewable energies	3.41
EMPOWERS	Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Great Britain, The Netherlands	Improving long-term access and rights to water for local populations in Egypt, Jordan and West Bank/Gaza	4.80
EMWATER	Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, the Palestinian Authority, Germany, Italy	Elaborating innovative solutions in wastewater treatment and wastewater re-use in the target countries of Turkey, Jordan, the Lebanon and Palestine	3.98
IRWA	Jordan, Lebanon, Italy, Spain	Improving an irrigation water management in Lebanon and Jordan	6.29
ISIIMM	Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, France, Italy, Spain	Sharing experiences, knowledge and build new perspectives for sustainable water management in Mediterranean agriculture systems	5.7
MEDAWARE	Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, Spain	Developing tools and guidelines for the promotion of sustainable urban wastewater treatment and re-use in agricultural production in Mediterranean countries	2.35
MEDROPLAN	Morocco, Tunisia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain	Creation of Guidelines for Drought Preparedness Plans	3.06
MEDWA	Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Austria, Spain	Creation a sustainable improvement of the regional development	5.49
ZERO – M	Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Austria, Germany, Italy, Greece	Creation of an integrated system to supply water and treat wastewater for its reuse in small towns	5.52

Source: *MEDA Water Programme*, <http://www.medawater-rmsu.org> (June 2009).

Another EU programme in the water sector was the MED.-EU Water Initiative (since 2003), which was realised within the framework of the EU Water Initiative. This initiative was begun at the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in 2002, as one of the components in realising the UN's Millennium Goals. During the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference on the subject of water, which took place in Jordan in December 2008, a long-term strategy for water in the Mediterranean region was adopted.²⁵²

Another important element in environmental protection activities in the Mediterranean region is the 'Horizon 2020' programme created at the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference in November 2005. This programme sets forth actions to reduce the largest sources of pollution in the Mediterranean region. In November 2006, at the third ministerial conference devoted to environmental protection, a timetable for the programme was adopted. Horizon 2020 accords with the strategy presented by the European Commission in September 2006 contained the following aims: a) reduction of pollution; b) promotion of sustainable use of the Mediterranean Sea and its coasts; c) encouragement of the coastal countries to develop cooperation among themselves; d) assistance to the EU member states in creating effective environmental protection policies and institutions for the purpose; and e) greater engagement of civil society in ecological activity. The means of achieving these goals were to be: 1) financial assistance from the EU; 2) developing and strengthening dialogue through the use of existing structures for cooperation (the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and European Neighbourhood Policy); 3) improving coordination with other organisations and partners working to protect the natural environment of the Mediterranean, particularly the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP); and 4) the EU's transfer of knowledge related to environmental protection to its partner countries.²⁵³

The timetable of the Horizon 2020 programme adopted in 2006 set forth four priorities for action to 2013:

- financing projects limiting the largest sources of pollution, among which are industrial emissions, municipal wastes and domestic sewage (constituting 80% of the Mediterranean Sea's pollution)
- forming the ability of EU countries successfully to introduce regulations concerning environmental protection
- European Commission financing for scientific research into particular environmental protection issues and disseminating the results

²⁵² *Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean: Declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Water, Jordan, 22 December 2008*, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu> (October 2009).

²⁵³ *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Establishing an Environment Strategy for the Mediterranean*, Brussels, 5 September 2006, COM (2006), 475 final.

- developing indicators for monitoring the achievements of Horizon 2020.²⁵⁴

The Union for the Mediterranean, which was established in 2008, describes the environmental protection of the Mediterranean region as one of its priorities for the coming years.

4. Conclusion

In 1993-2010 the EU played the role of promoter of market reforms and sustainable development in the Mediterranean region in accordance with the premise that only an improvement in the economic situation of the SEMCs and the sustainable development of the region would make it possible to transform the area into a sphere of stability, peace and prosperity.

Promotion of economic reforms in the SEMCs and a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area occurs largely through the Euro-Mediterranean agreements signed by the EU and partner countries within the framework of the Barcelona Process and action plans within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. In the process of transforming the economies of its partner countries, the EU particularly has supported development of the private sector, improving the quality and competitiveness of goods, and development of investment and technology. It has also worked toward liberalisation of trade in industrial products and (to a very limited degree) agricultural products, and the liberalisation of services. This support, along with international legal regulation, also encompasses advising, consulting and financial assistance. One aspect whose significance the EU has been emphasising was that of horizontal economic integration, i.e., between the countries of North Africa. The EU's activities in this sphere have not been large, however, and have been limited chiefly to rhetoric.

The EU created several instruments of financial support for the SEMCs in introducing economic reforms. The most important were the MEDA programme (1995-2006), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument - ENPI, from 2007)²⁵⁵, the Neighbourhood Investment Facility

²⁵⁴ *Horizon 2020 – Timetable for the first phase (2007–2013), Annex to the Cairo Declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on the Environment 20 November 2006*, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/med/pdf/2020_timetable_phase1_en.pdf (October 2009).

²⁵⁵ Funds from the MEDA programme for regional cooperation in the years 2002-2004 were allocated chiefly for economic cooperation. Priority sectors were considered to be transport, energy and telecommunications (17 million euros), development of trade (10 million euros) and sustainable economic growth (25 million euros). After adopting the new instrument of financial support – the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument – in January 2007 the EU produced a regional development strategy for the years 2007-2013 and a Regional Indicative Programme for 2007-2010. It committed itself to

(NIF) and the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP). In addition, the SEMCs can take advantage of loans from the European Investment Bank.

EU financial aid has been not only oriented toward supporting economic transformation in the SEMCs and realising the Euro-Mediterranean idea of a free trade area, but also finances many projects aimed at achieving the region's sustainable development. The EU has considered energy, transport, tourism and environmental protection to be the most important sectors.

granting financial aid in the amount of 343.3 million euros, of which part was to be earmarked for supporting Euro-Mediterranean multilateral programmes in the sphere of sustainable economic development. These programmes are intended to contribute to sustained economic development, particularly in regards to further liberalisation of trade, development of trade integration and infrastructure, and environmental protection.

CHAPTER VII

The EU as a propagator of democratic values, human rights and intercultural dialogue

1. Propagating democratic values and human rights in the SEMCs

The EU plays the role of promoter of democratic values and human rights in the Mediterranean region. The wave of democratisation that swept through Central Europe after the end of the Cold War aroused the hope of its spread to non-European countries. Many experts shared the opinion of Francis Fukuyama about the end of history, understood as the end of conflicts on account of the reign of democracy and free market economic principles²⁵⁶. In the liberal theory of democratic peace, democracies are assumed not to fight each other and thus a policy of promoting democracy throughout the world should be conducted. The EU's assumption of democracy and human rights issues in its policies toward third countries arises also out of the values that lie at its basis: freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. The EU's military weakness, which Brussels has recompensed through 'soft means of influence', is also not without significance.²⁵⁷

The importance of democratic values and human rights for the Mediterranean region was clearly stated in a document entitled 'Towards a New Mediterranean Policy' adopted by the European Commission in November 1989. From the moment of initiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in November 1995, the EU has consistently repeated that the countries of the southern and eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea should introduce democratic principles into political life and respect human rights. The Euro-Mediterranean agreements signed with the EU contained provisions

²⁵⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Free Press, New York 1992.

²⁵⁷ Irene Menendez-Gonzalez, *Arab Reform: What Role for the EU*, "Egmont Papers", No. 11, Academia Press for the Institute Royal de Relations Internationales de Belgique, Brussels 2005. See also: Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1993.

concerning political cooperation, respect for human rights and introduction of democratic principles.²⁵⁸

Yet the EU's role as a propagator of democracy and human rights in partner countries was not large, for several reasons, the most important being the difference of opinion in EU member countries as to the intensity and dynamic of activities in this sphere. The countries of Southern Europe feared that too strong an insistence on democratic principles could contribute to antagonising relations within SEMCs and the destabilisation of the Mediterranean region, which would have a very disadvantageous impact on the political, economic and social situation of Europe, and particularly of her southern coasts. France, and to a certain degree, Spain, were cautious about promoting democracy and human rights in North Africa, on account of their colonial past in the region.²⁵⁹ The northern European countries, on the other hand, due to their geographical location, did not feel the direct threat of negative phenomena occurring in the Mediterranean region, and maintained that spreading democracy and human rights in eastern and southern Mediterranean countries was essential. In the end, however, they left their southern partners free to act as they would in the matter.²⁶⁰ The shape of EU policies was thus to a large degree a reflection of the interests of her member countries located on the Mediterranean Sea and it was chiefly the European Commission that engaged in promoting democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean partner countries.²⁶¹

The impetus of democratisation activities increased after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. Among decision-makers of the EU institutions and EU member countries, the conviction was strengthened that there is a strong connection between the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism and the lack of democracy and respect for human rights. In May 2003, a document was adopted entitled 'Reinvigorating European Union Actions on Human Rights and Democratisation with Mediterranean Partners', in which it was stated, among other things, that improving the effectiveness of the dialogue between

²⁵⁸ Richard Gillespie, Richard Youngs, *Themes in European Democracy Promotion*, „Democratization”, 2002, Vol. 9 . No. 1, pp. 1–16.

²⁵⁹ Compare: Jean-François Daguzan, *France, Democratization and North Africa*, „Democratization”, 2002, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 135-148; Bernabé López García, Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, *Spain and North Africa: Towards the “Dynamic Stability*, „Democratization”, 2002, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 170–191.

²⁶⁰ Richard Gillespi, *A Political Agenda for Region-building? The EMP and Democracy Promotion in North Africa*, Institute of European Studies, University of California, “Working Paper”, AY0405-30, Berkley, May 30, 2004.

²⁶¹ Compare: Martin Ortega, *A New EU Policy on the Mediterranean?*, in: Judy Batt et al, *Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for Wider Europe*, “Chaillot Paper”, No. 64, September 2003, pp. 86-101; Luis Martinez, *European Union's Exportation of Democratic Norms*, in: Zaki Laïdi (ed.), *EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World. Normative Power and Social Preferences*, Routledge, London, New York 2008, pp. 118–133.

the EU and its Mediterranean partners required comprehensive action. In a speech in 2004, Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that ‘security against fanatics and terrorists cannot be provided by conventional military force; but requires a commitment to democracy, freedom and justice.’²⁶² Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for CFSP, gave a speech in a similar spirit in Rabat.²⁶³

This approach was reflected in the European Neighbourhood Policy, which was initiated in 2004 and created real possibilities for the EU to promote its basic values, such as good governance, democracy and human rights. Such provisions also appeared in the action plans worked out by each of the EU member countries individually. Each of these plans contains guidelines for the partner country concerning the introduction of political reforms and human rights. Their introduction has been monitored by specially designated subcommittees for human rights, democracy and governance; they operate with the Association Council. The first country that agreed to create such a subcommittee was Morocco (in 2003). In addition, in 2003, the European Commission proposed that its representatives in Arab partner countries should regularly organise meetings with representatives of non-governmental organisations forming part of civil society.²⁶⁴ With greater impetus, the EU began also to implement programmes serving to realise this aim and to increase financial aid for it.²⁶⁵

The EU basically attitude toward promoting democracy and human rights in a dual fashion: by influencing decision-makers in partner countries, presenting to them the necessity of introducing democratic reforms and respecting human rights (the top-down approach), while simultaneously supporting non-governmental initiatives and building civil society (the bottom-up approach).²⁶⁶ The political transformation of southern and eastern Mediterranean countries was to be assisted by multifaceted programmes of cooperation, financed from EU funds. Financing occurs chiefly through the MEDA and ENPI programme,

²⁶² Blair’s Mansion House Speech, “The Guardian”, 16 November 2004.

²⁶³ Intervention by Javier Solana at the Opening of the Forum on the Future, Rabat, 11 December 2004, p. 4, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu> (June 2009).

²⁶⁴ *Reinvigorating EU Actions on Human Rights and Democracy with the Mediterranean Partners. Strategic Guidelines*, Brussels, 21.05.2003, COM (2003), 294 final.

²⁶⁵ Richard Youngs, *Europe and the Middle East in the Shadow of September 11*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 2006, p. 7; Justyna Zajac, *Promocja demokracji w państwach arabskich w polityce zagranicznej Unii Europejskiej*, „Przegląd Politologiczny” 2008, nr 2, pp. 53–67.

²⁶⁶ Compare: Michèle Knot, Anette Jünemann, *EU External Democracy Promotion Approaching Governments and Civil Societies*, in: Beate Kohler-Koch, Dirk De Bièvre, William Maloney (ed.), *Opening EU – Governance to Civil Society*, CONNEX Report Series no. 5, Mannheim 2008, pp. 262–293; Anette Jünemann, *From the Bottom to the Top: Civil Society and Transnational Non-Governmental Organisations in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, „Democratization”, 2002, Vol. 9 . No. 1, pp. 87–105.

the Governance Facility mechanism and the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).²⁶⁷

The Governance Facility mechanism was announced in December 2006 in a document entitled 'Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy'. It was in accord with the May 2003 guidelines of the European Commission and with decisions made in November 2005 at the annual summit of the Barcelona Process. A mechanism was provided for the countries most advanced in implementing Action Plan guidelines such as respect for human rights and basic freedoms, democratisation, respect for the rule of law, the existence of an independent judiciary, unhampered access to information, transparency in the functioning of government institutions, human security, proper control of migration, access to basic social services, sustainable management of natural resources and the environment, and balanced economic and social development. The first of the EU's Mediterranean partners to receive money from the fund was Morocco. In 2007, it was granted 28 million euros. These funds were allocated for the modernization of public administration, social policy and educational programmes, and the fight against poverty.²⁶⁸ In the years 2007-2010 the European Commission allocated 50 million euros for the Governance Facility.²⁶⁹

Funds for supporting political reforms and strengthening human rights also come from the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), created in 1994, gives funds directly to non-governmental organisations. Part of the EIDHR was the programme MEDA Democracy, established in 1994.²⁷⁰ However, after the administrative reforms that were introduced in EU institutions after the corruption scandal, in 1999 this programme was replaced by many others. In 2000, the administrative service of these programmes was transferred to the EuropeAid institution.²⁷¹

Funds from all the above-mentioned instruments were used for the realisation of projects aimed to improve public administration, decentralise authority and increase the significance of non-governmental groupings in shaping state policy and promoting the greater activity of women in all spheres of social

²⁶⁷ European Union suggested a name 'Democracy Facility', but Arab States did not agree. Youngs, op. cit., p. 105.

²⁶⁸ Kristina Kausch, *Morocco*, in: Richard Youngs (ed.), *Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in Its Neighborhood?*, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, Spain, 2008.

²⁶⁹ *Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy*, Brussels, 04.12.2006, COM (2006) 726.

²⁷⁰ Annette Jünemann, *Democratization – Reflections on the Political Dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, in: Peter G. Xuereb (ed.), *The Mediterranean's European Challenge*, European Documentation and Research Center, University of Malta, La Valetta 1998.

²⁷¹ Annette Jünemann, *The European Parliament and its Impact on the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights in the Mediterranean*, "Dossier El Parlamento Europeo en la Política Exterior", No. 8, 2004.

life. In comparison with the funds the EU grants to support democracy and human rights in the world, those it grants to the countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean within the framework of Official Development Aid (ODA) were comparatively small.

An important element of actions to improve public administration in EU partner countries was training. Two programmes were established for the purpose: 1) Training of Public Administration and 2) Education and Training for Employment (MEDEA-ETE). Training of Public Administration operated in 2004-2009 and its aim was to train bureaucrats from the SEMCs in European matters and to create a network of training centres for public administration within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The EU allocated 6 million euros for its realisation. MEDEA-ETE operated in 2004-2010. Its tasks were training, improvement of the quality of schooling, exchanges of experience, and introducing social and economic projects. The EU gave 5 million euros for its implementation.²⁷²

An important place in the EU's policy for partner states has been occupied by the question of decentralisation of authority and increased participation of non-governmental groups in the shaping of state policy. Intensive activity was directed at developing and strengthening local authorities, whose greater participation in decision-making was to contribute to the balanced development of cities, which, in the context of rapid urbanisation, is unusually important. The programmes Med.-Urbs, MED.-PACT-Local Authorities, and CIUDAD (Cooperation in Urban Development and Dialogue) worked towards these goals.

MED-URBS was created at the beginning of the nineties. It promoted cooperation and the exchange of know-how between large urban agglomerations and small towns. It was chiefly directed at local governments and concentrated on issues of managing municipal areas, exchanges of experience between local government employees, setting up partnerships between towns and the socio-economic development of towns. After the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, this programme was suspended²⁷³ and later its activities were taken over by the MED.-PACT-Local Authorities programme. This latter programme was set up for the years 2006-2010 for the purpose of developing cooperation between societies at the local level, primarily through the creation of a network of cooperation between local governments in the countries participating in the EMP. The EU allocated 5 million euros to its realisation. In 2009, a succeeding programme was created,

²⁷² <http://www.meda-ete.net> (June 2009).

²⁷³ MED programmes were already created in 1990. Among them were: MED. Urbs, MED.-Campus,, MED.-Media. They were permanently suspended in 1996. See more: Annette Jünemann, *The Forum Civil Euromed: Critical Watchdog and Intercultural Mediator*, in: Stefania Panebianco (ed.), *A New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Cultural Identity*, Frank Cass, London 2003, pp. 84-107.

with similar goals, under the name CIUDAD. To 2011 the EU had allocated 14 million euros to it.²⁷⁴

Since 1995 the EU has tried to support the development of civil society of non-governmental organisations through financing two main programmes: TresMed Civil Society Dialogue and Euro-Mediterranean Summit of Economic and Social Councils.

The TresMed Programme was created for the period 2004-2010 for the purpose of introducing an institutionalisation of dialogue furthering the development of social society, good governance and democratisation of the Mediterranean countries. The main task of the programme was to strengthen the consultative role of economic and social institutions in the process of decision-making in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. The practical side of the programme involved training, seminars, study visits and exchanges of experience. The EU allocated 970,000 euros to its realisation.²⁷⁵

The Euro-Mediterranean Summits of the Economic and Social Councils fulfil a similar purpose. They have been held yearly since 1995. The chief object of the meetings are questions related with migration, energy and water resources, the indebtedness of the southern SEMCs and matters pertaining to the opening of the Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area. The EU has given 50,000 euros every year for the forum's activities.²⁷⁶

Particular importance has been attached to promoting the rights of women, who have traditionally been treated as a group of lower social status in Muslim societies. As Bernard Lewis writes, 'in accordance with the laws and traditions of Islam, three groups of humanity – unbelievers, slaves and women – were not entitled to the benefits of Muslim law and religion. The worst position of the three groups was held by a woman.'²⁷⁷

In actuality, the growth of the West's power and extension of its influence has brought major changes to the status of these groups, but the struggle for women's rights has turned out to be a difficult problem and the results are not entirely visible to this day.²⁷⁸ Thus the subject of equal rights for women has been present in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership from the beginning and has taken on considerable force since 2005. In that year, the leaders of the member countries, at a meeting in Barcelona, adopted a declaration about strengthening the rights of this group and its significance in political, economic and social life. To realise this aim the Euromed Gender Programme was established. In November 2006, a Euro-Mediterranean ministerial

²⁷⁴ <http://www.enpi-info.eu> (June 2009).

²⁷⁵ http://www.ces.es/TRESMED/pag_en/contextual_en.htm (June 2009).

²⁷⁶ *Euro-Mediterranean Summit of Economic and Social Councils*, <http://www.enpi-info.eu> (June 2009).

²⁷⁷ Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*, Oxford University Press, New York 2002.

²⁷⁸ *Ibidem*.

conference was held in Istanbul on strengthening the role of women in society. In their concluding document, the ministers of the participating countries stated that, like the other premises of the Barcelona Process, the equality of men and women in all fields of social life is a necessary element of democracy. They recognized the imperative of undertaking comprehensive activities for the development of political, civil, economic and social rights, as well as women's rights in the cultural sphere, including in the mass media and communications. A second conference on the subject took place in Marrakesh in November 2009. It confirmed the earlier premises and guidelines for actions to be taken in the sphere of promoting women's rights.

The EU's activities were not uncritically accepted by the Arab countries. For example the Moroccan government more than once pointed out that the member countries of the EU should respect the dignity of Muslims living within their territories, particularly women. The EU countries should take care not to discriminate against women in social and economic life and to respect their religious and moral laws, including the right to wear a head covering while posing for visa photos.²⁷⁹ Taking into consideration respectation of human rights the visas procedures should also be simplified.²⁸⁰

A similar position was presented by representatives of the Algerian authorities.²⁸¹ Jordan supported the programme of introducing democracy and economic reforms and agreed to the assistance of international society, yet insisted that innovations should accord with the beliefs and values of the Muslim countries.

2. Promoting intercultural dialogue

The EU has also undertaken to play the role of promoter of intercultural dialogue, in order to overcome stereotypes, fight racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and to build positive relations between the societies of European, North African and Middle Eastern countries.²⁸² In the years 1995-2010, three meetings were held for ministers of cultural affairs of the EMP member countries: in Bologne (April 1996), on Rhodos (September

²⁷⁹ *Réponse de M. Benaïssa, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération à une question orale à la Chambre des Représentants sur "le refus des consulats français de délivrer le visa aux femmes portant le voile", Rabat, 2 juin 2004*, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009).

²⁸⁰ *M. Mohamed Benaïssa: prochaines négociations pour la simplification des procédures d'octroi de visa de court séjour, Rabat, 10 janvier 2007*, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2009).

²⁸¹ *Aide-Mémoire de l'Algérie sur le bilan de dix années de partenariat euro méditerranéen, 28 novembre 2005*, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2009).

²⁸² Compare: Michelle Pace, Tobias Schumacher (eds.), *Conceptualizing Cultural and Social Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Area. A European Perspective*, Routledge, London, New York 2007.

1998), and in Athens (May 2008). Important guidelines for proceeding were adopted at the third meeting, in Athens, where the ministers declared the preparation within two years of a Euro-Mediterranean Strategy on Culture. It was announced that the strategy would encompass two aspects of cooperation: intercultural dialogue and cultural policy. The ministers for cultural affairs stated that the strategy would be based on the principles of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and the Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, signed in October 2005, and on other applicable principles of international law, including the conclusions from the 1998 Stockholm Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development. The ministers agreed to establish a Euro-Med Group, composed of experts in the field of culture, whose task would be to work out the strategies' specific provisions. In November 2009, a report was prepared for the European Commission concerning the guidelines for working out a Euro-Mediterranean cultural strategy, but the strategy itself was not agreed upon. On the other hand, by a decision of the European Parliament and Council of the EU (1983/2006/EC) 2008 was the European Year of Inter-Cultural Dialogue.

Multilateral cooperation programmes were very important in intensifying intercultural dialogue. The first pilot programmes appeared at the beginning of the nineties, and were joined with the structures of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership when it was constituted. One of the first programmes to be established was MED-Campus, in July 1992. Its aim was to bring about close cooperation between universities and local socio-economic actors, in order to raise the level of education in countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean. The programme financed courses for training adults (chiefly the employees of public administration), supported the schooling of management personnel in the public and private sphere, and promoted contacts between university professors. In the programme's pilot phase, the European Commission financed 142 projects for training, research and access to the EU data bank.²⁸³ In a later period, further cooperative programmes were set up:

- the Euromed Heritage Programme
- the Euromed Audiovisual Programme
- the Information and Communication Programme
- the Euromed Youth Programme
- the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures
- the Euromed Civil Forum.

The Euromed Heritage Programme was established at the culture ministers' meeting of April 1996. Its main goal was the promotion and protection

²⁸³ Maurizio Giammusso, *Civil Society Initiatives and Prospects of Economic Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Decentralized Co-operation Networks*, „Mediterranean Politics”, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1999, p. 29.

of Euro-Mediterranean cultural heritage through: 1) increasing social awareness of the necessity for protecting cultural goods; 2) promoting the idea of sustainable development, so that economic growth, including tourism, takes place with respect for the natural environment and existing historical sites; 3) the cooperation of institutions engaged in protecting cultural heritage; 4) exchanges of experience, organising joint cultural events and mutual technological assistance, including transfers of the most modern technological know-how; and 5) training and educating persons working in the cultural sector. The implementation of the programme began in 1998 and its three stages were implemented over the next 10 years. 36 projects were introduced, engaging the participation of around 400 non-governmental entities. The projects were realised with 57 million euros from MEDA funds (plus 10 million euros for bilateral EU-Syria projects). The EU has allocated 13.5 million euros for its realisation from the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.²⁸⁴

The Euromed Audiovisual Programme was initiated at the second Euro-Mediterranean summit, in La Valetta in April 1997, as a continuation of the suspended MED.-Media programme. The ministers of foreign affairs of the countries participating in the conference emphasised the great importance of audio-visual cooperation in realising the goals of the third basket of the Barcelona Process. The programme's main premises were defined at a meeting of high-ranking bureaucrats in Thessaloniki in November 1997 and included development of cooperation between the media, film producers, film distributors and owners of cinemas, as well as exchanges of experience and transfers of the most modern technology. This cooperation was supposed to contribute to building and deepening mutual understanding between European, Arab and Jewish societies. In 1998, the European Commission announced a competition for projects of audio-visual cooperation, and in 2000-2005 six of the proposals were realised. They were: Euromediatoon-Viva Carthago, Europa Cinemas, Capmed, Women...Pioneers, Cinemamed and Medea. The aim of the programmes, which ended in 2005, was to acquaint the societies of the partner countries with the creativity of different cultures. 18 million euros were allocated from the MEDA programme for the projects' realisation.²⁸⁵ In the years 2005-2009 a second phase of the programme was implemented. The EU gave 15 million euros for the realisation of a dozen projects, in four areas: 1) training for filmmakers and persons working in the media (the programmes Audiovisual Financing and Commercialisation, Mediterranean Film Business School, EurodocMed, Mediterranean Films Crossing Borders, Berlinale Talent Campus, Insight Out, Génération Grand Ecran 2006); 2) development of cinematography (the programmes Meda Films Development and The Greenhouse); 3) mutual promotion of films in

²⁸⁴ <http://www.euromedheritage.net>

²⁸⁵ <http://www.euromedaudiovisuel.net>

member countries of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the programmes Med Screen, The Caravan of Euro-Arab Cinema); and 4) increasing the ability of the countries of the SEMCs to manage the audio-visual sector and resolve new challenges in this area, such as media piracy (the programme Euromed Cinemas).²⁸⁶

The Information and Communication Programme was created by a decision of the ministers of foreign affairs of EMP members at Valencia in April 2002. It was begun in 2004 and its aim was to increase knowledge about relations between the EU and its neighbouring countries, chiefly through supporting the media and developing cooperation with them. The EU allocated 22 million euros to this goal (10 million for the first stage and 12 million for the second). In 2010, four projects were realised: Media Activities: Maximising EU Presence in the Region's Media; Communications Multiplier Activities: Training and Network Building; Information and Communication Support and Media Monitoring Project; and the Strategic Communications Research and Analysis: Opinion Research and Polling Project.²⁸⁷ In the history of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, it was not the first programme of its type. At the beginning of the nineties the MED.-Media project was engaged in promoting cooperation between public and private communications institutions. It supported training projects, seminars and conferences for television, radio and press personnel, and co-financed joint film productions. By 1998, 31 projects had been financed from MED.-Media projects.²⁸⁸

Next, the Euromed Youth Programme was established by a decision of the Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process as a pilot programme for the years 1999-2001. It involved youth exchanges and cooperation between the European countries and the SEMCs, for the purpose of increasing mutual understanding between them and gradually developing civil society and promoting the principles of democracy and human rights. Because the programme and the results of its activities were positively appraised, it was extended. 14 million euros were allocated to the programme in the years 2002-2004, and 5 million euros in 2005-2008.²⁸⁹

Another of the significant elements of the third basket was the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures, which was established in 2005 on the basis of a decision taken in 2003 in Naples. The Foundation's importance was confirmed in the five-year action plan adopted in November 2005, and in the Paris Declaration it was stated that the Foundation would cooperate in realising the aims of the UN Alliance of Civilizations.

²⁸⁶ <http://www.euromediaudiovisuel.net>

²⁸⁷ <http://www.enpi-info.eu>

²⁸⁸ Maurizio Giammusso, *Civil Society Initiatives and Prospects of Economic Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Decentralized Co-operation Networks...*, p. 29.

²⁸⁹ <http://www.euromedyouth.net>

The Foundation began to operate in April 2005, and was composed of 43 countries. Its headquarters are in Alexandria. The President of the Foundation became a Moroccan, André Azoulay. The foundation undertakes activities in six priority areas:

- ideas and ideologies – serving to increase social acceptance for cultural, social and humanitarian activities in the Euro-Mediterranean region
- education aimed at preparing the individual for life in a culturally diverse society, making rational appraisals of his or her surroundings and being tolerant
- cultural productions, using music, film, literature and art to promote various cultural values and changes of viewpoint
- media – activities to establish the media's positive role in transmitting reliable information and creating the possibility for opinions to be expressed
- religion and values – promoting diverse religious values
- cities – activities to promote tolerance for cultural diversity in cities where national minorities from different cultures constitute a large percentage of the population.²⁹⁰

Since 2006, in accordance with the guidelines of the Barcelona Process, the Foundation has annually award a prize for the promotion of dialogue and understanding.²⁹¹

The Euromed Civil Forum was another institution that was intended to contribute to understanding between societies of the countries involved in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Dialogue between representatives of civil society began in 1995.²⁹² In April 2005 at a meeting in Luxembourg, the representatives of 350 social groups and non-government organisations from 42 countries established the Euromed Non-Governmental Platform.²⁹³ In November 2006, at a meeting in Marrakesh under its auspices, the representatives of various social organisations from the countries participating in the EMP adopted a declaration setting forth the sphere of interests of the Euromed Civil Forum. The representatives emphasised that they would concentrate on the issues of peace and preventing conflict, migration and freedom of movement, democracy and human rights, sustainable development and the effective participation of citizens in the political decision-making process. In principle, the Forum is to act as a pressure group, through the proposal of

²⁹⁰ <http://www.euromedalex.org>.

²⁹¹ *Euro-Med. Award for Dialogue between Cultures*, <http://www.euromedalex.org/euromed-award/home> (November 2009).

²⁹² See more: Annette Jünemann, *The Forum Civil Euromed: Critical Watchdog and Inter-cultural Mediator*, in: Stefania Panebianco (ed.), *A New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Cultural Identity*, Frank Cass, London 2003, pp. 84–107.

²⁹³ *Final Declaration of the Luxembourg Euromed Civil Forum*, 3 April 2005, Luxembourg, <http://www.euromedplatform.org> (June 2009).

specific resolutions. The sum the EU allocates for the activity of this institution has been set every year by the EU presidency.²⁹⁴

An important element of intercultural dialogue has also been cooperation in the sphere of education and research. In 2003, Italy, which had the EU presidency during the second half of the year, proposed the establishment of a common Mediterranean space for higher education and the development of science. In undertaking this initiative, known as the Catania Process (from the name of the town in which it was proposed) the EU has participated in creating academic centres for the meeting of academics, researchers and students. They have been located in, among other places, Catania, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Greece and in the Palestinian Territories. As part of the developing cooperation in this sphere, in June 2007 the first Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference on the subject of higher education and scientific development took place in Cairo. The ministers decided to create a Euro-Mediterranean region of higher education and scientific research and expressed support for the idea of creating a Euro-Mediterranean University. Its activities were inaugurated in June 2008 in Piran (in Slovenia).²⁹⁵

The development of cooperation in the area of higher education was also furthered by the programmes Tempus and Erasmus Mundus.²⁹⁶

The EU's activities were not accepted by the partner countries uncritically. In the opinion of decision-makers in the Arab countries it was not possible to speak of intercultural dialogue without a freer exchange of societies. Without freedom of movement it would be difficult to achieve significant progress in implementing the premises of the Barcelona Process.²⁹⁷ Intercultural dialogue can not limit itself to the cooperation of experts or the organisation of exhibitions but must occur through mutual respect for cultural differences.²⁹⁸ As Egypt's representative stated, at the inauguration of the European Year of Cultural Dialogue, real dialogue between cultures requires a change in the policies of European countries in relation to immigrants and national minorities, the preservation of a balance between freedom of speech and respect for the rights of 'Others' and the responsibility of governments to protect social cohesion by considering the rights of all society's components. He also emphasised that western Europe had committed two serious mistakes in the past in relation to immigrants and national minorities: first, it had not adopted proper

²⁹⁴ <http://90plan.ovh.net>

²⁹⁵ *Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education & Research Area. First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Higher Education and Scientific Research, Cairo, 18 June 2007*, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/social/education_en.htm (June 2009).

²⁹⁶ <http://www.enpi-info.eu> (June 2009).

²⁹⁷ *Intervention de Monsieur le Ministre d'etat, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, Tampere, 28 novembre 2006*, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2009).

²⁹⁸ *Intervention de Monsieur le Ministre d'etat, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, Tampere, 28 novembre 2006*, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2009).

policies for them, particularly in the sixties and seventies, when large groups of immigrants flowed into Europe, and second, it did not make adequate use of financial measures to help these groups, which deepened the economic and cultural differences between the immigrants and the native Europeans.

3. Conclusion

In 1993-2010 the EU performed the role of promoter of democratic values, human rights and intercultural dialogue in the Mediterranean region. Built on such values as freedom, democracy, dignity and good governance, the EU has undertaken to disseminate these ideas in its partner countries. The EU's activities in this sphere have also resulted from the fact that it tries to recompense for its lack of a strong military component with soft influence.

The EU has declared its desire to democratize the countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean in a dual fashion: through influencing decision-makers (the top-down approach) and through supporting non-governmental initiatives and building civil society (the bottom-up approach). Since the beginning of the nineties, the EU has established and financially supported many projects to improve the public administration of partner countries, increase the participation of non-governmental organisations in creating state policy and increase the participation of women in all spheres of social life. It has also established and supported many initiatives to develop intercultural dialogue and increase intercultural understanding. These have included cooperation between the media and representatives of civil society, students and scientists. A programme of joint protection of Euro-Mediterranean cultural heritage and the activities of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures were also important elements in the intercultural dialogue.

However, the EU's declarations about its intention to play, intensively, the role of promoter of democratic values and human rights were only limitedly realised. The EU's policy has been characterised by considerable lack of cohesion and consistency. On the one hand, the EU declared that it would augment its activities to promote democracy and human rights in the Arab countries and intercultural dialogue. On the other, fearing to weaken regimes in the Arab countries, with the consequent destabilisation, it did not place any pressure on the decision-makers in those countries. It was very cautious in its support for non-governmental organisations as well, consistently avoiding cooperation with any sort of Islamic groups, even moderate ones.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁹ Compare: Francesco Galli, *The Legal and Political Implications of the Securitization of Counter-Terrorism Measures across the Mediterranean*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", No. 71, September 2008.

The specificity of the European Union's roles in the Mediterranean

The EU's roles in the Mediterranean region in 1993-2010 were not fundamentally different than those it played in other regions of the world. They were, however, different from the roles played in this region by other external actors. The EU treated the countries situated on the eastern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea as one region and implemented a unified policy toward it. The characteristics that differentiated the EU's roles from those of other external actors in the region were its institutionalisation of relations, the comprehensiveness of its activities, its policy of conditionality and its multilateralism (in the sense of cooperation with other institutions to realise priority goals). These traits appeared together. The specificity of the EU's roles in the Mediterranean region was closely related to its international position and identity.

1. The institutionalisation of relations with the SEMCs

One of the characteristics of the EU's roles in the Mediterranean region has been the institutionalisation of its relations with partner countries. At the turn of the eighties to nineties, when the Cold War was ending, the European Community, and particularly its southern European members, began to show increasing interest in developing cooperation with neighbours to the south. Spain and Italy proposed calling a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean region, on the pattern of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and when this idea did not meet with the interest of other European countries, they created, along with France, Portugal and Malta, the "5+5 Dialogue", which was a form of cooperation with the members of the Arab Maghreb Union. This institution was limited, however, in terms of its participants and range of cooperation; it concentrated primarily on political matters in the sphere of security. At the same time, the countries situated on the Mediterranean Sea took the first steps toward institutionalising

cooperation on environmental protection, particularly water resource management.

The EU's idea of inaugurating a multilateral and multifaceted form of cooperation had better success. The first joint mechanisms were created within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which was initiated in 1995. The most important forum for dialogue was considered to be the regular conferences of ministers of foreign affairs (Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conferences), and meetings of ministers, the heads of other departments and high-ranking officials. In 1995-2008 Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conferences were held ten times.

Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conferences, 1995-2008

Meeting place	Date
Barcelona	27-28 XI 1995
Valetta	15-16 IV 1997
Stuttgart	15-16 IV 1999
Marseille	15-16 XI 2000
Valencia	22-23 IV 2002
Naples	2-3 XII 2003
Luxembourg	30-31 V 2005
Tampere	27-28 XI 2006
Lisbon	5-6 XI 2007
Marseille	3-4 XI 2008

In addition, the ministers of foreign affairs met in Palermo (3-4 June 1998), in Brussels (5-6 October 2001), on Crete (26-27 May 2003), in Dublin (5-6 May 2004) and in The Hague (29-30 November 2004). Besides the conferences of ministers of foreign affairs, regular meetings were also held for other ministers: of industry, trade, finance, labour, tourism, health, science and education, and culture. Meetings for high-ranking officials also occurred.

The Barcelona Declaration also established a Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process, composed of the EU Troika and the partner states of the EU, to supervise implementation of its provisions. It was expected that contacts would be developed between the parliamentarians. The extent of this cooperation was institutionalised by a decision of the sixth Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference, in December 2003. On the basis of this decision the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly was formed. It was to have a consultative function and to work toward increasing

the transparency of the Barcelona Process and increasing cooperation between the countries participating in it.

Simultaneously, on the basis of Euro-Mediterranean association agreements, mechanisms of cooperation between the EU and individual member countries were established: the Association Council (representatives of the EU Council, the European Commission at the ministerial level, and members of the partner country's government), the Association Committee (representatives of the EU Council, the European Commission at the level of higher-ranking diplomats and ministers of foreign affairs of the partner countries), and working groups (composed of experts). Since 2003, the Association Council has begun to form subcommittees for human rights, democratisation and governance. The first such subcommittee was established in connection with EU-Morocco relations.

An essential decision in the area of institutionalising Euro-Mediterranean cooperation was taken in July 2008 at the Paris conference initiating the Union for the Mediterranean. The conference's participants' decided to raise the rank of the meetings by holding summits every two years at the level of heads of state and government (called the 'G-Med.' institution). It was agreed that the meetings of ministers of foreign affairs would take place once a year. The institution of a joint presidency was introduced, to be exercised by both the state holding the presidency of the EU Council and – on the side of the Mediterranean partners – by a state chosen by consensus for a period of two years, without the possibility of extending the term. The necessity of strengthening the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and continuing regular meetings at the level of higher-ranking officials was emphasised. It was decided to create two auxiliary institutions: a secretariat engaged in preparing proposals for projects and a permanent joint committee responsible for supporting the joint presidency in preparing meetings at the highest level. The modifications in 2008 of the previous arrangements were intended to increase the effectiveness of the operating mechanisms and encourage the EU's partner states to greater activity. The intergovernmental nature of the Union for the Mediterranean, in keeping with the premises of its originators – France, supported by other EU member countries – was supposed to contribute to greater equality between its members. In the new formula of cooperation the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, which in practice are unequal to the EU, were to possess equal status and be fully represented. The effect was supposed to be greater understanding between the EU and its partner states, and in consequence, more effective EU roles in the region.

In addition to creating institutions of cooperation at the highest level, the EU also works to institutionalise contacts at the level of local governments and to create a network of cooperation between non-governmental organisations. These include the EuroMeSCo Institution, a cooperative network between

research institutions specialising in analysing international relations; the Malta seminars, i.e., training for diplomats from the EU and southern and eastern Mediterranean countries in the sphere of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and European institutions; the Euromed Civil Forum; the Euromed Non-Governmental Platform – a dialogue between representatives of civil society; a yearly conference of experts on the subject of improving conditions for the operation of small and medium-size businesses; and many other forms of cooperation, financed from EU funds.

2. The comprehensiveness of activities

In 1995, the EU adopted a strategy of comprehensive activity in regard to the Mediterranean region. After the end of the Cold War, the European Commission began to weigh redefining relations with countries of the eastern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea, which it had been developing since the seventies.³⁰⁰ From the beginning it was obvious that the new strategy would encompass the previous economic and financial aspects of cooperation. However, in connection with the dynamic development of new challenges and threats to international security, it quickly became clear that the EU's new approach should take these into account. A demilitarized understanding of security³⁰¹ and growing fears about the negative consequences of Islamic fundamentalism, illegal migration and degradation of the natural environment, convinced EU decision-makers of the need to set forth a comprehensive operating strategy. Thus, at the conference held in 1995 in Barcelona, the EU proposed multifaceted cooperation to twelve Mediterranean partners. Patterned on the Final Act of the CSCE, the Barcelona Declaration distinguished three baskets of cooperation: political and security; economic and financial; and cultural, social and humanitarian.

The foundations of the second basket, pertaining to economic matters, were worked out in the most detail. In the EU's opinion, lessening the economic divide between the EU member states and the partner countries and improving living conditions for the latter's inhabitants would decrease the migration pressure on western Europe, make the anti-Western slogans of Islamic fundamentalists unattractive and additionally stabilize the market for European goods. Furthermore, introducing a well-functioning free market was supposed to contribute to liberalisation of the region's authoritarian regimes

³⁰⁰ Eberhard Rhein, *La politique méditerranéenne de la Communauté Européenne*, "Confluences Méditerranée", n° 7, été 1993, pp. 33-41.

³⁰¹ Barry Buzan, *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era*, Printer Publishers, London 1990; Ryszard Zięba, *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego, koncepcje – struktury – funkcjonowanie*, Wyd. czwarte, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2004.

and introduce democratic principles.³⁰² In order to accelerate this process, the EU simultaneously declared it would work toward building democratic systems in its partner countries, in accord with its general strategy that transforming the Mediterranean into a region of peace, stability and prosperity would not occur without democracy and respect for human rights.³⁰³ Realisation of this goal would be unusually advantageous from Europe's viewpoint. The policies of the region's states would become more predictable and peaceful, and their internal political and economic situations would improve, which would lessen the rapid growth of the region's challenges and threats to European security.

Political cooperation in the area of security, economics and finance, as well as in the cultural, social and humanitarian spheres, were treated as one whole, as necessary to reach the same goal of bringing peace and prosperity to the region. In consequence, the EU has striven to play the role of the region's stabilizer through partial roles: an active player in the Middle East peace process; a promoter of confidence-building measures, security and disarmament; a promoter of market reforms and sustainable development in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, and also a propagator of democratic values, human rights and intercultural dialogue.

The EU's concept of a complete and comprehensive approach was maintained and reflected in many documents. The priorities changed, however. While the original premise of the EMP was the simultaneous realisation of all aspects of cooperation, the largest place was actually occupied by economic questions, after the terrorist attacks on Washington D.C. and New York (in September 2001), Madrid (in March 2004) and London (in July 2005), the EU began to realise programmes to counter illegal migration and international terrorism. The EU's lack of success in introducing a Euro-Mediterranean charter of peace and stability resulted in its decreased promotion of the idea of introducing confidence-building measures and partnership. It concentrated instead on the two most important aspects of security for itself – migration and terrorism.

The priorities adopted by the Union for the Mediterranean, which was established in July 2008, were protection of the natural environment, the establishment of marine and land highways, civilian protection during natural and man-made disasters, work on the development of solar energy, development of scientific cooperation, and support for the development of the private

³⁰² Eberhard Kienle, *Destabilization Through Partnership?* "Euro-Mediterranean Relations After the Barcelona Declaration," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 1998.

³⁰³ Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998; Richard Youngs, *The European Union and Democracy in the Arab-Muslim World*, "CEPS Middle East & Euro-Med Working Paper", No. 2, November 2002. See also: Paul J. Kubicek (ed.), *The European Union and Democratization*, Routledge, London, New York 2003.

sector, chiefly small and medium-size businesses. These goals, like the institutions of the Union for the Mediterranean, have not replaced the previous forms and aims of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, but are complementary.

3. The policy of conditionality

One of the characteristics of the EU's external policy is the policy of conditionality, i.e., making aid, usually financial or technical, dependent on the recipient's degree of implementation of certain criteria. After World War II, these conditions were limited to economic and financial issues.³⁰⁴ With the end of the Cold War, the conditions ceased to be strictly economic and were widened to such requirements as respect for human rights, the organisation of free and unhindered elections, good governance and a decrease in military expenditure.³⁰⁵ In the beginning, the conditions were chiefly negative, consisting in the use of sanctions, penalties and the suspension or withdrawal of aid when the state did not realise the conditions presented to it. In a later period, positive conditions were also formed, which consisted in encouraging and rewarding states for effective fulfilment of the requirements.³⁰⁶

The evolution of the policy of conditionality also involved the activities of the EU towards third states. During the Cold War the policy was limited to economic stipulations. The EU required the functioning of a democratic political system, in which human rights are fully respected, only from candidate countries.³⁰⁷ In relations with third countries, not candidates for

³⁰⁴ Karen E. Smith, *The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?*, "European Foreign Affairs Review", Vol. 3, No. 2, 1998; Olav Stokke, *Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of Art*, in: Olav Stokke (ed.), *Aid and Political Conditionality*, Frank Cass, London 1995, pp. 377-400; Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Compliance and Conditionality*, "ARENA Working Paper", WP 00/18; Elena Fierro, *The EU's Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice*, Kluwer, The Hague 2003. Dorothee Schmid, *The Use of Conditionality in Support of Political, Economic and Social Rights: Unveiling the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership's True Hierarchy of Objectives?*, "Mediterranean Politics", Vol. 9, No. 3, Autumn 2004.

³⁰⁵ Gordon Crawford, *Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Inconsistency*, "Democratization", 1997, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 69-108; Peter Uvin, Isabelle Biagiotti, *Global Governance and the >>New Political<< Conditionality*, "Global Governance", Vol. 2, No. 3, 1996, pp. 377-400.

³⁰⁶ Dorothee Schmid, *Interlinkages within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Linking Economic, Institutional and Political Reform: Conditionality within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", No. 27, December 2003, p. 13; Amichai Magen, Leonardo Morlino, *The Rule of Law, and External Influence on Domestic Change*, in: Amichai Magen, Leonardo Morlino (ed.), *International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law. Anchoring Democracy?*, Routledge, London, New York 2009, pp. 1-25.

³⁰⁷ Compare: Der-Chin Horng, *The Human Rights Clause in the European Union's External Trade and Development Agreements*, "European Law Journal", Vol. 9, No. 5, 2003, pp. 677-701.

membership, the question of human rights appeared in the policy of the EU already in the Lomé Convention of 1989.³⁰⁸ Gradually, however, along with the deepening and broadening of European integration, the necessity of observing democratic principles and human rights became one of the most important conditions in relation to the EU's partner countries. The association agreements signed in 1991 with the former states of the eastern bloc – Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary – contained the explicit requirement that these countries introduce the rule of law, respect for human rights, a multi-party system, and free and unhindered elections. In June 1991, the European Council adopted a declaration which confirmed the importance of respecting democratic principles and human rights by third countries.³⁰⁹ These values were then entered in the Treaty of Maastricht and were repeated in the succeeding documents constituting the European Union.

From the beginning, the policy of conditionality in the EU was positive in nature ('positive conditionality'). This resulted from the convictions of experts and European decision-makers that the use of negative methods, in the form of sanctions or penalties, is considerably less effective than positive methods. The weakness of the EU, which is only limitedly able to apply negative methods, also contributed to its adoption of this approach. Working out a compromise between the EU member states toward third countries is easier in the case of using positive methods than negative ones.³¹⁰ Furthermore, it is true that a policy of sanctions would have a chance of being effective only if it were adopted by other non-regional actors.

The EU used its policy of conditionality toward the countries of the eastern and southern Mediterranean in the years 1993-2010. In articles 2 and 5 of the regulation on the MEDA programme, the guidelines for granting aid were set forth. They were the following: the priorities of the states-beneficiaries, their ability to absorb financial aid, progress in implementing structural reforms, the effectiveness of the measures taken to achieve stability and prosperity.³¹¹ Article 3 stated, on the other hand, the necessity for respecting democratic

³⁰⁸ Annette Jünemann, *Democratization – Reflections on the Political Dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, in: Peter G. Xuereb (ed.), *The Mediterranean's European Challenge*, European Documentation and Research Center, University of Malta, La Valetta 1998.

³⁰⁹ *European Council. Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg 28-29 June 1991*, 2/07/91, PE 151.797; Paul Magnette, Kalyso Nicolaïdis, *The European Union's Democratic Agenda*, in: Mario Telò (ed.), *The European Union and Global Governance*, Routledge, London 2009, pp. 43-63.

³¹⁰ Compare: Erwan Lannon, Kirstyn Inglis, Tom Haenelbacke, *The many faces of EU Conditionality in Pan-Euro Mediterranean Relations*, in: Marc Maresceau, Erwan Lannon (ed.), *The EU's Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies*, Macmillan, London 2000, pp. 97-138.

³¹¹ *Rozporządzenie Rady (WE) nr 1488/96 z dnia 23 lipca 1996 r. w sprawie środków finansowych i technicznych (MEDA) towarzyszących reformom struktur gospodarczych i społecznych w ramach partnerstwa eurośroziemnomorskiego*, „Official Journal of European Communities”, L 189, 30.07.1996, pp. 1-9.

principles, the rule of law, human rights and basic freedoms. Granting aid within the MEDA programme was thus dependent on progress in economic liberalisation, democratisation and respect for human rights, and effective use of the awarded funds.

In all the association agreements as well, it was confirmed that the countries were obliged to observe democratic principles and human rights. Article 2, which was the same in every association agreement, states that 'Respect for the democratic principles and fundamental human rights established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall inspire the domestic and international policies of the Parties and shall constitute an essential element of this Agreement.' The final articles of the agreement also state the possibility of taking appropriate measures in case the provisions are not observed. These, however, are less specific. The EU or its partner state is only allowed to suspend the agreement, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Treaty Law of May 1969.³¹²

The 'policy of conditionality' was also taken into account in the European Neighbourhood Policy. States for which the EU declares its assistance are obliged to introduce democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the introduction of a free market economy, and to counter terrorism.³¹³ In actuality, however, the ENP did not introduce any mechanism to ensure the conditions are met. The action plan guidelines within the framework of the ENP, like the Euro-Mediterranean association agreements, do not provide any specific means or methods that could be used by the EU in the case of the non-compliance of their partner countries (negative conditionality) or in a situation where a state is unusually effective in introducing them (positive conditionality). In 2005, the EU introduced 'positive conditionality' through the Governance Facility mechanism, but it was not used to a very large degree.

In practice thus, in the case of the EU's roles in the Mediterranean region, the strategy of 'conditionality' has been limited chiefly to formal provisions. A partner country's lack of progress in introducing democracy and human rights has not entailed any tangible measures on the part of the EU. It has limited itself solely to criticisms. The sense of 'conditioned actions' has thus remained in question. Furthermore, the lack of consequence to the EU's actions has evoked consternation among its partner countries. When the EU, having advertised the ideas of democracy, quickly withdrew its recognition for the government of Hamas, which was established on the basis of the free and democratic elections of 2006, the Arab countries decided that the EU

³¹² Schmid, *Interlinkages within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership...*, p. 17.

³¹³ Elena Baracani, *The European Union and Democracy Promotion: a Strategy of Democratization in the Framework of the Neighborhood*, in: Fulvio Attinà, Rosa Rossi (eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues*, The Jean Monnet Centre "Euro-Med", Department of Political Studies, Catania 2004.

was an unreliable partner, acting contrary to its previous declarations and solely in its own interest.

4. Multilateralism as a method of international action

Forming relations through cooperation is an element of the EU's identity. The EU continually relies on cooperation, based on compromise, in forming its internal policy. Gradually, cooperation has also become one of the characteristics of its external policy. In the opinion of EU decision-makers, multilateralism, understood as cooperation with other actors in international relations, is the best manner of tackling and resolving contemporary international problems.³¹⁴ In essence, as a civilian power lacking a strong military component, the EU is significantly more inclined to cooperate with others than is a traditional power, whose strength rests mainly on military might.³¹⁵ Realising the goals of foreign policy through cooperation with other actors is, in the case of the EU, fully rational, as it contributes to strengthening the multi-polar international order.

'Effective multilateralism' was clearly set forth as the EU's mode of proceeding in the European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003, but in actuality the method was used earlier, and its inclusion in the security strategy was closely related with the policy of unilateralism conducted by the United States during the presidency of George W. Bush.³¹⁶ The strategy consists in acting together with other entities in international relations, including the EU's largest partners – the USA, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Japan and Canada³¹⁷ – and also with international organisations such as NATO, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Mercosur, ASEAN, the World Trade Organisation and the African Union. An unusually important place in the EU's multilateralism is occupied by the United Nations and its agencies. It is written in the European Security Strategy that 'Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.' The EU should

³¹⁴ See more: Joachim Krause, *Multilateralism: Behind European Views*, „Washington Quarterly”, 2004, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 43-59.

³¹⁵ See also: Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, Knopf 2003.

³¹⁶ On multilateralism in EU foreign policy see more: Knud Erik Jørgensen, *A multilateral Role for the EU*, in: Ole Elgström, Michael Smith (eds.), *The European Union's Roles in International Politics. Concepts and Analysis*, Routledge, London 2006, pp. 30-46.

³¹⁷ See more: Giovanni Grevi, Álvaro de Vasconcelos (eds.), *Partnership for Effective Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia*, „Chaillot Paper”, No. 109, May 2008; Martin Ortega, *Building the Future: the EU's Contribution to Global Governance*, „Chaillot Paper”, No. 100, April 2007.

support the United Nations in the actions it takes 'in confronting threats to international peace and security.' In practice, the cooperation of the EU and the UN consists not only of matters involving peace and international security, but also economic, social, humanitarian, cultural and ecological questions.³¹⁸

In the documents describing EU policy toward the Mediterranean region and in those adopted within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, it is repeatedly stated that the EU will work with other external actors, particularly the UN and USA, to realise its goals and will try to ensure the maximum cohesiveness of its initiatives with those of other entities. In reality, it most often cooperates with the United Nations and its agencies, and in the case of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the United States.

The EU has systematically and consistently declared its desire to cooperate with other actors striving to achieve a just and lasting resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. EU representatives have repeatedly emphasised that the EU does not pretend to play the role of sole mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but tries to help the sides to decrease the differences existing between them, in a manner satisfactory to themselves.³¹⁹ From the beginning of the nineties the EU has participated in international diplomatic activities to achieve a peace agreement between the parties to the conflict. In 1991, the representatives of the European Community were present, as observers, at the Madrid Conference which began the Middle East peace process. In a later period, the EU took part in negotiations for the Hebron Agreement, signed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority in 1997. In 2002, along with the United States, the United Nations and Russia, it became a member of the Middle East Quartet, whose aim was to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

In addition, the Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process, Miguel Moratinos and then Marc Otte, cooperated with representatives of the US and the UN, and with decision-makers from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates.³²⁰ In 2007, the EU supported Washington's

³¹⁸ On EU-UN cooperation see more: Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister, Tom Ruys (eds.), *The United Nations and the European Union: an Ever Stronger Partnership*, TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2006, Martin Ortega (ed.), *The European Union and the United Nations. Partners in Effective Multilateralism*, "Chaillot Paper", No. 78, June 2005; Maximilian B. Rasch, *The European Union at the United Nations. The Functioning and Coherence of EU External representation in a State-centric Environment*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden Boston: 2008; Katie Verlin Laatikainen, Karen E. Smith (ed.), *The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting multilateralism*, Palgrave, Basingstoke 2006.

³¹⁹ *The evolution of European Common Foreign and Security Policy. Conference in the Helmut Kohl Institute for European Studies on January 11, 1998*, (URL < <http://consilium.europa.eu/>, June 2009).

³²⁰ Giovanni Grevi, *Pioneering Foreign Policy: The EU Special Representatives*, „Chaillot Paper”, No. 106, October 2007.

initiative to organise a peace conference in Annapolis and took part in it. Since January 2009, it has also supported the peace initiatives of President Barack Obama's administration.³²¹

In playing the role of participant in creating the structures of the Palestinian state and donor of development and humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, the EU is also regularly cooperating with other actors. In the nineties, it played a major role in the work of the multilateral groups established at the Madrid Conference; it headed REDWG. Since 1993, the EU has been a member of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), which was established at the Washington Conference on 1 October 1993, when it was decided to grant financial aid to the Palestinians. This institution was set up by the Multilateral Steering Group and its tasks are:

- coordinating international financial aid for Palestinians and serving as a forum for dialogue for donors
- promoting transparency in the actions of the aid donors and recipients
- working to accelerate the development of the private sector and investment in the Palestinian Autonomous Territories
- monitoring the development of the Palestinian economy
- reviewing reports submitted by the secretariat
- encouraging the sides to the conflict to implement the economic aspects of the Declaration of Principles.

Besides the EU's representation, the Committee was joined by representatives of Canada, Japan, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United States. The members of the AHLC association are Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and the United Nations. The function of Committee secretariat is performed by the World Bank.

In June 2006, at the request of the Middle East Quartet and in cooperation with the World Bank, the EU created the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) to transfer financial aid to Palestinian society, by-passing the Palestinian Authority. The PEGASE programme, which followed the TIM, was managed by the EU and was open to all actors wishing to give aid to the Palestinians. This mechanism was complementary to the trust fund managed by the World Bank, which handles the finances granted the Palestinians at the international conference held in Paris in December 2007. Transferring financial aid to the Palestinians is coordinated by the above-mentioned international committee, the AHLC. In the question of humanitarian aid, the EU works closely with the UN Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), non-governmental organisations, and the Red Cross and Red Crescent. As Anne Le More has said, in the majority of cases the process of granting international financial

³²¹ Justyna Zając, *EU-US in the Middle East peace efforts: to What Extent Cooperation?*, in: Andrzej Mania, Paweł Laidler, Łukasz Wordliczek (eds.), *US Foreign Policy: Theory, Mechanism and Practice*, Wydawnictwo UJ, Kraków 2007, pp. 235-248.

aid to the Palestinians happens as follows: the US decides, the World Bank organises, the EU pays, and the UN delivers.³²²

In matters of confidence building, security and disarmament in the Mediterranean region, the EU chiefly works with agencies of the United Nations.³²³ In September 2003, the EU signed a declaration with the UN establishing cooperation on conflict prevention and crisis management, chiefly in areas of planning and mutual communication. In October 2004, the EU concluded an agreement concerning cooperation and coordination in countering the effects of humanitarian disasters. In December 2005, it reached an agreement with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) on cooperation in preventing and countering the effects of natural and man-made disasters.³²⁴ Common activities were undertaken in July 2006 in Lebanon, when an oil spill contaminated the sea coast.

In terms of monitoring the situation on the Mediterranean Sea, chiefly in countering illegal migration and organised crime and for civilian protection, the EU also cooperates, although limitedly, with NATO and the United States. Greater cooperation with the United States could also occur through the Union for the Mediterranean. Unlike the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the UfM is intergovernmental in nature and concentrates on questions within the United States' sphere of interest (for instance, energy matters and civil protection).³²⁵ The Mediterranean region as a whole has not and does not occupy a strategic place in US foreign policy. Washington's interests are concentrated solely on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and chiefly on the Persian Gulf; its interests are specific issues and problems (the Arab-Israeli conflict, the unresolved question of Cyprus, the dispute over the Western Sahara, energy questions and civil protection).

The EU plays its role of promoter of market reforms and sustainable development in the Mediterranean region in cooperation with international financial institutions, as well as with the United Nations Environment Programme. Its actions are in accord with the Millennium Goals for development adopted by the UN in September 2000.³²⁶ In playing this role, the EU is guided by the

³²² Anne Le More, *Killing with Kindness: Funding the Demise of a Palestinian State*, "International Affairs", Vol. 81, No. 5, October 2005.

³²³ Marija Teresa Gil-Bazo, *The Practice of Mediterranean States in the Context of the European Union's Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension. The Safe Third Country Concept Revisited*, "International Journal of Refugee Law", Vol. 18, No. 3-4, March 2006, pp. 571-600.

³²⁴ Niklas Bremberg, Ahmed Driss, Jakob Horst, Eduard Solter I Lecha, Isabelle Werenfels, *Flexible Multilateralism: Unlimited Opportunities? The Case of Civil Protection in the Mediterranean*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", No. 80, February 2009.

³²⁵ Roberto Aliboni, Fouad M. Ammor, *Under the Shadow of 'Barcelona': From the EMP to the Union for the Mediterranean*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", No. 77, January 2009.

³²⁶ Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska, *Perspektywy świata arabskiego w kontekście Milenijnych Celów Rozwoju*, Wydawnictwo Petit, Warszawa 2007.

rules and norms set forth by the United Nations and its specialised organisations, as well as by the international economic institutions to which its member countries belong and with which it cooperates. These are chiefly the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The EU also cooperates with the UN on the region's sustainable development, i.e., mainly in terms of the natural environment. The most important guidelines in this area are the provisions of the Barcelona Convention and the six additional protocols elaborated under the auspices of the UN Environmental Programme; they form the only binding legal agreement on environmental protection in the Mediterranean region³²⁷. The SMAP programme³²⁸ and LIFE – 3C³²⁹ are closely related with these guidelines.

In November 2005, the European Commission and the body responsible for implementing the Mediterranean Action Plan signed an agreement for cooperation on environmental protection.³³⁰ The EU also contributed to the adoption, at a meeting of signatories of the Barcelona Convention in Portoroz (Slovenia) of the Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development.

The EU also joined the Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance Programme (METAP), created in 1989. METAP brings together the largest

³²⁷ The Convention for the Protection against Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea, called the Barcelona Convention, was signed on 16 February 1976 and entered into force on 12 February 1978. It was signed by 21 Mediterranean states (the Palestinian Authority did not sign). The additional protocols to the Convention were signed on 16 February 1976, 17 May 1980, 2 April 1982, 14 October 1994 and 1 October 1996. The aim of the Barcelona Convention – protection of the natural environment of the Mediterranean Sea and sustainable development in the region – are realised through the Mediterranean Action Plan. The Barcelona Convention was modified at a meeting on 9-10 June 1995, and the modifications went into force in 2004.

³²⁸ More on SMAP see chapter VI.

³²⁹ The LIFE Programme was created by the European Communities in 1992 and functioned to 2006. LIFE-3 C operated within its framework and was aimed at states that were not members of the European Communities. 80% of the funds from this programme were allocated to countries of the southern and eastern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea. *Report on the first five years of implementation of SMAP (1997-2001)*, Office for Official Publications of the European Community, Luxembourg, June 2002.

³³⁰ The decision to create such a strategy was taken during the twelfth conference of the state signatories of the Barcelona Convention, which took place in November 2001 in Morocco. The conference's participants – 21 Mediterranean states and the European Union – requested the Mediterranean Commission for Sustainable Development (MCSD), operating within the framework of the Mediterranean Action Plan, to prepare the project. The move was supported by the ministers of the environment of EMP member states during a conference in Athens in July 2002. *Work Programme of Cooperation between the MAP Coordinating Unit and the European Commission Concerning the Strengthening of Cooperation between the MAP Coordinating Unit and the European Commission in the Field of Environment*, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/pdf/map_joint_work_prog.pdf/, June 2009.

donors of financial aid for environmental protection in the Mediterranean region (the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, the UN Development Programme, Finland and Switzerland are also members of METAP), and its task is to coordinate investment in environmental protection in the region.

The EU plays its role of propagator of democratic values, human rights and intercultural dialogue through the achievements of international law in these respects. Both in the documents adopted unilaterally by the EU and those adopted within the framework of the Barcelona Process, the guidelines concerning democratisation and human rights are based on international conventions developed under the auspices of the United Nations Organisation, the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. However, because the EU's role as a promoter of democracy and human rights in states of the eastern and southern Mediterranean is limited, its cooperation with other entities in this sphere is also not large.³³¹

5. Conclusion

The specificity of EU roles in the Mediterranean in 1993-2010 resulted primarily from its international identity and appeared in its institutionalisation of relations with partner states of the region, the comprehensiveness of its activities, its 'policy of conditionality', and multilateralism as a method of operation. These elements also appeared in EU policy toward other regions of the world, but in the case of the Mediterranean they were considerably marked. The EU's combined treatment of its roles has differentiated them from those of any state in the Mediterranean region; no state has treated the countries situated on southern and eastern costs of Mediterranean as one region and none has realised such a comprehensive policy toward them as the EU.

From the moment the EU initiated a wide programme of cooperation with the SEMCs in 1995, the first common institutions were formed: regular ministerial conferences, meetings of higher-ranking officials, the parliamentary assembly, and networks of cooperation between experts in various areas and representatives of civil society. The Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process was also established. It was composed of the EU Troika and the partner Mediterranean states. The institutional dimension was strengthened by a decision at the Paris Conference in July 2008, during which the Union for the Mediterranean was established.

³³¹ Dorotée Schmid, Fares Braizat, *The Adaptation of EU and US Democracy Promotion Programmes to the Local Political Context in Jordan and Palestine and Their Relevance to Grand Geopolitical Design*, „EuroMeSCo Paper”, No. 50, October 2006; Thomas Carothers, Marina Ottaway, *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC 2005.

The EU has also realised a strategy of comprehensive action, on the premise that it is the only method of forming the Mediterranean into an area of peace, stability and prosperity. In consequence, the EU declared and performed several roles simultaneously: a promoter of peace and confidence-building measures, disarmament, market reforms and sustainable regional development; a propagator of democracy, human rights and intercultural dialogue. At the same time, it taken on the role of active player in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, correctly considering that without a permanent end to the dispute, peace and development in the Mediterranean region will not be possible. These general roles have been realised through partial roles.

The EU has declared to play the above-mentioned roles through the use of a 'policy of conditionality', consisting in making aid to a partner state dependent on its realisation of the EU's political and economic guidelines. In practice, however, the policy has stayed largely declarative in nature. The EU has not made use of any 'negative conditionality' and in consequence has not taken any specific actions in relation to partner states that have not observed democratic principles, or have violated human rights or are too dilatory in introducing economic reforms. It has not used 'positive conditionality' much either. The expression of this phenomenon was the Governance Facility mechanism, that is, additional funds for EU partner countries that had made significant progress in democratisation and in constructing a system of human rights protection. The mechanism has been very limited in nature, however.

Multilateralism, understood as cooperation with other actors, has also been part of the specificity of the EU's roles in the Mediterranean region. The EU has declared that it will cooperate with other actors and will ensure the maximum cohesiveness of its actions with those other actors. In practice, in playing its declared roles in the Mediterranean region, the EU has cooperated most with the United Nations and its specialised organisations. Cooperation with the United States has also been important in the political dimension of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The EU, being aware that as a political actor it is still overshadowed by the US, works closely with it. It has also engaged in cooperation with other external actors, for instance, Russia, NATO and the Council of Europe, but these activities have been limited in nature, on account of the minor engagement of these entities in the Mediterranean region.

It is important to highlight that the multilateralism used by the EU as a mode of operating pertains in actuality to non-regional actors. The EU's declaration that it would form its cooperation with Mediterranean partner countries on their active or equal engagement has not in fact been honoured. Proposals submitted by the EU have often been unilateral in nature, without consultation with its partner countries. In the Arab countries this has produced the justified impression of unilateralism in the EU's foreign policy and the EU's lack of respect for the principle of partnership and equality. The effectiveness of the roles played by the EU has thus been negatively impacted.

The effectiveness of the EU's roles in the Mediterranean: the conflict between its declared, expected and performed roles

Analysing the effectiveness of the EU roles in the Mediterranean region, that is, its effectiveness in realising a set aims, is a difficult task. Many internal and external factors influence the progress or lack of progress in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, the process of building confidence, partnership and security, disarmament, sustainable development in the region, or the introduction of market reforms in the Arab countries and also their democratisation. The activities of the EU are just one factor among many. The aim of this chapter is not to make a comprehensive analysis of the complex changes occurring in the Mediterranean region and all the elements influencing them – that would require a separate work in itself. This chapter intends rather to evaluate the effectiveness of the EU's roles in the region in the years 1993-2010, through the prism of three factors: the rationality of the EU's concept of its roles (relates mainly to *declared roles*); the degree of their realisation, with particular consideration for the EU's consistency and ability in playing its declared roles (*performed roles*); and the level of acceptance among the region's states for the EU's roles (*expected roles*).

1. The rationality of the EU's concept of its roles

The EU's concept of its roles in the Mediterranean region, comprehensively described in the Barcelona Declaration, seems to be rational. The region has had many serious problems: the lack of democratic governments, the difficult economic and social situation, the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, the lack of developed cooperation between the states of the southern and eastern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea. For years, these have generated numerous challenges for, and threats to, European security, including, most importantly, illegal migration, terrorism, military threats and the increasing degradation of the natural environment. Resolving such problems requires many different means and methods, thus a comprehensive approach encompassing politi-

cal, economic and social activities seems reasonable. In the experience of the highly developed countries, it would seem that the best method for multifaceted improvement of a state and its society is the introduction of a free market economy, a democratic system and protection of human rights. The most effective method of increasing states' security, according to the premises of political liberalism, is the development of cooperation and agreement on multiple levels and the creation of new interdependences. In this context, the EU's declaration of playing many roles simultaneously – an active player in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament, a promoter of market reforms and sustainable regional development, a propagator of democratic values, human rights and intercultural dialogue – seemed to be the best strategy for transforming the region into an area of peace, stability and prosperity.

In the context of the EU identity, its concept of its roles in the Mediterranean region has also been rational. It assumed roles requiring the simultaneous application of political, economic and cultural instruments, and thus ones the EU, as a civil power, is able to use. The institutionalisation of relations with the partner countries, applying the policy of conditionality, and cooperation with other international actors (multilateralism) seems to be the right approach. It would also seem to have been rational to invite Israel and the Arab countries – Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority – states that strongly differ from one another, into one programme of cooperation. The concept of EU roles in the Mediterranean region was fully formulated in 1995, and thus at a time when the peace process in the Middle East was having its most success. In this situation, the EU's setting up a programme of multilateral cooperation, which included Israel and the Arab states, appeared to be a logical and justified proceeding. The EU considered that signing peacetime agreements at the highest level would enable the beginning of the process of building peace at various levels (inter-governmental and non-governmental) and in various areas (politics, economics, culture, etc.). This was the aim of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

After the breakdown of the peace process in the autumn of 2000, when there was a lack of prospect for the return of the sides to the negotiating table, the EU, increased in size by ten new members, supplemented its previous concepts by proclaiming the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004. The new formula did not eliminate the previous forms of cooperation, but was treated as a complementary initiative. To a greater degree than the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the ENP placed emphasis on the development of bilateral relations between the EU and its neighbours. This approach was the correct one, because it allowed not only the realisation of varying policies toward Israel and the Arab countries, but also the greater diversification of activities in regard to Arab countries, which were at different stages of advancement in their cooperation with the EU. The rationality of creating the

Union for the Mediterranean was rather doubtful. The significant increase in the territorial reach of the EU's roles through the inclusion of the Balkan states, Mauretania and Monaco was not, in essence, a very rational compromise.

Moreover, the EU's concept of its roles in the Mediterranean region was doubtless not fully rational in reference to the expectations of the region's states and their internal situations, particularly as regards the EU's role as promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament, and also its role as propagator of democratic values and human rights.

There was a fundamental divergence between the EU and its Mediterranean partner states as to the idea of introducing confidence-building measures, partnership and security, on account of their different understanding of security and entirely divergent security cultures. The EU adopted a very broad understanding of security and considered that in addition to military security there are other kinds, such as economic, energy, cultural, humanitarian or ecological security, etc.³³² Therefore, as was clearly confirmed in the European Security Strategy of December 2003, it considered terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts (including the Middle East conflict), failed states and organised crime to be the main threats to its security. In the document it is written that 'It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.'³³³ Security thus understood required the application of many means and methods. As it is written in the strategy, 'In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.'³³⁴

The Arab states and Israel have not shared the EU's views.³³⁵ The Arab-Israeli conflict, which has been ongoing for decades, causes them to attach

³³² According to Fulvio Attinà the security culture of the European countries is linked to three recent experiences that entailed regional cooperation: 1) the arms control negotiations of the Cold War and détente eras; 2) the Helsinki Process, with the three-decade long elaboration of new ideas and the formation of the mechanisms for comprehensive and cooperative security; and 3) the formulation of new defence policies in the 1990s to react to unexpected crises and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to countries and non-state actors insensitive to the conventional logic of military strategy. Fulvio Attinà, *Partnership and Security: Some Theoretical and Empirical Reasons for Positive Developments in the Euro-Mediterranean Area*, "Jean Monnet Working Paper", University of Catania, Italy, No. 27, 2000.

³³³ *A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy*, in: *From Copenhagen to Brussels. European defence: core documents* Vol. IV, compiled by Antonio Missiroli, „Chaillot Paper", No. 67, December 2003.

³³⁴ Ibidem.

³³⁵ See more: Attinà, op. cit.; Roberto Aliboni, Mohamed Salman Tayie, Reinhardt Rummel, Gunilla Herolf, Yasar Qatarnah, *Ownership and Co-Ownership in Conflict Prevention*

considerably greater importance to traditional methods of ensuring security, based on their own military forces. Furthermore, neither the Arab states, nor Israel, are members of a military alliance, while most of the European countries belong to NATO, which provides them with a firm guarantee of security.³³⁶ In the opinion of SEMCs, the priority activity should be resolution of the existing conflicts, and not the implementation of mechanisms to prevent conflicts, as the EU has been proposing since 1995.³³⁷ Therefore, too, talk of introducing to the region confidence- and peace-building measures, without the earlier resolution of the existing conflicts, is doomed to failure at the outset.

Nor do the states of the SEMCs share the EU's position on the questions of illegal migration and Islamist terrorism. They themselves have struggled with the terrorist activities of Islamist fundamentalists, but they view the problem as one of many, and not as the most important threat to their security. The resistance of the Arab states was also produced by the EU's linking the question of security with the necessity for political and economic reforms, as they viewed this approach to be a violation of the principle of non-interference in states' internal affairs.

The EU's concept of its role as propagator of democratic values and human rights was also only very limitedly rational, given the Arab states' different axiological order. The Arab states do not oppose the adoption of democracy and human rights; the essence of the matter is their different understanding of them.³³⁸ In the general opinion of the West, democracy and human rights are universal values,³³⁹ while for the Arab countries, such values are proper to individual cultures, and could be different than those accepted by Europe (the West). This view has been confirmed by public opinion polls. A poll

in the *Framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", No. 54, October 2006.

³³⁶ *Casus foederis* rule was also put into the Lisbon Treaty in an art. 42 of the *Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union*, „Official Journal of the European Union“, C 83/15, 30.3.2010.

³³⁷ Antonio Marquina, Mohamad Selim, *Security Concepts, Institutions and Strategies for Cooperation, Partnership and Conflict Prevention in the Mediterranean*, "UNISCI Discussion Paper", No 2, Madrid, Mayo de 2003.

³³⁸ Dorothee Schmid and Fares Braizat pointed out that a more explicit and consistent definition of democracy is certainly needed to legitimise the Western discourse on necessary political change in the region. Dorothee Schmid, Fares Braizat, *The Adaptation of EU and US Democracy Promotion Programmes to the Local Political Context in Jordan and Palestine and Their Relevance to Grand Geopolitical Design*, „EuroMeSCo Paper“, No. 50, October 2006, p. 24.

³³⁹ F.e. *Report on the Implementation of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights in 2000*, Commission Staff Working Document, COM (2001) 252 final, Brussels, 22 May 2001; Richard Youngs, *The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002.

conducted in 2008 by the Gallup Institute in the Arab countries showed that a large part of their societies believes³⁴⁰ that an Islamic government is capable of observing democratic principles, and at the same time, they do not favour the introduction in their own states of democracy on the Western model. The majority of those polled preferred the implementation of the country's own style of democracy, which would take into account the principles of the *sharia*.³⁴¹ Polls conducted three years earlier by the same institute among women in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Morocco showed that the majority accepted the *sharia* as one of the sources of law (61% in Lebanon, 70% in Morocco, 36% in Jordan and 28% in Egypt). In Egypt and Jordan, the majority of those polled considered that the principles of the Koran should be the sole source of state law (62% of those polled in Egypt, 55% in Jordan). In Morocco, the percentage was 28% and in Lebanon – 8%).³⁴² The poll also showed that in actuality women – Muslim women – have a positive opinion of gender equality, freedom of speech and political rights, but that they expressed disapproval of the social status of women in Western Europe, accentuating such negative phenomena as sexual promiscuity, pornography or lack of modesty. At the same time, they did not consider the lack of gender equality to be a large social problem in their own countries.³⁴³

The results of these polls confirm the earlier tendencies. Research conducted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 have shown that the decided majority of respondents have a negative opinion of the influence of Western values on the value systems of their countries.³⁴⁴ Where there is a divergence in the understanding of democracy and human rights, with a simultaneous lack of clear definition of the EU's expectations in regard to its partner states, the EU's assumption of the role of propagator of democratic values and human rights is an enterprise characterised by a large probability of failure.

The rationality of the EU's concept of two other roles in the Mediterranean region – active player in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and promoter of economic reforms and sustainable growth – does not raise as many objections. In playing these roles, the EU has declared its intention to use economic and financial instruments, which was rational given the EU's economic potential and its strong position in international economic relations. However, in the case of promoting economic reforms in the Mediterranean Arab countries,

³⁴⁰ It must be noticed the great number of Christians group living in Lebanon.

³⁴¹ See more: Bruno C. Reis, *Political Change in the Mediterranean – Impact on Euro-Mediterranean Relations*, „EuroMeSCo Paper”, No. 70, June 2008; John L. Esposito, Dalia Mogahed, *Who Speaks for Islam?*, Gallup 2008, Washington, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/104731/Muslim-Want-Democracy-Theocracy.aspx> (June 2009).

³⁴² Dalia Mogahed, *Perspectives of Women in the Muslim World*, “Gallup World Poll: Special Report: The Muslim World”, <http://media.gallup.com> (June 2009).

³⁴³ Ibidem.

³⁴⁴ *Gallup Poll of the Islamic World 2002*, <http://gallup.com> (June 2009).

the EU overlooked questions that are unusually important for those countries. One serious weakness of the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area was its concentration on industrial products and exclusion of agricultural products, fish products and services. Revenues from trade in these products and from services constitute a large part of the revenues of the Arab countries.³⁴⁵ It was only after a few years that these products gradually began to be considered in the formation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, which never emerged in any case. Furthermore, the EU disregarded the question of foreign debt in its programmes for the Mediterranean region, leaving the resolution of the issue to other international institutions. This had a negative impact on the process of reforming the economy of Arab countries, as many are struggling with the difficulty of servicing foreign debt.³⁴⁶ In addition, in the opinion of the Arab countries, the European states are to a large degree responsible for their indebtedness³⁴⁷ and should thus undertake to help with repayment or restructuring. From the outset, avoiding a question that was very important to the Arab countries implied negative consequences for the effectiveness of the EU's roles.

2. The degree to which the EU's concept of its roles was implemented

The degree to which the EU realised the concept of its roles in the Mediterranean region in the years 1993-2010 varied; the least effective were its roles as a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament, and as a propagator of democracy, human rights and intercultural dialogue. To a larger degree it managed to realise its role as a promoter of economic reforms and sustainable development, although its role did not bring the expected results and did not contribute to an improvement in the situation.

The concept of the role of promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament in the region was not adapted to the existing conditions or the expectations of the countries involved. Attempts to establish a mechanism to prevent conflicts, protect civilians in times of

³⁴⁵ Foud Zaim, *The Third Generation of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements: A View from the South*, „Mediterranean Politics”, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 36-52; Nicola Minasi, *The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area and its Impact on the Economies Involved*, „Jean Monnet Working Paper”, No. 16, Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, October 1998.

³⁴⁶ Joseph Licari, *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Economic and Financial Aspects*, „Mediterranean Politics”, Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 1998, pp. 1-20.

³⁴⁷ Abdelwahab Biad, *A Strategy for Conflict Prevention and Management in the Mediterranean*, „Afers Internacionals”, 1997, núm. 37, p. 57.

disaster, combat illegal migration and international terrorism, and introduce a WMD-free zone in the region did not bring the intended results³⁴⁸.

The idea of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter of Peace and Stability, which the EU member countries strongly promoted as a mechanism to prevent conflicts, was not accepted by its partners. The guidelines adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference in Stuttgart in April 1999 were strongly criticised by the Arab states. In spite of the growing engagement of the EU, it was also not possible to create a multilateral, cohesive mechanism for preventing or managing natural or man-made disasters. It emerged that in the event of a disaster, the EU's member states are able to act faster and more effectively than is the EU as a whole, where the decision-making process is very highly bureaucratised. In spite of the powers that the European Commission has acquired in this respect, setting up a mechanism to prevent natural and man-made disasters rests to a large degree on a decision of the member countries.³⁴⁹ Consequently, the non-EU initiatives in this sphere were of greater significance: i.e., those proposed by the "5+5 Dialogue" and the Council of Europe³⁵⁰ and those worked out at the interstate level.

Problems also occurred in undertaking joint actions to counter illegal migration and international terrorism. In spite of the restrictive immigration policies of the EU's member countries,³⁵¹ the number of persons immigrating to Europe remained high. In 2006, four EU states – Spain, France, Italy and Greece – accepted 11 million immigrants to their territories.³⁵² In 2003-2007 the most number of immigrants from Arab countries arrived in Spain – in 2003 alone some 594,300 immigrants among the 1.6 million who immigrated to all the EU states. An only slightly lower number arrived

³⁴⁸ See more: Rosa Balfour, *Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean Political and Security Dialogue*, "Occasional Paper", No. 52, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris 2004.

³⁴⁹ *Mid-Term Evaluation EuroMed Bridge Programme for the Prevention, Reduction and Management of Natural and Manmade Disasters 2005-2008. Final Report, August 2007*, Europe Aid/119860/C/SV/Multi.

³⁵⁰ See more: Niklas Bremberg, Ahmed Driss, Jakob Horst, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Isabelle Werenfels, *Flexible Multilateralism: Unlimited Opportunities? The Case of Civil Protection in the Mediterranean*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", No. 80, February 2009.

³⁵¹ Erica Feller, *Mediterranean migration: a comprehensive response*, "Forced Migration Review", No. 26, 2006, pp. 54–56; María Teresa Gil-Bazo, *The Practice of Mediterranean States in the Context of the European Union's Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension. The Safe Third Country Concept Revisited*, "International Journal of Refugee Law", Vol. 18, No 3-4, March 2006, pp. 575-580; Dereck Lutterbeck, *Policing Migration in the Mediterranean*, "Mediterranean Politics", Vol. 11, No. 1, March 2006.

³⁵² 20% of migrants arriving to Italy and 38% – to Spain came from other European states. Eurostat database: <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home> (June 2009). See more: Martin Baldwin-Edwards, *Mediterranean Migration: from a Security to Regional Development Approach*, IEMed-UNPFRA 2007.

in Italy – around 511,200. For France it was 55,000.³⁵³ Cooperation in the sphere of migration, which began in November 2007, as the fourth basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, did not bring about closer ties between the EU and its partners.

There was not much progress noted in the development of cooperation in the sphere of countering terrorism either. Although it was thanks to the EU's efforts that the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct in Countering Terrorism was adopted at the Barcelona summit in November 2005, yet on account of the large difference of opinion, no common definition of 'terrorism' was accepted and the instruments for combating this phenomenon were not described.

The negligible effectiveness of the EU should be noted as well in the case of promoting arms limitations and creating a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. In this area, its policy was limited solely to declarations.³⁵⁴

The degree to which the EU concept of promoting democratic values and human rights was realised was likewise insignificant; not many Arab countries underwent political transformations. In 1996, important changes were introduced to the constitution of Morocco. Then in 1998, the Moroccan government was headed by the leader of the opposition, Abderrahmane Youssoufi, and after the death of King Hassan II, the policy of liberalisation was continued by his son Mohammad VI. Programmes financed by the EU enabled the introduction of certain political reforms (for instance, a Family Code and greater freedom of speech). Positive changes in the political system were also introduced in Jordan and Algeria. In the autumn of 2004 the Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika eliminated the most severe state-of-emergency restrictions on the public. The elections in the Palestinian autonomous territories were also democratic in nature. In February 2005, changes were introduced to Egypt's constitution to require the candidacy of several persons in presidential elections. In May 2004, the League of Arab States adopted a 13-point plan of political reforms. At the same time, many Arab countries joined the Initiative on Good Governance for Development programme realised jointly by the OECD and UNDP. These changes were all very limited in nature, however, as was confirmed in European Commission reports. A document in 1999 indicated many problems in the area of democratisation, the observance of political rights, women's rights and the rights of religious or ethnic minorities. An analysis of the situation in six countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, and on the West Bank and in the

³⁵³ Ludger Kühnhard, *10 years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: the Human Dimension Revisited*, in: Andreas Marchetti, *Ten Years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Defining European Interests for the Next Decade*, "ZEI Discussion Paper" 2005, C 154, p. 88.

³⁵⁴ There were activities undertaken by the EU toward Iran, however this state is not a subject of analysis in this book.

Gaza Strip showed a lack of respect for divisions of power and the rule of law, with frequent falsifications of election results, censorship and violations of women's rights and the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. A report published 10 years later showed that – in spite of progress in introducing political reforms – the SEMCs were far from achieving the goal of introducing democratic systems.³⁵⁵

Morocco, which in Western European opinion is most advanced in the process of democratisation, did in fact introduce significant changes in its political and social life, particularly on the basis of improvements to the constitution in 1996, but in general the outcome of the changes departed significantly from the EU's expectations.³⁵⁶ Morocco has remained a semi-authoritarian state, described as a 'centrally-controlled facade democracy'. Power has been concentrated in the royal palace and influential groups, called '*makhzen*', and freedom of speech does not encompass such issues as the state authorities or the independence of the Western Sahara. The changes occurring in Morocco are often described in the literature as modernisation rather than democratisation.³⁵⁷ Changes in Jordan have also not resulted in the establishment of democracy. Some civil rights were introduced, but others were not, or were limited even further. In 2003, King Abdullah refused to allow EU delegates to observe the elections, which, as it later emerged, departed far from democratic standards.³⁵⁸ Other Arab states have received similar appraisals. The reforms in Algeria and Lebanon were very limited in nature.³⁵⁹ Tunisia, the only country that displayed satisfaction with the Barcelona Declaration provisions referring to the promotion of democracy and human rights, took

³⁵⁵ *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2008*, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 23 April 2009, COM (2009), 188/3. *The GOLD Report Decentralization and Local Democracy in the Mediterranean Executive Summary*, Diputació Barcelona, United Cities and Local Governments Cités et Gouvernements Locaux Unis Ciudades y Gobiernos Locales Unidos, Barcelona 2008; Richard Youngs, *Europe and the Middle East in the Shadow of September 11*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 2006; Mahjoob Zwili, Ali Tekin, Andrew E. Johnson, *Fragile States and the Democratization Process: a New Approach to Understanding Security in the Middle East*, „EuroMeSCo Paper”, No. 74, November 2008.

³⁵⁶ See more: Richard Youngs, *The European Union and Democracy in the Arab-Muslim World*, Centre for European Policy Studies, „Working Paper”, No. 2, November 2002; Kristina Kausch, *Morocco*, in: Richard Youngs (ed.), *Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in Its Neighborhood?*, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, Spain 2008.

³⁵⁷ Kristina Kausch, *Change with the Makhzen Project on Freedom of Association in the Middle East and North Africa*, „Working Paper”, No. 54, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, Spain 2008.

³⁵⁸ See more: Ana Echagüe, *Jordan*, in: Youngs (ed.), *Is the European Union Supporting Democracy...*, pp. 33–53.

³⁵⁹ *The Middle East and North Africa 2009, Europe Regional Surveys of the World*, 55th edition, Routledge, London 2009.

backward steps in the process of democratisation, as did Egypt.³⁶⁰ Syria and Libya, on the other hand, did not begin any process of political reform.³⁶¹ In consequence, at the beginning of 2011, the political as well as economic and social situation led to the mass social demonstrations called the Arab Spring and the removal from power of hated regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, as well as a civil war in Syria. The development of events in these and other Arab countries is still uncertain.

The inadequateness of the EU's concepts in terms of the region's conditions and the partner countries' expectations contributed to its low level of success in propagating democratic values and human rights in the Arab Mediterranean states. In addition, the EU's activities in this sphere were inconsistent. In 1993-2000 the EU did initiate and financially support programmes to improve the operation of public administration, decentralise authority, promote women's rights and increase the participation of non-governmental groups in state policy, but they were restricted in nature. The EU declared its support for civil society, but in reality it supported it to a small extent. Furthermore, it treated political groups and non-governmental organisations rather selectively; it consistently did not support moderate Islamic groups, out of fear that if they came to power their policies toward Europe would be antagonistic,³⁶² and when it did uphold civil society, its assistance took such forms as would not provoke the uneasiness of the state authorities.³⁶³ Such behaviour on the part of the EU was in large measure the result of pressure from its southern European members, who feared that democratisation of the Arab countries could increase their internal problems and lead to destabilisation or chaos, and such a scenario would produce many difficulties for the EU, particularly for its Mediterranean members. Therefore, these members preferred the existing governments, which were able to maintain stability, even if they were undemocratic.³⁶⁴

For this reason as well, the EU was inconsistent in its application of the policy of conditionality, consisting in making economic and financial aid dependent on a government's introduction of political reforms. The clause of conditionality, which was adopted in a MEDA regulation, in the association

³⁶⁰ Richard Gillespi, *A Political Agenda for Region-building? The EMP and Democracy Promotion in North Africa*, "Working Paper", AY0405-30, Institute of European Studies, University of California, Berkeley, May 30, 2004, p. 6.

³⁶¹ Youngs, *Europe and the Middle East...*

³⁶² Compare: Roberto Aliboni, *Common Languages on Democracy in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", no. 31, May 2004.

³⁶³ Richard Youngs, *Europe's Flawed Approach to Arab Democracy*, Centre for European Reform Essays, Centre for European Reform, London, October 2006; Richard Youngs, *Trends in Democracy Assistance: What has Europe been Doing?*, „Journal of Democracy“, Vol. 19, No. 2, April 2008, pp. 160–169.

³⁶⁴ See more: Heiner Hänggi, Fred Tanner, *Promoting Security Sector Governance in the EU's Neighborhood*, "Chaillot Papers", No. 80, July 2005.

agreements and action plans, and within the framework of the ENP, was not used in practice.³⁶⁵ The effectiveness of the EU's actions to democratise the Arab countries was also hampered by the EU's too bureaucratised procedures, which delayed, for instance, the granting of financial aid to Arab groups and organisations.

The EU had a little success in realising the concept of **promoting economic reforms and sustainable development** in the Arab states of the eastern and southern Mediterranean. In the years 1995-2010, it signed association agreements with 8 states of the region (Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria and Lebanon), and seven of these states (without Algeria) have accepted an Action Plan by the EU within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU has undertaken various activities to accelerate the economic transformation of the Arab countries. It has supported enterprises with the aim of increasing their competitiveness on the world market; it has worked for the quickest possible introduction of the rules of origin for products and for the liberalisation of the services sector; it has supported foreign investment and the development of information technology. These activities have taken the form of consultations, advising, training, technical assistance and financial aid. The EU also created a programme for the region's sustainable development. In 1997 a programme for environmental protection (SMAP) was established, and in 2005 a decision was made to establish the programme Horizon 2020, which concentrates on reducing the largest sources of pollution in the Mediterranean region. In 2003 a project was set up for the development of the transport network in the Mediterranean region; it was extended to 2013 as the Regional Transport Action Plan. In 2003 an action plan for the development of energy cooperation was initiated as well, and in 2007 the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership. A better business climate was created in the eastern and southern Mediterranean countries as a result of the EU's activities in cooperation with other international entities. The economic indicators showed improvement. GDP for the MENA states grew from 1.2 billion USD in 1993 to 3.2 billion in 2008, i.e., by around 168%.³⁶⁶ Inflation decreased from 12% (in 1995) to 3% (in 2004).³⁶⁷ The unemployment rate dropped from 15.3% in 2003 to 12.39% in 2007.³⁶⁸ Direct investment grew. In the period 2003-2007

³⁶⁵ An exception was EU policy towards Palestinians. After Hamas victory in 2006 the EU suspended its financial support for the Palestinian authorities.

³⁶⁶ „World Economic Outlook”, 1993–2009.

³⁶⁷ *European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Regional Strategy Paper (2007–2013) and Regional Indicative Programme (2007–2010) for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, pp. 7–8.

³⁶⁸ European Commission – Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, *European Neighborhood Policy: Economic Review of EU Neighbor Countries*, “Occasional Papers”, No. 40, August 2008, p. 24.

the total value of foreign direct investment wavered from 5 to 8 billion USD a year, but they went chiefly to Israel and the North African countries.³⁶⁹ In 2003, foreign investment amounted to a total of 10 billion euros, and in the years 2006-2007 to around 60 billion euros.³⁷⁰ The largest foreign investors were the countries of the Persian Gulf (40% in 2007) and the EU (39% in 2007).³⁷¹ In the years 1995-2004 exports from the partner countries to the EU doubled, while import from the EU grew around 60%. The trade deficit was reduced by around 10-20% to the advantage of the countries of North Africa and the Middle East. Since 2000 the amount of exports from the Arab countries to the EU increased by an average of 10%, and imports from the EU by 4%.³⁷²

In spite of the successes noted, however, the economic situation of the Arab states remained very difficult in the entire region, without sustainable development. One of the main goals of the Barcelona Process – the establishment of a free trade area by 2010 – was not realised. The association agreement provisions on lifting customs duties were introduced in Tunisia. Since 1 January 2008 it has had a free trade area with the EU for industrial products. Since October 2008, Morocco has had advanced status, indicating strengthened bilateral relations with the EU³⁷³; in December 2009, the EU and Morocco signed an agreement for the gradual lifting of duties on agricultural and fish products. There is also a free trade area for industrial products between the EU and Israel, and in November 2009, they signed an agreement for the gradual elimination of duties on agricultural and fish products.

The EMP did not receive adapted financial and technical assistance from the EU for its goals. The delays in signing the association agreements and complicated procedures in applying for funds were among the leading reasons for the small use of funds from the MEDA programmes. Use of the funds allocated to them by the EU was within the bounds of 32-86%.

³⁶⁹ “UN World Investment Report”, 2005.

³⁷⁰ <http://www.anima.org> (June 2009). See also: Roberto Aliboni, Fouad M. Ammor, *Under the Shadow of ‘Barcelona’: From the EMP to the Union for the Mediterranean*, „EuroMeSCo Paper”, No. 77, January 2009.

³⁷¹ Bremberg, Driss, Horst, Soler i Lecha, Werenfels, op. cit, p. 6; Ghassan Omet, Ibrahim Saif, *Foreign Direct Investment in the MENA Region and Jordan: Regional Experience and Causality Analysis*, “Go-Euromed Working Paper”, No. 0607, 2006.

³⁷² http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/euromed/index_en.htm (November 2009).

³⁷³ See more: Kristina Kausch, *Morocco’s ‘Advanced Status’: Model or Muddle?*, “Policy Brief”, No. 43, March 2010, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, Spain.

Table 1. Sums allocated by the EU within the MEDA programme and their use by Arab participants in the EMP, 1995-2006

	MEDA I 1995-1999 (in million euros)		MEDA II 2000-2006 (in million euros)		MEDA I + MEDA II 1995-2006 (in million euros)		Use (in %)
	Com- mit- ment	Pay- ments	Com- mit- ment	Pay- ments	Com- mit- ment	Pay- ments	
Bilateral agreement							
Algeria	164	30	339	142	504	172	34.1
Egypt	686	157	592	695	1279	852	66.6
Jordan	254	108	331	345	585	454	77.6
Lebanon	182	1	133	182	315	183	58.0
Morocco	660	128	980	917	1 640	1 045	63.7
Syria	101	0	180	91	281	91	32.0
Tunisia	428	168	518	489	946	657	69.4
West Bank and Gaza Strip	111	59	522	486	633	546	86.2
Regional agreements	471	223	1 052	712	1 483	934	62.9

Source: *European Commission. EuropeAid*, <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid> (June 2009).

In spite of the relative progress, the development of the Arab Mediterranean states in comparison with other regions of the world was very small. Their share of the world economy decreased to a major degree from 1980. Compared with other economic zones, particularly South-East Asia, they lost their important position in terms of relative competitiveness and industrial development. The main role in those countries is played by specialised industry producing low-level technological goods and low value added. These goods are unusually sensitive to external competition. The economies of the states were heavily dependent on international trade, and the total of exports and imports constituted around two-thirds of GDP. Their export structure was very weakly diversified. Since the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the structure of trade with the EU has not changed much. Exports from the SEMCs were little diversified. The main export products were raw energy

sources (around 28%) and textiles (30%). A large part of these countries' budget revenues came from customs duties, and the services sector was of major significance. In 2007 it constituted around 50% of GDP in Egypt, Morocco and Syria, 60% of GDP in Tunisia and over 70% of GDP in Jordan and Lebanon.³⁷⁴

The EU's partner countries are characterised by large differences in their level of economic development. In 2006, GDP per capita varied from 1,000 USD in Egypt and the Palestinian autonomous territories to 5,200 USD in Lebanon and 17,000 USD in Israel. The rate of economic growth is equally diverse. In the years 1995-2009, the average economic growth was 3.9%. However, on account of the large natural population growth and high number of persons of productive age, there has been not much decline in the unemployment rate or much increase in individual income. In 2007, the European Parliament estimated that by 2015, with such natural growth trends as have appeared in the Arab countries at the beginning of the 21st century, 35 million new jobs will be needed in order to keep the level of unemployment at the level of 12-15%.³⁷⁵

The development of economic cooperation between the SEMCs was also quite small. The amount of trade between these countries grew by 0.6%: from 4.4% in 1995 to 5% in 2003³⁷⁶ and 2008.³⁷⁷ Trade between the three North African countries belonging to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership amounted to 3% of their total trade in 2003. By comparison, trade between the APEC countries reached the level of 70% of their total international trade; 50% in NAFTA; 22.3% in ASEAN; 19.9% in MERCOSUR; 12% in UEMOA (Economic Community of West African States); and 5% in the GCC. One of the main obstacle to the development of economic cooperation between the region's states is Arab-Israeli conflict³⁷⁸, yet relations between the Arab countries are also not free from political problems. In addition, their economies are not complementary.³⁷⁹ Talks on trade liberalisation were conducted

³⁷⁴ Rezolucja legislacyjna Parlamentu Europejskiego z dnia 15 marca 2007 r. w sprawie utworzenia euro-śródziemnomorskiej strefy wolnego handlu, 2006/2173 (INI)), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu> (June 2009).

³⁷⁵ Ibidem.

³⁷⁶ <http://ec.europa.eu> (June 2009).

³⁷⁷ *European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Regional Strategy Paper (2007–2013) and Regional Indicative Programme (2007–2010) for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, p. 8.

³⁷⁸ Compare: Emily B. Landau, Fouad Ammor, *Regional Security Dialogue and Cooperation in the South*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", No. 48, October 2006; Sven Biscop, *The European Strategy and the Neighborhood Policy: A New Starting Point for a Euro-Mediterranean Security Partnership?* Paper presented at the EUSA 9th Biennial International Conference Austin, Texas, 31 March – 2 April 2005.

³⁷⁹ Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska, *Świat arabski wobec globalizacji. Uwarunkowania gospodarcze, kulturowe i społeczne*, Wydawnictwo Difin, Warszawa 2007, pp. 131–132.

for many years within the framework of the Arab Maghreb Union, but since 2000 they have basically disappeared from the organisation's agenda.³⁸⁰ In 2004 Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco signed the Agadir Agreement on the opening of a free trade area. It entered into force in 2007, but its implementation is occurring slowly and without significant effects.

The lack of relative successes in the economic development of the Arab Mediterranean countries has meant that the developmental disproportion between these countries and the EU has remained very large. The poverty level in 2007 varied from 7% in Jordan and Tunisia to 44% in Egypt. Over 30% of the population of the SEMCs lived on less than 2 USD a day. The situation was made worse by backwardness in the area of education and scientific research. In some countries of the region there are high – even if declining – levels of illiteracy. In 1980 the region's illiteracy level was around 60%, while by 2002 it had fallen below 40%.³⁸¹

Table 2. Rank of the SEMCs on the Human Development Index (2009)

Country	Rank
Algeria	104
Egypt	120
Israel	27
Jordan	96
Lebanon	83
Libya	55
Morocco	130
Palestinian Autonomous Territories	110
Syria	107
Tunisia	98

Source: "Arab Human Development Report", UNDP, 2009.

There has been a lack of interaction between the labour market and the educational system, which has had a negative impact on the efficiency and qualifications of the labour force and on the region's prospects of development. Women and young persons have been insufficiently included in the

³⁸⁰ Luis Martinez, *Algeria, the Arab Maghreb Union and Regional Integration*, „EuroMeSCo Paper”, No. 59, October 2006.

³⁸¹ *European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Regional Strategy Paper (2007–2013) and Regional Indicative Programme (2007–2010) for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, p. 9.

labour market. Direct foreign investments, in spite of significant influxes, have not yet achieved the level where they could contribute to visible and tangible improvements in the socio-economic situation. Foreign investors fear the region's political instability and low economic competitiveness.

Even though the majority of the SEMCs have made progress in lowering infant mortality and increased access to basic levels of education, the levels of illiteracy are still high, particularly in rural areas. Extreme poverty has been reduced, but poverty remains a large problem.

The SEMCs, with the exception of Israel, remain far down on the Human Development Index.

Table 3. Human Development Index of SEMCs in given years

Country	1990	1995	2000	2005
Algeria	0.652	0.672	0.702	0.733
Egypt	0.575	0.613	0.659	0.708
Israel	0.868	0.883	0.908	0.929
Jordan	0.684	0.710	0.751	0.773
Lebanon	0.692	0.732	0.748	0.772
Libya	Lack of data	Lack of data	Lack of data	0.818
Morocco	0.551	0.581	0.613	0.646
Palestinian Autonomous Territories	Lack of data	Lack of data	Lack of data	0.731
Syria	0.646	0.676	0.690	0.724
Tunisia	0.662	0.702	0.741	0.766

Source: "Arab Human Development Report", UNDP, 2009.

The EU tried to perform another of its roles, that of **active player in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict**, chiefly through non-political means, since in the political-diplomatic dimension of the Middle East peace process it remained in the United States' shadow. Given the EU's conviction that without the United States' engagement the conflict would be impossible to end, the EU has worked closely with it (and other international actors); in 2002 the EU became a member of the Middle East Quartet (together with the US, the UN and Russia). It also supported Arab peace initiatives (most often presented by Saudi Arabia and Egypt). At the same time, the EU provided good offices and mediation through its High Representative for CFSP, its Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process, and leaders of

its member countries, delegated for the purpose. It has systematically and consistently urged the sides to the conflict to come to a peaceful resolution and it has emphasised the necessity for the creation of an independent state of Palestine on the territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the withdrawal of Israel from the land occupied during the Six Day War of 1967 and the removal of the Jewish settlements that have been built there, the observance of international law, and the sides' abstention from the use of force and violence. Disregard of these appeals by one of the sides has not, however, entailed any specific action by the EU; it has limited itself solely to words of criticism and to urging the parties to return to the negotiating table. The EU has undertaken more tangible activity in the process of building a democratic Palestinian state. The EU consistently supported the Palestinian legislative, executive and judicial organs, as well as security and police forces. The EU has also been the largest donor of financial aid to the authorities of the Palestinian autonomous territories, their population, and Palestinian refugees. This aid is given in the form of non-reimbursable payments, and also as loans and credit guarantees.

However, in spite of the unusually positive work the EU has performed on behalf of the Palestinian Autonomous Territories, its role can not be evaluated uncritically. For many years, support for the ruling group, which was headed by Yassir Arafat, was unconditional. In spite of the EU's declarations about creating a civil society with liberal views, peacefully oriented toward Israel, it did not try to include other major groupings in political life. It did not react to the undemocratic steps of the Palestinian authorities or the lack of transparency in the expenditure of the funds it transferred. Only after 2002 did it begin to make financial aid dependent on the Palestinian Authority's conducting of reforms.³⁸² However, many years of unconditional support for the ruling Al-Fatah party had compounded that party's corruption and the many irregularities in the functioning of the state apparatus it had created. In the parliamentary elections of 2006, the majority of Palestinian society, weary of endless broken promises and the lack of improvement in their living conditions, supported Hamas, which had campaigned on honesty, moral renewal and a fight against corruption. However, Hamas did not receive lasting support either from the EU or from international society. In such a situation, a political crisis occurred in the Palestinian autonomous territories, leading to a fratricidal struggle between Hamas and Al-Fatah. The situation was not calmed by the establishment, in June 2007, of a government of national unity. In consequence, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip (Hamastan), and Fatah of the West Bank (Fatahland). The division of the Palestinians significantly worsened their political, economic and social situation.

³⁸² See more: Daniela Pioppi, Nahalie Tocci, Karam Karam, *Domestic Politics and Conflict in the Casus of Israel, Palestine and Lebanon*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", No. 53, October 2006.

3. The level of acceptance for EU roles by the SEMCs

The EU's roles were only partially accepted by the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs). Even if they approved of some of the EU's declared roles, the manner of their realisation by the EU evoked criticism and, consequently, a limited degree of approbation.

The EU's declarations concerning its role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict were largely accepted by the Arab states, since the majority of the statements were in accord with their expectations. These states maintain that without a just and comprehensive peace solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict the Mediterranean area will not be freed from tension,³⁸³ and the basis for the conflict's resolution should be UN Security Council resolutions no. 242 and 338. They consider that the provisions of resolution no. 242 require Israel's withdrawal from all the territories occupied during the Six Day War in 1967 and the removal of the Jewish settlements built on these lands.³⁸⁴ Supported by UN Security Council resolution no. 1701,³⁸⁵ representatives of the Arab states have also called repeatedly for the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon's territory, and for realisation of the principle of establishing two states: Israel and a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with its capital in Jerusalem.³⁸⁶ As Jordan's representative, Marwan Muasher emphasised in September 2004, any solution other than two independent states (for instance, the establishment of one

³⁸³ *Aide-Mémoire de l'Algérie sur le bilan de dix années de partenariat euro méditerranéen*, 28 novembre 2005, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2010).

³⁸⁴ *La «Déclaration d'Alger»*, du 17^{ème} sommet de la Ligue des Etats Arabes, 22 et 23 mars 2005, <http://www.leconomiste.com> (June 2010); *Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process*, www.mfa.gov.jo (June 2010); *M. Belkhadem appelle à tenir compte du plan arabe de paix, Conférence euro-méditerranéenne des ministres des Affaires étrangères*, 29–30 novembre 2004, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2010); *Conférence euro-méditerranéenne des ministres des Affaires étrangères*, 29-30 novembre 2004, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2010); *Communiqué du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération qui condamne l'agression israélienne contre la Syrie*, Rabat, 5 Octobre 2003, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2010).

³⁸⁵ *Final communiqué of the Thirteenth Arab Summit Conference on the Intifadeh*, March, 27-28, 2001, http://www.mideastweb.org/arab_summit_2001.htm (June 2010); *Le Maroc condamne fermement l'agression israélienne contre Cana*, Rabat, 30 juillet 2006, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2010); *Communiqué du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération à la suite de la cessation des hostilités au Liban*, Rabat, 15 août 2006, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2010).

³⁸⁶ *Réponse de M. Taïb Fassi Fihri, Ministre Délégué aux Affaires Etrangères et à la Coopération, à une question orale à la Chambre des représentants sur la situation en Palestine*, Rabat, 12 mai 2004, <http://http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2010); *M. Mohamed Benaïssa: La relance du processus de paix, une nécessité pour l'établissement d'un état Palestinien indépendant*, New York, 23 septembre 2005, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2010); *M. Fassi Fihri réitère la position constante du Maroc à l'égard de la question palestinienne*, Rabat, 17 juillet 2007, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2010); *Solidarite- Algerie – Palestine*, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2010); *Discours du président Zine el Abidine Ben Ali à l'occasion du dixième anniversaire du changement*, Carthage, 7 novembre 1997, <http://www.changement.tn> (June 2010).

bi-national state) would not be beneficial, or in the interests of Jordan, the Palestinians or the Israelis.³⁸⁷ Jordan believes, however, that Jerusalem could be the capital of both states – the Israeli and the Palestinian.³⁸⁸ Another key question raised by representatives of the Arab states is the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes. In this context, they have repeatedly referred to UN Security Council resolution no. 194 and emphasised the necessity for its realisation. In this respect they have differed from the EU, which has not taken a position on the refugee issue, considering that it should be resolved during peace negotiations between the interested parties. The Arab states also unambiguously criticised the Israeli army's invasion of Lebanon in July 2006 and of the Gaza Strip in 2008. They appealed to the Israeli government to stop its attacks, and to international society, including the UN and the Middle East Quartet, to take appropriate actions to end Israel's military operations.³⁸⁹

Understandably, Israel's position on the Middle East conflict is decidedly different. Unalterably, irrespective of which party is in power, Israel maintains that UN Security Council resolution no. 242 does not require it to withdraw from all the territories seized in June 1967. On the basis of the Camp David peace accord of 1979, Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, but it is very unwilling to withdraw from all of the Golan Heights. Withdrawal from the West Bank is also a matter of dispute. From the moment of establishing contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organisation and beginning peace negotiations with it in 1993, the Israeli government has in fact recognised the right of the Palestinians to create their own state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, but the Israelis have been inconsistent in realising these declarations.

Israel does not want to remove all the Jewish settlements built on the West Bank, and moreover, is conducting a policy of building new ones. The

³⁸⁷ *His Excellency Dr. Marwan Muasher, Remarks at the Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C. on September 30th, 2004*, <http://www.mfa.gov.jo> (June 2010).

³⁸⁸ *His Majesty King Abdullah II Address to the World Economic Forum's (WEF) 34th Annual Meeting, Davos, Switzerland, January 23, 2004*, <http://www.jordanembassyus.org> (June 2010).

³⁸⁹ *M. Taïb Fassi Fihri: SM le Roi Mohamed V appelle à une plus forte implication internationale pour parvenir à un cessez-le-feu immédiat, Casablanca, 25 juillet 2006*, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2010) ; *Le Maroc réitère sa solidarité avec le Liban et appelle à un arrêt immédiat des agressions israéliennes, Rabat, 11 août 2006*, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2010); *Le Maroc condamne vigoureusement les opérations militaires israéliennes dans la bande de Gaza, Rabat, 27 décembre 2008*, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2010); *Massacre de civils libanais à Qana: déclaration du ministère des Affaires étrangères, 30 juillet 2006*, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2010) ; *Declaration de M. Idriss Jazairy, Ambassadeur, Représentant Permanent au conseil des Droits de l'Homme, Algerie – Palestine – agression reaction, 13 janvier 2009*, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2010); *Grande marche de solidarité à Tunis avec les peuples palestinien et libanais, "La Presse de Tunisie", 25 juillet 2006*; *Tunisia Condemns Dangerous Escalation in the Gaza Strip, "Tunisia Online News", December 28, 2008*; *Syrian President Bashar al-Assad meets French counterpart in Damascus, "Al-Masakin News Agency", January 9, 2009*.

status of Jerusalem also remains in dispute. Successive Israeli governments have unchangeably maintained, like the Palestinians, that the capital of their state is Jerusalem.³⁹⁰ Nor have the Israeli governments agreed to the Palestinians' request, supported by the Arab states, to allow the return of those Palestinian refugees who left their homes during the war in the years 1948-1949.

The Arab states' and Israel's different positions on resolving the conflict have influenced their relations with the EU as a player acting to end it. Acceptance of the EU's position is significantly larger among Arab countries than in Israel. However, in spite of acceptance for the EU's concept of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, the representatives of the Arab countries have been clearly indicating their dissatisfaction with its realisation. Not infrequently they have urged the EU to play a more decisive role³⁹¹ and have expressed the hope that in cooperation with the remaining members of the Middle East Quartet it will be the honest broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict.³⁹² The Egyptian authorities have many times called on the EU to work more actively toward the conclusion of an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, and, after the internal division, among the Palestinians to reunite them. Egypt's representatives have emphasised that the EU should pay more attention to factors negatively influencing the Arab-Israeli conflict, i.e., the Jewish settlements, Israeli violence at Islamic holy places in Jerusalem and Israeli attempts to change the demographics of Jerusalem.³⁹³ They have also stressed the need to protect the Palestinians' rights, given their habitual violation by the Israeli authorities.³⁹⁴ This position has been supported by other Arab countries. For example, in November 2005 Algeria's minister of foreign affairs, Abdelaziz Belkhadem, appealed to the state-participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to make a clear distinction between international terrorism and the right of a nation to fight against an occupying power. Although in his speech the issue was not clearly defined, it was obvious that he was appealing to the EU not to count Palestinian groups

³⁹⁰ On July 30 1980, the Israel passed a law declaring Jerusalem the capital of Israel.

³⁹¹ "Egyptian-European Policies", *Egypt State Information Service*, <http://www.sis.gov.eg> (June 2010).

³⁹² M. Taïeb Fassi Fihri: *le Maroc appelle au soutien du peuple Palestinien dans les négociations avec les israéliens*, Fez, 5 avril 2008, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2010).

³⁹³ Assistant Foreign Minister for European Affairs, Ambassador Fatma Al Zahraa Etman, and Assistant Foreign Minister for Arab Affairs, Ambassador Abd El Rahman Salah, held a meeting with European Ambassadors in Cairo on October 28th, <http://www.mfa.gov.eg> (June 2010); Dina Ezzat, *More than Washington's underwriters?*, "Al Ahram", No. 522, 22-28 February 2001.

³⁹⁴ *A Report on the visit of the President of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering*, 28 February 2008, <http://www.mfa.gov.eg> (June 2010); *Egyptian-European consultations on the situation in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories*, 24 July 2006, <http://www.mfa.gov.eg> (June 2010); *Egypt and Finland explore the situation in the region*, 27 July, 2006, <http://www.mfa.gov.eg> (June 2010).

among terrorist groups when the Palestinians are fighting solely for their right to self-determination.³⁹⁵

The Arab countries' critical appraisal of the EU's activities was reinforced by its position on Israel's policies. The EU in fact condemned Israel for its settlements on the occupied territory and for building the wall, considering them in violation of international law, but it does not back its statements with any particular actions; it limits itself solely to rhetoric. In addition, in all its agreements with the EU, Israel adopts the interpretation that the territories occupied during the Six Day War in 1967 are an integral part of its territory. In the opinion of the Arab states, the EU's lack of reaction signifies its agreement to such an interpretation.³⁹⁶ The suspicion of the Arabs, particularly the Palestinians, toward the EU was increased by the EU's rapid withdrawal of support for the government of Hamas, which was formed in 2006. The government emerged as a result of democratic general elections, thus the EU's objection was exclusively political, not legal, in nature. It left in question the meaning of EU declarations of working toward the democratisation of the Palestinian autonomous territories.

The EU's inconsistent behaviour caused the Arab states to think of it as an unreliable and ineffective actor, lacking a coherent policy. In consequence, it was perceived not as an independent actor, but as one helping the United States, which has real possibilities of influence. In the opinion of the Arab states, the US was appearing in the role of 'bad policeman', while the EU is trying to play the role of 'good policeman'.³⁹⁷ The EU's lack of credibility in Arab view is increased by the historical associations and a lack of faith in its real ability to act resulting from its specific nature as an international actor.³⁹⁸ When in the summer of 2006, during the war between Israel and Hezbollah, Spain proposed placing an EU civilian mission on the Lebanese-Syrian border, the idea was decidedly rejected by Syria, which considered that the European Security and Defence Policy was not sufficiently developed and the EU not sufficiently ready to undertake such an operation.

Similarly, in the eyes of many Jews, the EU was not playing a proper role in resolving the conflict. Israeli decision-makers have in fact spoken positively

³⁹⁵ M. Belkhadem: *il faut éviter l'amalgame entre terrorisme et résistance légitime à l'occupation*, 28 novembre 2005, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2010); M. Belkhadem *appelle à tenir compte du plan arabe de paix*, *Conférence euro-méditerranéenne des ministres des Affaires étrangères*, 29-30 novembre 2004...

³⁹⁶ Pioppi, Tocci, Karam, op. cit., p. 31.

³⁹⁷ Yezid Sayigh, *Security Sector reform in the Arab Region, Challenges to Developing an Indigenous Agenda*, Arab Reform Initiative, "Thematic Papers", No. 2. December 2007; *Securing the Future: Europe's Agenda for a More Peaceful Neighborhood* "Discussion Paper for the XI Kronberg Talks", Europe and Middle East, Bertelsmann Stiftung, January 17-19, 2009.

³⁹⁸ Karim Makdisi, Timur Göksel, Hans Bastian Hauck, Stuart Reigeluth, *UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", No. 76, January 2009, p. 12.

of the EU's activities in the Middle East,³⁹⁹ but they also frequently level harsh criticisms and accusations of biased behaviour at it. In the nineties, the government of Benjamin Netanyahu (1996-2001) more than once criticised the activities of the EU in regards to the conflict. For instance, in March 1999, Netanyahu expressed a negative opinion of the Berlin Declaration adopted by the European Council, in which it supported the right of the Palestinians to establish an independent state.⁴⁰⁰ During the Israeli army's invasion of Lebanon in July 2006, the prime minister, Ehud Olmert, stated decidedly that the EU had no right to criticise Israel since the European countries had attacked Kosovo and killed 10,000 civilians there and in light of such events the EU should not condemn Israel for the tragedy occurring to Lebanese civilians.⁴⁰¹ And during the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip in December 2008, President Shimon Peres accused the EU of being too one-sided in the conflict, of applying a double standard,⁴⁰² and of sympathising with Hamas, which is considered by Israel to be a terrorist group.⁴⁰³ The Israeli political scientist, Yohanan Manor, said 'the EU bears a lot of the responsibility for transforming the Palestinian educational system into a war machine against the Oslo process.'⁴⁰⁴

The level of acceptance for the EU's role as a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament was also low. The divergence between the EU, the Arab countries and Israel in their understanding of security and in their different views of security challenges and threats had a negative impact on the level of acceptance for the roles the EU declared and played. The Arab states' attitude to the EU's moves is distrustful; they accuse the EU of acting solely in its own interest, with a lack of respect for their sovereignty and too much interference in internal affairs. In consequence, it was not possible to create, within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, a mechanism for preventing conflicts or to work out a joint strategy on migration. There is also a lack of full acceptance for the EU's activities in combating international terrorism. The Arab countries, particularly Tunisia⁴⁰⁵ and

³⁹⁹ F.e: FM Livni press conference on IDF operation in Gaza, 31 December 2008, <http://www.mfa.gov.il> (June 2010); Israeli PM Olmert Meets with French National Assembly President Accoyer, February 10, 2009, "European Jewish Congress", <http://www.eurojewcong.org> (June 2010).

⁴⁰⁰ Reactions by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Sharon on the EU statement on Jerusalem, 25 March 1999, <http://www.mfa.gov.il> (June 2010).

⁴⁰¹ *Sie haben Israel sowieso gehasst*, "Welt am Sonntag", 6 August 2006.

⁴⁰² Peres: Europe needs to open its eyes, "The Jerusalem Post", January 6, 2009.

⁴⁰³ Peres: EU sympathy for Hamas diminishes chances of peace, "Haaretz", 24 February 2009

⁴⁰⁴ Yohanan Manor, *Les manuels scolaires palestiniens: une génération sacrifiée*, Berg International éditeurs, Paris 2003.

⁴⁰⁵ For instance, Tunisia has called upon international society to organise a conference under the aegis of the United Nations on the subject of countering terrorism and the adoption of a code of conduct, and on the cooperation of states against this threat. It was

Morocco,⁴⁰⁶ have declared their role in the fight with terrorism, but there is a lack of agreement on the understanding and essence of the phenomenon.

The suspicions of the Arab states are also evoked by the European Security and Defence Policy. The lack of a suitable information policy has created the suspicion that it is an instrument for 'Western interventionism'.⁴⁰⁷ These fears have been increased by the armed attack on Iraq in March 2003. France, Germany and several smaller countries of the EU did condemn the actions of the United States, but Great Britain – and Poland, which was then a candidate for membership – took an active part, and other countries, including i.a. Spain, Italy and Portugal, supported Washington politically.

The criticisms of the Arab countries were also aroused by the EU's policy in the matter of introducing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Although the expectations of the Arab countries in this respect were in accord with the EU's declarations, the EU's activities have called forth criticism. The EU has been accused of concentrating on the question of the non-proliferation of WMD, while failing to act to bring about real disarmament. In a situation where there is a lack of strategic balance in the region, such an attitude is disadvantageous for the Arab states. The only state in the Middle East with a nuclear weapon is after all Israel, which moreover is not a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Further, the Arab states object to the EU's promotion of disarmament and arms limitations in the horizontal direction, encompassing solely the states of the eastern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean, and not remembering the vertical aspect, which would encompass the EU states as well.

Criticism from the Arab states has also been evoked by the EU's realisation of its **concept of promoting and supporting economic reforms and sustainable development**. From the moment the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was created, the provisions to exclude agricultural and fish products from the free trade area were denounced. These arguments were accepted by the EU only after the passage of a few years. In the opinion of the Arab countries, greater attention should be concentrated on removing non-tariff barriers, and the association agreements should concern not only the introduction of a free trade area, but also the free movement of people.⁴⁰⁸ Greater attention

supposed to serve the interests of all international society and contribute to world peace. *Politique étrangère de Tunisie*, <http://www.changement.tn> (June 2010).

⁴⁰⁶ In May 2008 Morocco joined an initiative on non-proliferation, submitted by the president G.W. Bush in Cracovia one year later. *Le Maroc adhère à l'initiative de sécurité contre la prolifération*, 20 mai 2008, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (June 2010).

⁴⁰⁷ Biscop, op. cit., p. 13.

⁴⁰⁸ M. Belkhadem propose de réviser le modèle de coopération euro-méditerranéen, *Conférence euro-méditerranéenne des ministres des Affaires étrangères*, 29–30 novembre 2004, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2010).

should also be focused on a liberalisation of the services sector.⁴⁰⁹ In their opinion, the EU should increase its engagement in promoting investment, for instance, by establishing a system of guarantees for European businesses investing in the SEMCs countries.⁴¹⁰ Importantly, in spite of the high place which the EU occupies among foreign investors in the Mediterranean Arab countries, these investments only amount to 1% of the total EU investment in developing countries.⁴¹¹

Reforms introduced on the European model have been opposed by Islamists, who were not opponents of modernisation in general, but did not agree with the European approach. According to Jerzy Zdanowski political Islam, which is one of the trends of Muslim fundamentalism, is thinking concentrated on the problems of socio-political development of Muslim societies and proposes its own model of modernisation, which could be described as 'modernisation with God.' The necessity of referring to religion in stimulating economic development and shaping new social ties is a postulate that differentiates Islamism from many European models of social modernisation, which have grown out of the Enlightenment conviction of the power of the mind as the exclusive cause of change.⁴¹²

Among Arab states there was also a low level of acceptance for the role of the European Union as a propagator of democracy, human rights and intercultural dialogue. These countries had the feeling that they were treated in an unequal, unpartner-like manner by the EU.⁴¹³ The EU's promotion of the idea that Islam is a barrier to modernising the societies of Muslim countries has given the impression that Western Europe treats the Arab and Muslim world as backward and uncivilised. This perception has been strengthened by historical experience. The Arab countries remember the times when they were colonies or protectorates of the European countries, and even the period of the crusades. Amin Maalouf writes that the Arab East still sees in the West its natural enemy.⁴¹⁴ Even moderate, educated Muslims, who are open to cooperation with European countries and the United States, have argued

⁴⁰⁹ *Réponse de M. Mohamed Benaïssa, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération, à une question d'actualité à la Chambre des Représentants sur les mesures d'accompagnement que compte prendre le gouvernement pour soutenir la compétitivité des produits agricoles marocains, 5 novembre 2003*, <http://www.maec.gov.ma> (January 2009).

⁴¹⁰ *Aide-Mémoire de l'Algérie sur le bilan de dix années de partenariat euroméditerranéen, 28 novembre 2005*, http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr (June 2010).

⁴¹¹ Bremberg, Driss, Horst, Soler i Lecha, Werenfels, op. cit., p. 6.

⁴¹² Jerzy Zdanowski, *Współczesna muzułmańska myśl społeczno-polityczna. Nurt Braci Muzułmanów*, Askon, Warszawa 2009, p. 13.

⁴¹³ Roberto Aliboni, *Common Languages on Democracy in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", No. 31, May 2004; Anna Khakee with Jaber Afoukane, Fouad M. Ammor, Derek Lutterbeck, *Pragmatism Rather than Backlash: Moroccan Perceptions of Western Democracy Promotion*, "EuroMeSCo Paper", No. 73, November 2008.

⁴¹⁴ Amin Maalouf, *Les Croisades vues par les Arabes*, JCLattès, Paris 1983.

that the introduction of political reforms must take place slowly and gradually in order for them to produce an approving change in people's mentality. Thus all attempts to impose a system of values and principles from the outside provoke the fears and resistance of the Arab states. It has happened that the Egyptian authorities have encouraged the imams to condemn advocates of democracy and human rights who receive help from the West and to describe them as traitors. This has happened chiefly in respect to aid accepted from the United States, but the EU has also remained under suspicion. Even Morocco, which has been open to cooperation, expects the EU not to intervene in its internal affairs.⁴¹⁵

4. Conclusion

The effectiveness of the EU's roles in the Mediterranean region in the years 1993-2010, evaluated through the lenses of three factors – the rationality of the roles' concepts, the degree of their realisation and the level of their acceptance by the SEMCs – was negligible. A clear conflict of roles was produced: between those declared and performed, declared and expected, and performed and expected.

The EU's concept (*declared roles*), in which several roles were to be performed simultaneously – an active player in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament, a promoter of economic reforms and intercultural dialogue – was in accord with the EU's interests and its international identity, however there was no accord with the expectations of the partner countries.

The Arab countries did not agree with the EU's concept of security in the Mediterranean region, or its idea of introducing democracy, human rights and certain aspects of economic and social reform. Israel, on the other hand, was critical of the EU's concept of its role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, accusing it of having a pro-Palestinian stance. The European countries, the Arab countries and Israel had diametrically opposing perceptions of threats to their security. In as far as the EU countries concentrated their attention on 'soft aspects' of security and feared such phenomena as illegal migration, organised crime, fundamentalism and Islamist terrorism, and the degradation of the natural environment, so its partners understood their security much more traditionally, concentrating on military aspects. The Arab countries did not agree with European Union's concept of democracy and human rights. In their opinion, the EU's propagation of these values was a breach of

⁴¹⁵ See more: Dorothee Schmid, *The Use of Conditionality in Support of Political, Economic and Social Rights: Unveiling the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership's True Hierarchy of Objectives?*, "Mediterranean Politics", Vol. 9, No. 3, Autumn 2004.

the basic rule of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and a clear violation of the principles of equality and partnership. Considerable criticism among the Arab states was also produced by the idea of creating a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, which in accordance with the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 would exclude items the countries of the southern and eastern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea specialise in producing (it was chiefly a matter of agricultural and fish products) (*expected roles*).

The divergence between the roles the EU declares and the roles expected from it by the countries of the SEMCs has been increased by the EU's inconsistent performance of its roles (*performed roles*). In many cases, the EU has not introduced the concept it adopted. This is particularly true in regards to its stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in its promotion of democracy and human rights, as well as in matters of disarmament. The EU's image in the eyes of its Mediterranean partners has been negatively impacted, its credibility and position have been weakened, and the Mediterranean countries' level of acceptance for the EU's roles has diminished. All these factors have had negative implications for the effectiveness of EU roles in the Mediterranean in 1993-2010.

Conclusions

The Mediterranean region has occupied a special place in EU policy. In the opinion of EU decision-makers, the multiplicity of problems with which the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries are struggling and the variety of challenges and threats for European security generated in this area require the EU to play many roles simultaneously: an active player in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament; the role of promoter of economic reforms and sustainable regional development and a propagator of democratic values, human rights and intercultural dialogue.

In the years 1993-2010, the EU performed the roles it declared chiefly through multilateral programmes of cooperation: in 1995 it initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the EMP /Barcelona Process), in 2004 it initiated the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and in 2008, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). In addition, independently of these programmes, it has been working actively for a lasting resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In spite of the gradual shift of emphasis in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation to selected fields in the EMP and UfM, the EU's specificity of influence in the Mediterranean region depends on a comprehensive approach, i.e., a holistic treatment of political, economic, social and cultural questions. Additional elements that, treated together, have distinguished the EU's roles from those performed by non-regional states in the Mediterranean area have been: 1) the institutionalisation of relations with its partner countries, 2) the comprehensiveness of activities 3) cooperation with other international actors (multilateralism), and 4) the declaration of the 'policy of conditionality', consisting in the introduction of democratic reforms and observance of human rights. This difference, which may be described as the specificity of the EU's roles in the Mediterranean region, is not unique in the EU's external policy. In its relations with other regions of the world, it has realised a similar concept. This approach resulted not only from the EU's interests but also from the values, norms and principles that constitute its foundations and are components of its identity. These values, in connection with its specific institu-

tional system, have hampered its ability to play effective international roles, as can be clearly seen in an analysis of its activities in the Mediterranean region. Part of the EU's declared roles have remained in conflict with the roles expected of it by the SEMCs. These countries have differed from the EU on many matters; they possess entirely different security cultures; they do not accept the West's concept of democracy and human rights; they do not fully agree with the EU's approach to introducing market reforms and sustainable regional development. Furthermore, some of the roles declared by the EU, particularly its role as a promoter of democracy and human rights and its role as a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament, were inadequate to the conditions of the region. The problem was similar with its partial role of promoter of market reforms and sustainable development.

The divergence of the EU's declared roles from those expected of it, and their limited suitability to the region's conditions, had a negative impact on the roles it played. In spite of the EU's declarations of promoting democracy, it did not enter into any cooperation with Hamas, which was democratically elected in January 2006 in the Palestinian Autonomous Territories; the EU talked of introducing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, but did not take any steps toward the disarmament of Israel, the only country in the region to possess a nuclear weapon; it was the largest donor of financial aid to the Palestinians, but for many years did not provide proper supervision over the funds' expenditure by the Palestinian Authority; it declared its intention to work toward improving the economic situation of the countries of the eastern and southern Mediterranean, but was unwilling to include agricultural and fish products – exports constituting a large part of the revenues of these countries – in the planned free trade area; it propagated the development of intercultural dialogue, but did not open its borders to the inhabitants of the SEMCs.

The conflict between the roles the EU declared and performed evoked the suspicion of its partners and additionally lowered the level of acceptance for those roles. In the opinion of the most countries of the eastern and southern Mediterranean, the EU was working solely in its own self-interest: it wanted to create in its neighbouring region an area of stability, democracy, peace and improved economic situation in order to strengthen its own security and increase its own prosperity. Even though the Arab countries are not a monolithic entity in the international arena and differed among themselves on many questions, yet their appraisals of EU policies were very similar. They were critical on most of the EU's roles. Even if they accepted the declared roles, they exhibited limited approbation for the roles performed. Israel has also been critical of the EU's activities, particularly its role as an actor in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. In Israel's opinion, the EU's position is pro-Palestinian, and its policy has contributed rather to intensifying the conflict than to resolving it.

The effectiveness of the EU's roles in the Mediterranean region in 1993-2010 was relatively slight, given the divergences between the roles the EU declared and performed and those expected of it. The least effective were the EU's roles as a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament, and as a propagator of democracy, human rights and intercultural dialogue. The EU's role as a promoter of economic reform and sustainable development was realised to a greater degree, although also limitedly.

The analysis produced in the book allows a few conclusions, on the EU roles in the Mediterranean region in the years 1993-2010, to be formulated:

First, the EU declared that it would perform the following roles simultaneously in the Mediterranean region: an active player in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict; a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership, security and disarmament; a promoter of market reforms and sustainable development; and a propagator of democracy, human rights and intercultural dialogue. Such an approach resulted from the EU's interests in the area and its international identity, which is comprised of the values, norms and principles guiding the EU in its foreign policy, the specific institutional nature of the system, including the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, and the EU's weak military component, when the military component is a trait of countries with aspirations to be powers, hampers the EU's playing of effective international roles. As has been shown by a study of the EU's roles in the Mediterranean region, they are chiefly normative in nature. Above all, the EU declares and plays the roles of 'promoter', 'propagator', 'participant' and 'initiator' of the values, norms and principles it recognises.

Second, the roles declared by the EU were not very compatible with the roles expected of it by the countries to which its roles pertained. In the case of the Arab countries, this chiefly concerned the role of promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership and disarmament, the role of propagator of democracy, human rights and intercultural dialogue, and, although to a lesser degree, the role of promoter of economic reforms and sustainable development. The difference between the EU's declared roles and those expected of it, as well as their inadequacy to the region's conditions, had a negative impact on the roles it performed.

Third, the effectiveness of the EU's roles in the Mediterranean region, when evaluated through the lenses of three factors – the rationality of the roles' concepts (declared roles), the degree of their realisation (performed roles) and the level of the roles' acceptance by the SEMCs (expected roles) – was relatively small. In as much as the EU's concept of its roles in the Mediterranean region could be considered rational in reference to the means at its disposal in the given territory, it would be hard to consider its concept rational in the context of the conditions existing in the region, particularly in regard to its role as a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership

and security, and as a propagator of democracy, human rights and intercultural dialogue. The degree to which the EU realised its roles varied among the individual roles. The concept of the EU as a promoter of confidence-building measures, partnership and security and as a propagator of democracy, human rights and intercultural dialogue was least realised; the EU's role as an actor in the Middle East peace process and as a promoter of economic reforms and sustainable development were realised to a larger degree. The level of acceptance for the EU's roles by its partner countries was also varied on account of the divergence between the EU's declared and expected roles, and the EU's inconsistent realisation of its roles.

Fourth, the effectiveness of the EU's roles has also resulted from its position in different areas of international relations. A key position in international economic relations has meant that it was capable of playing more effective economic role, while its weaker position in international political and military relations contributed to limiting its political and security roles. The EU has also occupied a strong position in international cultural relations; however, in order to play effective roles in this sphere, it should pay greater attention to the specificity of the various regions of the world and particularly to the different axiological orders occurring there.

At present, the EU is indubitably facing the necessity of redefining its roles toward the Mediterranean region. It needs to work out a new strategy of action in which it precisely describes its interests, goals, means and methods of acting. In the new document it should eliminate the errors it has committed in its policy to this time. Above all, it should take into account the complicate situations and the expectations of its partners. The EU's present approach, which treats political issues and those in the sphere of security, economics and culture equally, has evoked considerable criticism from the Arab countries. The criticisms increased with the events of the Arab Spring. The Arab countries would like economic support from the EU, with simultaneous respect for their own choice of path to transformation. The EU's talk about promoting democracy and human rights has not met with much interest. The Arab countries justifiably consider these ideas to be mere slogans which the EU treats instrumentally.

The EU, if it wants to play a significant role in the Arab world, or at least in a part of it, should adopt a more pragmatic policy and concentrate on specific undertakings, particularly economic ones, that will be accepted by the Arab countries. Without the approbation of the authorities and society, it will not be possible to introduce any permanent changes in these countries. Political, economic and social transformations have to be introduced independently by the Arab states and their societies. The EU should help but not by imposing its own models in this sphere. It should also continue the principle it has begun of a varying approach to each state and a policy of positive conditionality, which will encourage the Arab states to closer

cooperation.⁴¹⁶ It should take care that the roles it declares are also the roles it performs, and that both types are compatible with the roles expected of it. Given its international position, if there were substantial correspondence between its three types of roles, the EU could act effectively in the Mediterranean region.

⁴¹⁶ Compare: Richard Youngs, *The EU and the Arab spring: from munificence to geo-strategic*, "Policy Brief", No 100, October 2011, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior; Rasmus Alenius Beserup, Fabrizio Tassinari, "The Return of Arab Politics and Europe's Chance to Engage Anew", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2012, pp. 97-103.

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