

European Security – Challenges for the European Union

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Introduction

The early 1990s were marked by the disintegration both of the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union itself as well as the optimism, symbolized by Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History". The final victory of the so-called "Values of Western Civilization" – in particular liberal democracy, was proclaimed. The coming years or rather decades seemed destined to be dominated by the Transatlantic Community with the United States as *primus inter pares*. A large and rapidly increasing "power gap" between a strong Martian America and its perennial ally – a weak Venusian Europe proved the unprecedented US hegemony and unipolar international system architecture. At the same time, America inevitably began to move toward a unilateral approach to key security issues. The "American dream" of a so-called "New World Order" collapsed along with the Twin Towers in September 2001. That memorable day was destined to shatter forever the illusion of "full security" that not only Americans but the West as a whole used to enjoy and at the same time highlighted an importance of "new security challenges" – terrorism and cultural differences in particular.

New threats require a new way of thinking. Scholars, analysts and practitioners have begun to interpret challenges as a struggle to consolidate democracy, trade disputes, and most importantly the so-called "war on terror" through the lens of national identity and culture. Nowadays, security in the traditional sense seems to be a "melody of past times". The EU was inspired by a "comprehensive approach" to international security. Today we are witnesses of two parallel and intermeshing processes: a globalisation and transition in the global balance of power, which are additionally stimulated and enhanced by the effects of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The first one emphasizes the existence of transnational threats, the second entails the risk of an emergence of new interstate tensions. Along with the shifting of the world's centre of gravity towards the East, "new threats", such as terrorism, are making room for "old challenges". The impact of both processes leads to an increasingly complicated, uncertain and at the same time fluid security environment.

This book was born of two convictions: the first is that the new challenges to European security are getting more and more important nowadays. At the same time, the Authors are convinced that other threats could not overshadow the “hard security” aspects completely.

The publication that goes into the hands of the Reader is not a detailed analysis of all relevant security challenges in Europe. Rather it attempts to summarize and assess the importance of the analysed issues. Having regard to the accusations that may occur of marginal references to historical events, the Authors suggest that the purpose of the publication was not a historical vivisection. However, they have an ambition to answer the questions; what the main challenges for European security are and whether the “old continent” is able to deal with them without outside support. Moreover, while preparing this publication, the Authors have systematized and prioritized available materials that have been collected in the bibliography, which will enable the Readers to expand horizons in the areas which are interesting for Them.

This volume is divided into two parts. The first one is dedicated to the three-day-long edition of the Weimar Youth Forum, this time held in Poland and organized by the Centre for International Initiatives (CII). The second part of the book examines various challenges in the realm of the widely understood European security.

The first part is divided into two chapters. Chapter I consists of two letters. The first one, written by Barbara Marcinkowska and Aleksandra Radziwoń, Coordinators of the Weimar Youth Forum project, describes the idea of the Forum and its history. The second written by Professor Klaus-Heinrich Standtke, President of the Committee for French-German-Polish Cooperation, which was his Opening Address of the Weimar Youth Forum 2012.

Finally, the second chapter is an attempt to summarize the conference entitled “European security – challenges for the EU”, the lectures and the seminars concerning various aspects of political, economic and social security organized in the framework of the Weimar Youth Forum. The Authors who took part in the above-mentioned seminars/events try to shed light on the key findings from these considerations.

The second part of the volume examines various challenges in the realm of European security in a broad sense. In the third chapter the Author tries to assess the impact of several EU Petersberg missions which already took place, or still do, in Western Balkans. He supposes that EU CSDP operations are an important element of the broader Union’s activity of stabilising the states recently formed in the region. The Author analyses the impact of Petersberg missions on the stability, state-building, inducement of the rule of law, transformation of security forces and other important elements, essential for the welfare of Western Balkans’ states.

The fourth chapter analyses a progress that has been made in the development of European military capabilities essential to conducting independ-

ent full-scale out of area operations since the foundations of the ESDP. The Author seeks to give an overview of the efforts undertaken to generate such capabilities at the EU level, their results and the challenges ahead. On the basis of these considerations the Author tries to introduce how the military capabilities driven division of labour works in Afghan and Libyan missions.

The fifth chapter is dedicated to the matter of “cultural security”, the area often ignored by the traditional approach. The Author in his study draws attention to a long forgotten scholar – Felix Koneczny. The Author points out that not many are aware that most of Samuel Huntington’s views and theories were preceded by early 20-th century historiosophy. He believes that Koneczny’s concepts provide a sensible explanation on why Europe’s cultural policy is failing today to such an enormous extent.

The sixth chapter analyses the European Union’s food security system. The Author in her study tries to sketch out and analyse operating solutions, pinpoint steps that have already been taken to adapt the policy to the changing environment and show both failures and areas demanding particular attention.

In the last, seventh chapter, the Author in her article maintains that Germany, also thanks to its special relations with Russia, has the potential to become Europe’s most influential power. She attempts to answer the following questions: “Will Berlin maintain its absolute principle of *Westbindung*?” or “will it try to go solo at least with reference to some vital security matters?”.

Problems that have been the subject of analysis in this monograph are rarely examined in Polish literature. Therefore, the basis for the preparation of this work were English-language volumes in particular scientific articles, reports, expert analysis both prepared by public and nongovernmental institutions. It is worth noting that only a small number of them are available on our publishing market and even less has been translated into Polish. Although the Authors are aware of the limitations and imperfections of this publication, they hope that at least to some extent, it will help to fill the gap in the literature.

This book is the result of cooperation of students of the Institute of International Relations and Ph.D. candidates from the Faculty of Journalism and Political Science at the University of Warsaw. They are also active members or in case of one person a contributor to the Centre for International Initiatives.

The main, but not the only target of this monograph are students and beginner researchers of international relations, European integration and political science. The Authors also hope that it will be an attractive position for people who are interested in international affairs in a broader sense.

Weimar Youth Forum 2012. Opening Addresses

Barbara Marcinkowska, Aleksandra Radziwoń

1.1. The Weimar Youth Forum – international cooperation beyond the high-level politics

The Weimar Youth Forum is an annual project in which three non-governmental organizations associated with the Politeia Network participate: France is represented by the Conférence Olivaint, Germany by the Studentenforum im Tonissteiner Kreis, and Poland, since 2011, by the Centre for International Initiatives (Centrum Inicjatyw Międzynarodowych).

The Forum is a great opportunity for young people to meet and discuss the most important topics related to political, economic and social issues which are the subject of concern to many European governments and societies. It is also a possibility to share experiences by people from different countries, which is an important aspect of international cooperation and which helps to build real European society, based on mutual understanding and tolerance.

The Forum refers to the long and interesting tradition of the high-level meetings of the Weimar Triangle, which were established in order to strengthen the trilateral cooperation between Germany, Poland and France. The idea of rapprochement of these three societies also inspires the organizers of the Weimar Youth Forum, as they meet once a year to debate the main European topics.

During this year's edition young representatives of organizations from four countries (France, Germany, Poland, Belgium), as well as students from the two biggest Polish universities (Univeristy of Warsaw, Jagiellonian University) participated in the three-day forum whose main topic was 'European Security'. During these intensive three days participants tried to identify the main challenges for security in Europe and find possible solutions.

The organization of Weimar Youth Forum 2012 would not have been possible without the help of our partners, especially the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung,

the Stiftung für deutsch-polnische Zusammenarbeit, Komitee zur Förderung der Deutsch-Französisch-Polnischen Zusammenarbeit e.V. (“Weimarer Dreieck”), the University of Warsaw and the International Relations Review “NOTABENE”.

We would also like to thank the guest speakers that participated in the conference and lectures: Mr Andreas Krüger from the Embassy of Germany to Poland, Professor Klaus-Heinrich Standke from the Komitee zur Förderung der Deutsch-Französisch-Polnischen Zusammenarbeit, Dr Marek Madej and Dr Kamila Pronińska from the University of Warsaw as well as Mr Andrzej Ocalewicz from the The Casimir Pulaski Foundation. Thanks to their knowledge and experience Weimar Youth Forum 2012 represented a really high level of debate.

Furthermore, we would like to thank Professor Bolesław Balcerowicz from the University of Warsaw, who kindly agreed to review this publication.

Last but not least we would like to thank our entire Weimar Youth Forum team, who supported us all the way and helped us realize the project just as we imagined it.

We look forward to the next editions of the Weimar Youth Forum and to the growing cooperation between Member States of the Weimar Triangle – not only at the level of high politics, but also on the social one, among young members of European societies.

1.2. The Weimar Triangle Today: Origins – Functioning – Assessment – Expectations. Weimar Youth Forum 2012 – European Security Opening Address

1.2.1. Origins of the Weimar Triangle

In the history of Political Sciences, the Weimar Triangle has a unique position.

- It is not based on a Treaty ratified by Governments or by the Parliaments of the three countries concerned, i.e. France, Germany and Poland.
- It has no institutional framework, i.e. no secretariat structure, no budget, no plan of action.
- Even the name ‘Weimar Triangle’ was coined years after its creation.
- Outside a small circle of politicians, scholars and journalists it is even after more than 21 years of existence almost unknown.

Thus, one of the ‘Founding Fathers’ of the Triangle, the former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas has labelled it as an “*UFO – an Unidentified Flying Object.*”

Hans-Dietrich Genscher has labelled the Weimar Triangle as “*a facility, quite independently from the day-to-day concerns of politics to reflect upon the spirit of the New Europe*”. The third founding partner, former Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, has seen in the Weimar Triangle a “*Community of Interest*” of the three countries concerned.

The history of the Weimar Triangle is quickly being told: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, at that time the Foreign Minister of Germany, has invited his two counterparts from France and from Poland on the birthday of the great German poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, i.e. on 28 August 1991, to the small town of Weimar in Thüringen. One day later, the three ministers have presented to the public a “Joint Declaration on the Future of Europe”, not as some people perceive, on the future of the French-German-Cooperation. The text of the statement which is the only document laying the foundation of the trilateral cooperation known hitherto as the Weimar Triangle, contains not more than ten paragraphs. They are as valid today as at the time of their inception:

1. The need for France, Germany and Poland to shoulder jointly the responsibility for the creation of lasting neighbourhood structures in Europe.
2. It reasserts the unique chance at hand to develop together the new Europe against the background of solidarity among the countries, common destiny and common values.

3. It pleads for the development of networks among the civil society.
4. The text reiterates the importance of the European institutions as framework for stability in Europe. Stability is defined in a wider sense: it includes the political dimension as well as security policy and economic, social and ecological aspects.
5. Special reference was given to the importance to maintain close North Atlantic security relations with the US and Canada within the NATO framework.
6. Reference was made to the importance of the two bilateral friendship treaties between France and Poland and Germany and Poland signed just a few weeks earlier, i.e. on 9 April 1991 and 17 June 1991 respectively.
7. A plea was made to pave the way of the Central and Eastern European countries into the European structures.
8. Quite modern against the background of the global challenges which are confronting Europe today which are calling for joint European answers a series of common concrete projects were spelled out: Environment, Technology, Infrastructure, Communication, Energy and Culture.
9. A plea was made to create living conditions allowing people to exist in dignity.
10. Finally, the three ministers have recalled that the most important asset of Europe is embodied in its cultural diversity and in the creativity of its people. They have pledged for a vast cooperation programme on the fields of Culture, Education, Science, Media and Exchange Schemes. It is vital, in their opinion, to facilitate human encounters across the borderlines of countries and languages, wherever possible.

As you can see in hindsight, all vital elements for a close cooperation between France, Germany and Poland have been stipulated by the three visionary Foreign Ministers more than two decades ago. We have to ask ourselves, why have these visions not been put systematically in action? We shall come back later to this touchy question. This year's Weimar Youth Forum will, hopefully attempt to deal with this fundamental question in one way or another.

1.2.2. Functioning: Governmental trilateral activities 1991-2012

Beginning with the first meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in Weimar on 28/29 August 1991 all-in-all 25 different Foreign Ministers have met on 18 occasions, the last meeting took place in Berlin on 29 February 2012 when ministers Westerwelle, Sikorski and Juppé have met. The Agenda has almost a standard setting: *European Policy including questions of economic and energy policy, EU Financial Framework, European Neighbourhood policy, in particular Belarus, Syria.*

In addition to frequent meetings of the foreign ministers and their European Ministers the Defence Ministers have established a framework of meetings and consultations. It has culminated in the creation of a so-called “Weimar Battle Group” with French, German and Polish participation.

As from 1997 the Presidents of France and Poland and the German Chancellor have taken the habit of meeting in irregular intervals within the format of so-called “Weimar Summits”. The last meeting of this sort took place in Warsaw on 7 February 2011 to which President Komorowski has invited French President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel. The agenda of these high-level gatherings does not differ basically from the agendas of the ministerial meetings and not much interaction between the two formats seems to take place. However, the Weimar Summit meetings enjoy a much higher degree of visibility and stir more public interest. The absence of an organisational apparatus hinders, unfortunately, the implementation and follow-up of agreed action. This does not prevent, however, that the leaders of the three countries are seemingly favourably disposed towards the Weimar Triangle and are declaring as often as possible their willingness to reactivate the Weimar Triangle.

All-in-all 8 Weimar Summits have taken place.

The French President Hollande has invited for the next Weimar Summit for the 8th May 2013 to France.

1.2.3. Assessment of the Weimar Triangle

Whereas official government representatives usually praise the Weimar Triangle as a unique platform for consultations among three important EU member states of the EU-27, scholars come to a more sobering assessment.

The interest in the Weimar Triangle seems to be rather uneven among the three partner countries.

Whereas France and Germany dispose on the basis of the Élysée Treaty during half a century over a well-oiled functioning machinery which – in spite of its ups and downs – has remained the backbone of the EU, the French-German-Polish cooperation within the Weimar Triangle is seen by many as too ceremonial and without tangible results.

The hopes that the trilateral French-German-Polish setting in the Weimar format could gradually develop into a similar mechanism as the French-German engine set-up by the Elysée Treaty in 1963 have not proven to be realistic.

It is astonishing that the three countries were not able – or not willing – to define a political joint programme ‘for the future of Europe’ as suggested by the Founding Fathers way back in Weimar.

The model of the French-German cooperation has demonstrated that in addition of the bilateral governmental cooperation the systematic building up of a network of cooperation schemes involving the civil society is the best

guarantee for a sustained cooperation. Up till now proposals of our Committee to develop a French-German-Polish cooperation scheme ('Agenda 2021') with a series of concrete projects has not found the necessary echo and support in any of the three countries. Perhaps the time has come, that the host country of the WYF 2012, i.e. Poland, is taking the lead?

The fact that Poland, unlike France and Germany, does not belong to the Eurozone marginalizes the effectiveness of the trilateral cooperation. Many issues of concern of France and Germany within their policy towards Europe are not of the same importance to Poland.

The current EU middle-term budget negotiations within the EU illustrate this dilemma. Whereas Germany (9,0 Bill.€) and France (6,41 Mill.€) are the two largest net contributors to the EU budget, Poland is the largest net beneficiary (10,98 Bill.€). Within the EU budget discussions, obviously, the Weimar partners have different, if not opposing interests.

And yet, the issue of budget discrepancies and the issue of belonging or not belonging to the Eurozone should not result in accentuating the notion of a Europe with different speeds. Poland, therefore, can play an active role within the Weimar Triangle which indeed could set an example within the EU-27 for speeding up the integration process.

As at the days of the Founding Fathers in 1991 the success of – or the indifference towards – the Weimar Triangle is to a large extent determined by the personal interest shown by the political leaders of the three countries. The present constellation augurs well: President Komorowski as well as President Hollande both from the beginning of their mandate repeatedly underlined their interest on a revival of the Weimar Triangle.

For the first time at the ceremonies rewarding the Adam Mickiewicz Prize, both the French and Polish Presidents as well as the German Chancellor have transmitted personal messages of greetings to the prize rewarding ceremony which took place on 7 September 2012 at the Presidential palace in Warsaw. Symbols of this sort play an important role in international relations.

1.2.4. Some reflections for future action

The Committee for French-German-Polish Cooperation ('Weimar Triangle') is a non-governmental organisation. It was created in 2002 under the auspices of the Founding Fathers of the Weimar Triangle, the former Foreign Ministers Roland Dumas, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Krzysztof Skubiszewski. The Committee has no financial support. Its members are working *pro bono*.

The Committee has launched a Homepage www.weimarer-dreieck.eu which is the only consistent source of information on all Weimar Triangle initiatives – governmental and non-governmental – brought to our attention.

On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Weimar Triangle the Committee has created the Adam-Mickiewicz Prize rewarding mer-

its of individuals or organisations on the field of French-German-Polish cooperation.

Furthermore, the Committee has published a comprehensive handbook "The Weimar Triangle in Europe"¹ to which some 50 authors from the three countries have contributed.

The Committee is setting great hopes on the next Weimar Summit which, as already mentioned, will take place on 8th May 2013 in France. To this effect we have elaborated a number of proposals which we do hope will find their way into the agenda to be considered by the Heads of State and of Government:

In our opinion a few carefully selected topics should be selected, for example,

1. Launching of the Weimar Triangle of Innovation. The issue of increasing the international competitiveness through a better use of Research and Development is of vital importance in France and Poland, but increasingly to Germany as well.
2. Special attention should be given to the low level of university mobility between the 3 countries.
3. Enhanced Energy and Environmental cooperation between the three countries would call for political attention.
4. For the regional cooperation among the 16 Polish wojwodships, the 16 German Federal States and the appr. 20 French départements a concept should be developed.
5. The question of systematic contacts between the young people of France, Germany and Poland is a feature on practically all WT summit meetings. The idea was first launched by the Founding Fathers of the Elysée Treaty in 1963 when creating the Office Franco-Allemand pour la Jeunesse. Something similar was created between Germany and Poland in 1991. If we regard the trilateral dimension however, not more than 600 to 700 young French, German and Polish people are meeting each year. Detailed figures to this effect are contained in my book.
6. The launching of a Weimar Forum – alternating annual meetings in Poland, Germany and France – similar to the bilateral gatherings between Germany/US, Germany/U.K., Deutsch-Polnisches Forum (which, incidentally, has met in Warsaw on 29 November 2012)– would allow the elites of the three countries to become better acquainted with each other.
7. A closer cultural cooperation between the three countries should be enhanced. The holding of the next WT summit in France and the reward of the Adam Mickiewicz Prize 2013 in France could be used to give wide publicity to this notion.

¹ Klaus-Heinrich Standke (ed.), Trójkąt Weimarski w Europie – Das Weimarer Dreieck in Europa – Le Triangle de Weimar en Europe, Edition Adam Marszalek, Toruń 2010

8. The multitude of – bilateral – associations of the civil society in France, Germany and Poland should be used for openings to the third partners. To this effect an initiative should be launched aiming to form a joint informal framework for the associations of the civil society of the three countries
9. The www.weimarer-dreieck.eu Homepage should become a trilingual mechanism.

I would welcome if the WYF here in Warsaw would be able to come out with some additional concrete proposals to this effect which we would gladly support.

I wish the Weimar Youth Forum 2012 assembled here in Warsaw great success and I would wish, I could be among you here today.

CHAPTER II

European Security Nowadays – the Main Attributes, Challenges and Threats. The Report from the Weimar Youth Forum 2012

Barbara Marcinkowska, Marta Makowska

Faire l'Europe, c'est faire la paix²
Jean Monnet

It has already been more than a half of century since Europe, as a whole continent, witnessed the atrocities of a war. The peace provided by the cooperation between states, started in the early 1950s by the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, to the modern Europeans it seems to be the basic good, something obvious. However, the question of the international security is still crucial and should not be forgotten.

Being a part of the united Europe and at the same time having a strong impression that young people should take part in the public debate on the most important European issues, we gathered between November 30 and December 2, 2012 in Warsaw, together with young people from France, Germany, Poland and Belgium in the framework of three-day long forum to discuss the main features, challenges and threats to the European security today.

2.1. The Opening Conference: European Security – Challenges for the EU

The Weimar Youth Forum 2012 started on November 30 with the opening conference on the subject of modern challenges to the European security. The Conference took place at the University of Warsaw and was moderated by Marta Makowska – the Vice-President of the Centre for International Initiatives.

The conference began with a short speech of Marcin Kaczmarczyk, who represented one of our key partners – Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Mr Kaczmarczyk underlined the historical importance of the Weimar cooperation, which gives us nowadays a great potential to enhance this partnership. He also pointed

² “To create Europe is to create peace” Jean Monnet’s Speech, Aix-la-Chapelle, 17 May 1953.

out that deeper integration within the Weimar Triangle might help to face the crisis in these difficult times.

Afterwards, the main debate began. The two panellists were Andreas Krüger, Head of the Political Department at the German Embassy in Warsaw and Andrzej Ocalewicz, expert from Casimir Pulaski Foundation.

The broad subject of the discussion provoked interesting discussion on several different issues of the European security. The main problems were answers to the questions concerning EU's priorities in terms of international politics and the main limitations in formulating common foreign policy in the times of crisis. Both guests were concurring that Europe is now almost entirely absorbed by internal affairs, but on the other hand, they perceived it as being the most integrated in its history.

Mr Krüger pointed also, that EU cannot entirely outsource the security issues to other international actors, such as NATO whenever it fails or whenever it does not want to deliver its military capacity.

The panellists also argued about the European border security challenges and the need to enhance their control to prevent the influx of illegal migrants. They highlighted that this issue demands a careful approach and cooperation between all member states in order to protect its citizens, but also to respect human rights of people crossing the borders.

Another important aspect of this debate was the role of the Weimar Triangle in the security of the EU. Both panellists perceive this group of cooperation as an important actor combined of three influential European states, which may provide incentives for the rest of Europe in terms of enhancing common European security strategy (within the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy) and establishing mutual goals. Especially since the cooperation between Poland and Germany on this matter has been quite promising so far.

In the conference participated a number of students and young professionals interested in international relations.

2.2. The WYF 2012 Seminars: Three Dimensions of the European Security

There are three main dimensions of European security: political, economic and social. Using the hard power arguments, which are characteristic to the realism theory we should consider the first one as the most important. However, this logic was undermined many times and challenged by neo-liberalism, constructivism and other economically and socially-oriented theories. Following the two latter, we decided to look also at the economic and social dimensions of the European security.

Taking into account these three aspects of the international security, we decided to divide the second day of Weimar Youth Forum 2012 into three

panels. Each of them consisted of opening lecture, given by one of the invited experts, and seminars that followed it.

2.2.1. Political Dimension of the Security – Is It Really the Most Important?

Bearing in mind that the political dimension of security is in many cases still the most important one, the seminars' part of the Weimar Youth Forum 2012 started with the political security panel. During the lecture and a series of seminars the participants discussed the main challenges to the European political security. Following the lecture of Dr Marek Madej they debated about the importance of CSDP development. Furthermore, the WYF 2012 participants took a closer look at the issues related to the illegal immigration and problems of open borders in the Schengen zone and correlation between the protection of the civil rights and the fight against terrorism. The last seminar in this panel was referred to the problem of non-democratic regimes in the neighbourhood of the European Union.

2.2.1.1. The Development of CSDP – An Answer to the Challenges for the European Security?

The opening lecture was given by Dr Marek Madej from University of Warsaw and concerned the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). At the beginning Dr M. Madej emphasized that it has been always very difficult project in which the member states put a lot of ambitions but at the same time they struggled with their own national politic lines. Because of that, regarding the development of the CSDP, we could assume that it was disappointing in certain aspects.

The declarations of willingness to strengthen the cooperation are presented all the time, even at the end of November 2012, just before the WYF 2012, during the meeting of Weimar Triangle members; we could observe the manifestation of enthusiasm and some proposals concerning this policy. However, it has always been difficult to balance between the military requirements of European countries, capabilities and the willingness of member states. Alike other important fields of common policy, the unanimity of EU members is required to move beyond wishful declarations and optimistic resolutions.

Furthermore, Dr Madej recalled the history of creation of the CSDP. He highlighted that in the 1980s the member states were more concerned about strengthening of the European position in comparison to the United States rather than about building the autonomous capabilities, which according to him seemed to be an attitude a little bit 'schizophrenic' and illogical. As Dr Madej stated, the situation changed in 1990s, along with the creation of the European Union (by the Maastricht Treaty). The new structure included also some provisions concerning the long-term purposes in the field of security.

At that time, the EU was trying to build a structure around the Western European Union (WEU) and to create a common self-defence force. He also highlighted the importance of the Berlin Plus Agreement (according to which the assets of NATO could be used for the missions led by the WEU), the Treaty of Amsterdam (in which member states agreed to give the EU responsibility for the Petersberg Missions) and the Colonia Agreement (1999) when the UK, France and Germany (among others) agreed, for the very first, time to the common principles of the security policy including the development of European military capabilities in order to provide the stabilization of the neighbourhood of the EU.

Later on, Dr M. Madej presented the succeeding European Headline Goals (2003, 2010) and pinpointed that even if the European Union achieved significant success by the creation of the CSDP, there are still some challenges for this policy, especially concerning the military capabilities.

Moreover, he recalled that in order to face these challenges, the CSDP was one of the main points of French (2007) and Polish (2011) Presidency programs. Both of them concentrated their attention to the reinforcement of CSDP structures. However, their results are questionable.

Dr Madej concluded that although some difficulties and challenges are still visible, as far as it concerns the Common Security and Defence Policy, there are some signs of positive actions. The EU is able to conduct military and civilian Petersberg missions, to be active on the international arena and to become an important actor in international relations, also in the field of security.

2.2.1.2. Europe Without Borders or Fortress Europe? The Future of Schengen Zone

The opening lecture was followed by three seminars related to the political dimension of the security. First of them, moderated by Pierre-Alix Binet (Conférence Olivaint, France) aimed to find the answer for the anxiety about the future of the Schengen zone in the enlarged European Union. The participants of the seminar tried to answer several questions concerning the future shape of the European migration policy and the main security threats related to this issue. Moreover, an important aspect of the discussion was how to balance the freedom of movement and the fear of uncontrolled influx of immigrants. Also, participants posed the question of how to coordinate the efforts between states to manage illegal immigration and to integrate immigrants into the European societies.

The participants argued that Europe faces certain challenges related to the migration policy, therefore discussion started with the reflections about FRONTEX (Frontières extérieures/European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) and the tasks and challenges that it faces. One of the most

occupying tasks for international border institutions such as FRONTEX is the uncontrolled influx of migrants. The periphery states of the EU are the most exposed to the illegal human trafficking and are in need of assistance from other European states. The EU has developed community law concerning movement of migrants within the Schengen Zone. However, it is never easy to develop such a measure, which will be both satisfactory to the European states and the migrants themselves. As the participants highlighted, there are some states that are more attractive to them than the others, mainly due to the economic (low unemployment rate, relatively high remuneration) and cultural reasons (language, freedom of religion) and the ability of a particular state to incorporate migrants varies. Therefore, there should be a more efficient and reliable system of law, regulations and information, which would prevent in the future situations of immigration on a too high level.

Another important aspect of this discussion on immigration was how the governments should balance between the freedom of movement and the fear of the unknown, which may influence the public mood. Especially at the times of crisis that Europe is facing nowadays, citizens are very sensitive to the loss of their jobs and less tolerant to the newcomers, who may be perceived as competitors. Nonetheless, some issues are highly exaggerated by media, for example the influx of asylum seekers from Syria back in 2011 into Europe was remotely visible. Moreover, unfair and rather harsh opinions of job seekers from Eastern Europe, who would flood Germany, France and the UK, were far from the reality.

Furthermore, according to the participants, Europe needs to focus on tackling the key issue of integrating the migrants into the societies they inhabit. This extremely delicate matter requires long lasting strategy and constant monitoring, which would prevent from any kind of violations of human rights.

2.2.1.3. How Far Can Europe Go? Defence against Terrorism Versus Civil Liberties

During the second seminar moderated by Karolina Libront (Centre for International Initiatives, Poland), the participants tried to discuss the topic of correlation between the defence against terrorism and the protection from abuse of civil liberties.

All agreed that the Internet could become another area where the violation of human rights is highly possible. Government's fight against terrorism and crime recurs to filtrating personal data of Internet users and pressures companies to share the confidential data. As it was emphasized, in the era of globalisation it is almost impossible to hide any information from the authorities. This relatively new situation results in public disagreement and protests of Internet users who feel threatened by 'the system'. They do not accept increased control as a security tool preventing from terrorism and organised crime. Moreover, the participants pinpointed that according to the

advanced Internet users the government control is harmful but inefficient at the same time, as they do not have enough resources to tackle the problem wisely. Furthermore, the best Internet specialists, the so-called 'hakers', often do not accept working for the governments.

During the debate another issue was raised. A part from the doubt whether such measures are actually effective, there is also a huge concern about the limits of control. Citizens do not want to get completely deprived of their freedoms and they request transparent actions of the authorities. They associate living in the democratic and liberal communities with considerable autonomy and self-governance.

2.2.1.4. How to Export Democracy? The Problem of Non-Democratic Regimes at the Borders of Europe

The last seminar during the political security panel concerned the problem of 'exporting democracy'. Hanno Focken from Studentenforum im Tönissteiner Kreis e.V. (Germany) who moderated the discussion started with posing the question whether the EU has an interest in exporting democracy.

As it was stated during the debate, the European countries have been praising their liberal democratic systems for years. The European Union, granted the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012, has been presented as an example of consequent and transparent promoter of the universal values and establishing international institutions, which prevented the continent from repeating the tragic history of the 20th century. Yet, the question of exporting the 'Western' democracy to the other parts of our globe delivers certain doubts.

The participants of this seminar highlighted that democracy provides good conditions for economic growth and stable international relations. Promoting and giving good examples by helping local governments in establishing democratic institutions and systems may have positive effects in general, but each intervention in the internal affairs of another state must be treated as a final solution when other measures fail and are performed prudently. There are cases when such approach was introduced, just to name Iraq or Afghanistan in recent years. Until now opinions about those operations are divided, as the stability in the region has not been entirely achieved.

Furthermore, according to young Europeans taking part in this discussion, the important question is whether the European Union can impose the democracy for certain reasons such as the situation of threat or with regard to the migrants inhabiting its territory. Some asked whether the liberal democracy itself assumes the free choice of participation why one does not have the right to resign from these privileges and subject themselves to the authorities? The answer for this question stayed non-provided.

Later on, the participants discussed the history and importance of the European engagement into peacekeeping missions. As it was emphasized, Europe has a history of participating in different international peacekeeping

operations (e.g. within the United Nations) and due to its resources and capabilities it developed a wide range of assistance tools available to whoever needed them. The nongovernmental sector has also played an important role in this process by offering the direct help and different means of assistance (e.g. know-how). Efforts of hundreds of thousands of people cannot be undermined by the political decisions of their leaders.

2.2.2. Energy, Food or Financial Crisis – What Is The Most Important Issue to the EU Economic Security Nowadays?

Thinking about the importance of economic aspect of the international security we have tried to identify the main challenges for the European Union in this field. Regarding the most commented topic of previous years, we reserved one of the seminars on the debate concerning all crisis-related issues.

Notwithstanding the importance of financial aspect, the European security should be understood in broader terms. Therefore, the new challenges were also defined. One of them is food security, which, taking into account the importance of the Common Agricultural Policy (almost 40 % of the EU annual budget) is also a subject of concerns of the European decision-makers. Last, but not least, we decided to examine the importance and impact of issues related to the energy sector onto the broader, international as well as European security. The energy security was also the topic of Dr Kamila Pronińska's (University of Warsaw) lecture, which opened the second panel of the Weimar Youth Forum.

2.2.2.1. Energy Security – the Main Challenges and Features

Polish participants especially waited for the Energy panel, which was introduced by Dr Kamila Pronińska's lecture on the energy security. Why was it so important? To answer this question it is essential to present main points from K. Pronińska's discourse and the debate that followed the lecture in the seminar groups.

It is crucial to define the principal terms related to the energy security in order to identify challenges. Dr Pronińska started with a simplified definition of energy security, which for the purpose of lecture was defined as *the availability of the energy in sufficient quantities and at affordable prices at all time*. To understand the complexity of this issue, many different factors should be taken into account such as economic, geostrategic, ecological and institutional ones that were highlighted by Dr Pronińska. Each of them is very important, however, only when considered together they show the big picture of the intricacy of the energy security. In this context it is necessary to introduce the following levels of analysis: global, national, sectorial and individual, which influence also the energy security.

Furthermore, according to Dr Pronińska, energy security is in constant flux because it depends on many factors, including: the context of multilateral relations between consumers and suppliers, the trends of demand and supply in the energy market, the country's position in the supply chain and, the least quantifiable but also very important – the fear of the energy crisis. The shape of the domestic energy market depends on all of aforementioned factors. If countries possess their own resources and the well-developed market based on many sources of energy (including the renewable kind), it can be regarded as the secure one.

The next step in the process of defining the main challenges for the European energy security is to identify the principal actors and their interests. As mentioned before, one of the factors has the most significant impact on the energy security is the position in the supply chain, which can be: importers, exporters or transit states. The interests depend often on the role that the particular state plays in the system. For the importers – to feel the sense of energy security – it will be necessary to provide the security of supplies, the access to energy sources and their diversification. By contrast, the exporting states should provide the security of demand and revenues and the diversification of importers. It is not an easy task to define the interest of transit-states. Each of them has a different perspective, each is put into a different context and it is why each has a different energy policy.

Considering that in the European Union at the same time there are the importers, the exporters and the transit state, we should ask ourselves if the transformation of the European system is possible, and if so, is the common energy policy feasible, especially when the main preoccupation of member states is a struggle against the results of the financial crisis.

Taking into account the increasing role of interdependency, three main principles of the EU energy policy were indicated by Dr Pronińska and later developed in further discussion. The future common policy toward energy security should be based on the market rules (and especially on the rule of competitiveness), on the security of supply and on sustainable development. To achieve these goals, the EU should decrease the dependency on supplies from Russian. What is also important, it is the necessity of special provisions in the EU law, which should be made to encourage the common energy policy.

2.2.2.2. Nuclear, Renewable or Conventional Sources of Energy – Is the Common European Energy Policy Feasible?

Once defined, the energy security was the subject of the following discussion within the seminar group moderated by Karolina Libront (Centre for International Initiatives, Poland). During the seminar several topics related to this issue were evoked. Participants from three different countries, with different concerns and points of view related to the energy topic discussed together about the possibility of creation of the common European energy

policy, the relations between production of energy and the ecology, and the possible crisis scenarios.

Regarding the ecology, important questions were raised. First of all, the participants of the seminar examined the question of interdependence between ecology and economy in the European Union, especially about the possible ways of dealing with this delicate issue. Two – fairly opposite opinions were presented during the discussion. On one hand, for some people it was obvious that in the time of the economic crisis, ecology should not be the main concern. On the other hand, the ‘green energy’ was considered as a future of European energy system and therefore should be developed, however, in the accordance with geographical, economic and cultural features of the states. Following this debate, next question was asked: whom should Poland follow – France and its nuclear energy system or rather Germany and its green energy program? And again, the audience was divided into at least two parts – the supporters of the green energy on the one side and the atomic enthusiasts on the other. What was important for the Polish participants was the negative connotation of nuclear energy (because of the Chernobyl and Fukushima catastrophes). Moreover, building nuclear plants and managing the radioactive wastes seem to be much more expensive than providing the equipment for the renewable energy systems. Furthermore, all agreed that the entire Europe retires from the atomic programs to some extent; therefore the development of the green energy is most appropriate.

The second big issue of this discussion was the common European energy policy. K. Libront asked if at this stage it was possible? Later on, she interrogated whether it might be possible regarding the failure of the Nabucco pipeline project. The answer to this question seems to not be straightforward. The variety of particular states’ interests and politics is the crucial obstacle in the process of developing the common policy in this area. The attitude of France and Poland towards the shale gas was given as an example. However, the main goal for all member states should not be to disturb each other and try to harmonize their policies.

The harmonization and solidarity were indicated as the common values of European Union also in the last main topic of this seminar, that means reactions of the possible energy crisis or blackmails. As the energy security is one of the main challenges to the EU, the member states should act unanimously in order to provide it in case when one or more of them would be a victim of terroristic attack which blocks the supplies or of a blackmail from energy exporter country.

2.2.2.3. Financial Crisis – Has the European Solidarity Paid Off?

The second seminar was dedicated to the financial aspect of the economic security. The discussion about the impact of the financial crisis on the European security was moderated by Bastien Gautier from Conférence

Olivaint (France). The topic of the European solidarity dominated completely this panel. It was discussed in many aspects, such as the cohesion policy, the rescue plans for most indebted countries, the limits of the solidarity principle and the development of the European economy based on the solidarity.

At the beginning the Participants talked about the cohesion policy and the need of decreasing the differences between regions within the European Union. As it was highlighted, we do not want to live in the community where there is a huge disproportion of standards of living not only between the states but also between some regions inside the countries. The participants from three different countries noticed that the ongoing economic crisis has shown that the EU wants to be solidary, what is especially visible in the so-called *rescue plans*.

Although, everyone highlighted the importance of the European solidarity, none of the participants was delusional that it is built on the altruism of the member states. Due to the interdependence between states, the collapse of one of them could entail problems in others, especially in the Eurozone. This is the reason why they decided to provide the financial support.

What was also emphasized, it is the need of acting in a solidary and united way as a continent and as a community in order to be able to compete with other big markets such as the US, China, India and Brazil. However, the competitiveness of the European economies should not be a victim of this cooperation.

2.2.2.4. Food Security – When, What, and How to Produce?

The last seminar of this panel was moderated by Constanze Blum from Studentenforum im Tönissteiner Kreis e.V. (Germany). The participants were trying to answer several questions concerning the food security. First of all, they found it necessary to identify if the problem of non-availability of food is a challenge for Europe. The answer to this question was agreed unanimously – Europe should not meet any food crisis, however it faces other challenges, such as the lack of competitiveness, the need of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform and the problem of GMO (Genetically modified organism).

The Common Agricultural Policy is the subject of constant debate both on the European as well as national levels. More than 35% (ca. 35 – 40%) of the annual EU budget's expenditure is devoted to agriculture. However, not all of the countries benefit much from the CAP, therefore there is need of a reform. A huge problem of the European agricultural system are the subventions that are a burden for the budget and provoke the lack of competitiveness of the European products (prices on the EU level are higher than on the global level).

The other important issue is the need of competition with GMO products, that are not fully acceptable in Europe. There is a great discussion if GMO products should be allowed on the European market and if so should they be

labelled in a special way? A huge part of the discussion within the seminar group concerned the security of GMO products. Are they an improvement or rather a danger? What should we do if we cannot ban GMO products on the European market due to the WTO agreements? These questions stayed opened but the participants agreed that more research on the GMO products should be done and we should work on the promotion of the non-GMO food produced by the European countries. They claimed also that introduction of labels for GMO products could be a solution.

2.2.3. Social Dimension of the European Security

We say that Europe cannot be really secure without having a solid base in the civil society. As it was discussed during the first panel (*Political security, How to export democracy? The problem of non-democratic regimes at the borders of Europe*) there is visible interdependence between the democracy and the international security. The links between democratic system and peace were noticed already by Immanuel Kant in the XVIII century. Now we have the opportunity to examine this thesis by challenging it with new issues that have raised recently, such as the importance of non-governmental organisations (NGO) in the process of building the civil society, relations between civil liberties and the propriety rights as well as the future of the socio-economic rights that are guaranteed by a welfare state. During the lecture given by Mr Andrzej Ocalewicz (The Casimir Pulaski Foundation) and the following debates at the seminar groups, the participants of the Weimar Youth Forum 2012 tried to identify the place and the importance of the social dimension of the international security.

2.2.3.1. German Political Foundations in Central Europe – Can They Spread Democracy?

The lecture given by Mr A. Ocalewicz aimed to explore three main topics. First was to describe the history, the legal status and the reach of German political foundations in Central Europe. The second aim was to show, basing on Polish and Ukrainian experiences, what are the roles conducted by these foundations. The final goal was the discussion with the participants about how the German foundations can be used to spread democracy around the world and if it is always the best transmitter to do that.

Mr A. Ocalewicz highlighted that there is a huge variety of political foundations in Germany. Virtually, all large German parties have one foundation that it affiliated to it, such as: The Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) is affiliated to the Social-Democratic Party, The Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) is affiliated to the Christian Democratic Union, The Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNS) is affiliated to the Liberal Democratic Party, The Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSS) is allied to the Bavarian Christian Social Union, The

Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBS) is affiliated to the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (RLS) is allied to the Left Party.

As the speaker stated it, the foundations have different history and political background but they are all financed by public funds. The amount that each foundation receives depends on the number of deputies that each political party has in the Bundestag. For example, the biggest one, KAS, has the annual budget of more than 100 million euros.

Furthermore, the lecturer with the help of participants of the WYF 2012, identified several roles played by the political foundations, which are: to be an advocate of pro-democratic change and free-market reforms; to support political and societal education; to serve as an political lobbyists to decision makers, opinion makers, politicians, journalists, young professionals, students, etc.; to build contact network among politicians, businessmen, media, culture and youth; to gain knowledge of given state's foreign and domestic policies, thus giving every German party a glimpse into the political reality of countries; and last but not least, to socialize hosting societies into "European" values and preparing them to associate with the European Union, Council of Europe as well as other international organizations.

The discussion about the role of the NGOs was later continued in one of seminar group.

2.2.3.2. NGOs as the Backbone of European Civil Society

The seminar about the importance of NGOs was moderated by Charles Ohlgusser (Conférence Olivaint, France). The participants fully agreed with the given title. According to them it is essential to highlight the importance of the NGOs in the creation of the European civil society. In developed democracies non-governmental organizations are an unquestionable part of a civil society. Once agreed on that, the question about the role of NGOs' that they play in the developing countries has been raised and discussed.

Firstly, the issue of private humanitarian organisations was raised. According to the participants, it is valuable that private NGOs are created in order to help people in the poorer parts of the world, especially that often they are more efficient than the public institutions. However, if this aid is not coordinated with the public and international donations, it may disrupt the balance in the developmental aid, which is already provided. Secondly, there is a problem of the European/American based NGOs implementing their actions in developing countries (e.g. Eastern parts of Africa) without cooperating with local organizations. This kind of behaviour can be interpreted as not- respecting the state's sovereignty, and what is more, can be misleading due to the lack of coordination on the national level.

The second big issue raised during the seminars concerns the possible roles that NGOs should play in the international system. The participants agreed that NGOs should respect the division of competences between local

and international institutions. What is also important is the respect of the rule that each action of an NGO should have a proper legitimization and be provided where the governments cannot act efficiently. However, being part of the civil society, NGOs should be able to replace some of the government's responsibilities, but all that regarding the challenge of avoiding the counter-productive effects, which often are the case.

The other challenge of the NGOs' engagement in the humanitarian aid is the fact that there is no transparency in the capital management. The participants noticed that according to the unofficial data, sometimes only 20% of money that people contribute to the humanitarian aid reach the beneficiaries, the huge part of these funds are used for working costs of NGOs.

At the end of the discussion the crucial issues occurred: how could we improve the functioning of NGOs system and their cooperation with the governments? Can we limit their actions in order to avoid their harming impact? Is it undemocratic? And last but not least, if their role as exporter of the democracy is really possible? Regarding these questions, there is no simple answer. We cannot deny that NGOs play an important role as a backbone of the civil society. They could export the democracy but it will not be possible without the international coordination and cooperation with governments both from democratic and authoritarian states – as the NGOs cannot act in place where they are not allowed to be present. Therefore some international regulation is needed, even if, according to some people, it involves certain level of democracy limitation.

2.2.3.3. Civil Intellectual Property and Civil Liberties – Do They Contradict Each Other?

The second topic related to the social dimension of the international security concerned the possible abuse of the civil liberties in the context of intellectual property. This topic was proposed by the organizers, due to a huge international debate concerning the introduction of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) that took place a year ago. Taking the results of this discussion as a starting point we proposed the participants of the Weimar Youth Forum 2012 to think about the links between the protection of intellectual property and the civil rights, such as freedom of speech, the free access to the common cultural goods and other liberties that according to the adversaries of the ACTA and similar agreements were threatened.

The conclusions of the seminar, which was moderated by Michael Fues – the representative of Studentenforum im Tönissteiner Kreis (Germany), varied significantly.

First of all, the participants highlighted that we cannot consider the intellectual property rights and the civil liberties as the opposing terms. The intellectual property is part of human rights, one of the fundamental issues, which guarantees the respect of intellectual work made by people. As it was

claimed, there is a problem with understanding this issue by the society in Poland, where the awareness on this matter is scarce. Moreover, the government does not propose any solution to tackle this problem.

The other challenge for this issue, according to the participants, is to inform correctly the public opinion which is very influenced by the media. The information provided by the media and business actors are not always objective and can mislead the audience.

The interesting fact that is related to this topic is that in Europe the Pirate Parties are more and more popular. Other than Poland, they also already exist in France, Germany and Belgium. The participants asked about their view on this phenomenon emphasized that this is a very complicated issue. There are different goals that the Pirate Parties want to accomplish, among them are: protection of civil rights, reform of copyright and patent law, free sharing of knowledge, and freedom of information. They also want to provide free access to the Internet, which was the subject of further questions asked by the moderator of the discussion. And again, the participants highlighted the complexity of this issue. On the one hand, each person has a right to have access to information but on the other we cannot deny that authors have rights to be remunerated for their work – and it is why the intellectual property should be protected.

However, the participants agreed that the current system of protection does not work properly. Some rights should be assured, but at the same time the law should not be too strict to threat other civil liberties. Moreover, in creating the proper regulations, the constant development of technology and changing nature of the media should be taken into account.

And the end of the debate, the question of a common welfare was raised. All conceded that people should be allowed to use the common goods for a common welfare, but at the same time they agreed that it is very difficult to define what is the common good (example of pharmaceuticals companies which often have to invest a lot of money in the research but are obliged to share knowledge and their products in some circumstances i.e. epidemic).

2.2.3.4. Can Europe Still Afford a Welfare State?

During the last seminar of the “social dimension of the international security” panel, which was moderated by Kamil Mazurek, a representative of Centre for International Initiatives (Poland), the participants tried to answer the question whether Europe was still able to function as a community of welfare states. The base for this discussion was an article of Martin Eiermann (*The Myth of the Exploding Welfare State*), which advocated that the argument of a necessity to fight against the public debt is overused when talking about the reform of a welfare state, because those issues are not deeply related.

There were five main topics raised during the discussion. Firstly, the participants debated about the pension system and its possible reforms. During the discussion, the issue concerning the importance of balance between the

budget and social rights was raised, including the necessity of guarantee of a minimum salary and a reform of the retirement system. All agreed that the current system is based on a wrong assumption that further generations will be more numerous than the present one, although we live longer and therefore we should work longer. However, there is also a question of a different kind of work that should be taken into account during the reform of the pension system.

Secondly, the discussion turned into direction of changing balance between the generations. The starting point was the statement that our generation is the first one that will be poorer than the generation of our parents and therefore the reform is absolutely needed. This debate was followed by the analysis of the labour market and its changing shape (for example, there are more well-educated people without job perspectives that suit their education; the education system is not adequate to the labour market etc.).

Thirdly, the seminar's participants debated about the possible reform of the social system. They tried to answer the question if we should follow the American example. Some of the participants claimed that partial privatization could be a solution to the problem, others, answering the question asked by K. Mazurek, tried to compare current "European" system with the American one. They concluded that completely following the US system is counter-productive for Europe but we should learn from their example and try to combine it with the best components of systems of several European states.

The last two questions asked by the moderator concerned the possible creation and the prospective of the social system on the European level. All agreed that the possible creation of such a centralized social system should be an answer to the necessity rather than realization of a political will because there are too many differences between states; some of them are more social and some not so much. The coordination of social system would be rather difficult, especially in the moment of a global debate about the future of a welfare state as an idea.

2.3. Final Remarks

The Weimar Youth Forum 2012 finished on Sunday morning with the closing conference. It was the opportunity to collect and present the conclusions drawn by each of the seminar groups. As it was highlighted by all participants, it is essential to consider the international security in a broader sense than it was used to be done in the past (only hard security). Moreover, the participants pointed out that the forum was a good opportunity to discuss many modern European security challenges. However there are still some aspects that have not been taken into consideration.

These remarks became an important inspiration for the Authors of this publication to take a look at the main threats to the European security and its main challenges and to discuss them on the pages of this book.

Does CSDP matter? Assessment of Petersberg Missions in the Western Balkans and Their Impact on the Region's Stability

Kamil Łukasz Mazurek

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the impact of several EU Petersberg missions which already took place, or are still underway, in the Western Balkans. The thesis of the chapter is that the CSDP operations are in fact one of the most important elements of the broader EU activity of stabilising states recently formed in aforementioned region (Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo). Author's focus point is to assess how Petersberg missions contribute to the stability, state-building, inducement of the rule of law, transformation of security forces and other important factors, essential for the welfare of Western Balkans' states. In order to fulfil this task the Author analyses economic and political indicators used to measure well-being of state, as well as opinions and analyses prepared by leading European experts on the subject of CSDP operations and state-building.

With the end of the Cold War and disintegration of socialist federal states, whole Europe (including its western part, but more as a spectator) witnessed political, social and economic changes not seen before. While the majority of people were thrilled by the fact that the two block system had ceased to exist, experts and policy makers knew it could also bring chaos and disorder to at least several post-soviet states. Unfortunately, their predictions came true. The Collapse of Yugoslavia plunged several newly independent states into the abyss of the series of wars (including the civil ones), as federal authorities in Serbia were still advocates of one political entity.

In this context, the international community could not stand still and do nothing. During the last decade of the 20th century, several international organisations³ launched numerous civilian and military operations to bring order and stop atrocities in the Western Balkans. Although the most profound were these carried out by NATO, it was clear that crude military force could not resolve all the problems entrenched deeply within societies of newly formed states. Accordingly, after the bombing stopped and wars and atrocities ended, international community (especially European actors) decided

³ Such as: the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

that the new and fragile independent political beings are unable to survive by themselves and massive assistance is needed. This attitude paved the way for launching several peacekeeping, state-building and rule-of-law operations under the aegis of the newly formed European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the form of Petersberg missions⁴.

The Author of this chapter formulates a thesis that the EU engagement in the Western Balkans is an important factor for the well-being and stability of the recently formed states (especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia⁵, and Kosovo⁶) and The Common Security and Defence Policy⁷ (CSDP) Petersberg operations are one of the most important elements in providing stability to aforementioned states and assistance to local authorities. Although it is difficult to precisely assess the impact these operations have had on the region (the EU Petersberg missions are only a portion of the international involvement in the Western Balkans), there are analyses of the subject made by researchers and some qualitative data, such as opinions and interviews with people who were on the ground, that can be used to verify the chapter's thesis.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section briefly describes political, security, social and economic situation in the discussed region in the wake of the EU involvement in the Western Balkans (the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the following one), as well as several years after (second decade of 21st century). In the second section the Author presents shortly all EU Petersberg missions launched so far, both those already finished and ongoing. The final and the most important section seeks to answer the question whether the European Union CSDP operations have had an impact on the stabilisation of the region and state-building processes.

3.1. Western Balkans – Then and Now

For states situated in the Western Balkans, the last decade of the 20th century was astonishingly difficult. Several wars, an economic downturn, social

⁴ Name “Petersberg operations” comes from the term “Petersberg tasks”, which includes the following: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization.

⁵ In international terminology this states is called the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and in this chapter both names are treated as synonyms.

⁶ Although Kosovo is recognised as an independent state only by 98 members of the United Nations and even the EU does not have clear policy on this matter (five members states have not recognised its independence), in this chapter Kosovo is regarded as a state like any other.

⁷ CSDP is a new name given to ESDP after the reforms introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon.

unrests and many other tragedies occurred, which is why at the wake of the new century the whole region was in a far worse shape than any other place in Europe. Although our comparative analysis in this section will not involve description of the situation during the early nineties, but will focus on the beginning of the 21st century and on the current state of affairs; there will be at least several references to the times when the region plunged into disarray.

In terms of general security and political situation, the state of affairs in the relevant Western Balkan states⁸ improved meaningfully. Strong EU involvement in the region followed by the successful NATO military operations has brought more than a decade-long period of peace and relative stability unseen since the eighties. At the turn of centuries, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia remained divided in lines of ethnic affiliation. Already mentioned military enforcement type operations had stopped open conflicts, however political situation remained extremely unstable and the authorities of Bosnia, FYROM and Kosovo⁹ would not last without firm international support in the form of thousands of NATO soldiers and other international personnel on the ground. This period was characterised by the weakness of domestic political institutions, unable by their own to stop violence, and a renewed EU commitment to the region in a form of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)¹⁰.

After several years, at the outset of the second decade of the 21st century, the Western Balkans ranks among other regions of Europe where military conflicts belong to the past. Considering the security of the area, relevant states are much safer places than they were a decade ago. Serious clashes between ethnic group ceased, albeit certain level of distrust remains and from time to time the region faces minor security problems, such as riots in June and in July 2012 at the Kosovo-Serbia border. Talking of the situation in politics, democratic transition should be also mentioned. All three states hold free elections in accordance with democratic standards (though with multiple setbacks) and have relatively well functioning political institutions. At the same time however, previous election campaigns (parliamentary and presidential) and every-day politics have shown that deep ethnic divisions within societies are still in place¹¹. Moreover, institutions' effectiveness is still lagging

⁸ Our analysis refers not to all Western Balkans states, but only to these where the EU launched operations under ESDP, namely: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo.

⁹ Naturally, out of these three, only Bosnia and Macedonia were sovereign political beings, though with significant international presence. In the first years of a new century authority over Serbia region of Kosovo was fully exercised by the international community.

¹⁰ SAP's main goals were: to stimulate democratisation and create proper and stable institutions; to induct the rule of law; to support economic reconstruction and development.

¹¹ S. Ralchev, *Bosnia & Herzegovina*; G. Stojkowski, *Kosovo*; G. Stojkowski, *Republic of Macedonia*, in: O. Minchew, M. Lessenski, G. Stojkowski, S. Ralchev, *The Western Balkans: Between the Economic Crisis and the European Perspective*, Sofia 2010, p. 46-47, 75-76, 90, iris-bg.org accessed on: 18.12.2012.

in comparison with other Balkan states. It is true that the years of reforms improved the situation, but in some cases almost nothing has changed (for example in regard to ethnocentricity in Bosnia administration) or even has become worse (like with the freedom of speech in Kosovo)¹². To sum up, after a decade of changes in the field of politics and security it can be now said that the most profound progress has been seen in the matter of stabilisation in relevant states and in the eradication of serious ethnic violence (however it is still present, especially in Kosovo). Contrary to that, political and institutional development has been rather vague. Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo are still under international support, have weak institutions, with deeply divided societies and in some areas the situation has become even worse than a decade ago.

As for the socio-economic perspective, the region described has changed significantly since the beginning of the 21st century. While the situation in the discussed countries differs, there are certain visible patterns of development and serious problems concerning all of them. At the outset of the new century, Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo¹³ had to face the legacy of previous conflicts and the problem of centrally-planned economy, which in turn caused “poor public sector management, non-transparent budget accounting and procedures, significant price subsidies, monetisation of fiscal deficits and a piling up of arrears and debts” and although there had been an improvement over past years, the situation was still difficult¹⁴. Previously undertaken reforms and the continuation of the stabilisation process improved investment and economic climate, however, indicators such as trade deficit, budget imbalance, high level of unemployment, robust state expenditures and difficulties in inducing economic growth without foreign aid were main problems those states were facing¹⁵. Additionally, living conditions (housing for instance) were subpar due to the fact that the recently finished conflicts and ethnic tensions were still a source of difficulty. The post war economic environment was also conducive to the further spreading of corruption, which heavily affected both businesses and ordinary people¹⁶.

Thanks to the relatively stable security situation in the region during the several previous years, the economic outlook of Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo is better than at the beginning of the 21st century, although not as

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 48-49, 76.

¹³ At that time it was a province of Serbia under administration of KFOR and the United Nations.

¹⁴ *The Western Balkans in Transition*, European Economy, European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels 2002, p. 6, ec.europa.eu, accessed on: 03.01.2013.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 1-2, 6, 8, 24, 46, 52. Additionally, the security crisis in 2001 in FYROM caused drop in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in this country.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 28-29, 56.

good as some people may have anticipated. Constant and high GDP growth continued in all three states¹⁷, trade imbalances and external debt declined (although with exceptions) and several economic reforms were implemented, which further improved business environment¹⁸. Significant progress was seen also in the field of banking – the sector was “restructured and largely placed in the ownership of reputable foreign financial institutions as part of a comprehensive privatisation agenda”, which fostered GDP growth and increased the number of financial products on the market¹⁹. However, despite reforms, stable security situation and international aid, current picture is not as colourful as everyone would like it to be. The Labour market is still in a bad condition and unemployment is extremely high, even in comparison with the other Western Balkan states, GDP per capita remains one of the lowest in Europe and recent financial crisis hit their economies severely, which in turn widened fiscal deficits and shown a great vulnerability to financial turmoil²⁰. Moreover, what is probably even worse from the perspective of ordinary citizen is that in terms of corruption, housing, access to social services and other every-day matters, the situation improved inconsiderably and the states concerned are still ranked very low in most of the global indexes measuring human well-being²¹. Generally, socio-economic performance of all three states during the several previous years has been mixed and although relative stability has been maintained, it has not helped significantly in economic recovery, which is still very distant.

3.2. Petersberg Operations in the Area

Until now, the European Union has launched six Petersberg operations, from which only two are still ongoing (European Union Force [EUFOR] Althea and European Union Rule of Law Mission [EULEX] Kosovo) and remaining four already ceased their presence after a few years of existence²².

¹⁷ With the exception of years 2009-2011 when global financial crisis hit their economies and GDP growth was sluggish and even downfall occurred.

¹⁸ *The Western Balkans in Transition*, European Economy Occasional Paper 46, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels 2009, p. 52-56, 61-64, 72-77, ec.europa.eu accessed on: 03.01.2013.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

²⁰ *Western Balkans, Bumps on the road to the EU accession*, M. L. Lanzeni (ed.), Current Issues Emerging Markets, Deutsche Bank AG DB Research, Frankfurt am Main 2012, <http://www.dbresearch.com>, accessed on: 03.01.2013.

²¹ S. Ralchev, *Bosnia & Herzegovina*; G. Stojkowski, *Kosovo*; G. Stojkowski, *Republic of Macedonia*, in: O. Minchew, M. Lessenski, G. Stojkowski, S. Ralchev, *The Western Balkans...*, p. 46-51, 75-79, 90-94.

²² Operation Concordia lasted only several months and ended in December 2003, European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) Proxima lasted from 2004 to 2005, its succes-

All these mission, though different in many aspects, have had at least several commonalities due to the fact that all of them have been carried out in the same region, in the similar context and with almost identical actors involved.

The first ever conducted operation under the aegis of the ESDP was the EUPM in Bosnia. It took over the responsibility for reforming and strengthening Bosnian police authorities from the United Nation's (UN) International Police Task Force, which ended its presence in 2002. During its 9 years of activity, the EUPM's international personnel was at the level of a few hundred people every year, with the peak number of about 550 personnel and another 300 locals in the years 2003-2004²³. The Mission's main tasks were: to assist in reform and establishment of multi-ethnic police service; to support law enforcement agencies in their fight against organised crime and corruption; to enhance justice system and relations between police, prosecutors and penitentiary authorities and to level-up law enforcement agencies accountability²⁴. Moreover, the EUPM was not only an international actor in the area, but also cooperated with the European Commission (EC), the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) and the EUFOR Althea. While this collaboration was both important and unavoidable, it is considered one of the main (next to the numerous problems with local authorities) issues the EUPM personnel had to deal with in order to fulfil its mission²⁵.

Chronologically, the first military EU Petersberg mission in the Western Balkans was the operation Concordia in Macedonia. "EU forces took over NATO's Operation Allied Harmony with the aim of contributing further to a stable, secure environment in FYROM and ensuring the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, the political accord which settled the mounting conflict between Macedonian Slavs and Albanians"²⁶. Although Concordia was a successor operation, it was scaled-down to around 350 soldiers, which were tasked to monitor former crisis areas as well as to promote stability and perform deterrence activities against possible ethnic violence²⁷. Even more than aforementioned EUPM, the operation Concordia

sor's – European Union Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) – mandate was even shorter (from December 2005 to June 2006) and finally, the longest operation – the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) started on 1 January 2003 and ended in June 2012.

²³ *Factsheet on European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)*, European Union External Action, June 2012, p. 2, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>, accessed on: 12.01.2013.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 1; M. Merlingen, *The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)*, in: *European Security and Defence Policy. The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, (ed.) G. Grevi, D. Helly, D. Keohane, EUISS, Paris 2009, p. 161, 164-165.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 167-169.

²⁶ D. Lynch, A. Missiroli, *ESDP Operations*, EUISS, p. 3.

²⁷ E. Gross, *EU military operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia)*, in: *European Security and Defence...*, p. 175.

acted in the midst of several international actors²⁸ and was heavily dependent on NATO's planning and logistical support under the Berlin-plus agreement²⁹.

Military mission Concordia, briefly described in a section above, was succeeded by a civilian operation – EUPOL Proxima. Although political and security situation in Macedonia was still fragile, thanks to international support it was slowly improving. European Union leaders and Macedonian authorities decided that attention should be shifted to the improvement of police forces³⁰. Around 200 international personnel was tasked: to aid local police in fighting against organised crime; to help implement the reform of the Macedonian Ministry of Internal Affairs; to assist in creation of border services; to advise local police in elevating trust and confidence within population (especially Albanian); and to strengthen cooperation with other states in the field of policing³¹. EUPOL Proxima's activities fitted in the broader context of EU's dual track-approach, where a long-term EC's approach (structural reform of the Ministry of Interior) meet with a short-term, exerted by the Council in the form of ESPD operation (providing urgent assistance and on the field training)³².

One out of the two still on-going EU Petersberg operations in the Western Balkans – EUFOR Althea – is, at the same time, the largest of all CSDP missions ever launched. Like the operation Concordia, the establishment of EUFOR Althea followed the termination of NATO's military mission SFOR (Stabilisation Force) and EU troops continued SFOR's main tasks in a predominantly unchanged manner³³. At present, Althea's personnel is tasked: to ensure compliance with 1995 Dayton-Paris peace agreement; to assist the EUSR in Bosnia in his duties; and to aid and support local authorities in a number of tasks, such as: patrols, mines clearance, training, information gathering etc.³⁴. In practice however, along with military activities, EUFOR Althea also assists local authorities in fighting crime, by applying pressure on criminal networks³⁵. Operation contingent has changed in number over time

²⁸ Such as the EC, the EUSR, the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) – to name only a few.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 175-176; D. Lynch, A. Missiroli, *ESDP Operations...*, p. 4.

³⁰ I. Loannides, *The EU Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima) and the European Union Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, in: *European Security and Defence...*, p. 189.

³¹ *European Union Police Mission PROXIMA Fact Sheet*, p. 1, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>, accessed on: 12.01.2013.

³² I. Loannides, *Police Mission in Macedonia*, in: *Evaluating the EU's Crisis Missions in the Balkans*, M. Emerson, E. Gross (ed.), CEPS Paperback Series, issue 2/2007, p. 83, 85, www.isn.ethz.ch, accessed on: 15.12.2012.

³³ E. Gross, *Civilian and Military Missions in the Western Balkans*, in: *Evaluating the EU's Crisis...*, p. 143-144; D. Keohane, *The European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Althea)*, in: *European Security and Defence...*, p. 213.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 211, 216.

³⁵ E. Gross, *Civilian and Military Missions in the Western Balkans*, in: *Evaluating the EU's Crisis...*, p. 144-145.

significantly – at the beginning of the mission there were 7000 soldiers and currently only about 600 personnel performs mandated duties³⁶.

The last but not least ESDP operation launched to FYROM so far is EUPAT. Although the mission was a direct continuation of the expiring EUPOL Proxima, it was significantly smaller in numbers (around 30 police advisers), yet with similar operational mandate and tasks³⁷. Nevertheless, it focused mainly on monitoring and mentoring Macedonian middle and senior police staff in the field of border services, public peace and order, accountability of the law enforcement services, police-judiciary cooperation and internal control³⁸. From the outset, the whole operation was treated as the final tone of the Council's rule of law activities in FYROM (the bridge between former missions and the EC's succeeding projects) and it was possible after meeting certain conditions imposed by the Macedonian authorities³⁹.

Finally, the latest in the Western Balkans and the first in Kosovo, still ongoing Petersberg mission, is EULEX Kosovo. It is by far the largest EU rule of law operation ever launched and consists of around 2000 police officers, judges, prosecutors and other personnel out of which 1200 are international staff with another 900 are locals⁴⁰. EULEX is mandated to perform a number of tasks, which include: monitoring, mentoring and advising relevant authorities in order to reform judicial, law enforcement, penitentiary, border control systems; eradicating organised and financial crimes and corruption; providing legal support, proper investigation and prosecution practises as well as running trials concerning important crimes⁴¹. Due to the fact that the mission operates in a newly formed and only partially recognised state, it does not only advice and assist Kosovar authorities, but also holds executive powers over certain matters, such as dealing with serious crimes⁴². Like every previously described operation, EULEX's personnel works

³⁶ D. Keohane, *The European Union military operation...*, p. 211; *EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA)*, Press release – EU Council Secretariat, October 2012, p. 1, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>, accessed on: 05.01.2013.

³⁷ I. Loannides, *The EU Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima) and the...*, p. 193; *EU police advisory team (EUPAT) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, December 2005, p. 2, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>, accessed on: 05.01.2013.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

³⁹ These conditions were: EUPAT presence would not harm FYROM's EU membership prospects; it would be reform-oriented operation, not stabilization one; it would not be defined as a "mission"; it would be linked to projects funded from the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) budget.

⁴⁰ *EULEX KOSOVO: EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo*, European Union External Action, October 2012, p. 2, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>, accessed on: 12.01.2013.

⁴¹ G. Grevi, *The EU rule-of-law mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)*, in: *European Security and Defence...*, p. 353, 357.

⁴² L. Montanaro, *The Kosovo Statebuilding Conundrum: Addressing Fragility in a Contested State*, FRIDE Working Paper no. 91, October 2009, p. 17, www.fride.org, accessed on: 11.01.2013.

among several other international actors in the area⁴³ and under high political pressure from EU policy makers and the international community to successfully establish credible local rule of law institutions.

3.3. Do CSDP Missions Matter?

Assessing whether an international operation can be considered successful, partially successful or a failure is a difficult task. Usually it is assumed that in order to designate a mission's success, one should confront its real outcome with a mandate which that particular operation received. While this approach is definitely sensible, some authors argue that this is not enough and that broader criteria (such as providing international and regional security and reduction of human affliction) should also be included in aforementioned assessments⁴⁴. This study covers both aspects – missions' mandates and broader context – and although there are six missions to assess, it provides certain generalisation to verify the suggested thesis.

Despite the fact that Petersberg operations launched in the Western Balkans are of different kind, there are some visible patterns and similarities between their tasks and goals, which make them possible to organize. Most of the missions were tasked:

- to aid security forces in maintaining stability and to deter possible outbreaks of ethnic violence (Concordia and EUFOR Althea);
- to support the reform of law enforcement authorities (the EUPM, EUPOL Proxima, EUPAT and EULEX Kosovo) and to assist in their everyday fight against crime (all three with the exception of small EUPAT);
- to improve relations between police and other law enforcement agencies with local populations (the EUPM, EUPAT, and EUPOL Proxima).

The aforementioned patterns show that at least from the conceptual perspective many missions are to some extent alike, which makes them easier to analyse. Moreover, only EULEX Kosovo is the sole operation in this state, while all others are connected by the fact of operating in the same place simultaneously (the EUPM and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia) or being followed by one another (Concordia, EUPOL Proxima and the EUPM in Macedonia), hence they should not be assessed in a completely separate manner.

As analyses show, both EU military operations in the Western Balkans, although greatly different in scope, timeline and numbers, are considered as a success⁴⁵.

⁴³ Such as NATO Kosovo Forces (KFOR), United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the EUSR and the EC.

⁴⁴ D. Pushkina, *A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission*, in: *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 13, no. 2, June 2006, p. 134-135, 145.

⁴⁵ J. Knauer, *EUFOR Althea: Appraisal and Future Perspectives of the EU's Former Flagship Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Department of EU International Relations and Diplo-

A short but significant presence of European soldiers in FYROM for several months, after the outbreak of ethnic violence in this country and EU's successful political intervention to calm the situation, can be considered as a symbol of European Union's firm engagement in resolving the conflict. Soldiers from the EU states eased tensions between the ethnic groups and greatly contributed to the overall stability. A similar statement can be said about a larger EUFOR Althea. All key military and supporting tasks were carried out properly and internal security of Bosnia has been provided very well⁴⁶. As a result of this positive development, the mission changed its profile to more assistance and advisory one, which, fortunately, is also executed effectively.

Regarding the task of reforming law enforcement authorities (security sector reform), four listed operations performed this job in a successful way. In Bosnia the EUPM gave a meaningful technical support and provided expertise, which increased effectiveness of the local police and improved their capacity in advanced rule of law tasks⁴⁷. At the same time however, the EUPM was unable to provide a comprehensive police reform as Bosnian authorities had not coherent vision on its future⁴⁸. Approximate assessment can be made for EUPOL Proxima and EUPAT. Although security forces are still lagging behind their western counterparts almost in every aspect, personnel of these operations took a myriad of different activities in order to improve efficiency of the Macedonia's police, especially of medium and upper ranks, supported standardisation reform and internal control as well as taught work culture according to international standards⁴⁹. As for EULEX Kosovo, security system reform is underway and the mission's staff contributes to it greatly by mentoring and advising local police officers⁵⁰. Moreover, assistance given by the EU personnel in combating corruption, organised and financial crime was (and in EULEX Kosovo still is) also visible. The EU police officers performed their duties along local security services and despite some material difficulties, their performance can be regarded as a success⁵¹.

macy Studies, EU Diplomacy Papers 07/2011, p. 17, www.dtic.mil accessed on: 23.12.2012; E. Gross, *EU military operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia)*, in: *European Security and Defence...*, p. 179-180.

⁴⁶ J. Knauer, *EUFOR Althea: Appraisal...*, p. 17.

⁴⁷ B. Edina, M. Čehajić, *Politics, Policing and Security Sector Reform in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina*, in: *Ten years after: lessons from the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002-2012*, T. Flessenkemper, D. Helly (ed.), EUISS Joint Report, Paris 2013, p. 49.

⁴⁸ D. Tolksdorf, *Police reform and conditionality*, in: *Ten years after: lessons from...*, p. 24.

⁴⁹ I. Loannides, *The EU Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima) and the...*, p. 191, 193.

⁵⁰ M. Spornbauer, *EULEX Kosovo – Mandate, structure and implementation: Essential for an unprecedented EU mission*, CLEER Working Papers 5/2010, p. 31, www.asser.nl, accessed on: 23.12.2012.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, s. 30; I. Loannides, *The EU Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima) and the...*, p. 191-192; M. Merlingen, *The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and...*, p. 166, 169.

When it comes to the improvement of relations between different services and among local populations, all four operations are usually regarded as a medicare success, with better results in Macedonia than in Bosnia. Activities of police missions in FYROM generated higher trust towards local police and although the statistics were better among Macedonians than Albanians, the overall situation improved⁵². Regarding Bosnia, the EUPM was unable to convince local population that the security sector reform had been at least a partial success and consequently confidence in the police, judiciary and other authorities decreased⁵³.

In addition to the aforementioned, EULEX Kosovo was mandated to deal with one additional task, specifically – justice system reform and performance of prosecutorial and judicial functions. Judges and prosecutors from EULEX Kosovo exercise real powers and their duty is to handle investigations and to hear lawsuits⁵⁴. They also have monitoring, mentoring and advising duties in order to reform the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice⁵⁵. According to information coming from the area of operation, mission's personnel is in fact the only credible force in providing legal support and executing prosecutions and lawsuits on an international level.

While being aware that the foregoing assessment refers to the most important tasks the EU operations in the Western Balkans were mandated, it should be noted that this synthesis does not comprise them all. Due to the limits of this chapter, it was impossible to provide even a short summary of every specific task and only those essential for the missions' success were included⁵⁶.

Leaving behind arguments related to the specific mandates of the EU operations in the region, we should focus on a general state of affairs in Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo. According to the World Bank Governance Indicators⁵⁷, between 2002 and 2011 Bosnia and Herzegovina (chart 1) improved in some areas (government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption) while in other became worse (political stability and absence of violence). Voice and accountability remained more or less at the same level.

⁵² I. Ioannides, *Police Mission in Macedonia*, in: *Evaluating the EU's Crisis...*, p. 118.

⁵³ S. Latal, *Has policing changed? And if not, why not? – Local community perception*, in: *Ten years after: lessons from...*, p. 54-55.

⁵⁴ They have jurisdiction over cases of terrorism, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, inter-ethnic cases, organized crime, financial crimes and other serious crimes listed in the amended Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition to that, they exercise subsidiary powers over several other types of crimes and some types of civil law proceedings, like property related issues.

⁵⁵ M. Spornbauer, *EULEX Kosovo – Mandate, structure...*, p. 29-30.


⁵⁶ For comprehensive analyses of the missions, look at the publications included in bibliography.

⁵⁷ Worldwide Governance Indicators, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>, accessed on: 14.01.2013.

These findings show that although state of affairs is improving in general terms, positive changes can be reversed (like in the case of voice and accountability) and much more effort must be taken in order to eradicate violence⁵⁸.

A similar statement can be made about the situation in Macedonia. Most of the aggregate indicators (chart 2) show significant improvement in three areas – government effectiveness, control of corruption and rule of law – and moderate in the other two – regulatory quality and political stability/absence of violence. Only one indicator (voice and accountability) has not improved much and since the year 2007 we witnessed a meaningful downfall. Like in Bosnia, the example of Macedonia shows that the most troublesome areas to improve are voice and accountability and political stability. As we can see, FYROM is on a better track to permanent improvement than Bosnia and Herzegovina, however similar difficulties can happen to the former and if the EU does not want to send another CSDP operation to stop the fire, it should stay vigilant.


Chart 1. Evolution of several World Bank aggregate indicators for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2002, 2007 and 2012.



Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>, accessed on: 14.01.2013. Methodology taken from: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, M. Mastruzzi, *The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues*, World Bank, September 2010.

⁵⁸ The situation appears to be different when we look at official crime rates in Bosnia and compare them to countries of similar size (Finland and Ireland). According to one such research, Bosnia is safer place to live than these two. Naturally, data gathered from this country may not be accurate, since the collection system of data lags far behind to Western standards. More on this particular research, look: S. Latal, *Has policing changed? And if not, why not?...*, in: *Ten years after: lessons from...*, p. 54.

Chart 2. Evolution of several World Bank aggregate indicators for Macedonia in 2002, 2007 and 2012.




Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>, accessed on: 14.01.2013. Methodology taken from: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, M. Mastruzzi, *The Worldwide Governance...*

Finally, since Kosovo is a very young sovereign subject, indicators concern only years 2008-2011, that is to say, from the outset of the newly formed state. As we can see on chart 3, the current state of affairs is worse than it was in 2008. According to these aggregated indicators, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption did not change. (all fluctuations are at the limits of statistical error). At the same time, Kosovo witnessed some decrease in regulatory quality and extremely serious downfall in political stability/absence of violence indicators. This data shows that despite substantial international support and the presence of EULEX Kosovo situation became worse than prior independence. Although the country does not face serious ethnic violence or political *coup d'états*, this situation could become a reality if the UE and NATO were not on the ground.

To conclude our assessment of the EU Petersberg operations in the Western Balkans, it is reasonable to say that the results of these missions are in fact mixed. As can be seen in the previous section, in terms of mandate's fulfilment most of the operations are regarded as a success. Out of all described missions, especially successful are these launched to Macedonia together with EUFOR Althea – they fulfilled their tasks with the best results. At the same time, the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although important in the field of security services reform and due to assistance in numerous tasks carried out by the local police, it was unable to bring essential reforms to the end and convince the population of Bosnia that things move into the right direc-

tion. As for EULEX Kosovo, due to the weak state institutions, it has been probably the sole source of high level law enforcement and judiciary standards in the whole country and one of the main incentives to reform, it did not provide qualitative improvement in terms of state-building.

Chart 3. Evolution of several World Bank aggregate indicators for Kosovo between 2008 and 2011.



Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>, accessed on: 14.01.2013. Methodology taken from: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, M. Mastruzzi, *The Worldwide Governance...*

Similar conclusions can be drawn from the general situation in these three countries. While the state of affairs in Macedonia has improved significantly, the same cannot be said about Bosnia and especially about Kosovo. Political stability in the latter two is worse than it was a decade ago (Bosnia) and a few years ago (Kosovo). Fortunately, Bosnia did improve in most other aspects and while it still lags behind FYROM, it can be considered a success. Kosovo, however, according to the data, was unable to change its image of an unstable and artificially sustained state and in fact the situation became worse than in 2008.

To sum up, the thesis of this chapter has been confirmed only partially. The Presence of the EU and its Petersberg operations is an important stabilising factor for the Western Balkans and probably an important incentive to reform these three fragile states. The CSDP missions in the region provided and in two cases still provide indispensable support and expertise to the local law enforcement, to border and to justice authorities. At the same time, however, some of them were unable to fulfil all of their tasks and despite significant contribution to the reform process, the overall situation (especially in Kosovo and to some extent in Bosnia) is still far from satisfactory.

CHAPTER IV

European Military Capabilities in the Twenty First Century

Łukasz Smalec

ABSTRACT

The European military capabilities are a curious as much as a thorny topic. The last decade was marked by the European growing ambition of an active role in the security sphere. It has begun to play an increasingly important role as an actor in crisis response missions to deal with both regional and global security challenges. At the same time, since the end of the Cold War, we are witnesses of US gradual withdrawal from Europe. The Author in his article analyses a progress that has been made in the development of European military capabilities essential to conducting independent full-scale out of area operations since the foundations of the ESDP. He tries to shed light on the efforts undertaken to generate such capabilities at the EU level, their results and the challenges ahead.

“No important problem in the world can be resolved without the joint efforts of the United States and Europe; no problem is unsolvable when we confront it together⁵⁹.”

Vittorio Emmanuel Parsi

There was a widespread consensus that the last decade of the twentieth century was a special time marked by the growing dominance of the United States of America (USA). The coming century seemed to be destined to be an American era. In spite of *rebus sic stantibus* a transatlantic partnership remained the basic precondition for a stable structure of the international system and the strongest alliance in the world cemented by a community of shared values. The global hegemony, together with its staunchest ally – the European Union (EU), appear to have ambitions not only to restore the West’s global primacy but to introduce a “New Deal” in the field of international security. However, such a golden period did not last long. The 9/11 attacks revealed that preserving the security of the Atlantic area requires much more activity than safeguarding own borders. To maintain global stability and protect the world from “new threats” in particular terrorism and weapons of mass

⁵⁹ V. E. Parsi, *The Inevitable Alliance. Europe and the United States Beyond Iraq*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2006, p. 1.

destruction (WMD) proliferation, the USA and its European allies have to undertake combat missions outside NATO's area of responsibility (AOR). One of the most significant innovations brought up by that time were the so-called "wars of choice" involving US-led "coalitions of the willing"⁶⁰. Given political results of these combat missions, starting from Allied Force operation (1999), through Iraqi Freedom (2003-2010) and ending with the so-called "Afghan war" (2001-), revealed the fact that pure military power is not sufficient to achieve a decisive victory.

Over the last decade, the EU has shown growing activity in dealing with security threats. It has begun to play an increasingly important role as an actor in crisis response missions to deal with both regional and global security challenges. This includes not only crisis management, conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, but state- or nation-building as well as peace-keeping missions. Bound by the foundation and further development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) after the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has obtained new instruments in this field. Mounting pressures over defence budgets and an increasingly complex and uncertain security environment call for renewed efforts in European defence co-operation.

The study assess the progress that has been made in the development of European military capabilities essential to conduct full-scale out of area operations since the foundations of the ESDP. It seeks to give an overview of the efforts undertaken to generate military capabilities at the EU level, their results and the challenges that lie ahead. This chapter outlines a number of points that ought to be taken into consideration when thinking about this issue. The Author begins by investigating the influence of current global key challenges on European state decisions with regards to military capabilities. Then he makes an effort to select and systematize the most significant steps towards the EU independent military capacity. Then, the Author turns his attention to the question whether the EU member states possess relevant capabilities for conducting high-intensity out of area missions without significant American military support. The aim of this part of the study is to shed light on the issue of European military capabilities with particular reference to its shortcomings and development. On the basis of these considerations he tries to explain how the military capabilities-driven division of labour works in Afghan and Libyan missions. A purpose of the following structure is to better present the complexity of the issue analysed.

⁶⁰ The first US-led "coalition of the willing" was formed in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm.

4.1. Background: Financial Crisis, Pacific Pivot and US-European Partnership

At the very beginning we should answer the question, why European capability to take full-scale military action should be currently taken into consideration. On the one hand, the EU after the Treaty of Lisbon⁶¹ as a whole as well as the majority of key European actors more often reveal ambitions to play an autonomous and independent political role on the global stage. On the other hand, a declining US interest in European affairs is probably more important. The so-called transatlantic partnership is at a crossroads in the face of the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

Nowadays, the United States of America is becoming less and less prone to provide resources needed to comply with European security requirements. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 (the global financial crisis) requires difficult decisions regarding US military presence. Washington needs to make an effort to seek the balance between political commitments, operational effectiveness and fiscal efficiency. The USA has gradually shifted away from Europe since the end of the Cold War focusing on the Asia Pacific and the Middle East region. The Obama administration ought to avoid huge expenditures on maintenance of unnecessary military equipment as well as bases and build a new security system that is less rigid than its antecedent. The US has reduced the number of its military installations and bases in Europe by approximately 75% from the height of the Cold War. Nowadays, the American footprint on European soil comprised of 25 major bases with smaller supporting installations and 68,000 active duty in the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (EUCOM AOR). The so-called “raise of the Pacific” is not a subject of doubt but transatlantic relations remain crucial not only for “perennial” allies but the international system too, playing a key role in a shaping global development⁶².

In the aftermath of the *September 11 attacks* US foreign policy changed significantly, its symbol became the so-called “Bush doctrine”. Washington

⁶¹ The Treaty of Lisbon has equipped the EU with a significant number of new tools in foreign and security policy. Cf. E. Johansson, J. Kreutz, P. Wallenstein, Ch. Altpeter, S. Lindberg, M. Lindgren, A. Padsokocimaite, *A New Start for EU Peacemaking? Past Record and Future Potential*, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/21/21951_UCDP_paper_7.pdf, accessed on: 9.01.2013.

⁶² *Testimony of Admiral James G. Stavridis, United States Navy Commander, United States European Command before the 112th Congress*, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington 2012, p. 2, 70-74, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/03%20March/Stavridis%2003-01-12.pdf>, accessed: 22.12.2012; *European Military Capabilities*, European Union Center of North Carolina “EU Briefings” May 2007, p. 2, http://euce.org/assets/doc/business_media/business/Brief0705-military-capabilities.pdf, accessed on: 22.12.2012; E. Jones, A. Liberatore (ed.), *Mapping the Future of the Future of the EU-US Partnership: Policy and Research Perspectives. A Synthetic Overview of the Proceedings*, Directorate-General for Research Science, Economy and Society, Luxembourg 2010, p. 5-9.

became more concentrated on new global security challenges. Its new security principal preoccupation was to prevent “rogue states” from getting weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and Islamic terrorist groups, whose objective was to wreak havoc and instability on the West in general and the US in particular, from gaining logistical bases and safe havens essential to operate. To deal with these threats, the US has modified its old military doctrine which authorizes actions in response to an “imminent” attack, into the concept of “preventive self-defence”. New challenges the same as new strategy required different military capabilities, therefore the Pentagon decided to develop expeditionary forces capable of conducting high intensity instead of obsolete peacekeeping missions⁶³.

In the fall of 2011 the Obama Administration moved to implement one of a lot of their earlier election promises. The 44th US *President* announced that “the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region [the Asia-Pacific] and its future”. In fact, a better part of Obama’s “Pacific Pivot” represents an evolution rather than a turnaround of US foreign policy. The Administration follows a long line of US former governments. The next US step on the road to “rebalance” attention toward the Asia-Pacific region was indicated in the January 2012 “Strategy Review”. In this document meaningful US force reductions focused on Army and Marine ground forces were announced. Thus, most of all they will apply to American commitment in Europe where two out of four US Army brigades are planning to be withdrawn. Thereat, now the USA is more inclined to admit that European common initiatives have positive impact on its security and the potential to become one of the primary defence pillars of the Atlantic Alliance⁶⁴.

Nobody doubts that the economy matters greatly, but paraphrasing the words of the Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney in reference to the ISAF mission, the transatlantic partnership should be considered not only in terms of expenditures. The United States enjoys a strong bond with Europe formed and cemented by a “complex mixture of shared history, common origins, and an abiding belief in certain principles like democracy, freedom, and

⁶³ A. I. Zakharchenko, *The EU and U.S. Strategies against Terrorism and Proliferation of WMD: A Comparative Study*, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen 2007, p. 35; O. Croci, A. Verdun, *Security challenges in the 21st century: EU, USA, and Canadian approaches*, p. 6, <http://canada-europe-dialogue.ca/events/Workshop-June12-2006/Croci-Verdun19-June2006.pdf>, accessed on: 29.12.2012; *European Military Capabilities...*, p. 2.

⁶⁴ C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *EU military Capabilities – some European Troops, but not yet a European Army*, in: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi, S. Silvestri (ed.), *EU Crisis management: Institutions And Capabilities In The Making, English Series 19*, Quaderni IAI, Rome 2010, p. 21; M. Man- yin, S. Daggett, B. Dolven, S. Lawrence, M. Martin, R. O’Rourke, B. Vaughn, *Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia*, “Report for Congress”, 2012, p. 1-2, 12-14, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf>, accessed on: 22.12.2012.

justice”⁶⁵. Beyond doubt, the European stability and US engagement have been closely related since World War I, when “first” American soldiers stepped foot onto the continent in 1917. In the meantime, periods of American neutrality in the 1930s and even a relatively short period of diminished attention to the problems of Europe in the 1990s led to renewed interstate tensions and regional instability requiring more decisive US action⁶⁶.

Briefly said, from the economic point of view, the stability of the transatlantic area is vital for the USA. Economic cooperation between the USA and Europe dominates the global economy and is the largest and most complex in the world (more than \$1.5 trillion between the USA and the European Union on the current account). This increasing interdependence ensures not only benefits but challenges too. From a (geo)strategic point of view, the existing position of the US on European theatre provides both essential units and infrastructure to conduct expeditionary missions in the global areas of instability, among others in North Africa and Afghanistan. Last but definitely not least is brotherhood in arms, as mentioned above, which dates back to World War I. Nowadays, Europe as a whole is the most robust military contributor of US-led out of area missions. The facts indicated above prove that *rebus sic stantibus* after the end of the bipolar system cemented by the current financial crisis have weakened the transatlantic security ties, but the feeling of allied solidarity remains and will probably survive⁶⁷.

The financial crisis challenged not only the USA but all EU member states too. It put a significant amount of pressure on their budgets. After launching recovery programmes, the European states started to seek fiscal consolidation through reducing the level of public spending. Hereof, the economic slowdown is likely to have a significant long-lasting impact on European military capabilities. As a result, defence budgets are being continually reduced, therefore crisis management resources that are available now will become leaner

⁶⁵ S. Coonen, *The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?*, p. 69, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/06autumn/coonen.pdf>, accessed on: 22.12.2012.

⁶⁶ *Testimony of Admiral...*, p. 4; *The European Union and the United States. Global partners, global responsibilities* European Commission, Brussels 2006, p. 15-17.

⁶⁷ W. Cooper, EU-U.S. Economic Ties: Framework, Scope, and Magnitude, “*Report for Congress*”, 2011, p. 1-6, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30608.pdf>; ; *Testimony of Admiral...*, p. 2-4, accessed on: 22.12.2012; E. Greco, N. Pirozzi, S. Silvestri, *Conclusions and Policy Recommendations What Model for EU Crisis Management? Realities and Prospects in the post-Lisbon Era*, in: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi, S. Silvestri (ed.), *EU Crisis management...*, p. 102; D. Braddon, *Operational, Structural and Procurement Expenditure in European Defence Budgets: Trends, Patterns and Reform*, in: L. Simon (ed.), *European Defence Capabilities No Adaptability without Co-operation*, Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall London 2010, p. 26; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *EU military ...*, p. 20; J. Herz, *Military Capabilities – A Step Forward in ESDP?*, p. 5, http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2009_artrel_322_esr46-military-capabilities.pdf, accessed on: 22.12.2012; O. Croci, A. Verdun, *Security challenges...*, p. 1-3.

soon. It could be seen as a strong incentive to deepen European military cooperation or even “Europeanization” of defence capabilities. Meanwhile, the states tend to implement their own strategies of savings, without much coordination at the EU level, although there is also a few examples of a different trend. The most important in this context is the bilateral cooperation between London and Paris, both European powers continue to account for nearly half of Europe’s defence spending. In the field of propaganda, they declare the will “to sustain a high level of defence spending, flexible and rapidly deployable forces, interoperability with our Allies and a solid industrial basis”. Undoubtedly their joint action is an essential, but definitely not sufficient precondition to improve European military capabilities significantly. However, these declarations give some hope that Europe will be able to play a full role in the field of international security⁶⁸.

4.2. Towards Efficient European Military Capabilities – Historical Overview

After the Soviet Union collapse both global and European security architecture changed dramatically. The “old continent” repositioned itself in political as well as military terms. Two Balkan crises in early and late 90’s revealed European inability to gather essential forces and carry out autonomous expeditionary missions. The first exposed European weaknesses. The second illustrated that almost nothing changed and perhaps the military gap between the United States and its European allies even deepened. The Balkan war (1991-1995) was the first but not last bitter pill which demonstrated that European armed forces, in spite of their large numbers (more than 2 million troops) were ill-equipped for the crisis management missions. The “hour of Europe” demonstrated the continent’s inability to deal not only with global but its own problems too. American troops played a key role in resolving the conflict while European units had only little impact on its final outcome. Moreover, these events proved that without credible military capabilities European bargaining power during negotiations seemed to be rather weak. Similarly, the conflict in Kosovo and further NATO Allied Force air operations in 1999 confirmed American predominance, the contribution of European aircraft was only limited. This conflict is often invoked to draw attention to the disparities in power between old allies⁶⁹.

⁶⁸ Cf. *UK-France Declaration in Security and Defence*, 17 February 2012, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/uk-france-declaration-security>, accessed on: 19.01.2013.

⁶⁹ *European Military Capabilities...*, p. 1-3; D. Keohane, *Needs An Avant-Garde For Military Capabilities. Briefing Note Europe*, Centre for European Union. New Ideas for a New Europe, p. 1, http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2012/briefing_militarydk-5642.pdf, accessed on: 19.01.2013; J. P. Weiskopf, *Out of Area – Out of Sight?*

The above-mentioned European impotence led to the strengthening of bilateral French-British cooperation *culminating* in the *St. Malo* declaration of December 1998. It laid the cornerstone for further cooperation in the area of security and defence at the EU level. Two strongest European military powers called the EU members to establish “the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so”⁷⁰. Next year at the European Council *meeting in Cologne* on 3 and 4 June, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was formally conceived. It was the merely a prelude or first step of the European Union on the road to play a more important and independent role on the international stage in the field of security. To achieve this goal “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises, without prejudice to actions by NATO”⁷¹. Later in the same year, during the European Union Summit in Helsinki (December), member states decided to set themselves a target of creating the European Rapid Reaction Force known as the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG). Immediately it should be noted that the purpose of the HHG was not the establishment of an European Army, but a formation of a pool of national armed forces up to 60,000 personnel (15 brigades)⁷² at the disposal of the EU, on a basis of voluntary involvement. The units would be able to fully deploy within less than 60 days and remain in the theatre of operation for up to one year. The forces were supposed to undertake the so-called Petersberg tasks adopted in 1992, which include: “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces undertaken for crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization”⁷³. Based on arrangements of the

What Role do Gender and Peace Policy Aspects play in the European Security Policy?, p. 12, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/03701.pdf>, accessed on: 20.12.2012; *The European Union and the United States...*, p. 23-24; S. Larrabee, *Unfinished business in Europe*, in: A. de Vasconcelos (ed.), *The Agenda for the EU-US Strategic Partnership*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris 2012, p. 10-14; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *EU military ...*, p. 12; J. Morel, A. Cameron, *The EU and Defence Capabilities: Charting the Course*, in: L. Simon (ed.), *European Defence...*, p. 2; S. Bowman, *Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations December 16, 1996*, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/93-056.htm>, accessed on: 20.12.2012.

⁷⁰ *Common Security and Defence Policy. Development of European Military Capabilities*, p. 2, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1222506/110106%20updated%20factsheet%20capacites%20militaires%20-%20version%208_en.pdf, accessed on: 3.01.2013; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *EU military ...*, p. 12; J. Herz, *Military Capabilities...*, p. 1.

⁷¹ D. Braddon, *Operational, Structural...*, p. 15.

⁷² This would involve the need to ensure additional units (at least 60 thousands) together with the associated military equipment in order to ensure the regular troop rotations in theatre.

⁷³ *Common Security and Defence Policy. Development...*, p. 2; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *EU military ...*, p. 12-13; J. P. Weiskopf, *Out Of Area...*, p. 11-12; Fu-chang Chang, *EU as*

Washington NATO Summit (1999), a joint declaration was announced on 16 December 2002. Next year the agreement was adopted on 11 March 2003, which became the cornerstone of official WEU-NATO cooperation, known as the “Berlin Plus”. What is most important in this arrangement is the EU access to NATO planning capacity and establishment of a list of its assets and capabilities available for use in EU-led missions⁷⁴.

The next step on the road to greater independence of Europe in this field was an adoption of the European Security Strategy “Draft for a global security strategy – A secure Europe in a better world” in June 2003. Whilst the HHG was the result of the Balkan war, the strategy recognizes the importance of new threats or rather challenges. It was an important but above all, a symbolic step. In that document Javier Solana would rather point out security challenges and threats than analyse them accordingly. Another crucial shortcoming is the lack of resources essential to implement strategies concerning the described threats and challenges⁷⁵.

Following the failure of the first, a new Headline Goal 2010 was approved at the meeting of the European Council in Brussels on 17-18 June 2004. Then European Union member states announced that they want to “commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty”⁷⁶. The key element of the HG 2010 was the presence of high-readiness forces based on the concept of Battlegroups. This shift from the HHG to the HG 2010 was a step forward. Its aim was the removal of the capability shortfalls of the previous initiative. While the HHG was focused on quantitative targets, then new HHG presented a more qualitative approach. The HG 2010 included the following scenarios of military actions: separation of parties by force; stabilisation, reconstruction and

Military Actor—The Role of the European Defence Agency, p. 8, http://www2.tku.edu.tw/~tiexm/conference_paper/session5/Fuchang.pdf, accessed on: 9.01.2013.

⁷⁴ *Berlin Plus agreement* http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/berlinplus_/berlinplus_en.pdf, accessed on: 29.12.2012; *The EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreements*, European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of WEU, Paris 2009, p. 1-2, [http://www.shape.nato.int/resources/4/documents/14E_Fact_Sheet_Berlin_Plus\[1\].pdf](http://www.shape.nato.int/resources/4/documents/14E_Fact_Sheet_Berlin_Plus[1].pdf), accessed on: 9.01.2013; *European Military Capabilities...*, p. 3; J. Herz, *Military Capabilities...*, p. 1; J. Morel, A. Cameron, *The EU and Defence...*, p. 2; J. P. Weiskopf, *Out Of Area...*, p. 10-15; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *EU military ...*, p. 12-13; E. Gross, *EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories*, p. 38, http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/Preventing_Conflict_Managing_Crisis/03.Gross.pdf, accessed on: 20.12.2012.

⁷⁵ J. P. Weiskopf, *Out Of Area...*, p. 19; J. Morel, A. Cameron, *The EU and Defence...*, p. 2.

⁷⁶ *Common Security and Defence Policy. Development...*, p. 2; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *EU military ...*, p. 12-14; J. P. Weiskopf, *Out Of Area...*, p. 12-16.

military advice to third countries; conflict prevention; evacuation operations and humanitarian assistance⁷⁷.

The above-mentioned “Battlegroup Concept“, prepared on the basis of a common Franco-British proposal, had its origins in the experience of Artemis Mission (2003) and was approved during the meeting of the Council of Minister in 2004. Finally, in November that year European member states decided to establish 13 Battlegroups which were meant to acquire full operational capability by 2007. These highly trained battalion-sized units (up to 1,500 soldiers) which would be deployable within 15 days and sustainable in the field for up to 120 days will make up the core of EU high readiness forces and be able to undertake autonomous rapid response operations. This concept represented a significant improvement of existing European capabilities⁷⁸.

Last but not least, the Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities was adopted by the EU Council in 2008. This six page declaration outlined ambitious goals for the EU, such as the capacity to conduct two major simultaneous operations involving up to 10,000 troops for 2 years, two rapid response operations using EU Battlegroups, civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation up to 90 days and one civilian mission involving up to 3,000 experts. However, one major important problem has not changed, the gap between available and desired capabilities remained significant⁷⁹.

4.3. European Military Capabilities. Assessment and Perspectives

The European military capabilities are a curious as much as a thorny topic. The idea of the European Army foundation had its origins in the European Defence Community (finally abandoned in 1954). Generally speaking, a vast number of critics permanently blame the EU members for not delivering the promised military contribution. During the tenures of the former US President George Walker Bush, many US commentators and analysts highlighted the widening military gap between old allies from the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean. They considered it as a major obstacle, which prevented the “old continent” from becoming an important global military actor. The end of the Cold

⁷⁷ J. Herz, *Military Capabilities...*, p. 1; J. Morel, A. Cameron, *The EU and Defence...*, p. 2; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *EU military ...*, p. 12-14; J. P. Weiskopf, *Out Of Area...*, p. 10; Fu-chang Chang, *EU as Military...*, p. 8; *Headline Goal 2010 approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004 endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004*, p. 1, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>, accessed on: 20.12.2012.

⁷⁸ E. Greco, N. Pirozzi, S. Silvestri, *Conclusions...*, p. 102; Fu-chang Chang, *EU as Military...*, p. 6.

⁷⁹ C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *EU military ...*, p. 18-19; J. Herz, *Military Capabilities...*, p. 2-3.

War brought about a fundamental change of circumstances and modified key tasks of European armed forces. Its majority was largely geared toward territorial defence rather than expeditionary campaigns. Consequently, European states had to refocus their armed forces toward the ability of conducting out of area missions and sustaining forces in distant theatres. This transition toward expeditionary warfare required completely different capabilities. To be perfectly candid, the allegations of European capability shortfalls in defence are not a novelty. The traditions of such disputes have a long pedigree and date back at least to the beginning of the Cold War. At the time American policy-makers, defence analysts and scholars appealed to Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own security and demanded to increase their military capabilities. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc have brought *rebus sic stantibus*. Both, European countries and their ally on the other side of the Atlantic wanted to take an advantage of “peace dividends”⁸⁰. However, in the USA this trend was reversed quickly, after initial fall, the level of defence expenditure stabilized at a height of 4% of GDP, while in Europe fell below 2% (for comparison during the Cold War it was 3.5%). As a result the gap in military capabilities between the allies has increased, which hindered cooperation on the battlefield during joint missions⁸¹.

After more than two decades, European military capacity for expeditionary missions has remained unsatisfactory. Several causes of this situation should be noted here. First of all, Americans and Europeans look at international security through a different lens. The US government considers security in global terms while European leaders, with the possible exception of the British, primarily in the regional. Secondly, the EU similarly to NATO have to rely upon military forces of its member states rather than European common combat units. Thirdly, even if European mobile units are created, their availability will be often limited by commitments to other international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) or NATO⁸².

Shortly after a quick and overwhelming victory in Iraqi Freedom Operation, this military campaign was hailed as a model of modern combat intervention. Even then there were a few different opinions on this matter. Professor Boleslaw Balcerowicz rightly pointed out that it could be considered as such only in relation to operations involving US military because of the shortcomings of European military capabilities. A similar position was represented by

⁸⁰ *European Military Capabilities...*, p. 1; S. Coonen, *The Widening...*, p. 75.

⁸¹ *European Military Capabilities...*, p. 1; S. Coonen, *The Widening...*, p. 75; E. Gross, *EU-U.S. Cooperation...*, p. 40-41.

⁸² B. Seibert, *The Quest for European Military Capabilities*, in: L. Simon (ed.), *European Defence Capabilities...*, p. 8; D. Braddon, *Operational, Structural...*, p. 14; *European Military Capabilities...*, p. 2; E. Greco, N. Pirozzi, S. Silvestri, *Conclusions...*, p. 107 C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *EU military ...*, p. 11; O. Croci, A. Verdun, *Security challenges...*, p. 3.

Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algeri⁸³. They created a ten-point scale of international armed conflicts intensity and took notice that: “Only the forces of the USA is strong enough to deal with the conflict intensity of level 10”⁸⁴. According to their assessment, the United Kingdom had the most significant military capabilities among European countries, capable to conduct missions of the 8th level intensity⁸⁵.

Table 1. Capabilities of the United States of America and the EU-25

Level of intensity	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Type of operation	Petersberg tasks with low intensity			Petersberg tasks with medium intensity			Advanced Expeditionary Warfare		Full scale Warfare	
Required Capabilities	- general purpose ground-forces			- Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) protection - specialised forces - Civilian and Military Cooperation (CIMIC) - Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC)			- special forces - sea control - air support - air-to-air refuelling - strategic lift - Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) - TBMD (Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence)		- Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (C4IS-TAR)/ Network Centric Warfare (NCW) - satellite conference - sensor-to-shooter network - nuclear deterrence	

Source: Fu-chang Chang, *EU as Military Actor—The Role of the European Defence Agency*, p. 4-5.

We should not forget, that Europe (the EU) takes second place in the ranking of largest defence spenders in the world. However, merely counting money spent on defence does not provide an accurate outlook of the range of the military capability gap. Qualitative comparisons are more important and confirm American significant dominance of the many cutting-edge dual-use

⁸³ B. Balcerowicz, *Sily zbrojne w państwie i stosunkach międzynarodowych*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2006, p. 138-139; Fu-chang Chang, *EU as Military...*, p. 3.

⁸⁴ Fu-chang Chang, *EU as Military...*, p. 3.

⁸⁵ Among the other members of the EU France have the strongest armed forces (capable to conduct missions up to 7th level intensity); Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain (up to 6th); Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Sweden (up to 5th); the Czech and Republic Poland (up to 4th) and the other EU-Member States up to 2nd level. Cf. Fu-chang Chang, *EU as Military...*, p. 3.

and military technologies, which are supported by a leading information technology sector and governmental research and development programmes. Political analysts from the European Union Center of North Carolina believe even that “European forces are said to possess only 10% of US capabilities for 60% of the US budget”⁸⁶. On the other hand, they pointed out that “Europe’s defence industry maintains considerable capabilities and European armies are gradually acquiring many of the same types of high-tech equipment and munitions that are employed by the US”⁸⁷. Nevertheless, this progress with the acquisition of modern military capabilities remained rather slow, particularly with regard to the military equipment required for high intensity out of area missions. The effectiveness of the EU approach to security issues was undeniably compromised by the lack of a common position concerning foreign policy priorities among members. Actually, no more than 10% of European soldiers are ready for rapid response missions overseas. Thus, in spite of European ability to act as a regional military actor, it is still far away from undertaking extended global responsibilities. In the near future, the EU will probably play second fiddle in the US-led out of area operations, concentrating on peace-support operations⁸⁸.

Table 2. Selected EU-27 Military Capabilities 1999-2009

	1999 (EU-15 and 12 candidates)	2009	Change
Defence Expenditure			
Total Expenditure	€162.9 bn	€209.7 bn	+29%
Expenditure/GDP	2.1%	1.7%	-19%
Armed Forces			
Total Active Military	2.508 mn	2.014 mn	-20%
Army	1.516 mn	0.996 mn	-34%
Navy	0.327 mn	0.222 mn	-32%
Air Force	0.539 mn	0.345 mn	-36%

Source: *Strength in numbers?. Comparing EU Military Capabilities in 2009 with 1999*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris 2009, p. 2.

A brief look at the strategy of the EU and the United States of America takes into consideration Robert Kagan’s observation that the allies have

⁸⁶ *European Military Capabilities...*, p. 1-2.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 1-2.

⁸⁸ *European Military Capabilities...*, p. 1-7; E. Greco, N. Pirozzi, S. Silvestri, *Conclusions...*, p. 106; S. Coonen, *The Widening...*, p. 77.

different views of the world⁸⁹. This difference lies elsewhere, namely in the ways of response to these challenges. In spite of an existing military gap between the United States and Europe, the “old continent” possess a comparatively significant military capability and, what is more important, a will to use it. Since 2003 – a critical point for transatlantic partnership as well as intra-European relations (the split was so severe that some observers doubted the survival of the perennial alliance), the EU had conducted 28 operations, both civilian (20) and military (8). All of which differed very much from Operation Allied Force, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom or ISAF Mission in Afghanistan. Generally speaking, lightly armed EU-forces consisted of EU-Member States units are able to conduct “low-intensity“ Petersberg missions. On the basis of previous experiences, it is possible to point out existing European challenges. From the military point of view, European combat units are not developed well enough to lead full scale armed missions. In such operations they played only a secondary role. The majority of the most sophisticated and at the same time decisive weapons used in the latest wars were American assets. Despite a significant number of troops and traditional types of weapons the EU still does not possess military capabilities required for today’s combat operations. In order to attain a larger global range, European forces will have to acquire sufficient capabilities at least in the following areas: strategic lift; aerial refuelling; C4SIR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Surveillance, Intelligence, and Reconnaissance Systems); ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) and power projection (inter alia Stealth Aircrafts and Bombers, Strategic Lift and Air-to-Air Refuelling) and PGMs (Precision Guided Munitions). In addition to the above-mentioned shortcomings, there is another concern – an unprecedented fragmentation and intra-European duplication of weapon systems among European states which are not compatible (roughly 125 different types of weapon systems exist, in particular in the area of air-force there are at least 40 systems) with each other⁹⁰.

As Jeffrey Bialos aptly pointed out: “American and European forces do not necessarily require the same types of capabilities to be interoperable, but at a minimum they must be able to communicate with each other via secure modes in order to exchange information”⁹¹. As a matter of fact, European military capabilities do not lag behind. An undeniable gap in military capabilities do not prevent interoperability between allied forces. Moreover, the cost of demanding European investments in the C4ISR systems is not

⁸⁹ Cf. A. I. Zakharchenko, *The EU and U.S. Strategies ...*

⁹⁰ Fu-chang Chang, *EU as Military...*, p. 2-9; S. Coonen, *The Widening...*, p. 70, 76-79; E. Gross, *EU-U.S. Cooperation...*, p. 38; *EU Common Security and Defence Policy*, <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSEX/EX4.htm>, accessed on: 22.12.2012; O. Croci, A. Verdun, *Security challenges...*, p. 1.

⁹¹ S. Coonen, *The Widening...*, p. 77.

overburdening or even overwhelming. However, several important steps should be taken. Europeans ought to modernize their forces with aforementioned networks, develop new weapons systems among them modern precision-strike munitions, WMD defence, mobility and logistic support assets. These existing disparities have constituted a *sui generis* division of labour wherein the USA plays the main role during “hot phases” of operations and conflicts, in the meantime European forces become more visible in the stabilisation and reconstruction (generally speaking post-conflict) phase. Each “partner” will focus on those military missions which bring them a comparative advantage. Already during the Balkan crises the vast majority of combat units was provided by the American superpower. The EU has taken over command of the operation from NATO when the focus has shifted to the state-building tasks⁹². In public debate this qualified division of labour is described in this way: “Americans making dinner and the Europeans washing the dishes”⁹³. In this context it is worth recalling one more quite often quoted motto: “US combat, the UN feeds, the EU pays”⁹⁴.

More than ten years of the ESDP (renamed the CSDP after the Treaty of Lisbon) have brought a few and above all only minor successes which were overshadowed by a lot of unfulfilled promises. As the main achievement is presented the EU Battlegroups initiative, which significantly intensified military cooperation among EU states. Since 2007 two such units have always been on stand-by. Although the Battlegroups are presented as the most significant success of the CSDP, we ought to be aware of some important limitations. First of all, the EU has never deployed any Battlegroup so far, therefore no one is able to assess the level of interoperability between European forces and their effectiveness in dealing with combat tasks. Second, the EU member states used to prefer creation of *ad hoc* coalitions in accordance with the Donald Rumsfeld principle: “missions define coalitions”. Unfortunately, in these cases military lessons learned from the field are few and seldom taken into account, because of states reluctance. Thirdly, the Battlegroups are capable to conduct only low-intensity small crisis management missions. If the EU has ambitions to conduct full scale operations, these battalion-sized units ought to be extended to include more troops and encompass diverse capabilities (military units exhibiting various levels of readiness)⁹⁵.

⁹² S. Coonen, *The Widening...*, p. 77-8; *Affordable Defense Capabilities for Future NATO Missions. A National Defense University Special Report*, Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University 2010, p. 12, http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/NATO_Affordable%20Defense%20Capabilities.pdf, accessed on: 20.12.2012.

⁹³ S. Schmemmann, *Some Are Cooks, Some Are Dishwashers*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/30/books/some-are-cooks-some-are-dishwashers.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>, accessed on: 30.12.2012.

⁹⁴ Fu-chang Chang, *EU as Military...*, p. 1.

⁹⁵ D. Braddon, *Operational, Structural...*, p. 25-26; J. Herz, *Military Capabilities...*, p. 2-3; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *EU military ...*, p. 15-16.

Being meticulous is essential to indicate that the EU is far from the capability hubris. On the contrary its member states are aware of their weakness. Concerning existing military gap between Europe and the US essential analyses have been conducted and several measures have been found in early 2000. European ambitious plans have been summarized in the table below. Even a cursory analysis of them allows to draw at least two conclusions. On the one hand, these armaments programmes were prepared on the solid foundation of European military shortcomings and desired strategic capabilities. On the other hand, they were just as ambitious as unrealistic in a given time frame⁹⁶.

Table 3. Selected European Armaments Programs

Program	Description	Number of Units	Deliveries	Current progress
A400 M	Transport aircraft	180-planned (in fact 160 ordered by EU members so far ⁹⁷)	2009-2010	Successfully completed the 300 hours of F&R (Function & Reliability) flight-testing in December 2012 ⁹⁸ .
Eurofighter	Combat aircraft	620-planned (almost 500 ordered by EU members so far)	2003-2015	First Eurofighter entered to service in August 2003 ⁹⁹ .
Tiger	Attack helicopter	180-planned	2003-2008	Significant delays in deliveries, program is still underway.
NH-90	Transport helicopter	300-planned	From 2006	The total volume of orders exceeded 570 machines, both NH90 TTH transport version (Tactical Transport Helicopter) and sea one NFH (NATO Frigate Helicopter) ¹⁰⁰ .

⁹⁶ *European Military Capabilities...*, p. 5-6; *Strength in numbers?...*, p. 4.

⁹⁷ C. Gauntier, A 400M Program Update 2012, <http://www.slideshare.net/robbinlaird/a400-m-program-update-2012>, accessed on: 10.01.2013.

⁹⁸ Airbus Military A400M completes critical flight-test phase, http://www.airframer.com/news_story.html?release=19966, accessed on: 10.01.2013.

⁹⁹ A History of the Programme, <http://www.eurofighter.com/eurofighter-typhoon/programme/history.html>, accessed on: 10.01.2013.

¹⁰⁰ *Portugalia zrezygnowała z NH90*, http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=8089, accessed on: 10.01.2013.

Future Carrier	Aircraft carriers (United Kingdom/France)	3-planned	2012-2014	HMS Queen is to be launch in 2016 and HMS Prince of Wales in 2018 ¹⁰¹ , the future of second French aircraft carrier – PA2/CVF future in doubt ¹⁰² .
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Source: *European Military Capabilities*, European Union Center of North Carolina “EU Briefings” May 2007, p. 6.

In spite of even the most ambitious European plans, the Author of this study recognizes that for the foreseeable future, both the EU as a whole and its members will not possess the capability essential for conducting successful major combat operations without significant US support. Given budgetary pressures, some countries will have to reallocate funds and other resources from defence to other sectors (among others the UK’s decision to purchase 160 Eurofighters Typhoon instead of 232). On the other hand, it could be a strong incentive to strengthen European cooperation on a larger scale on the basis of the close-up between the UK and France. Ambitions are huge, here the Author will confine himself to one issue which is the establishment of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) which is to achieve full operating capability in 2016¹⁰³.

4.4. European Military Contribution to the Out of Area Operations in Afghanistan and Libya

The Libyan operation and the final stage of ISAF Mission in Afghanistan were conducted in a completely new security environment. After years of unprecedented dominance, the current position of the US has significantly changed and now looks a lot more complicated. Washington’s freedom of strategic action is constrained by its prolonged combat commitment to

¹⁰¹ *Stęпка pod Prince of Wales, A History of the Programme*, http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=6215&q=lotniskowce%20brytyjskie, accessed on: 10.01.2013.

¹⁰² France’s PA2/CVF Carrier Project Stalled Until Whitepaper Verdict, <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/france-steaming-ahead-on-pa2cvf-carrier-project-01621/>, accessed on: 10.01.2013.

¹⁰³ *Britain and France Will Share Aircraft Carrier to Combat Defence Cuts, Says Admiral*, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1394185/Britain-France-share-aircraft-carrier-combat-defence-cuts-says-admiral.html>, accessed on: 10.01.2013; *New declaration agreed at the UK-France Summit; Production for the United Kingdom*, http://www.targetlock.org.uk/typhoon/production_uk.html, accessed on: 10.01.2013; *Business Plan 2012-2015 Ministry of Defence 31 May 2012*, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/MOD-2012-Business-Plan.pdf>, accessed on: 10.01.2013.

Afghanistan, the trauma of the Iraqi war (somewhat reminiscent of the so-called “Vietnam syndrome”), never ending budgetary problems and last but not least the situation in the Middle East, especially the “New Deal” in the field of security and the rising tide of anti-Americanism in this Gulf area. However, it is not a secret to anyone who is interested in international affairs that Americans still bear the majority of the burden of the Afghan mission both in terms of the number of soldiers and military equipment in the Afghan theatre as well as expenditures. This does not mean that the EU members participating in the operation behave as “free riders”. Over the last few years the EU member states made significant contributions to US-led combat operation in Afghanistan. Europeans are roughly 90% of the 40,000 non-US troops serving in Afghanistan. Three out of six regional commands and several of the 29 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan are led by European allies¹⁰⁴.

However, merely counting troops does not provide an accurate outlook of the European contribution to the operation. US European Command (EUCOM) actively supported European allies during their preparations for troops deployment to Afghanistan. Americans provided them pre-deployment training programmes, including among others: C-IED (Counter-Improvised Explosive Device) procedures, counterinsurgency intelligence analysis tailored to the Afghan security environment, operations of MRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected) and HMMWVs (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles) and finally – battalion-level counterinsurgency exercises. This is not the end of US military support for the Europeans when it comes to Afghanistan. EUCOM has also provided American allies with equipment essential for ISAF Mission in Afghanistan inter alia: communications systems, night vision devices and above mentioned C-IED systems (i.e. robots). The main objectives of these activities were to provide links and increase the level of interoperability between the allied forces being deployed and US forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, EUCOM ensured essential logistical capability to dislocate European troops and equipment to and from Afghanistan. In the Fiscal Year of 2011, the US regional command coordinated the Lift and Sustain Program put into life by the Department of Defence. More than 16,000 personnel and 2,500 tons of cargo from 19 allied nations was transported to Afghanistan under this programme. In spite of aforementioned shortcomings of the European forces, the “old continent’s” contribution to ISAF Mission, including troops, equipment and funding, is critical to meeting its current goal, which is the transition of security responsibility in Afghanistan by 2014¹⁰⁵.

¹⁰⁴ *Testimony of Admiral...*, p. 82.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 4-9, 89.

Table 4. Coalition Deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan

Level of casualties	“Iraqi war”	“Afghan war”
United States	4486	2177
United Kingdom	179	440
Other states	139	640
Total number	4804	3257

Source: <http://icasualties.org/>

Despite the fact that CSDP structures and instruments are not militarily involved in Afghanistan, the majority of EU member states are. In most cases their participation in the mission meant to incur significant efforts. At the very beginning their governments sometimes had to struggle to legitimize their decision to participate in this operation. During the mission they suffered from the lack of significant successes and a few losses, inter alia the need to extend the military presence of their troops, a quite significant number of casualties, higher than in the case of the “Iraqi war”. Summing up, it has reduced both readiness and the willingness for future large-scale expeditionary missions. As has been mentioned, the EU has carried out both civilian and military missions since 2003, but the majority of them belonged to the first category. They do not conduct integrated civilian-military missions even on a smaller scale, because of quantitative and qualitative shortages¹⁰⁶.

The crucial role of Europe both in terms of basing, military infrastructure and force contributions was even better visible during the operations in Libya (Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector). However, also in this case the USA played a decisive role. Initially, Washington decided to take a seemingly secondary role in the intervention. American support for UN resolutions 1970 and 1973 was not unconditional and excluded an involvement of US ground troops. One of the easiest aspects of the Libyan mission was that the coalition agreed on US leadership without debate. There were at least two inter-related causes of US allies position. First, they well understood the necessity of unity of command (joint command). The second and probably more important one was based on the fact, that the US Air Force possessed the essential capabilities to command and control (C2) as well as the significant logistical support of this air campaign. Moreover, US Air Forces in Europe provided not only essential infrastructure to the rapid response to emerging operational requirements in Libya but forces capable to respond to crises in the AOR. Additionally, the USA during the whole operation played a specific role of an irreplaceable combat enabler focusing largely on theoretical

¹⁰⁶ C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *EU military ...*, p. 18.

support but practically also crucial tasks in aerial refuelling and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support¹⁰⁷.

The operations in Libya provide at least one important example of current European military capabilities to conduct out of area crisis response operations. The USA was forced to step in to refill European weapon stocks. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates chided the allies for having insufficient inventory of weapons (spending too little on defence). Maybe it overshadowed real EU power a bit, but at the same time shed light on their huge deficits. The Libyan air campaign has brought additional important conclusions and lessons for the future. Gen. Stéphane Abrial, the Commander of Allied Command Transformation had no doubt that European air forces “could not have performed to the same level of effectiveness without heavy contribution from the US”. Moreover, the Libyan case also highlighted European shortages in terms of C2, logistical support, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance equipment and assets essential to carry out combat as well as rescue tasks. Without US participation it would be difficult to ensure the same interoperability and coordination as has been seen during the Libyan operations. Conclusions of these short deliberations seem to be quite simple. European states have to develop their own military capabilities independently – without US involvement¹⁰⁸.

On the other hand, the Libya missions are another example of the weakness of transatlantic partnership not only on the line of US-Europe, but within the EU as well. The Iraqi crisis had proven that the transatlantic alliance is not an automatic mechanism. When it comes to Libya, while France and the United Kingdom were the founders of Security Council Resolution 1973, Germany abstained during voting and did not participate in the Libyan air-campaign. Moreover, we ought to remember limited Italian contribution. The above mentioned examples highlights that the CSDP exist only in theory and the level of distrust as well as difference in foreign policy among allies remain meaningful¹⁰⁹.

The Author of this study does not share the optimism of Admiral James G. Stavridis, who summarized last year’s transatlantic cooperation in these words: “Through years of deployment to Afghanistan, and in recent operations over Libya, we have made great strides toward developing the military capabilities called for in the November 2010 NATO Strategic Concept. (...) Working together, we have accomplished some important objectives (...):

¹⁰⁷ J. Tirpak, *Lessons From Libya*, “Air Force” 2011 Vol. 94, No. 12, p. 34-36, <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2011/December%202011/1211libya.pdf>, accessed on: 10.01.2013; *Testimony of Admiral...*, p. 1, 10-11, 31, 84; E. Fojón, ‘*Odyssey Dawn*’ – *Beyond Libya*, <http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/2011/03/30/odyssey-dawn-beyond-libya/>, accessed on: 10.01.2013.

¹⁰⁸ E. Fojón, ‘*Odyssey Dawn*’...; J. Tirpak, *Lessons...*, p. 34-38.

¹⁰⁹ E. Fojón, ‘*Odyssey Dawn*’....

saving tens of thousands of lives from a despotic and unstable regime in Libya; supporting continued progress and transition in Afghanistan; maintaining a safe environment in the Balkans”¹¹⁰.

Based on the analysis of the last two major military operations, which are ISAF Mission in Afghanistan and Libyan operation, he is almost convinced that even current European regional powers (France and the UK) military capabilities have not radically changed since 2004. Taking into account the increasing budgetary pressures and essential austerity measures in the near future, the majority of EU countries will not be able to acquire more advanced military capabilities, but retain the full range of military forces too. To pursue one of its main goals of becoming an important actor not only in economic but in strategic and military terms, France and the United Kingdom “have decided to prioritise our joint work in the key areas of: command and control; information systems; intelligence, surveillance, targeting and reconnaissance; and precision munitions”¹¹¹.

The experience of previous armed conflicts starting from the “Balkan war” have demonstrated, that modern combat operations can rarely be won only by using pure military power. Preserving the new security architecture requires a full range of military as well as non-military capabilities, along with the political commitment to use them for sustained periods of time. European states control significant civilian assets which can be applied to conduct the stabilization and reconstruction tasks. Nevertheless, a great deal of truth remains in Frederick the Great’s statement: “Diplomacy without military force is like music without instruments”. Thus, European states have to develop military capabilities which allow them to perform a full catalogue of combat missions or tasks – from high-intensity, through nation- and state-building military operations to traditional peace-keeping tasks. In essence, European states are forced to cooperate more than they used to in the past. Without significant American combat support its European allies are not capable to deal with the new security challenges¹¹².

The Author attempted to outline the crucial issue connected with a development of European military capabilities to conduct full-scale combat missions. Conclusions coming from these considerations allow him to draw several important findings. Firstly, in the face of declining US interest in European affairs cemented by effects of the global crisis could be seen as a strong incentive to deepen European military cooperation or even “Europeanization” of defence capabilities. Secondly, apart from an adoption of specific institutional

¹¹⁰ *Testimony of Admiral...*, p. 1, 90.

¹¹¹ *Cf. UK-France Declaration...*

¹¹² D. Braddon, *Operational, Structural...*, p. 24; F. Burwell, D. Gompert, L. Lebl, J. Lodal, W. Slocombe, *Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture*, Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington 2005, p. 7-8.

solutions more than ten years of the CSDP (former ESDP) have brought a few and above all only minor successes. As Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out: “Europe remains a junior geopolitical partner to the United States in the semi unified West”¹¹³. Thirdly, there is a fairly broad judgment that a significant military combat or even crisis management operation, especially one that must be sustained over time and at a substantial distance from home bases, will require US involvement through NATO. Fourthly, military and political analysts as well as scholars on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean recognize the still existing and not decreasing military capabilities gap between the allies as major obstacles to transatlantic cooperation. Nonetheless, only limited military capabilities do not prevent the EU to play significant role in meeting the new security challenges. A Venusian Europe possess assets essential for peace-keeping and state-building tasks, which is complementary to American assets. Finally, the EU will be able to play the role of one of the most influential or even the global number two or three military power. Prerequisite for an implementation of this optimistic scenario is more close and robust integration in particular in the field of security. The problem is and probably will remain the lack of common position on matters of security since European states preserve full authority in these fields¹¹⁴.

¹¹³ Z. Brzeziński, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power* (ebook version), Perseus Distribution, New York 2012, p. 53.

¹¹⁴ S. Coonen, *The Widening...*, p. 67-68; F. Burwell, D. Gompert, L. Lebl, J. Lodal, W. Slocombe, *Transatlantic Transformation...*, p. 7-8; A. I. Zakharchenko, *The EU and U.S...*, p. 6.

CHAPTER V

Utter Failure or Misunderstanding: The Concept of Modern Multiculturalism Seen Through The Eyes of an Early 20th Century East European Scholar

Jan Szczepanowski

ABSTRACT

The matter of “cultural security” is an area often ignored by most analyses concentrated on providing a broad explanation for the complex scheme of international security perceived in a broader systemic sense. Calculations and scenarios based upon the paradigm of hard power, while truly useful, often seem to miss the point. Without a more in depth historical approach it is rarely possible to fully comprehend the matter at hand. This article discusses the hypotheses presented by an early 20-th century east European scholar, who is rarely remembered even in his own country of origin. His theories can be compared to those of Samuel Huntington, the primary difference being the fact that the former presents a broader array of precise historiographical arguments to support his thesis. Felix Koneczny created a very persuasive theory on the synthesis of civilizations and multiculturalism which seems profoundly up to date when addressing the most lively issues of the modern European Union. He attempts to illustrate, on the basis of particular cases taken from world history, that it is nearly impossible to make multiculturalism work properly. The article presents a sceptical point of view upon the mentioned issue.

The complex matter of security concerning a specific entity observed on a global scale, has traditionally been viewed as the domain of cryptic calculations based on the paradigm of hard power. This rarely sparks serious opposition. It makes perfect sense to assess the level of security based on facts, numbers, statistics and diplomatic relations. This data seems to provide many sensible and by all means objective (or close) answers. It is not at all surprising that serious scholars prefer to prove their hypotheses by providing evidence that is as strictly “scientific” as possible, which may however prove to be insufficient in order to obtain a coherent picture of reality. Without deeper and less “mathematical” insight one cannot expect to comprehend the full scheme of things. Sometimes the argument based on history, emotion or the subtle differences in the line of thought decides on how a group/nation/civilization will behave, whether it is vulnerable or not so, whether its values are susceptible to change and/or deterioration or whether they provide an example willingly followed abroad. The matter of “cultural security”, there-

fore seems like the perfect way to direct the reader's attention to areas often ignored by the traditional approach.

5.1. Multiculturalism Today

The problem of European security does not at all look promising from the perspective adopted in this analysis. This could be illustrated by many internal problems derived from and associated with the doctrine of multiculturalism. It proved to be a failure, as opposed to, for example the success of the United States – the world's largest melting pot. Germany and France not only failed to turn many of their immigrants into west Europeans but managed to transform moderate thinking groups and societies into fanatics (this term obviously does not concern everyone but is used solely as an image meant to illustrate the nature of the process), who on a large scale feel nothing in common with the countries they were born in. It would seem useful to provide a certain explanation for this occurrence- one which does not in any way boast absolute certainty or mathematical proof. The sensitive area defining culture or civilization is based largely on subjective feeling, but primarily depends on the past. It is in the depths of history that one should attempt to find the answer to why European culture as we know it is not safe – even if such an analysis may prove to be politically incorrect.

It would be useful in this context to mention a scholar long forgotten by science. Not many are aware that most of Samuel Huntington's views and theories were preceded by early 20-th century historiosophy. Amongst the myriad of minds concerned with this once popular area of study one may find such brilliant individuals as Karl Jaspers, Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. One notable acquaintance of the latter was Felix Koneczny, author of "On The Plurality of Civilizations", published in English with a preface by Toynbee¹¹⁵. The Polish historiosopher, being a severe opponent of an omnipotent state, was virtually banished from all bookshelves in times of communism, only to cautiously return many decades later (during the 90's). To those who ever heard of him (which is a rarity also in Poland) the scholar is known for creating a complex theory based not only on rational arguments and pure logic but also on persuasive examples from world history. His concepts, even though from a different age, provide a sensible explanation on why Europe's cultural policy is failing today to such an enormous extent. They could prove helpful if one wishes to predict the shape the continent will take as a possible effect of past mistakes. Before the above mentioned theory will be explained in regard to the issue of multiculturalism it seems necessary to provide some brief evidence on why it is currently believed by

¹¹⁵ F. Koneczny, *On the plurality of Civilizations*, Komorów 2011.

many that the West is so culturally vulnerable and why traditional European values seem to be under attack.

A wise place to begin would be by quoting the words of the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel. She appears to be quite confident that the attempt to create a multicultural society in Germany, where people would “live side by side happily” has “utterly failed”. Most importantly the leader of CDU puts the majority of the blame for such a state of things on immigrants, noting that it is they who failed to integrate and lack initiative – not even wanting to learn the language of the country they inhabit¹¹⁶. According to some polls conducted in 2010 as much as 30% of the population believed that the “country was overrun by foreigners”¹¹⁷. Even the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is sceptical. The world renowned think tank, known primarily for its leftist and “progressive” views states that about one third of the German populace believes that new citizens came to the country only for social benefits¹¹⁸. The 16 million immigrants appear to be viewed by both left and right as completely unassimilated and often unfriendly towards with the culture of the state they live in. In this context Angela Merkel’s statement must be presented in more detail:

“In the beginning of the 60’s our government called the foreign workers to come to Germany and now they live in our country [...] We kidded ourselves a while, we said: ‘They won’t stay, someday they will be gone’, but this isn’t reality. [...] The approach to build a multicultural society and to live side by side and to enjoy each other has failed, utterly failed¹¹⁹”.

The Chancellor was followed sometime later by Horst Seehofer, the leader of CSU who simply remarked that “multiculti is dead”¹²⁰. The most impor-

¹¹⁶ M. Weaver, *Angela Merkel: Multiculturalism has “utterly failed”*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed>, accessed on: 19.01.2013.

¹¹⁷ O. Decker, M. Weissman, J. Kiess, E. Brahler, *Die Mitte in der Kreise: Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2010*, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/do/07504-20120321.pdf>, accessed on: 10.01.2013.

¹¹⁸ For more vide: speeches from the conference on “European Approaches to Multiculturalism and Integration” organized by The Smith Institute and The Fredriech Ebert Stiftung, London Office.

¹¹⁹ Vide for comments: D. Frum, *Germanys Merkel is Right- Multiculturalism Has Failed*, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-18/opinion/frum.merkel.multicultural_1_germany-s-merkel-chancellor-merkel-angela-merkel?_s=PM:OPINION accessed on: 19.01.2013; J. Smee, *The World From Berlin: Merkel’s Rhetoric in integration Debate is Inexcusable*, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-merkel-s-rhetoric-in-integration-debate-is-inexcusable-a-723702.html> accessed on: 19.01.2013; for entire speech: A. Merkel, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UKG76HF24_k.

¹²⁰ H. Seehofer, *Multikulti ist tot*, <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/horst-seehofer-multikulti-ist-tot/3563806.html>, accessed on: 19.01.2013.

tant, provocative and controversial voice in this debate was without a doubt that of Thilo Sarrazin. This figure, traditionally more associated with the left (member of the SPD) dedicated a whole book to proving a theory that Muslim immigration is a threat to the cultural identity and security of the *Bundesrepublik*. The former member of the German central bank wrote: “No immigrant group other than the Muslims is so strongly connected with claims on the welfare state and crime”¹²¹. Another interesting comment on the subject is that of Rene Cupercus, Senior Research fellow at the Wiardi Beckman Foundation a think tank of the Dutch Labour Party:

“When and why has the former Marxist, anti-religious, secular left become so respectful to religion, to Islam in particular, which in its core values and practices is not easily compatible (to put it mildly) with the anti-authoritarian cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, the time when the world view of the left-liberals originated? Why did the cosmopolitan anti-patriotic left aggressively taboo and deny the idea of a national identity for European majority cultures (‘England or Holland does not exist’), but at the same time defend aggressively identity politics and ‘multi-cultures’ for non-western minorities?”

He goes on to say, that multiculturalism has produced the contrary effect to what was expected. Its fruits are no other than growing xenophobia, populist resentment and alienation¹²². The ideology behind immigration in Europe portrayed something different than for example in the United States, where many different nationalities and cultures live as “one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all”. The European model proved to be less successful. “You do not have to integrate”, should be rather interpreted as: “we do not want you here forever (reflected directly in Merkel’s words)”. The rest of the population was told that they are the majority among others. The point is that such a situation already occurred in history and did not work. Pre-war Poland was a typical multicultural state, even more so than modern day Germany, France, the Netherlands or Britain. All societies lived relatively peacefully together, but they did not even try to integrate. Felix Koneczny attempted to explain this situation historiosophically – many of his observations and hypotheses may prove useful as an argument in this debate¹²³.

¹²¹ Merkel Says German Multicultural Society Has Failed, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451>, accessed on: 19.01.2013; For more on Thilo Sarrazin vide: *Deutschland schafft sich ab*, or *Germany Is Doing Away With Itself*, 2010.

¹²² R. Cupercus, *Why the Left was Trapped Into Multiculturalism*, <http://www.social-europe.eu/2011/06/why-was-the-left-trapped-into-multiculturalism/>, accessed on: 19.01.2013.

¹²³ For broader insight vide: F. Koneczny, *Państwo i prawo w Cywilizacji Łacińskiej*, Komorów 2001; F. Koneczny, *Prawa Dziejowe*, Komorów 1997; F. Koneczny, *On The Pluralism of Civilizations*, Komorów 2011.

Rainer Baubock from the European University Institute in Italy provided quite a formidable theoretical argument against the concept of multiculturalism. While according to international law every nation has the right to self-determination and all minorities should be allowed to protect their culture against the majority “through pursuing their own projects of nation building”; it is difficult to oversee the fact that this principle is virtually incompatible with the “basic Westphalian norm of territorial integrity of states”. There was an attempt to get around this obvious logical contradiction by defining “peoples” in a more narrow manner than “nations”¹²⁴. This was a wonderful solution in theory, but requires very specific norms in order to be implemented in practice. Can norms solve such complexities as values that seem almost spiritual – those deriving from the concept of a nation, culture or civilization? Can a sheer formality put an end to a live entity that has been in existence for hundreds of years? Highly doubtful. It is impossible to regulate relations between cultures entirely merely with the help of definitions and norms, simply because cultures are based on emotion, feeling and the soul to a much more significant extent than on written sheets of paper. If one wishes all people within a nation to live side by side in a state of peace, they simply must have more in common than just an identical system of law and bureaucracy. This was the American approach and Europe really should take example from that success story rather than attempt write its own from scratch. The “multiculti” failure was foretold by scholars long before the modern implementation of the doctrine. It seems worthwhile to provide a short reminder of that criticism and divert the reader’s attention to the classical theory of the “synthesis of civilisations” and futility of “multiculturalism” presented by Felix Koneczny.

5.2. An Obscure Historiosophical Analysis of the Multicultural Ideal

It appears that not all types of multicultural entities and strategies should be perceived as identical. Some cultures bear more common traits than others and are thus prone to synthesis and/or the possibility of fruitful cooperation. Some of them are even members of the same civilization and creating a common ground between them resembles a natural process. American culture came into existence as the fruit of cooperation and common values shared by representatives of a myriad of nations – most of which were European. If another civilization would come into the picture the situation would become drastically different, simply because the primary reason for the birth of any

¹²⁴ R. Baubock, *What went wrong with liberal multiculturalism*, etn.sagepub.com/content/8/2/271.extract, p. 271-275, accessed on: 19.01.2013.

social group is a single unifying purpose, without which the need for a mutually supportive society never comes into existence. And although some individuals fool themselves to think otherwise – not all groups of people think the same way and have identical needs, especially if they have lived apart for hundreds of years with little contact apart from an occasional war. The chances are that they will never get along very well nor will they even think according to the same pattern; even when an inquiry concerns the simplest of things. The primary characteristic for every social group is, therefore a common purpose – this purpose is not the fruit of a simplistic contract, it is the effect of a long process of historic and spiritual evolution. According to Oswald Spengler the reason for the existence of a certain culture is not bound to the civilization itself; its purpose has to be an abstract ideal, simply because only something not yet in our possession provides the necessary motivation for movement, action and the “feeling of longing”¹²⁵. Thus, the matter of purpose determines that a group forms (is created) not only as the fruit of biology but also due to a sort of higher calling. The specificity of each purpose predetermines the fact that a certain society is in fact a separate civilization. This simple theory suggests that mixing various cultural entities and thus attempting to create a sort of synthesis will always result in utter failure. The obvious reason for this is that various purposes show different paths to different places (various goals). How can a single group function in harmony if it is concentrated on separate and maybe even contradictory elements; if it wants (expects) different things from life? Such coexistence means nothing more than chaos and often leads to the decline of a certain or of all cultures concerned. The only way to merge two separate civilizations is by creating an alternative, much like it was done in the USA. Felix Koneczny states that various civilizations are in a state of endless rivalry and a victory in war does not necessarily mean real victory in the field of culture – Rome and Greece are perfect examples. The reason for conflict lies in the mutual incompatibility of purposes and a popular feeling of certainty that “our goal makes the most sense”. This never ending rivalry is caused by the fact that societies naturally come into contact, they interact, live together or next to each other. As an effect some of them may cease to exist – and it is rarely the “better” (more developed, sublime) group that survives. Complexity is not at all attractive according to this hypothesis¹²⁶.

¹²⁵ O. Spengler, *Zmierzch Zachodu (Der Untergang des Abendlandes)*, Warszawa 2001, p. 192-208.

¹²⁶ F. Koneczny, *Prawa...*, p. 237-260.

5.2.1 The Problem of Compatibility and Synthesis of Civilizations

One of the most valuable elements of Koneczny's theory is probably the matter of compatibility and synthesis. Both terms are worth explaining in more detail. The scholar directs the reader's attention to cultures which at first glance seem to be almost analogous. When observed in more detail however, one may notice significant differences even amongst the closest (representing many features, that are alike) and most similar civilizations. Even if genuinely subtle, in those differences lies the true character of any society. Rome and Greece are perfect illustrations of that thesis; the similarities between them without a doubt surpass any possible differences: their alphabets are fully phonetic; their religious systems were virtually identical etc. Interestingly enough, according to Koneczny both societies belong to entirely different civilizations. This is because the essence of every culture is based on "the common method of organizing a society". In the case of Greece in times of Hellenism, *ergo* the period after Alexander the Great its society can be characterized as oriental or Eastern. It resembles the original Hellenic civilization to a limited extent. The Roman model is personalistic, centred on the individual and on the classical rule of law. The attempt at synthesis was based on a common intellectual base. Unfortunately the basic line of thought turned out to be incompatible, which is the main reason for which the empire split into two separate cultural entities. Both civilizations were without a doubt inspired by a similar set of abstract ideals, which derived from common sets of beliefs: first the classical, then Christianity. These, however can be interpreted in very different ways and thus lead to the formation of various forms of practice, preferred ways of acting, dogma and moral duty. Orthodox and Catholic Christianity do not differ significantly (much less than for example Protestantism and Catholicism) in terms of the declared set of beliefs, but the practice of faith is entirely different. The dominating rule which requires one to follow in the footsteps of The Lord stays the same but the ways of realizing that rule vary significantly. Both religions value humility. In the West the mentioned trait is altruistic, centred on the individual and understood as helping others, actively combating injustice and evil, changing the world etc. This is precisely why we had schools, hospitals, poorhouses, universities and such – all established and ran by the clergy. In the East the world is also understood as imperfect, but the religious element simply implies that one has to accept imperfection and contemplate fate as God's will – similarly to Islam¹²⁷. This is perfectly reflected in many works of art – for example architecture. Oswald Spengler sees the dome of an Orthodox Basilica as a sort of prelude or introduction to the quick spread of Islam in the former Eastern

¹²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 237.

Roman Empire. The German historiosopher sees the Hagia Sophia as a perfect Mosque – built before the formal birth of Islam as a sort of prediction of the future. This example seems to illustrate how two almost identical societies – with common roots and similar beliefs can choose disjoining paths of development; the reason for which lies simply in the deep incompatibility of vision and purpose. A man of the West wished to experience objective beauty – paying special attention to both realism and symbolism in creating works of art. The Easterner sought perfection by deep introverted thought and meditation. According to Koneczny “various societies look upon good and evil, the idea of beauty, perfection, usefulness and uselessness in a completely different manner. They can have various points of view concerning the above elements, not to mention that even their vision (ideal) of truth (purpose) is never compatible or analogous. A certain goal is only analogous (mutually corresponding/correlating) within societies belonging to one civilization”¹²⁸. Ergo, it is futile to expect the possibility of creating a synthesis of civilizations, since different cultures are by their very nature incompatible (they have different goals, dreams, ideals, interpretations of dogma etc.) Koneczny backs this thesis up by quoting one of the conclusions of an annual meeting held by The Ethnological Society of Religion in 1929: “one cannot imagine a crime that at some time or place could not have been interpreted as an honourable deed”¹²⁹.” This statement seems just as persuasive today as over 80 years ago. How can one hope to create a common society when the group concerned lacks a common system of ethics, morality; its elements (nations, peoples) act differently, represent various mythologies, traditions and abstract ideals? One could obviously create a system of do’s and don’ts a priori- it would however certainly prove to be seriously impaired by the lack of a historical (realistic) foundation. Such artificial constructions rarely prove to provide sufficient value. How can one substitute years of experience and evolution by a baseless projection. It is certainly better to trust in the wisdom of past generations than the meditations and projects of madmen with visions of transforming the true fabric of society.

Because faith is such an important element in creating a civilization there are attempts to, in a way, establish a common ground in this matter in order to bring the people of the world closer together. This tendency is evident for example in the form of ecumenism in Christianity, which is without a doubt a noble and romantic cause. Such sentimental ideals usually do not bear the expected fruits however. Is it worth losing the truth in the name of common and united error? It is better to be divided by truth than united in error. Only people that are religiously indifferent could think of an endeavour to synthesize beliefs in the name of abstract compatibility at all costs. If one perceives

¹²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 238.

¹²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 239.

his/her own culture or civilization seriously and believes in its mission or purpose how can one simply sacrifice it on the altar of uniformity? What is the point of unity without passion and belief¹³⁰?

Another important element worth mentioning is the fact that victory in the field of rivalry is rarely possessed by the most aggressive or warlike civilization. Cultural expansion derives from the strength of ideals, beliefs, abstract ideas, myths and traditions. Let us consider the initial expansion of Islam. Christians, at first, were not being converted by sword, but primarily in the form of economic discrimination. The mission of expansion takes place in the mind and soul, because civilization is based on emotion, feeling and the heart – it lays in the world of abstraction, which precedes physical matter. The heart is always closed to the material world, but that world is bound to reflect the dreams and ideals of the former¹³¹. Most prominent and long lasting civilizations are in fact, as Koneczny describes them, sacred/spiritual in nature. They are characterized not only by ideological thought or doctrine but primarily by certain traditional customs (actions) reflected for example in liturgy, celebrating holidays, not eating meat (or certain types of meat) etc. Every element of life is filled with duties and obligations deriving from a certain religious system. It would be virtually impossible to merge these rules in the case of, for example orthodox Judaism and Hinduism, whilst maintaining their true form, nature and world outlook. Attempting synthesis would in this case seem barbaric and ignorant, would surely never work and most certainly be an act of sacrificing what both societies view as truth in the name of unifying them in error¹³².

The Polish scholar presents numerous examples from history which are meant to prove that attempts at the synthesis of cultures belonging to different civilizations are determined to fail. The vision of uniting mankind by merging its beliefs and traditions is not a modern invention it has been around since ancient times. The most notable example, no doubt directed by noble intentions was that of Alexander the Great, who was certainly one of the first great synthesizers of societies. The Macedonian king urged his soldiers to marry Persian women of which he gave an example by entering the eternal union with an Iranian dancer. He made numerous analogies between the Greek and Persian gods and dreamed of creating a common ideology encompassing his whole reign which was to be based on his individual persona. Alexander the Great believed it impossible to Hellenize the enormous and diverse East, which was no doubt a wise predicament. The problem, however was that he did not wish to accept the fact that people are by nature

¹³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 240-260; O. Spengler, *Zmierzch...*, p. 25-60.

¹³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 405-417; about the relationship between spirit and matter vide: Platon, *Fajdros i Uczta*, in: *Dialogi*; about the hierarchy of matter vide: Arystoteles, *Metafizyka*.

¹³² Feliks Koneczny, *Prawa...*, p. 240.

diverse and apparently could not understand that the existence of various cultures and states is a treasure of mankind instead of its burden. The king of Macedonia dreamed of unification and uniformity, which in turn ended up deeply changing the nature of his own civilization forever. The utopian vision of a single empire collapsed with ruthless consequence, what is worse is that even the Greeks themselves never again united (until the 19th century) – at least not in accordance with their traditional values and historical outlook. This is also proof that power politics and military conquest is not a sufficient method of successfully spreading certain values and beliefs¹³³. The effect of such endeavours is usually contrary to expectations. Greeks (especially the elite) became increasingly “Eastern” (“oriental” if one prefers) – no one in their right mind would call Cleopatra (a Greek noble of the Ptolemaic dynasty) as an individual resembling Pericles, Demosthenes, Aristotle or Plato to a more significant extent than the Pharaohs of the Old Kingdom. The same can be said about distant Bactria. The only Greek element one could observe there would probably be the external design of money (coins), which in some manner resembles the traditional Hellenic model.

A very notable example of the madness of artificial “self-correction” carried out in order to look (seem) more friendly to a foreign culture could be perfectly portrayed by early Byzantine-Islamic relations. The empire wished to persuade the Muslims to convert to Christianity by incorporating some elements of their civilization. Images of God, the Saints and Angels- which were particularly revered by the Eastern Orthodox Church were banned and thus thousands of priceless works of art were barbarically destroyed. The fact that worshipping images is not allowed in Islam is in full accordance with the main principles of that religion. One can say that it is a fundamental logical outcome of the nature of that civilization. Allah is primarily characterized as all powerful and his will cannot be questioned or creatively reflected upon. The same cannot be said about Eastern Christianity, which is so strongly tied to the image as an important sacred element, that brings an individual closer to God – whose most important traits are centred on mercy and love. The Byzantine Greeks wished to solve the problem of an expanding Islam by cooperation, dialogue and compromise. They went ahead and decided to sacrifice one of the most important elements of their own world outlook only because they believed it would spark positive feeling towards them from their adversaries. The effect was contrary to their expectations: such an act can only be perceived as a display of weakness and decadence by young and dynamically expanding cultures. How can one motivate the destruction of something so dear? Could it be only because one does not have the will or strength to fight for what one believes in? Or perhaps that individual does not really believe in anything anymore? Every idealist thinks

¹³³ *Ibidem*, p. 250.

in the categories presented above and the only way to gain his/her respect is to honorably fight (not necessarily in militaristic terms; by argument as well for example). An act that is hostile to something as dear as one's own civilization seems to be nothing more than the proof of its decadence and spoilage. It is a sign of its oncoming end¹³⁴. Thus it becomes almost obvious, that attempts at combining (by means of synthesis) entities as ancient and complex as civilizations does not reap the expected benefits.

It is worth mentioning here that a myriad of other examples similar to the one presented above exist. One of them was an attempt to unify all Slavs by the Russian empire – an ideal especially popular during the 19th century. This concept was based on common ancestry and ethnicity, which are basically the only elements that East and West Slavs have in common (*vide* Koneczny, Huntington). This is not a formidable way of establishing a common culture. How absurd and foolish is it to say that blood ties determine anything other than how a person looks! One cannot build or persuade someone to join their civilization on something as absurd as the concept of race. Human beings are not animals and their character traits are in no way determined by something as simplistic as genealogy or genotype. Culture and tradition are not formed on racist predicaments (Only modern attempts at synthesis and multiculturalism seem to have attempted to do so). This has been proven by history again and again. The fact that Poles or Czechs have virtually nothing in common with Russian culture except a similar language and accent is proof of that. Whether it makes sense to incorporate a people into ones culture purely based on such a banal element however, is doubtful and seems nothing more than an excuse to conquer¹³⁵.

In this context it would also be wise to mention another failed case of cultural synthesis. This time it concerns two protestant churches in Hohenzollern Prussia. Frederick I strove to centralize and unify the religious sphere which would give him the possibility to even further submit it to the rule of the state. The theological dogma of the Lutheran and Calvinist sects are fundamentally different. One cannot simply reconcile the two. This is precisely why they came into existence- the protestant religion split into various groups for idealistic and philosophical reasons (The Anglican Church is probably the only exception), not practical ones. It is futile to hope to unite separate religious entities simply by administrative means. This depth of thought could not be achieved by the Prussian elites at that particular moment in time (18th century). Their actions portrayed religion not as the foundation of civilization or culture but a means to an end – a sort of tool whose primary purpose was to further strengthen the formal institution of their state (institution). In 1719, as an initiative of Frederick Wilhelm I, theologians from Tübingen put together

¹³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 240.

¹³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 240.

15 new articles of faith based on which both branches of Protestantism were supposed to be united. The king subsequently rejected the Calvinist idea of predestination and at the same time issued a directive for the newly unified church to stick to the Calvinist “Agenda” (means of administration). The only effect of this act was the growing indifference of the protestant religion towards matters of faith and could have been one of the many seeds of atheism and agnosticism in Europe. It would be useful to mention George Calixtus in this context. The 17th century theologian planned to create a synthesis of all protestant branches. This proved to be impossible and the fruit of his universalism was nothing more than a system of ethics without the proper motivation (roots). Thus one can observe that attempts at uniting cultures artificially usually lead to their significant decline¹³⁶.

Civilizations differ in basically all forms of human existence. They even perceive science itself in a completely different manner. Both the scientific method and purpose of science vary drastically in the West and for example in China. According to Koneczny, in the former the main goal is learning the truth – no matter if mankind can reap its practical benefits. Within the latter culture one performs each action for the good of society, thus science has to be utilitarian and useful here and now¹³⁷. It is difficult to leave this thesis without discussion. Practicality as the sole motive for invention is surely not a Chinese trait. Black powder, for example was put to religious/sacral use, it became an element of many festivities in honour of the emperor, which is no doubt a very abstract sphere. One can find many more examples of inventions that were meant to fulfil higher needs than just earthly and practical.

The creation of new cultures by synthesis is a futile task also because it is nearly impossible to even understand the motivation of another civilization without extensive knowledge about it (and even then it is difficult). A good example would be an illustration of the difference between Hinduism and western Christianity. The first is based upon religious acts (customs) – and not ethics are important here but rituals. Even if someone would undertake the endeavour of collecting the meanings of all of them, the system would prove to be inconsistent and illogical. Christianity is mostly about reflecting upon a theologically (scientifically) organized dogma. The rituals are mostly introverted and in comparison to Hinduism there are very few of them. In Hinduism every day is a unique holiday which demands certain rituals (for example on the island of Bali). Each day is a cause for celebration and brings with it a certain mythical story, which often does not even contain a point (moral). The goal is to petrify certain ways of acting, gestures, mimicry and motivate life with tradition and myth. Hinduism brings one closer to the Deity with gestures. Christianity does the same with thought and

¹³⁶ F. Koneczny, *Prawa...*, p. 244-245.

¹³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 246-248.

ethics. It would seem wise to provide an example of Hindu myth as evidence of the hypotheses put forward above. While observing a play on a temple altar in Bali one could not help but wonder about the lack of its moral or philosophical value. The legend concerned a prince who failed to hunt down an animal. While looking for the pray he noticed an empty coconut shell and urinated inside it. On the next day a simple girl went into the forest, noticed what the prince left behind and drank it. She got pregnant, carried the baby for a year and gave birth to a frog. A certain princes fell in love with this (male) frog, who in turn asked Shiva to turn it into a human being. The deity replied that the frog is in fact a prince and fulfilled his bidding. They lived happily ever after. One cannot help but address a question to Mahatma Gandhi, who stated that the Western mind is entirely materialistic and the Hindu is idealistic, what ideals the above legend contains? To be brief – it is just a meaningless story, with no abstract value, its strength is locked in the fact that it exists and is believed to be true – which is direct proof that Hinduism feeds primarily on tradition: classic forms of sacrum. How can one possibly hope to unify two societies as different from each other as the West and Hinduism? They think differently, have various motivations, believe in different things and have entirely disjoint purposes for existence according to their ways of thinking. To even consider synthesis is thus without a doubt entirely a waste of time, for the only way in which it could be successful is by destroying both societies and building something else in their place. Such barbarism should no doubt be avoided¹³⁸.

It would be worthwhile to also mention the subject of time itself. This too is perceived in an entirely different manner by various societies. The Hindus look upon time in an emanative and cyclic way. The energy of Brahma endlessly emanates from the deity but with each minute it becomes more and more unclean – polluted by actions that do not derive from it directly. This is the source of suffering and the reason that the world is not perfect. Every once in a while bad energy starts to dominate over the good and the world collapses in on itself. The deity then builds a new world thus beginning a fresh cycle. Every individual is trapped inside- this is known as reincarnation. He/she can break free however by entering the state of Moksha, thus become “nothing”. This theory implies that existence is something evil and each Hindu should live in a state of conflict towards his/her being as well as the material world¹³⁹. The Latin civilization is based on creationism (not to be understood in its new meaning) a concept which leads one to believe that the world was created only once and does not undergo significant change in terms of its nature and character. This formulates a bond of the individual

¹³⁸ Own observations and F. Koneczny, *Prawa...*, p. 247.

¹³⁹ Own observations; F. Koneczny, *Prawa...*, p. 51-52; F. Koneczny, *O wielości cywilizacji*, Warszawa 2002, p. 289- 294.

and physical matter that he exists in, which in turn led to the evolution of modern empirical science¹⁴⁰.

When considering the concept of the synthesis of civilizations one cannot help but mention the Jewish people and their unique culture. Because of the complexities of history the Hebrew people can be found all over the world – always for the benefit of the place they inhabit. They do not wish to assimilate fully however and represent an elitist point of view upon their values and beliefs. They feel no particular need for spreading their outlook abroad either – it was meant solely for them. This is what makes the Jewish civilization strong and vital. No special longing for synthesis is typical for this culture – it is content with the respect it feels towards its ancestors and forefathers: “they stand on the shoulders of giants”, that is why they achieved so much. The belief in being a chosen people does not have to be abandoned just so other cultures feel better about themselves¹⁴¹. This is no doubt an attitude that provokes respect from people of worth that remember their own heritage.

5.2.2. Multiculturalism and the Theory of the Crossroads

Felix Koneczny also directs the reader’s attention on the matter of multiculturalism and the theory of the crossroads. It is based on the predicament that cultures which exist at the crossroads of civilizations are predestined to be richer, more valuable culturally and stronger intellectually. He states that the belief in the many benefits flowing from that idea is “one of the most absurd myths of modernity”. If it would make any sense then Russia would prove to be the leader of the world. He meticulously identifies as many as seven cultures which can be found within the great country¹⁴². Even if, sometimes it would be easy to disagree with the details the Eastern giant was always, without a doubt a truly multicultural nation. Instead of making that trait the primary example set for humanity it was the source of a significant energy drain. Russia put so much effort during its long history in order to suppress internal nationality driven conflicts (Poland, Georgia, Ukraine, The Caucasus as a whole etc.). Much of its actions were driven by attempts to maintain unity instead of concentrating on more vital problems. This may be one of the reasons why the country is still quite backward. Civilizations simply have different goals, purposes and ideals, they cannot be merged or reconciled nor can they be conquered by sheer force. It is simplistically understood expansionism that made Russia what it is today.

Finally it should be made clear that the matter of synthesis of civilizations was based purely on an *a priori* method of analysis. It was a premeditated

¹⁴⁰ Feliks Koneczny, *Prawa...*, p. 47-72.

¹⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 249.

¹⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 35-36.

romantic and sentimental ideal of creating a universal society in which everyone could live together in harmony. Such concepts are usually utopian in nature. How can you expect harmony from two groups of people who have conflicting goals? It is a child's wish that will probably never come true, for it is deemed impossible by philosophy and logic. Looking back at history one may easily notice that attempts at civilizational synthesis were always artificial and predestined to fail¹⁴³. A new civilization can come into existence as an effect of the emergence of a new purpose/ideal or it can undergo significant decline and be dominated by another culture. There is simply no alternative.

Multiculturalism is a somewhat different concept than the one described in detail above, when the main goal of analysis is the full explanation of certain occurrences which make it difficult for a given culture to realize its purpose or the mission it believes it is a set to fulfil. Synthesis means sacrificing some elements and truths of a given cultural order (system) and incorporating others in their place so that a new entity based on common methods of thinking, feeling and existence could be created – this group may otherwise be called a civilization. Multiculturalism is simply about incorporating foreign elements of existence into an entity (society) which are unable to correspond with the given order of life¹⁴⁴. These new methods of existence are unable to assist in achieving a certain culture's purpose if they were provoked into being by entirely different sentiments and beliefs. Incorporated elements of a foreign origin can only disrupt a given culture from achieving a certain goal (or attempting to achieve it). They can tear the delicate fabric of a unique way of life, change the nature of a civilization and interrupt its sense of direction (movement, dynamism). The greatest risk of creating a multicultural environment artificially is that society will transform into an uncultured, chaotic mass without a certain unique purpose. Such a state would ensure its decline.

Oswald Spengler for example describes civilization as a live organism. It is difficult to fully agree with such Neo-Darwinist statements but society is surely something more than just a mechanism or group of people who agreed upon a common "social contract". It is also not merely founded on pure instinct, which transforms the actions of a group based on changes of the outside environment in accordance with a certain system. The German scholar presents the opposition between what "is alive" (as opposed to "dead" mechanical creations) and what is not. He believes that live entities are defined by their spiritual element and thus cannot be understood as machines put into movement by matter. In this case the term organism does not contain its typical meaning. Spengler uses it as a metaphor; if society is an organism then it contains an element of escaping the curbs of science and the possibility

¹⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 249.

¹⁴⁴ F. Koneczny, *Prawa...*, p. 260.

of empirical description – it is more complicated than a regular mechanism. It does not react in a given, predefined manner towards external change; its actions, in a way, cannot be predicted; they seem almost metaphysical¹⁴⁵. The metaphor of an organism was also used by scholasticism in the Middle Ages in order to describe purpose in nature. This term is obviously very useful also when analysing the goal of every society, as long as it is understood purely as a metaphor¹⁴⁶. The existence of a given entity has meaning only when it has a certain predefined goal that it strives to achieve; in other words it should act in accordance with the platonic “intention of existence”. Simply put: every element of a certain organism has to fulfil its purpose according to the goal of the whole. The head is responsible for leadership, the legs for walking etc. Their actions are brought into life automatically, simply because the mentioned body parts have been designed (by nature or God) to do so. The same could be said about a society, culture and civilization. It should be allowed to act based on instinct (which is the fruit of historical development), in accordance with its character and purpose. Its representatives should realize that when two legs move in an unsynchronized manner this may bring about the risk of tripping. Oswald Spengler is positive, however that each society is determined to grow and develop to a certain moment and is bound to deteriorate one day anyway. Every civilization must face decadence, nihilism and die of natural causes.¹⁴⁷ Felix Koneczny is sceptical towards such theories. His argument is based on the fact that many ancient civilizations still exist and did not disappear whilst some were short-lived and fell into a period of decadence and decline. *Ergo*, societies do not simply die of old age as people do but are able to carry their traditions with them almost endlessly – unless of course they lose their sense of purpose and meaning – this in effect leads them to a state of adaptation: they either yield to another civilization or fall into a state of deep depression and cease to exist¹⁴⁸. According to Koneczny the primary reason for the fall of a society is the loss of its unique goals – this happens most often as an effect of multiculturalism, where a variety of unfamiliar ways of understanding reality are introduced. It is impossible to believe and/or acknowledge two contradicting truths/ points of view/ purposes of life etc. When the representatives of a society begin to do so it just stops being a society and becomes a group of different people united by one law and government – nothing more. This is also predetermined to be temporary. Every culture understands the concept of law differently; every civilization has different sets of rules based on various historical and/or religious traditions/predicaments rooted in thousands of years of practice. It is naive

¹⁴⁵ O. Spengler, *Zmierzch...*, p. 115-142.

¹⁴⁶ St. Thomas Aquinas, *O Królowaniu*, Kraków 2006, p. 43-61; (*De Regno...*).

¹⁴⁷ O. Spengler, *Zmierzch...*, p. 205-224.

¹⁴⁸ O. Spengler, *Zmierzch...*, p. 115-142.

and sentimental to believe that many cultures can happily live in a “modern”, “liberal” state – this is possible only in the case of its inventors; no one else will understand it nor truly acknowledge its purpose.

When certain elements of a given organism are motivated by disjointed sets of hopes, purposes and truths, then the whole entity is unable to achieve the originally intended goal. When a society completely loses its predefined traits and thus the purpose for its existence it becomes pointless to even analyse it.

A civilization can lose its unique direction as an effect of the simplest events, which by themselves should not under any circumstance, be subject to criticism. In neighbouring societies cultural contact between them as well as mutual impact are inevitable and profound. Some “foreign cultural elements” are not a danger to the civilizational fabric of a society at all – inventions, simple customs and technical details can exist in full correlation with its purpose and goal¹⁴⁹. The adaptation of external elements has to, however be in full accordance with the “law of proportion”. Felix Koneczny notices (at the beginning of the 20th century) that occurrences typical for frontiers and border areas can now be found virtually everywhere. “We can now observe that two members of the same family can now belong to two different civilizations, even ones hostile to each other. This is evidence of a growing instability of beliefs, views – even terms and ideas, as well as the growing uncertainty of purpose and the meaning of existence of individuals¹⁵⁰”. Not so long ago we could witness the disappearance of ancient and noble families of the past. Each owed its allegiance to one stable and continuous meaning for ages, which could be decrypted for example from their medieval coats of arms. They were loyal to the traditions of their ancestors. One could expect a certain predefined way of thinking and analysis from a given noble family for decades, even though they married representatives of the aristocracy from many different nations (but usually within one civilization). Today, the respect for tradition and duty has virtually disappeared and one can observe that individual views are no longer shaped by the family.

It looks as though Felix Koneczny attempts to blame the decline of Western Civilization on different cultures. This is no doubt a serious mistake. Dadaism, turpism, surrealism, futurism etc. were not the fruits of foreign thought. The relativist point of view is uniquely Western, no one else thought of it but us. Every civilization has a profound feeling of righteousness – it is absolutely sure that the direction which it chose over the centuries is the right one. There are certain implications based on which one may call a society a civilization. They are inspired by a belief in a certain purpose and meaning. The West seems to have lost its sense of direction. Instead of reflecting upon the matter of multiculturalism and the synthesis of cultures one should rather

¹⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 260.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 260.

create a new category: anti-civilization. This entity did not evolve as an effect of an energy drain caused by the influx of foreign cultures as Koneczny would like, but as the fruit of The French Revolution. It is without a doubt that attempts at synthesis or creating a multinational state may have an effect on the feeling of purpose of a given society, but living next to someone of a strong sense of identity can also serve as an inspiration to revive our own sets of values. In practice a more diverse society can lead to stronger feelings of civilizational patriotism and self-definition. It often happens that a given culture can incorporate foreign elements and thus enrich its heritage. In the case of Hinduism for example there is no doubt that without its special characteristic, based on the ability to provide a unique way of understanding others and giving meaning to cultural values stemming from the outside, it would not last for such a long time. If not for the fact that each foreign truth could not be meticulously and quite accurately (with broad understanding) added to the system, that system would probably decompose. Its tolerance should not be understood in the modern meaning of the word, *ergo*; everyone has their own truth and we should respect that because we do not really know what truth is. The Hindu civilization says rather – every truth is in accordance with our truth; if it is not, then we will make it so. Instead of attacking it tries to prove the futility of the classic form of conflict. It fights rather in the intellectual and mystic spheres. This special kind of tolerance makes the mentioned culture very resilient and powerful; it takes what it can, enriching its heritage without in any way destroying its foundations – everything is modified in accordance with its main set of beliefs. However, one should mention the fact that Hinduism never could really incorporate or tame Islam. The conclusion can be twofold therefore: the “law of history”, as Felix Koneczny calls it, concerning the futility of multiculturalism and the synthesis of civilizations is not entirely accurate. Sometimes multiculturalism provides the best results for a given culture, but it is very often the other way around as well. Historiosophy does not really give a certain answer, but provides a broader spectrum which enables an individual to really understand the meaning of such words as tolerance, diversity and multiculturalism; instead of just repeating them aimlessly as an element of fashionable modern propaganda¹⁵¹.

There are numerous examples in history which prove that multiculturalism as well as its other form based on the synthesis of civilizations are ideals that are incredibly difficult to achieve in practice. If a given society really wishes to put them to life its elites should feel obliged and compelled to rely not only on empty words and goodwill, but also on historical evidence and experience stemming from the past. It is possible for different cultures

¹⁵¹ O. Spengler, *Zmierzch...*, p. 118-124; F. Koneczny, *Prawa...*, p. 261.

to live together happily, whilst enriching their heritage, but in order to do that all of these cultures have to believe in a certain form of truth. If one of these societies is decadent and increasingly nihilist it is bound to be spiritually conquered by others. This is a conclusion, which cannot be ignored when attempting to bring such ideas to life – for with noble ideals it is always profoundly difficult to do so.

CHAPTER VI

Food Security System of the European Union – Operative Solutions in Terms of Contemporary and Future Challenges

Katarzyna Czupa

ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to analyse the European Union's food security system. Its objective is to sketch out operating solutions, pinpoint steps that have already been taken to adopt policy to the changing environment and show both failings and areas demanding particular attention. The first part of the article concerns EU's domestic production and is divided into two sections which refer to the Common Agricultural Policy and Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO). The second part is thoroughly devoted to the external dimension of the food security (foreign trade) and examines the influence of trade relations on the analysed issues. The purpose of this study is to present in simpler way the complex nature of the food security and explain it lucidly.

The 21st century has brought a wide range of challenges which either have been completely unprecedented, or occurred before but never with such intensity. The food prices' volatility noted in recent years should be placed somewhere in the middle. A phenomenon as such has been known since the very beginning of the commodity market, however its current cause – preternatural growth of the world population and climate change – makes it unusual.

According to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in the late 2011 the 7bn demographic milestone was exceeded and it is said that in mid-2012 about 7.058 million people lived on Earth¹⁵². As Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) prognoses, in 2030 global population will reach nearly 8.3bn and in 2050 it may surpass 9.3 bn. Despite the fact that the bulk of people is being born in developing countries and the growth rate per annum peaked in the late 1960s at 2 per cent a year and slowed to 1.2 per cent between 1997-99 and 2015 thus lowering the annual rate of growth in the world demand for agricultural products from 2.2 per cent in 1969-1999 period to 1.6 between 1997-99 and 2015, food prices remain affected¹⁵³.

¹⁵² 2012 *World Population Data Sheet*, Population Reference, p. 6, <http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2012/world-population-data-sheet.aspx>, accessed on: 27.12.2012.

¹⁵³ Data from Food and Agriculture Organisation, *World Agriculture: towards 2015/2030. Summary report*, Rome, 2002, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/esag/docs/y3557e.pdf, accessed on: 9.01.2013.

On the whole, the FAO Food Price Index has been increasing since the very first years of the 21st century and the tendency was broken by few short falls (Table 1). The most significant surge was reported in 2011, yet prices still linger on relatively high level. A negative impact of high demographic pressure has been additively escalated by recurrent natural disasters. Extreme drought which hit the United States in the summer of 2012 resulted in poor harvest of maize (the amount of crops was 100m tonnes lower than what was expected) and raised cereals price rate by nearly 18 per cent¹⁵⁴.

Table 1. FAO Food Price Index variations in 2000-2012 period.

FAO food price index							
	Food Price Index ¹	Meat ²	Dairy ³	Cereals ⁴	Oils and Fats ⁵	Sugar ⁶	
2000	90.4	95.8	95.4	85.2	67.8	116.1	
2001	93.4	96.5	107.1	86.5	67.6	122.6	
2002	89.9	89.5	82.2	94.4	87.0	97.8	
2003	97.7	96.8	95.1	98.1	100.8	100.6	
2004	112.4	113.7	122.6	107.5	112.2	101.7	
2005	117.3	120.1	135.4	103.5	103.6	140.3	
2006	126.7	118.5	128.0	121.7	112.5	209.6	
2007	158.7	125.1	212.4	166.9	170.0	143.0	
2008	199.8	153.2	219.6	237.8	227.2	181.6	
2009	156.9	132.9	141.6	173.7	150.9	257.3	
2010	185.3	152.2	200.4	182.6	194.2	302.0	
2011	227.6	176.6	220.5	246.8	252.3	368.9	
2012	211.6	174.7	188.6	240.9	225.3	305.7	
2011	December	210.8	178.8	201.7	217.6	227.5	326.9
2012	January	212.8	174.2	206.8	222.7	233.7	334.3
	February	215.6	178.1	202.0	226.3	238.7	342.3
	March	216.0	178.0	197.0	227.8	244.9	341.9
	April	213.0	179.6	185.6	223.3	251.0	324.0
	May	204.7	175.0	176.1	221.3	233.8	294.6
	June	200.4	169.5	173.4	222.1	220.7	290.4
	July	212.9	166.8	172.9	260.2	226.1	324.3
	August	212.5	170.5	175.6	259.9	226.0	296.2
	September	215.7	174.9	187.7	262.6	224.7	283.7
	October	214.4	177.0	194.0	259.5	206.4	288.2
	November	211.7	177.0	195.0	255.6	200.4	274.5
	December	209.3	175.6	196.8	249.6	196.5	273.8

Source: <http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/foodpricesindex/en/>, accessed on: 27.12.2012.

Due to a network of global relations, changes on the food commodity market directly influence food security in the European Union. The term,

¹⁵⁴ L. Elliot, *The era of cheap food may be over*, The Guardian, 2.09.2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/sep/02/era-of-cheap-food-over>, accessed on: 4.02.2013.

originated in 1974 on the World Food Conference, evolved for decades and was ultimately defined on the World Food Summit in 1996: “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economical access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”¹⁵⁵. This widely accepted definition simultaneously stresses different aspects – availability, access, stability and utilization. Ongoing processes – unremittingly increasing demand for agriculture products and frequently appearing weather anomalies – pose a challenge to all of those factors. The rise in prices carries a risk to availability and access to sufficient quantities of goods necessary for a proper diet while the yield variability and therefore the prices volatility threaten stability of supplies for households.

Rapid growth of the world population may be also an opportunity for the European Union’s (EU) agriculture. The Union’s production, worth 76 bn euro, accounts for 18 per cent of world food exports what makes Union one of the biggest players on the market that is likely to avail of current tendencies. As it was said in EC’s statement concerning European Innovation Partnership “Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability”, soaring demand in developing countries, which is expected to increase by 70 per cent by 2050, “will inevitably trigger a supply reaction from Union’s agriculture”¹⁵⁶. Nevertheless, as it is underlined, ramping up crops may entail serious consequences for environment – especially for biodiversity and soil quality – and thus utilization of food, which as a result of progressive fertilizer usage and the following extinction of flora and fauna, will become unsafe.

Taking all of that into consideration this study aims to analyse the European Union’s food security system. Its objective is to sketch out operating solutions, pinpoint steps that have already been taken to mould them to the changing setting and show both failings and areas demanding particular attention. In order to examine the matter thoroughly, the research is based on the official compilations and reports issued by bodies and agendas responsible for operating in agriculture and economic field – i.e. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organisation (WHO), European Commission and its Directorates and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

The first part of the study concerns EU’s domestic production and is divided into two sections which pertain to the Common Agricultural Policy, being a paramount scheme in Union’s food production and Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) which may play a pivotal role in the future

¹⁵⁵ Food and Agriculture Organisation, *FAO: Policy Brief*, June 2006, Issue 2. ftp://ftp.fao.org/es/ESA/policybriefs/pb_02.pdf, accessed on: 27.12.2012.

¹⁵⁶ European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the European Innovation Partnership “Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability”*, COM/2012/0079.

agriculture patterns. The second part is thoroughly devoted to the external side of the food security (import and export) and examines influence of trade relations on the analysed matter. The purpose of that layout is to explain the complex nature of the food security to raise awareness about the EU policy among European citizens.

6.1. Internal Production. Measures Used in the Food Security Field

6.1.1. Common Agriculture Policy

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), launched in 1962, is a partnership between agriculture and society. As it is signified, it pursues improvement in agricultural productivity so that 500 mn Union's consumers have stable supply of affordable food¹⁵⁷. Its role is to secure sufficient level of production essential for achieving food security of each Union's member country and delivering unimpeded stream of income for EU cultivators.

A direct support, which consists of payments granted directly to farmers under certain support schemes, is at the heart of this system. As a result of the 2003 reform, previous existing agricultural solutions linked to specific sectors and production level (coupled aids) were replaced by a new one known as the Single Payment Scheme which came into force in 2005. As a general rule, the "Single Payment", is paid in the form of a single annual payment based on the value of the payment entitlements held by the farmer (they are allocated to active farmers by the competent national authorities). They give no automatic right to the single payment: a farmer must "activate" his payment entitlements and declare an equivalent number of eligible hectares in a yearly application in order to claim the single payment. If payment entitlements are not used within 2 years, they are reverted into the "national reserve", from which the administration can allocate them to other farmers in specific situations (e.g. newcomers, force majeure cases, investments)¹⁵⁸.

Moreover, simultaneously with the reform of direct payment scheme, cross-compliance rules have been introduced. This mechanism links EU support for farmers to compliance with standards of environmental care and public/animal/plant health and animal welfare. Its aim is to penalise cultivators

¹⁵⁷ European Commission, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, *The Common Agricultural Policy. A Partnership between Europe and Farmers*, p. 3, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-overview/2012_en.pdf, accessed on: 9.01.2013.

¹⁵⁸ European Commission, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, *Factsheet: The Single Payment Scheme*, p. 1, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/direct-support/pdf/factsheet-single-payment-scheme_en.pdf, accessed on: 28.12.2012.

who breach the so-called Statutory Management Requirements – EU law on environmental, public and animal health, animal welfare or land management – by reducing the sum of money received from the EU (the size of the limitation depends on the severity of the infringement) which is supposed to prevent soil erosion, the deterioration of habitats and protect and manage water supplies.

Thanks to these solutions, farmers get kind of a “safety net” in the form of a basic income support that stabilise their revenues stemming from sales on the markets, which are a subject to volatility. As a result of cutting the connection between payment and production, some market measures have also been introduced into CAP. The so-called decoupling gives cultivators a free choice in the area of their operation and enables them to respond to market signals so that they can produce goods that are demanded by consumers and will maximise their profits.

Direct payments in combination with cross-compliance mechanism also render some basic public goods delivered through sustainable farming. Income support payments from the CAP are increasingly used by farmers to adopt environmentally sustainable farming methods. Having additional sum of money to spare, they can reduce the amount of chemical fertilisers or pesticides that are applied to crops. It also makes them able to pare down stocking densities (the number of farm animals per hectare of land), leave field boundaries uncultivated and create many landscape features instead (like ponds etc.) what enrich the environment in the most exploited rural areas. These aspects of farming go beyond what usually is considered to be conventional farming but they contribute to rural areas and food production system as a whole by making it more environmentally friendly and thus beneficial for humans’ health¹⁵⁹.

Apart from assisting cultivators, CAP also offers some instruments that aim at supporting the rural development. Given that the definition mentioned before accents an importance of satisfying dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life by providing an access to safe and nutritious food, it seems essential to ensure proper environmental and technological conditions for cultivation. Many of our rural areas face significant challenges and need to build their competitiveness. More generally, average income per head is lower in rural regions than in our towns and cities, while the skill’s base is narrower and the service sector is less developed. Also, caring for the rural environment often carries a financial cost¹⁶⁰.

The crucial rules and principles governing this sphere for the period 2007 to 2013, as well as the policy measures available to Member States

¹⁵⁹ European Commission, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, *The Common Agricultural Policy. A Partnership ...*, p. 8.

¹⁶⁰ *Rural Development policy 2007-2013*, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rurdev/index_en.htm, accessed on: 31.12.2012.

and regions, are set out in *Council Regulation (EC) No. 1698/2005*¹⁶¹. Under this Regulation, rural development policy is focused on three themes – called “thematic axes”- that are: boosting the competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry sector, enhancing environment and countryside, improving the quality of life in rural areas and encouraging diversification of the rural economy. While acting within this framework, Member States and regions are obliged to spread their rural development funding between all three of these axes (the policy is funded partly from the central EU budget and partly from individual Member States’ national or regional budgets). It is also required that some of the funding must support projects based on experience with the institution called Leader Community Initiatives, which being financed by EU structural funds has been created to help rural actors consider the long-term potential of their local region. It involves highly individual projects designed and executed by local partnerships to address specific local problems¹⁶².

Moreover, as before 2007, every Member State (or region, where powers are delegated to regional level) was obliged to set out a rural development programme that specified what funding would be spent on which particular measures in the period 2007-2013. They were also required to introduce National Strategy Plans based on EU Strategic Guidelines so as to homogenise countries’ activities in this field. This approach is supposed to help in identifying the areas where the use of EU support for rural development adds the most value at EU level, making the link with the main EU priorities (for example, those set out under the Lisbon and Göteborg agendas) and ensuring consistency with other EU policies, in particular those for the economic cohesion and the environment.

Multifaceted and universal as EU’s food security system is, it still needs some amendments so as to become capable of facing both contemporary and future challenges. As of yet, many steps have been taken in this field. In November 2008 the EU agriculture ministers reached a political agreement that introduced some modification known as the Health Check of the Common Agricultural Policy. Its goal is to modernise, simplify and streamline the CAP as well as remove restrictions on farmers, accordingly helping them to respond better to signals from the market¹⁶³.

Among a range of measures, it gradually increases milk quotas (by one per cent every year between 2009/10 and 2013/14) leading up to their abolition in 2015 and abolishes arable set-aside (an instrument that required arable farmers to leave 10 per cent of their land fallow) what allows cultiva-

¹⁶¹ *Council Regulation (EC) No. 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD, Official Journal of the European Union L 277, 21.10.2005.*

¹⁶² *Rural Development Policy 2007-2013...*

¹⁶³ More on that subject visit : http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-history/health-check/index_en.htm.

tors to maximise the potential of their production. The new policy has also raised funds spent on rural development by adding additional €90 million for EU-12 farmers (so that they can use Article 68 more easily until direct payments to their farmers have been fully phased in), shifting money from direct aid to Rural Development (since 2012 payments higher than €5,000 have been reduced by 10 per cent and the money is transferred into the Rural Development budget) and giving investment aid for young farmers¹⁶⁴.

An even more significant reform is due to be made by 2013. On 12 April 2010 a public debate on the Common Agricultural Policy's future, objectives and principles was launched so that every Member State could contribute to nascent solution. It stayed open until the middle of June 2010 and centred around following questions: Why exactly is European Common Agricultural Policy needed and why should it be reformed? What are society's objectives for agriculture in all its diversity? What tools should be used in tomorrow's CAP? In the late autumn 2010 the EC published a Communication on "The CAP towards 2020" that outlines options for the future CAP and started the institutional debate within EU. On 12th October the Commission presented a set of legal proposals designed to make the CAP a more effective policy for more competitive and sustainable agriculture and vibrant rural areas¹⁶⁵. Among many solutions it proposed a better-targeted income support which will cover only active farmers and introduction of the "Green" payment for preserving long-term productivity and ecosystems. The EC's proposal also puts forward a more competitive and balanced food chain that will support producer organizations and develop inter-professional organizations. It will also facilitate the establishment of young farmers by creation of new installation aid available to farmers under forty years old (during the first five years of their project) and stimulate rural employment and entrepreneurship. Following a debate in the European Parliament and the Council, the approval of the different regulations and implementing acts is expected by the end of 2013, with a view to having the CAP reform in place as from 1st January 2014¹⁶⁶.

At the beginning of 2012 the EC, bearing in mind the slowing productivity of the agriculture, brought forward a new European Innovation Partnership (EIP) on Agricultural Sustainability and Productivity. It stated that "the key challenge is not only to produce more, but also to do this in a sustainable manner" and the only way to resolve it is "to bring researchers, farmers and other players closer together so that they can accelerate the speed of technological transfer from science to farming practice, and provide more systematic

¹⁶⁴ "Health Check" of the Common Agricultural Policy, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/healthcheck/index_en.htm, accessed on: 9.01.2013.

¹⁶⁵ *The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013*, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/index_en.htm, accessed on: 2.01.2013.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibidem*.

feedback about practice needs from farming to science”¹⁶⁷. Given this, reversing the recent trend by 2020 and securing soil functionality at a satisfactory level by the same date were identified as the two headline targets. In order to transpose innovation into agricultural practice, the EIP will make use of a range of existing policies, in particular CAP Rural Development Policy and Union Research and Innovation Policy¹⁶⁸. According to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council from 29th February 2012, funding, implementation and prioritisation of actions of the EIP will be based on respective mechanisms embedded in those policies. The EC also signified that activities leading to preparation of the strategic implementation plan should start as soon as possible.

Since the very beginning, the CAP’s role was to adapt European farming sector to the incessantly changing reality so as to secure an unimpeded access to food supplies for Europeans and to ensure the EU’s leading role on global market. As the environmental and efficiency issues have become dire problems, the Union’s policy has begun to evolve and adopt mechanisms that will make the agriculture production sustainable and competitive. Steps that have already been taken aim at increasing productivity by transferring technology and the most innovative solutions into the rural areas, raising the employment among the young people and developing a countryside in general. Given the fact that all launched initiatives are not just empty declarations and have been overtures to further actions, the EU efforts seem to be heading in a right direction. Their only drawback is a nature of Union’s legislature process that demands common acceptance among Member States. Many European countries are not willing to reform their agriculture sector (mainly due to high costs), yet additional amounts of money proposed by EC for modernisation may be an incentive that will facilitate hammering out the future solution.

6.1.2. Genetically Modified Organisms

Since the first introduction to the market in the mid-1990s of a major Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO), there has been increasing concern about such food among politicians, activists and consumers¹⁶⁹. According to a definition placed on a website of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development “GMOs are organisms such

¹⁶⁷ European Commission, *Innovation Partnerships: new proposals on Raw materials, agriculture and healthy ageing to BOOST European competitiveness*, Press Release, IP/12/196, 29 February 2012.

¹⁶⁸ European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament ...*, p. 6.

¹⁶⁹ The World Health Organisation, *20 Questions on genetically modified (GM) Foods*, p. 5, http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/biotech/en/20questions_en.pdf, accessed on: 3.01.2013.

as plants, animals and micro-organisms (bacteria, viruses etc.), the genetic characteristics of which have been modified artificially in order to give them a new property (a plant's resistance to a disease or insect, increased crop productivity, a plant's tolerance of herbicide, etc.)”¹⁷⁰. The fact that this type of organisms has been formed not through a natural process but as a result of biotechnological efforts, provoked a bitter debate around the world (particularly fierce in Europe) which aroused mainly over the question of safety of human health and the implications on the environment¹⁷¹.

In the pursuit of the high level of protection for the European citizens, the EU adopted common regulations in this field in early 1990. Between 1991 and 1998 the marketing of 18 GMOs was authorized in the EU by a Commission's decision¹⁷². Currently, the Union's policy is based on a law adopted at the beginning of the 20th century. *Directive 2001/18/EC*¹⁷³ and *Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003*¹⁷⁴ are the basis of the operative system. In accordance with them, GMOs are authorised at EU level after a positive assessment of health and environmental risks conducted by the European Food Safety Authority¹⁷⁵. Applications for cultivation of GMOs can be submitted by the particular companies if are to be used as source material in food and feed production (Article 5 of *Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003*) or are to be deliberately released into the environment for uses other than food/feed (Article 6 of *Directive 2001/18/EC*). In both cases, the Member States carry out the initial risk assessment of the GMO for cultivation.

In line with Article 23 of *Directive 2001/18/EC*, Member States are entitled to provisionally restrict or prohibit the use and/or sale of that GMO as or in a product on its territory when “new or additional information is made available since the date of the consent and affecting the environmental risk

¹⁷⁰ According to the WHO, insect resistance is achieved through incorporating into the food plant the gene for toxin production from the bacterium *Bacillus thuringiensis* (BT) which is currently used as a conventional insecticide in agriculture and is safe for human consumption. Virus resistance is attained by the introduction of a gene from certain viruses which cause disease in plants. Thanks to this, plants are less prone to diseases caused by such viruses, resulting in higher crop yields. Herbicide tolerance is achieved through the transferring of a gene from a bacterium conveying resistance to some herbicides.

¹⁷¹ It centred around the following issues: allergic reaction (allergenicity), gene transfer and so-called outcrossing that refers to the movement of genes from GM plants into conventional crops or related species in the wild.

¹⁷² World Health Organisation, *20 Questions on genetically modified (GM) Foods...*, p. 6.

¹⁷³ *Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC*, Official Journal of the European Communities L106, 17.4.2001.

¹⁷⁴ *Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed*, Official Journal of the European Union L 268, 18.10.2003.

¹⁷⁵ More on that subject, visit: http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/biotech/en/20questions_en.pdf.

assessment or reassessment of existing information on the basis of new or additional scientific knowledge, has detailed grounds for considering that a GMO as or in a product which has been properly notified and has received written consent under this Directive constitutes a risk to human health or the environment”¹⁷⁶. Moreover, according to Article 34 of (EC) No 1829/2003, it is also possible to ban GMO when it is evident that products authorised by or in accordance with this Regulation are likely to constitute a serious risk to human health, animal health or the environment, or where, in the light of an opinion of the Authority the need to suspend or modify urgently an authorisation arises (so-called emergency measures). Till summer 2010, seven member states decided to prohibit or restrict cultivation of GMO on their territories. On the basis of the first and/or the second of these articles, genetically modified maize (MON 810) has been banned in Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Luxemburg and Poland¹⁷⁷.

Bearing in mind that an introduction of GMOs into agriculture carries a risk of its unintended presence in other products, the EU had to manage the following issues: the need of separating GM crops from the traditional ones, the ability of agricultural sector to maintain different production systems, implications of the cost of GMO labelling requirement¹⁷⁸ that non-GMO farmers may face and general cost of avoiding unintended GMO presence. The matter is regulated by Article 26a of *Directive 2001/18/EC* which states that Member States may take appropriate measures to avoid mixing artificially modified plants with conventional and organic crops. In attempt to support Union’s states in the process of developing measures in this field, the Commission published in 2003 *Recommendation 2003/556/EC*¹⁷⁹ which was then replaced by the *Recommendation of 13 July 2010*¹⁸⁰. According to its

¹⁷⁶ *Directive 2001/18/EC*...

¹⁷⁷ European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the freedom for Member States to decide on the cultivation of genetically modified crops*, COM(2010) 380 final, Brussels, 13.7.2010, p. 3.

¹⁷⁸ In accordance with the *Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003*, food and feed must carry a label which refers to the presence of GMOs. As the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Health and Consumers informs, labelling provides information for consumers and allows them to make an informed choice. These labelling requirements apply to food/feed which contains, consists of, or is produced from GMOs in a proportion higher than 0.9 per cent of the food/feed ingredients considered individually.

¹⁷⁹ *Commission Recommendation of 23 July 2003 on guidelines for the development of national strategies and best practices to ensure the coexistence of genetically modified crops with conventional and organic farming*, Official Journal of the European Communities, Official Journal L 189, 29.07.2003.

¹⁸⁰ *Commission Recommendation of 13 July 2010 on guidelines for development of national co-existence measures to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs in conventional and organic crops*, Official Journal of the European Union, C 200, 22.07.2010.

principles, instruments created and introduced by particular members must be transparent, developed with cooperation with all relevant stakeholders and proportional to the objective, which is pursued.

Between 2009 and early 2011 the Commission carried out an evaluation of the GMO legislation. On the Commission's behalf, two independent consultants prepared separate reports that concerned the EU's legislative framework in the field of GM food and feed and operative solutions in the area of GMOs cultivation respectively. Their purpose was to collect facts and opinions, particularly from stakeholders and competent authorities, assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the legislative processes and to formulate options for the improvement and adjustment of the system. After the completion of those documents, the Commission conducted the internal policy examination on their findings.

As the EU Press Release states, on the whole, both reports registered broad support for the main objectives of the legislation, such as the protection of health and the environment and the creation of an internal market but at the same time it was noted that there is room for further improvement inter alia higher efficiency of the GMO authorisation system, higher flexibility in artificially modified plants cultivation and further harmonisation in assessment process. As it was underlined, while the more flexible approach on GM cultivation is desirable, the strict EU-wide authorisation system already in place, which is based on science, safety and consumer choice should be preserved¹⁸¹.

In December 2008 the Council also requested the Commission to prepare a study on the socio-economic implications of GMO¹⁸². A report, based on feedback provided by 25 Member States was published in April 2011. It revealed that the existing information on the examined matter is often limited and in many cases it is based on already preconceived ideas about GMO farming. As it was emphasised, the experience with GMO cultivation in Europe is quite limited and hardly gives any statistically relevant data on the ex-post socio-economic impacts of GMO cultivation¹⁸³.

As it was highlighted, this report is the starting point for the Member States, the Commission, the European Parliament and all interested parties to deepen their reflection on this sensitive topic. However, in order to move

¹⁸¹ *GMO Evaluation*, http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/evaluation/index_en.htm, accessed on: 9.01.2013.

¹⁸² European Commission, *Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on socio-economic implications of GMO cultivation on the basis of Member States contributions, as requested by the Conclusions of the Environment Council of December 2008*, COM (2011) 214, Brussels, 15.04.2011.

¹⁸³ European Commission, *European Commission – Press Release. GMOs : GMOs : Commission publishes report on socio-economic aspects of GMO cultivation in Europe*, Press Release IP/11/477, 15.04.2011, p. 1.

forward in a sensible way, the Commission considers that discussions should shift from the polarised perceptions documented in the report to a more tangible and objective basis. On 18 October 2011 the declaration was followed by launching a process to assist Member States in the collection and sharing of information¹⁸⁴.

All efforts made by the EU in GMO field pursued the proper level of human health and environment protection which has been achieved. Given the ruling system, if there is no scientific objection, the artificially modified organisms may be freely legalised and introduced in agriculture. However, after almost 20 years since the GMO debut on the market, most of the European citizens are afraid of the possible implications of its cultivation on the food quality. Some states resolutely oppose to the introduction of this type of organisms in their agriculture and use every permissible solution to ban it. As EC's reports showed, many opinions are just simple prejudices and are not underpinned by any verifiable evidence¹⁸⁵. This situation demonstrates that the amount of the official research pertaining to that matter is insufficient.

GMOs have been invented so as to improve the efficiency of the cultivation – pare down the amount of pesticides used and to increase plants resistance to diseases or insects. Striving to achieve a high level of food production that would also be of good quality, the EU officials ought to launch works that would be aimed at raising awareness of GMO among Europeans. Some reliable studies should be carried out by Union's agendas in order to facilitate agriculture policies of particular countries. By reasonable adoption of artificially modified organisms, the Common Agriculture may not only raise its productivity (what certainly will be desirable in terms of supplying the constantly increasing global demanding and thus the EU economy) but also may reduce the usage of chemicals and other detrimental substances.

6.2. External Trade Relations

In the analysis of the EU food security, apart from internal (Common) production, also external side concerning import and export should be considered. The Union's trade relations (those regarding merchandise as well as agricultural products) form a kind of complex network that includes many different initiatives and embraces a variety of states. They may be divided into three categories: Free Trade Agreements (FTA), Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) and overseas countries and territories (OCTs). Each of them has been granted an individual status and some preferences that provide a facilitated access to European market (barriers normally used in

¹⁸⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸⁵ COM (2011) 214....

trade contacts with other countries like quotas, tariffs etc. are limited or suspended). Their role is to ensure stable supplies of affordable food that is not produced in Europe (coffee, rice, dried fruits etc.). On the whole, all those initiatives are separate and addressed to different states, but some of their elements mix and coincide each other what sometimes make them almost impossible to distinguish¹⁸⁶.

The idea of Free Trade Agreements between the EU and other countries and regions is a response to the 21st century challenges that make simple tariff reduction insufficient. As it is stressed on the website of The European Commission's Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry, nowadays barriers, such as restrictive regulations or standards, become increasingly important. This is why the European Commission proposed a new generation of competitiveness-driven bilateral free trade agreements with key partners, in which the economic criteria is a primary consideration¹⁸⁷.

With regard to agriculture products, relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and South Africa are the most significant. Current trade arrangements with ACP states, that are banded in 7 regional groupings: the Cariforum (Caribbean) region, West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, the East African Community, the Southern African Development Community, and the Pacific region, are agreed or being still negotiated under the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)¹⁸⁸. Since 2008, all EPA partner states benefit from duty free quota free access to the EU market, with the exception sugar for which a transition period applies until 2015¹⁸⁹. According to European Commission's Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development data, ACP countries account for around 14 per cent of agricultural imports to the EU (average 2009-2011) and in the main export cocoa, coffee, tea, tropical fruits and spices, raw sugar and raw tobacco¹⁹⁰.

As to South Africa, the bilateral *Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement* was signed in 1999 and separate agreements facilitating trade in wine and spirit drinks have applied since 2002. These arrangements provide for substantially free trade and a stable environment for investment and growth. South Africa has seen an increase in exports of agricultural product to the

¹⁸⁶ *International Affairs. Free Trade Agreements*, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/facilitating-trade/free-trade/index_en.htm, accessed on: 6.01.2013.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibidem*.


¹⁸⁸ As of yet, only the Cariforum EPA is fully implemented.

¹⁸⁹ European Commission, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, *Agriculture and Preferential Trade Relations with Developing Countries. The Case of ACP countries*, October 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/developing-countries/publi/overview/text_en.pdf, accessed on: 6.01.2013, p. 6.

¹⁹⁰ Data from European Commission, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, *Agriculture and Preferential Trade Relations with Developing Countries...*

EU from EUR 1.4 bn to EUR 2 bn over the last decade¹⁹¹. Fresh or dried fruits, citrus fruit, wine and vermouth are main products exported to the European Union¹⁹².

Table 2. Agricultural imports from ACP countries and South Africa



Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, *Agriculture and Preferential Trade Relations ...*, p. 2.

The Generalised Scheme of Preferences, created in 1971 and updated on 31 October 2012¹⁹³, is another instrument that simplifies trade relations between European and food exporting countries. It consists of three dimensions: general arrangement, GSP + arrangement and Everything but Arms, and provides a sliding scale of preferences conferred to particular groups of developing states. Depending on a level of the economic development (according to the World Bank classification) they may enjoy duty reductions¹⁹⁴, zero

¹⁹¹ European Commission, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, *Bilateral agricultural trade relations. EU agricultural trade with South Africa*, p. 1, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/bilateral-relationships/acp/south-africa_en.pdf, accessed on: 6.01.2013.

¹⁹² *Ibidem*.

¹⁹³ Its provisions will come into force on 1 January 2014.

¹⁹⁴ According to European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, *The European Union's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)*, the general arrangements cover roughly 7000 products, of which 3250 are classified as non-sensitive and 3750 are classified as sensitive products. The sensitivity of them is determined by the situation of the sector manufacturing the same products in the Union. Sensitive products still require a higher order protection, while non-sensitive products can compete with duty-free imports from developing countries.

duties or full duty free, quota free access for all exported products except arms respectively.

According to Part IV of the *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*¹⁹⁵ (Articles 198 to 204), also 33 non-EU states and territories, which as a result of colonial history have special relations with Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, have been given a special access to the Union's market. Relations between them take form of favourable rules of origin and advantageous trade arrangements¹⁹⁶.

Apart from special agreements, the EU trade relations in the agriculture field are also based on a wide range of multilateral disciplines. Member States import products from countries like the United States (which covers about 20% of EU's soya beans supplies and 20% of wheat imports), Canada (it is a top supplier of wheat that covers around 25% of EU import needs), India (it supplies most of total EU imports of Basmati, coffee, fruit and nuts, vegetables and spices) etc.¹⁹⁷.

The purpose of this elaborate network of trade relations is to deliver products that due to the climate cannot be cultivated in Europe. It encompasses tens of states and regions so as to diversify its importers in order to deliver commodities of best quality and to avoid any supply distortions. Given that the global economic landscape is constantly evolving, contacts with trade partners are monitored and if necessary renegotiated (currently FTAs with ASEAN, Canada, Gulf Co-Operation Council, India, Malaysia and Ukraine are being negotiated). This approach provides control over the agriculture import being thus an essential component of the Union's food security. The only drawback is a slow pace of these talks, which in most cases, as a result of difficulties in the process of reaching the agreements, have been under way for over 5 years¹⁹⁸.

The EU's policy in the food security field is a complex activity that involves many initiatives both in internal and external sphere. As to European agriculture, efforts are primarily directed towards improvement of productivity

¹⁹⁵ Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union – Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Protocols – Annexes – Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon – Tables of equivalences, *Official Journal C 115, 09/05/2008 P. 0001 – 0388*.

¹⁹⁶ *EU relations with Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs)*, http://ec.europa.eu/euro-peaid/where/octs_and_greenland/index_en.htm, accessed on: 4.02.2012.

¹⁹⁷ Data from *International aspects of agricultural policy. Background document for advisory on international aspects of agriculture*, 30 January 2012, Updated 1 June 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/trade-analysis/international-aspects-of-agricultural-policy_en.pdf, accessed on: 6.01.2013, p. 45, 53.

¹⁹⁸ *International Affairs. Free Trade Agreements....*

and enhancement of food quality that due to ongoing climate changes and diversity of development level among particular rural areas (especially those in EU-12) face severe problems. Transfer of technology and investments stimulation are perceived as the best solutions to the slowing productivity of the EU agriculture sector. Taking into consideration that innovation is the most successful way in terms of streamlining the efficiency, this approach seems to be correct.

Some measures have also been taken in the GMOs field. Since many Member States are still not convinced that cultivation of artificially modified organisms is safe, a high level of human and animal health protection is a main objective of operative regulations. As regards to quality of produced food this line is justifiable, but given that GMOs seeds are more productive and need less chemicals than traditional ones, some incentives that would encourage farmers to their cultivation should be simultaneously introduced (especially when we consider growing the world food demand that is a chance for the Union's economy).

Because of weather conditions, not all kinds of food can be produced in Europe. In order to ensure a stable supply of some exotic commodities, the EU has developed multifaceted network of trade relations based on different agreement that provide reduced tariffs for imported products and thus spur partner countries to deliver necessary products.

Concerning food security, the EU has one of the most elaborate and complex policies in the world. Its goal is to secure unimpeded access to affordable food that meets dietary needs and food preferences of their citizens. All things considered these efforts head in good direction. They are targeted at the current challenges and are adopted as ruling mechanisms that were agreed by all Member States what makes these initiatives beneficial for the whole European Union.

CHAPTER VII

Germany Unbound: Europe's Dominant Power in the Making? On German Foreign and Security Policy in Europe

Karolina Libront

ABSTRACT

One of the most important and irrefutable characteristic of German security policy after the World War II is the principle of *Westbindung*, which means strict connection with transatlantic area and various European security formations. The Federal Republic of Germany is not only bound in every aspect with the European community; it has also become one of its most crucial pillars. Its importance has risen due to the financial crisis. Nonetheless, since the fall of the Berlin wall the German European policy has also had another equally essential component – the new *Ostpolitik*, including policy towards Russia, which is perceived as indispensable factor of stability and security in Europe. The Author in her article maintains that Germany, also thanks to its special relations with Russia, has the potential to become Europe's most influential power. Will Berlin maintain its absolute principle of *Westbindung*? Or will it try to go solo at least with reference to some vital security matters?

The first big factor influencing German foreign policy was marked by the fall of the Berlin wall: the reunification. The second one was brought upon by the end of Cold War and bipolar international system. In the new multipolar world, Germany became a great power of European significance, though still remained one among many, held back by its own restrictive doctrines about the use of power. This situation seems to be gradually changing.

Theories of international relations – notably, the neorealist theories – predicted that unified Germany would turn away from its traditionally multilateral, low profile foreign policy and seek to gain more influence on international stage¹⁹⁹. After all, the division of Germany after the World War II was designed to curb its power. The unified country was bigger in terms of territory and economy; it has also regained full sovereignty in foreign and security matters as a result of the Two-plus-Four Treaty of 1990. Its population has reached nearly 82 million inhabitants, which makes it 16th most populated country in the world and 1st in Europe (excluding Russia). It found itself neatly located at the heart of the “old continent”.

¹⁹⁹ V. Rittberger, *Introduction*, in: V. Rittberger (ed.), *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, Manchester 2001, p. 1-2.

Neorealist theories foresaw that the new country will be less cooperative; some even expected that the Federal Republic would try to become **European hegemon** – a power that would have the most influence in Europe. According to the theories the following factors: the anarchic nature of the international system, the desire for survival, and the inability to predict other states' intentions all ultimately make states try attaining hegemony²⁰⁰. States which wield dominant power and influence within a region of the world possess regional hegemony. Such a country should dominate its region in economic and military terms, be able to exercise hegemonic influence in the area by successfully pursuing its own particular interests and have considerable influence on the world scale. Furthermore, it should be willing to make use of power resources and be recognized or even accepted as the regional leader by its neighbours.

The predictions of neorealists were subsequently challenged by authors who pointed to **base doctrines** that shape German foreign and security policy. They were in fact meant to prevent BRD from becoming a regional hegemon. German society, recovering after the shock of the Second World War, insisted on self-restraints so that the wartime nightmare never happens again. Domestic pressures are often fundamental in shaping foreign policies of European governments²⁰¹. Doctrines which emerged as a result of post-war shock urged Germany to develop its security within the Euro-Atlantic institutions (the principle of *Westbindung*), take any action together with its partners only and never against the interests of the Euro-Atlantic community (the principle of multilateralism) and forbade the Bundeswehr to act outside of German borders (principles of pacifism, anti-militarism). Germany was to behave according to the model of a civilian power, a *Zivilmacht*²⁰², which strives to avoid military conflict and resolve international disputes with soft instruments of power – diplomatic or economic ones. A *Zivilmacht* seeks to civilize international relations by encouraging wide acceptance of international norms and institutions. Contrary to the popular belief, the concept of civilian power does accommodate the use of force but only as an *ultima ratio*.

For Germany to develop hegemonic traits, it would have to emancipate from those doctrines. Indeed, some experts maintain that the emancipation process is under way. This paper seeks to address the issue particularly with regard to the doctrine of *Westbindung*. Almost all theories stated that some adjustments to German international behaviour due to their new power position would occur, however, the authors did not agree on the depths of these

²⁰⁰ Cf. John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York 2001.

²⁰¹ A. Mayhew, K. Oppermann, D. Hough, *German foreign policy and leadership of the EU – 'You can't always get what you want... but you sometimes get what you need'*, "Sussex European Institute Working Paper", no 199, May 2011, p. 4.

²⁰² H.W. Maull, *Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers*, "Foreign Affairs", no Winter 1990/91; cf. H. W. Maull, Sebastian Harnisch (ed.), *Germany As a Civilian Power?: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic*, New York 2001.

changes. Most controversies concern relations with Western allies²⁰³ – how much assertive and power conscious the German foreign policy will become towards them. In order to assess whether emancipation from this principle takes place, an analysis of German foreign policy on the European stage should be made. First of all, if the predictions are correct, Germany should strive to achieve more influence within the European Union. This paper, although adopting a broader historical background, will focus on the recent events. In the author's opinion, the most important causal variable is the ongoing financial crisis that started in 2007 and partially remodelled the European scene, with Berlin emerging as the most important decision-maker as clear economic champion. Furthermore, federal government's reluctance to bail out highly indebted Eurozone members, coupled with Germany's insistence on imposing severe fiscal constraints in these countries, has called into question not just Berlin's commitment to euro, but also the pro-European, pro-integration norms and values that form the *Westbindung* and multilateralism doctrines that underpin Germany's EU policy. The outcomes of the predicted policy changes that are taken into consideration are Germany's engagement in international operations and its behaviour towards European states. Secondly, Germany's position towards Russia will be analysed. Berlin maintains special relations with Kremlin even if its standards of democracy and human rights protection are not met. Moreover, some European allies feel threatened by some aspects of this cooperation. If the Federal Republic continues its course or strengthens the ties with Russia, it would mean going against European values and allies for particular economic and energy sector desired gains. These two directions of analysis will help determine Germany's position on the European stage. According to neorealists, the power position in international system determines foreign policy behaviour of a state. If causal variables such as the new position in EU thanks to the economic crisis or strong relations with Russia had impact on the foreign policy behaviour, neorealist claim – that the Federal Republic will act more autonomously and according to its own particular interests – can be evaluated.

7.1. Primary Stage: the European Union

At first glance **Germany is hardly a superpower**. It cannot even begin dreaming of matching up to the United States. It also cannot compare itself with Great Britain and France, which jointly account for roughly 70% of the EU's military research and development and 60% of its deployable forces²⁰⁴.

²⁰³ D. Peters, *The Debate about a new German foreign policy after unification*, (ed.), German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies, Manchester 2001, p. 12.

²⁰⁴ *Will Germany now take centre stage?*, "The Economist", nr 21.10.2010.

Military capabilities have long since been German Achilles' heel. It is not easy to move from an oversized force focused on territorial defence, designed for Cold War border conflict, to a streamlined military with sustained and varied operational expertise. A few years ago, the army embarked upon a long-term process of transformation. The conscription is to be eliminated. The number of soldiers will be reduced, though at the same time the reform aims at improving Bundeswehr's performance and optimizing its expeditionary skills. Currently, only about 3 % of German military personnel can be deployed abroad at the same time; the number which seems ridiculous for a country this big and influential. Military spending is at 1.4% of GDP and remains well under NATO's recommended 2%. If military spending numbers were not enough, Germany remains one of the few Alliance members that does not have an official national defence strategy approved by the government. Instead, its Ministry of Defence announces political and defence guidelines – *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien* – and 'white books' – *Weissbuch* – once every few years. The latest White Book came out in autumn 2006²⁰⁵. It contains some significant omissions, for example – the part that dealt with the strategic context of German security policy did not even mention the rise of China and India or the re-emergence of Russia.

On a normative level, the doctrines mentioned above also restrict the country's activity. One of the most important and irrefutable characteristic of German security policy after the World War II is the principle of *Westbindung*, which means strict connection with transatlantic area and various European security formations. The Federal Republic of Germany is not only bound in every aspect with the European community; it has also become one of its most crucial pillars. The doctrine further states that no independent decision within NATO and the EU shall be made, particularly if they are against the U.S. or France. It was also assumed that The Federal Republic would provide political support and military contribution if those two countries called for them and led the operations²⁰⁶. The principle was based on the assumption that what was good for the EU and NATO was also in line with German interests. Such approach is to be explained by adopting a broader historical perspective; it was necessary for Berlin to build trust in relations with its allies and partners who could feel endangered by the remilitarisation of unified Germany and feared its independent policy. Consequently, a refusal to participate in the West's overseas operations could mean undermining the credibility of Germany as a responsible partner. Therefore, despite little

²⁰⁵ *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, 2006, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Dca7DYAwDAXAWVgg7unYAuicYCVP-Qrnsz7omqObfoUnPHfUwolOuhx2u4zN0xuFC_IGQddWEzqi4eLF1i7mqXFkKf-WQNUOF-6jFY_sAY_7e5g!!/, accessed on: 10.01.2013.

²⁰⁶ J. Gotkowska, *No more compulsory engagement. The emancipation of German security policy*, "OSW Commentary", no 57/2011.

public support, Bundeswehr was sent to Afghanistan in 2002 on the principle of unconditional solidarity with the American ally.

The contemporary BRD is **more willing to use its strength** to pursue its own interests and to accept responsibilities that go along with it. However, it has a long history of behaving according to the doctrines that restricted its foreign policy, such as *Zivilmacht* or antimilitarism. The Federal Republic, until breakthrough ruling of its Federal Constitutional Court in 1994²⁰⁷, had perceived itself exclusively as a ‘civilian power’ not allowed to use force abroad and employed primarily diplomatic, economic and development aid instruments. The Bundeswehr served exclusively to protect German territory as part of NATO. However, since the end of the Cold War conventional threats have been minimized, whereas new challenges have emerged, such as international terrorism or ethnic and regional conflicts. Partly by itself, partly urged by allies, Germany is pursuing a more active foreign and security policy. Bundeswehr is deployed on many missions abroad, gradually enhancing the scope of engagement in terms of numbers, tasks and territory since the 1990s. Nonetheless, many state that the Federal Republic is still **boxing under its weigh category in this respect**. Germany’s economic links make it influential; however, at the same time – they curb both its willingness and ability to join allies’ global operations, since it would mean undermining trading relationships.

The first government that decidedly tried to shift from obliviousness of German power was led by Chancellor German Schröder. At the beginning of the last decade he stated assertively: “Germany is well-advised to consider itself a great power in Europe – something our neighbours have done for long – and to adjust its foreign policy accordingly within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic institutions”²⁰⁸. In the same year 2002 when German soldiers were sent to support U.S. in Afghanistan, Chancellor Schröder’s government began to revise this situation by gradually withdrawing from the doctrine of multilateralism²⁰⁹. The most visible aspect of this policy was the famous “I am not convinced” from the Chancellor for the Iraqi campaign²¹⁰.

²⁰⁷ The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 1994 stated that Germany’s membership in collective security systems and collective defence organisations and the fulfilment of the tasks this membership entails do not breach the German constitution.

²⁰⁸ Quote: D. Peters, *The Debate about a new German foreign policy after unification*, (ed.), German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies, Manchester 2001, p. 12.

²⁰⁹ J. Gotkowska, *No more compulsory...*

²¹⁰ Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) decided to oppose the US intervention in Iraq in 2003. Schröder not only ruled out his country’s participation in the ‘coalition of the willing’ – even if it had been authorised by the UN Security Council to act. He also made opposition to the U.S. on the Iraqi campaign a subject of the parliamentary elections in autumn 2002. Subsequently, the SPD/Green Party coalition won the elections to the Bundestag.

Also in 2011, the Federal Republic, despite strong criticism, did not participate in the operation in Libya. When there is a crisis near European border and Germany does not react, it gets scolded more viciously than other states. Its abstention from voting on the resolution 1973 at the UN Security Council and its later decision not to take part in the military intervention gave rise to heated debate both in Germany and abroad²¹¹, raising questions about its willingness to co-operate with key Western allies.

The process of emancipation is still under way. German security policy is lurching wildly between commitment to the culture of restraint, acting like a civilian power and the plunge into military action, between hypermoralism and opportunism. Recently, the government promised to provide two transport aircraft for the needs of Mali operation, even though Germany regards French intervention in this country above all as securing France's strategic and economic interests. Initially, the support was limited to political backing. Since the operation was unanimously supported by the UN Security Council, Berlin did not rule out offering further medical, logistic or humanitarian support, as it wished to avoid being accused of abandoning its allies once again. It seems that the strategic framework of German security policy remains rudimentary, above all when it comes to the most important issues besetting the West: what to do with Afghanistan, how to handle Iran, how to develop an assertive approach towards Russia and China. The result is, as Klaus Naumann wrote, a security policy that substitutes "a tactical policy dictated by caveats instead of a strategic logic dictated by goals"²¹².

Notwithstanding constraints and limitations described above, these days Germany is often described as **dominant power in Europe**. It is not just in Berlin's interests, as other countries in the EU expect Germany to act decisively not just in times of crisis but also in setting future agendas. Many member states instinctively look to the Federal Republic when trying to solve various and sundry of their EU-related problems. Also for Washington any German initiative to contribute more to maintaining international stability – at least close to European borders – will be welcomed with open arms, largely due to U.S. pivot to the Asian Pacific.

The claims of German dominance mostly refer to **the economic perspective**. The global recession set a new pecking order. In times of **austerity**, all eyes are directed towards still solid, low-debt, highly competitive Federal Republic, which dictates the rules and concocts measures out of the financial quagmire. Chancellor Merkel during a debate in Bundestag about giving German assent to the €110 billion Greek rescue package stated that "Europe today has its eyes set on us; without us, against us there cannot and there

²¹¹ V. Rühle, *Deutschland im Abseits*, "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung", 16.05.2011.

²¹² Quote: C. Stelzenmüller, *Hands Off our Shackles, Please: The Debate Over German Security Policies*, "Der Spiegel", 11.03.2010.

will not be a decision”²¹³. It is however worth mentioning that prior to the recession German economic performance was rather mediocre, particularly when contrasted with those of Spain, Ireland or Greece. From 1995 to 2005 the average rate of real economic growth was less than 2 % annually. It all led to relative weakening of Germany’s leadership in economic debates within the EU. BRD also suffered due to the crisis at first. In 2009 its economy declined at a faster rate than at any time since the World War II, with real GDP sinking by 4.7 %²¹⁴. Exports and investments were shrinking and unemployment rates were rising. Nonetheless, Germany found itself quickly on the right tracks, largely due to keeping unit labour costs constant in the last decade as well as outsourcing some low value processes to countries in Central and Eastern Europe, rising the savings rate investing abroad – thus maintaining competitiveness. Impressive export performance is a sign of economic muscle. Germany’s ability to produce goods that the rest of the world wants to buy has been a constant theme since the *Wirtschaftswunder* in the 1960s. Consequently, German economy, fuelled by record exports, has been growing steadily, in the end expanding by a quarter over the last decade²¹⁵.

As a result, the Federal Republic’s relative importance has risen due to the global recession. *The Economist* even states that no other big developed country has come out of the financial crisis looking stronger²¹⁶. With exports booming and unemployment rates falling, Rainer Brüderle, Federal Minister for Economics and Technology happily announces and “XL upswing”. These developments coupled with strong recovery after crisis demonstrate that BRD remains the major economic power of the EU.

In the past, Germany’s reflexive and instinctive support for European integration often meant that Berlin would put the community’s interests before its own. Since 2008 a lot has changed. German traditional approach has been replaced by more instrumental, hard-headed and openly interests-based approach to the EU. During the debates on how to tackle the crisis Angela Merkel was continuously accused of acting unilaterally and pursuing to impose German model on the rest of the Eurozone members. Indeed, for a while it seemed that the negative debate marked a shift from Germany’s decades-old pro-European outlook, at the heart of integration and with public opinion firmly behind ‘Europe’. The federal government was blamed for repeatedly limiting itself to doing just enough to prevent the breakup of the euro, while failing to express a vision for common Europe and leaving the

²¹³ *Angela Merkel’s Bundestag Speech*, 05.05.2010, <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/17/17039.pdf>, accessed on: 10.01.2013.

²¹⁴ A. Mayhew, Kai Oppermann, Dan Hough, *German foreign policy and leadership of the EU ...*, p. 13.

²¹⁵ A. Tooze, *Germany’s Unsustainable Growth*, “Foreign Affairs”, no Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 91, Issue 5.

²¹⁶ *Will Germany now take centre stage?*, “The Economist”, nr 21.10.2010.

fixing to the European Central Bank rather than providing policy solutions. The quarrel has been stimulated by the discrepancy between two approaches to the economy: specific German economic principles insist on austerity and stability, and the South's profligacy even with budget numbers painfully in the red. In the protests in Athens in fall 2011, the demonstrators wore masks portraying Angela Merkel dancing with Adolf Hitler²¹⁷. Old fears about *Sonderweg* and the German question were brought back to life.

On the other hand, German society sensed that something was wrong; many were asking why they have to pay for the Greek debts and described themselves as the true victims of the crisis²¹⁸. There still lingers a fundamental sense of betrayal over the loss of the Deutschmark. Most people associate the euro with higher prices following its introduction in 2002. Furthermore, Berlin considers itself as rather the solution than part of the structural problem – economic interdependencies within the single market, the symbiotic relations between creditor and debtor nations and the problems created by trade asymmetries – that led to the crisis²¹⁹. The aspects described above brought upon anxious and rather narrow economic debate underlining Germany's victimhood rather than the benefits of European integration. Those views stood in stark contrast to the international perception of Germany as the biggest beneficiary of the euro and the single market. It has also directly benefited from the crisis itself, through an estimated €80 billion in reduced interest rates on its bonds alone²²⁰. Much of Germany's trade surplus has been earned at the expense of the corresponding current account deficits of the European countries in crisis²²¹.

The dispute seems to be resolved for now, at least partially. The public was convinced that they had much to lose by the reversal of aspects of integration such as a euro collapse. In turn, Germany's central role became even more evident, as it directly benefited from the crisis and was the mastermind behind the decisions. On the other hand, the reactions showed that European Union, while clearly needing clear political guidance, still fears German pre-eminence. At the same time France, traditionally EU's co-leader, is expected to suffocate soon under structural reforms that will come too late. Its influence is steadily waning, while the relations with its biggest neighbour remain

²¹⁷ H. Horn, *Why Greeks Are Protesting Bailouts Designed To Help Them*, "The Atlantic", 18.11.2011.

²¹⁸ Some daily newspapers were campaigning against the "lazy Greeks", conveying the perception that hard-working and solid Germans are being cheated out of their money by profligate Southerners. Hugo Müller-Vogg, *Ohne Fleiß kein Preis*, "BILD", 15.08.2012.

²¹⁹ *Interview with Jean-Claude Juncker, Wir haben doch nichts als den Euro*, "Süddeutsche Zeitung", 30.07.2012.

²²⁰ M. Wolf, *Eurozone plays 'beggar my neighbour'*, "Financial Times", 18.05.2010.

²²¹ A. Tooze, *Germany's Unsustainable Growth*, "Foreign Affairs", no Sep/Oct 2012, Vol. 91, Issue 5.

kind of volatile. The old maxim saying that France would lead while Germany would pay is no longer applicable. Former Commission President Romano Prodi has described the change in the division of labour in brutal terms. “It used to be that France was the political driver and Germany the economic one,” he said. “Now it is the lady [Merkel] that decides and Sarkozy that holds a press conference to explain her decisions”²²².

In the past the common security policy of the EU was shaped mainly by France, which led the debate on the use of the ESDP/CSDP instruments and often treated the EU as a tool for implementing its own policy²²³. However, as described above, Germany is emancipating from its multilateralism doctrine and former imperative to cooperate with France no matter the cost. As a result, Berlin blocked proposals to use EU Battle Groups with its participation for a mission in Chad in 2006 and for another mission in Congo in 2008²²⁴, as well as prevented any common stance over EU’s military engagement in Libya. Particularly the last case showed that federal government is prepared to pick and choose its international partners on a global scale according to specific issue at hand rather than being tied to its Western allies. During the Libyan crisis Germany isolated itself from two other European powers: France and Great Britain, which instead turned to strengthen their bilateral cooperation in the scope of security²²⁵. These two countries have radically different security cultures, mainly due to their experiences with colonies. As a result, they also express policy and security interests that are unlike those of Germany. Berlin will surely not abandon its pro-European rhetoric regarding building closer military co-operation, however, the actual improvement in building the CSDP seems more elusive than ever.

Another important causal variable to Germany’s European policy is the relations with the U.S. They have undergone a substantial change in the last few years. Partnership with the American ally and close co-operation within NATO were the landmarks of German security policy throughout the Cold War and until the end of the 1990s. In the new millennium, the Republic’s security is no longer unconditionally dependent on U.S. guarantees. The second issue is Washington’s pivot to Asia-Pacific region, announced by President Obama’s administration. Although the scope of this article does not allow going into details about the changes in bilateral relations between Washington and Berlin, it is worth remembering that these two factors give the latter a lot of room for manoeuvre on the European stage.

²²² Quote: U. Guérot, M. Leonard, *The new German question: How Europe can get the Germany it needs*, “European Council On Foreign Relations Policy Brief”, 2011, p. 8.

²²³ J. Gotkowska, *No more*

²²⁴ C. Major, Ch. Mölling, *EU-Battlegroups. Bilanz und Optionen zur Weiterentwicklung europäischer Krisenreaktionskräfte*, “SWP-Studie“, nr August 2010, p. 22-23.

²²⁵ In November 2010, France and Great Britain signed two agreements concerning security.

Summing up, the **Federal Republic is clearly seen as Europe's leader**, and perhaps this leadership is now desired more than ever. However, Berlin is not a hegemon, at least not yet. Too weak to dominate, too powerful to be just one among any, Germany has always had problems with fitting in Europe. However, European Union is no longer the only stage for German foreign policy, as it was before reunification. Berlin increasingly looks beyond the EU for other arenas to assert their interests. Another ace up the German sleeve would be the second pillar of *Europapolitik*, the *Ostpolitik*.

7.2. Secondary Stage: Eastern Europe

Ostpolitik is a specific instance of German foreign policy. The term was coined by Willy Brandt, Chancellor of West Germany between 1969 and 1974. This expression alludes to the commencement of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc communist states, marking a turning point in post-war German history. One of the most famous and unforgettable gestures of *Ostpolitik* happened during Brandt's first visits to Moscow and Warsaw when he fell to his knees in Warsaw in 1970 as an act of apology for crimes committed by Nazi Germany. Among the elements of Brandt's *Ostpolitik* were the abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine and the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the border between Poland and East Germany²²⁶. The "Eastern policy" was continued by the government of Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and finally culminated in the reunification of Germany in 1990²²⁷.

Ostpolitik should not be reduced to Russia, but in reality it is Moscow which is the single most important partner in the East. The disintegration of the Soviet Union shook Russia's economy and put a strain on its economic relations with other countries. Germany, as its substantial partner, also felt the effects of this change, particularly in the Eastern part of the country. This new situation made Helmut Kohl and his government adopt a more pragmatic policy towards Moscow. The Chancellor focused on maintaining good personal relations with Boris Yeltsin, which facilitated the transition from what has been called the "romantic phase" of Russian foreign policy to the interest-oriented period at the end of the 1990s. It is a common belief that this rational approach facilitated the ongoing transformation

²²⁶ I. Kempe, *Among the elements of Brandt's Ostpolitik were the abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine and the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the border between Poland and East Germany*, "CAP Policy Analysis", no 3, May 2006, p. 5.

²²⁷ The term *Ostpolitik* has mostly positive connotations for the German. Poles on the other hand tended to look at it more as relating to the predominance of German-Soviet relations.

of post-Soviet economic structures²²⁸. Kohl's successor, Gerhard Schröder had quite a different start. He was known for his criticism of previous Chancellor's private meetings with Yeltsin and government guarantees for Russian debt. The controversy over NATO enlargement also cast a shadow over Russo-German relations. The turning point came in 2000 when Vladimir Putin became President. He raised high expectations in Germany, especially with regard to further investment opportunities and Russia's modernisation²²⁹. In September 2001, Putin's speech in the Bundestag provoked a standing ovation as he represented the embodiment of the new and democratic Russia—or so policymakers hoped at that time.

During the time when government of three parties – CDU/CSU and SPD formed a “Grand Coalition”, there was talk in Berlin of strategic transformation in relations with the East. The coalition proposed the policy of “**change/ rapprochement through integration**”²³⁰. Its assumption is that the direct and purposeful expansion of mutual dependencies will make Russia a reliable partner for cooperation in energy and security policy in the long term. Grand Coalition's Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier of SPD developed the concept of “Partnership for Modernisation” that became part of the EU's agenda for Russia. Furthermore, Germany's position has been since long that European **can't build common Europe against Russia** or without Russia. There have been many joint Russo-German initiatives in the scope of security. The former President, Dmitry Medvedev, proposed to the Europeans in his first speech in a foreign country – namely in Germany in Berlin in 2008 – a dialogue on a **new Euro-Atlantic security system**. While the majority of the EU countries have abstained from a dialogue with Medvedev, the idea was welcomed in Germany. Another idea – this time invented in Germany – is endorsing the so-called Meseberg initiative of 2010 on security cooperation with Moscow, on solving the existing territorial disputes in the east of Europe, basically the disputes which exist within the post-Soviet territory. The negotiations were stuck²³¹, but they show the will to include Russia in common European security architecture.

However, the development of European policy towards Russia which was instigated in Berlin has to overcome many obstacles. It is difficult due to the

²²⁸ C. Ochmann, *The New German Ostpolitik*, “New Eastern Europe”, no Spring 2012.

²²⁹ G. Friedman, *Germany and Russia Move Closer*, “Stratfor Geopolitical Weekly”, 22.06.2010.

²³⁰ I. Kempe, *A New Ostpolitik? Priorities and Realities of Germany's EU Council Presidency*, “CAP Policy Analysis”, no 4, August 2007, p. 3.

²³¹ The memorandum agreed upon by Merkel and Medvedev on 5 June 2010 stated that Russia would cooperate to settle the Transnistria conflict – proof, as it were, of Moscow as a bona fide security partner. However, two years after the signing of the Meseberg Memorandum, there are no signs of the Kremlin obliging and making concessions on the Transnistrian issue.

position of new member states, particularly **Poland**, which treat any closer relationship between the West and Russia with a fair dose of suspicion and a hint of dread. It is feared that Germany's *Ostpolitik* would be determined by economic interests over norms. Most remarkably, the agreement on the construction of the Baltic pipeline, which was signed in 2005 during the last months of Chancellor Schröder's tenure, seemed to confirm all the negative prejudices about the existence of special interests between Berlin and Kremlin, something the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs had been trying to avoid since the country's reunification. Poland's policy has changed a little, though. Notably, at the end of March 2012 the foreign ministers of three countries – Russia, Germany and Poland – held in Berlin second meeting on current European and international issues in the triologue format. Certain conflict points remain, of course, but the rapprochement between Warsaw and Kremlin leaves Berlin with more room for manoeuvre.

Elections in 2005 that brought a shift of powers on the political scene did not change German interests in Russia remarkably, although it was clear that the new Chancellor Angela Merkel had a rather low-key approach towards President Putin. Merkel stated that she would stop in Warsaw on her way to Moscow, a gesture which clearly upgraded the role of Poland in the formulation of a new *Ostpolitik*. What's more, during her first visit to Moscow, Merkel met the representatives of Russian civil society, another symbolic gesture, the importance of which should not be underestimated²³². It was a sign that German politicians are growing **frustrated with Russia** and its lack of adherence to European norms. The EU members made human rights and democracy a central part of their foreign policies and Germany is no exception. Furthermore, as a self-called *Zivilmacht* it should seeks to civilize international relations by spreading these norms. After all, applying military means in the Balkans was justified by this very concept.

An important turning point for Berlin's *Ostpolitik* was the 2008 war in Georgia. It came as a shock to a lot of German politicians, formerly facilitating rapprochement with Russia. Within a couple of days Moscow wasted the trust that it had enjoyed for decades. The war also made clear that there is a genuine military threat to Europe from Russia²³³. Although the relations with Germany and EU rather quickly returned to normal, a red line was drawn. The prevalent image of Kremlin has changed.

During the recent consultations in November 2012 Chancellor Merkel mentioned that she found some aspects of Russia's internal policy disturbing, such as restricting the development of civil society or the court ruling against Pussy Riot. Still, it did not prevent German delegation to talk about

²³² C. Ochmann, *The New German Ostpolitik*, "New Eastern Europe", no Spring 2012.

²³³ C. Stelzenmüller, *Germany's Russia Question. A New Ostpolitik for Europe*, "Foreign Affairs", no March/April 2009.

economic cooperation, including the energy sector. A number of German research institutes and think tanks published unprecedented critical analyses of Russian internal policy and German position towards it²³⁴. All of this makes for a partnership with Russia that is no less as difficult than it is important.

Nonetheless, **no change is to be expected. Economic ties are too important to sever them on the basis of human rights violations and lack of democratisation.** Whereas security relations since 2000 have shown no signs of improvement, German-Russian economic relations continue to be a success story. Whereas German-Russian trade turnover in 2000 had amounted to €13 billion, in 2011 it reached a record high of €75 billion²³⁵. In that year, total trade grew by 29 % compared with the previous year, with German exports to Russia increasing by 31 % and German imports from Russia by 27 %. This in fact exceeds trade with all the other Post-Soviet Eastern European states combined. With an 8.7 % share in Russia's foreign trade, Germany is Moscow's third most important trading partner worldwide, after the Netherlands and China. Russia is not only an important and receptive export but also a major investment market. In the first half of 2012, investment by German companies in the Russian Federation amounted to €19.2 billion. There are currently more than 6,500 companies with German equity participation in Russia, operating in 81 out of 83 Federation subjects (administrative units)²³⁶. The German-Russian trade and economic relationships are also well supported institutionally²³⁷. Another essential piece of puzzle is that Germany remains the most important market for Russia's **gas and oil**. "Gas diplomacy" through Gazprom and Ruhrgas (with financial support from Deutsche Bank) plays a great role in defining bilateral relations. Due to recent decision to phase out nuclear plants, Germany will continue to be dependent on Russian natural gas for a while.

Consequently, it can be observed that the idea of a strategic partnership limited to economic cooperation, especially in the area of raw materials will shape the relations between the Federal Republic and Russia. The latter will continue to offer important and potentially lucrative markets for German business. Politicians will always take economic interests into account, no matter what combination of parties happens to be in power.

²³⁴ A. Ciechanowicz, A. Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, W. Rodkiewicz, *Merkel and Putin's consultation: the economy first of all*, "East Week", no 38(314)/2012.

²³⁵ R. Neukirch, Matthias Schepp, *Chilly Peace: German-Russian Relations Enter a New Ice Age*, "Der Spiegel", no 30.05.2012.

²³⁶ Information from German Federal Foreign Office, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes/RussischeFoederation_node.html, accessed on: 10.01.2013.

²³⁷ H. Adomeit, *GERMAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS Balance Sheet since 2000 and Perspectives until 2025*, "ETUDE Prospective & Strategique", Spring 2012.

Is there a real threat of Germany going alone? The reflexive pro-European approach that underpinned German foreign policy before reunification has now given way to a more selective and assertive position on European integration. Also some recent polls suggest that public opinion in the Federal Republic has become reluctant towards 'more Europe'. Quite understandably, 70% of Germans are 'fed up' with the euro crisis, over a half would prefer Germany to leave the Eurozone. As much as 77% are against 'more integration' – like initiatives such as direct election of a European president, and 70% are against creating 'United States of Europe'²³⁸. This suggests that the financial recession has left many Germans disillusioned with the project Europe and the public support for European integration has significantly waned. Also on parliamentary level some major parties present their fair share of euroscepticism, most notably among the CSU (co-ruling with CDU) and die Linke (far left party). The resulting paradox is that Germany is simultaneously at the helm of the future of Europe and also the country seemingly rather reluctant to deepen the integration and find a definite way out of the conundrum.

One explanation could be that Berlin no longer pursues European integration as an end in itself because it now supports integration only if it is congruent with national interests. These interests should no longer be expected to be always in line with pro-integration objectives. Moreover, due to the financial crisis the BRD emerged as a clear leader in EU. European integration has less to offer for Germany than before, since the country no longer depends on EU as a means to establish itself as a legitimate international player²³⁹. On the normative level, Germany reinterpreted its multilateral commitments from responsibilities-based to interests-based. **As a result, German behaviour within the EU has become more assertive, selective, contingent and instrumental**, which confirms neorealist predictions in this respect.

As Germany's economy is expanding from beyond the Eurozone to the BRIC countries, it is increasingly tempting for it to **go alone in foreign policy**. Europe will continue to be the most important stage for German foreign policy, but at the same time it is considered increasingly slow, complex and costly, with a return on investment that no longer seems assured, visible or transparent for many of its elites. On the other hand, there is desire within Germany to develop and maintain strong energy and economic connections with Russia. Although the principles of *Zivilmacht* and *Westbindung* should assist in politicisation of economic relations, the opposite is happening: an economisation of German foreign policy. Therefore, it is to be expected that

²³⁸ *Umfrage zur Euro-Krise: Mehrheit der Deutschen hält weitere Rettungspakete für sinnlos*, "Der Spiegel", 05.07.2012.

²³⁹ A. Mayhew, K. Oppermann, D. Hough, *German foreign policy and leadership of the EU...*, p. 9.

BRD will be more willing to cooperate with Russia irrespective of the interests of its EU partners²⁴⁰.

Consequently, it can be observed that the Federal Republic commenced to auto-identify itself as a medium-sized power able to shape security policy structures, which would increase Germany's influence on international politics²⁴¹. In the future, Berlin will be guided primarily by its own interests in foreign, economic and security policy. The question about Germany's new role in the international relations seems crucial. After all, the answer will shape Europe and therefore the world. Its identity is still not fully formed, with its overall direction obscure. Several years after first engaging in a military conflict abroad, Germany is no more a nation in shackles of its own making. It is still not sure, however, what to do with its new freedom and might.

²⁴⁰ H.-J. Spanger, *Die deutsche Russlandpolitik*, in: Thomas Jäger, Alexander Höse and Kai Oppermann (ed.), *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, Wiesbaden 2011, p. 105-125.

²⁴¹ M. Staack Michael, *Normative Grundlagen, Werte und Interessen deutscher Sicherheitspolitik*, in: S. Böckenförde (Hg.), S. B.Gareis (Hg.), *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik*. Herausforderungen, Akteure und Prozesse, Opladen/Farmington Hills 2009, p. 45-96.

Conclusion

In the preamble to the Lisbon Treaty we read about “the need to create firm bases for the construction of the future Europe”. Regardless of the many different opinions of political economy coryphaei, not only economic prosperity but state security understood in a broad sense was, is and will be the prerequisite for the implementation of this ambitious postulate in the foreseeable future. Europe used to be a Hobbesian world of fratricidal wars but a Kantian reality of “perpetual peace” (post-modern paradise) does not look as optimistic as it was presented by Robert Kagan in his *opus magnum* – “Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order”. Post-historical reality entails new security challenges which in some aspects are completely different in nature than their predecessors.

The central objective of this publication was to answer the questions associated with the main challenges for European security and its capabilities to deal with them. Conclusions drawn from these considerations, with the exception of the so called “food security”, were far from optimistic. The Authors recognized the current security challenges enforced by the EU in order to develop common positions and speak with one voice on key security issues. The most significant European failures identified in this volume were the result of the combination of several security policy factors, namely: the fact that decisions were made on an *ad hoc* basis, the lack of a coherent strategy as well as the chaotic choices and absence of true European leadership. Only a sophisticated mix of economic and military capabilities, assertive political leadership as well as a moral will and a cultural cohesion will allow uniting Europe to address these challenges and restore its fundamental position in the international system.

It is high time for uniting Europe to truly face its current security challenges. The EU is still perceived as a soft power. European transformation towards a mature geostrategic actor must be preceded by a comprehensive debate on this issue. Surprisingly enough, this hasn't been done since the Treaty of Lisbon.

The Authors hope that They have fulfilled the main objective of the *study*, while at the same time restraining from overly detailed analysis which could exceed the scope of this book.

When preparing this publication, the Authors attempted to: avoid dictatorial and unilateral assessments, verify information and opinions contained in individual studies and limit personal opinions as much as possible.

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Summary

This publication attempts to summarize and assess the various new challenges to European security. Considering the fact that security in the traditional sense seems to be a “melody of past times”, the Authors like the EU are inspired by a “comprehensive approach” to international security.

This volume is divided into two parts. The first, shorter one, consists of two chapters and is dedicated to the three-day-long edition of the Weimar Youth Forum 2012 (WYF 2012) organized by the Centre for International Initiatives (CII). The second part examines various challenges in the realm of security in a broad sense.

The first part is divided into two chapters. Chapter I consists of two letters. The first one, written by Barbara Marcinkowska and Aleksandra Radziwoń, Coordinators of the Weimar Youth Forum project, describes the idea of the Forum and its history. The second, written by Professor Klaus-Heinrich Standtke, President of the Committee for French-German-Polish Cooperation, was his Opening Address of the Weimar Youth Forum 2012.

The following chapters examine the various challenges in the realm of European security in a broad sense. In chapter III the Author tries to assess the impact of several EU Petersberg missions in the Western Balkans. To accomplish this goal the section analyses the economic as well as the political state’s well-being indicators and the opinions of leading European experts.

Chapter IV discusses a process that has been undertaken to generate European military capabilities essential to conduct independent full-scale out of area operations. The Author maintains that without significant American combat support its European allies are not capable of such operations.

Chapters V and VI concentrate on new, hitherto ignored, security dimensions: cultural and food. The fifth chapter is dedicated to the matter of cultural security. The Author believes that a scholar long forgotten – Felix Koneczny provides a sensible explanation on why Europe’s cultural policy is failing today to such an enormous extent. The sixth section adheres to the subject of the European Union’s food security system, revealing to the Reader that the EU has one of the most complex and well-functioning policies in the world in this sector.

In the last chapter, the Author in her article maintains that the Federal Republic is clearly seen as Europe’s leader, and perhaps this leadership is now desired more than ever. She highlights that the EU will no longer remain the only stage for German foreign policy. Berlin increasingly looks beyond its borders for other arenas to assert its interests.

Conclusions coming from these considerations allow us to recognize that the new threats mentioned above could not overshadow “hard security” aspects completely. Furthermore, to meet the current security challenges the EU ought to be able to develop

common positions and speak with one voice on key security issues. European failures identified in this monograph were the result of several policy factors combined, namely: the fact that decisions were made on an *ad hoc* basis, the lack of a coherent strategy as well as the chaotic choices and lack of true leadership.

Zusammenfassung

Die folgende Publikation versucht die neuen Herausforderungen für die europäische Sicherheit zusammenzufassen und zu beurteilen. Da die Sicherheit, in der traditionellen Sinne des Wortes, scheint eine "Melodie der Vergangenheit" zu sein, die Autoren – genauso wie die Europäische Union – bevorzugen eine ganzheitliche Auffassung der Frage "internationaler Sicherheit".

Die Monografie wurde in zwei Teilen geteilt. Der erste, kürzere Teil besteht aus zwei Kapiteln und wurde dem von dem Centrum Inicjatyw Międzynarodowych (CIM) organisierten 3-tägigen Konferenz Weimar Youth Forum 2012 (WYF 2012) gewidmet. Der zweite Teil enthält die Analyse der verschiedenen Herausforderungen im Bereich von Sicherheit.

Kapitel I besteht aus zwei Briefen. Der erste Brief wurde von Herrn Professor Klaus-Heinrich Standke als Eröffnungsvortrag an die Teilnehmer von WYF 2012 gerichtet. In dem zweiten Brief, der von Barbara Marcinkowska und Aleksandra Radziwoń gefasst wurde, befinden sich die Informationen zur Vorbereitung des WYF und die Zusammenarbeit von CIM mit den Partnern. Kapitel II fasst die Schlussfolgerungen der Konferenz, Vorträge und Workshops, die während des WYF stattgefunden haben, zusammen.

Die nächsten Kapitel werden verschiedener Herausforderungen im Bereich von Sicherheit gewidmet. Der Autor des Kapitels III versucht den Einfluss der Petersberg-Operationen in dem West-Balkan Region zu beurteilen. Um das zu erreichen, werden die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Anzeichen des Staatswohlstandes, aber auch Meinungen der europäischen Hauptexperten, analysiert.

Kapitel IV diskutiert die Fortschritte, die erreicht wurden, um die europäischen militärischen Fähigkeiten zu erschaffen, die für eigenständige Out-of-Area-Operationen notwendig sind. Der Autor stellt fest, dass ohne militärische Unterstützung der USA die europäischen Staaten zu solchen Operationen unfähig sind.

Kapitel V und VI analysieren die bisher ignorierten Aspekte von Sicherheit: Kultur- und Ernährungssicherheit. Im Kapitel V (kulturelle Sicherheit) behauptet der Autor, dass die Ideen des lang vergessenen Forschers, Feliks Koneczny, die Antwort auf die folgende Frage enthalten: warum ist die europäische Kulturpolitik in so einem schlechten Zustand? Kapitel VI wurde der Analyse des Ernährungssicherheitssystems der EU gewidmet. Die präsentierten Fragen sollten dem Leser veranschaulichen, dass die EU über eine der komplexesten und am besten funktionierenden Politiken im Bereich von Ernährungssicherheit verfügt.

In der letzten Kapitel VII stellt die Autorin fest, dass die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als Führungskraft in Europa betrachtet wird – und dass die deutsche Führungskraft noch nie so gefragt wurde wie heutzutage. Sie betont, dass die EU nicht mehr der einzige Raum ist, wo deutsche Interessen verwirklicht werden können und das Berlin immer häufiger außer der Euro-Raum hinschaut, um neue Bereiche zu finden.

Aus allen diesen Artikel kann man die folgende Schlussfolgerung ziehen: die "harten" Aspekte der Sicherheit dürfen nicht ignoriert werden. Außerdem, um die gegenwärtigen Sicherheitsanforderungen gewachsen zu sein, sollte die EU fähig sein, die gemeinsamen Standpunkte zu erarbeiten und mit einem einheitlichen Stimme zur Thema der Hauptprobleme im Bereich Sicherheit zu sprechen. Die in der Publikation erwähnten Misserfolge der EU sind Ergebnisse von ein paar politischer Faktoren: Mangel der gemeinsamen Strategie; Ad-Hoc-Entscheidungen; chaotische politische Wahlen und Mangel an einer echten Führungskraft in Europa.

Sommaire

Cet ouvrage essaie de résumer et d'évaluer les défis contemporains de la sécurité européenne. Cependant, les auteurs – en suivant l'approche envisagée aussi par l'Union Européenne – trouvent que la manière traditionnelle de comprendre la notion de sécurité internationale n'est plus suffisante et c'est la raison pour laquelle ils essaient de la traiter de manière plus complexe.

La publication est divisée en deux parties : la première, qui est plus courte, se compose de deux chapitres. Cette partie est consacrée au Weimar Youth Forum 2012 (WYF 2012) qui a été organisé à la fin de l'année 2012 à Varsovie (Pologne) par le Centre pour les Initiatives Internationales (Centrum Inicjatyw Międzynarodowych). La deuxième partie traite des défis de la sécurité internationale comprise largement (dans ses dimensions politique, économique, sociale et culturelle).

Le premier chapitre est composé de deux lettres dont la première est écrite par les coordinatrices du WYF 2012 (Barbara Marcinkowska et Aleksandra Radziwoń) et parle de l'idée du forum et de son histoire. La seconde lettre, écrite par le professeur Klaus-Heinrich Standtke, a été la lettre d'ouverture de cette édition du Forum. Le deuxième chapitre du livre essaie de présenter les conclusions du Forum, y compris les conclusions des séminaires, lectures et débats.

Les chapitres suivants traitent des défis divers de la sécurité. L'auteur du chapitre III analyse et évalue l'influence des missions de Petersberg sur la situation dans la région des Balkans occidentaux. Dans son travail il analyse des indicateurs économiques et politiques qui mesurent le niveau de la prospérité des États. Il essaie aussi d'analyser des opinions d'experts européens.

Le chapitre IV est une tentative d'estimer le progrès du développement des capacités militaires de l'UE qui sont nécessaires pour mener des opérations *out of area* de façon indépendante et complète. Selon l'auteur, les Européens ne sont pas capables de réaliser ce genre d'opérations sans l'aide substantielle des États-Unis.

Deux chapitres suivants (V et VI) examinent les nouvelles dimensions de la sécurité qui, selon les auteurs, ont été ignorées jusqu'à aujourd'hui: la sécurité alimentaire et la sécurité culturelle. Le cinquième chapitre aborde la dimension culturelle de la sécurité internationale. L'auteur trouve que les concepts créés par Feliks Koneczny – un savant oublié – donnent des réponses à la question pourquoi la politique culturelle européenne est en si mauvais état. Le chapitre VI, par contre, traite du système de la sécurité alimentaire en Europe. L'auteur conclut que l'UE a une des meilleures et plus complexes politiques alimentaires du monde.

Dans le dernier chapitre (VII) de cet ouvrage, l'auteur examine la conviction que, dans l'UE, la République fédérale d'Allemagne est vue comme un leader et que sa conduite

est maintenant plus souhaitable que jamais. L'auteur souligne aussi que l'UE cesse d'être une arène unique de réalisation des intérêts d'Allemagne.

Les conclusions des analyses faites par tous les auteurs permettent de dire que les nouveaux défis auxquels l'Europe fait face ne peuvent pas faire oublier les aspects militaires et politiques de la sécurité. En outre, pour surmonter les obstacles et défis posés, il faut que tous les États-membres parlent d'une seule voix dans les situations qui concernent les questions les plus importantes pour l'UE, et surtout dans le domaine de sécurité. Les problèmes et échecs explicités dans l'ouvrage ont été les résultats de facteurs divers, parmi lesquels on trouve: un manque de stratégie cohérente, des décisions prises *ad hoc*, des choix chaotiques en ce qui concerne la politique et un manque de vrai leadership en Europe.

Streszczenie

Niniejsza publikacja jest próbą podsumowania i oceny nowych wyzwań dla bezpieczeństwa europejskiego. Biorąc pod uwagę fakt, że bezpieczeństwo w tradycyjnym sensie wydaje się być “melodia czasów minionych”, autorzy, podobnie jak Unia Europejska są zwolennikami “kompleksowego podejścia” do bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego.

Monografia została podzielona na dwie części. Pierwsza, krótsza, złożona z dwóch rozdziałów, jest poświęcona trwającej trzy dni ostatniej edycji Weimar Youth Forum 2012 (WYF 2012) zorganizowanej przez Centrum Inicjatyw Międzynarodowych (CIM). W drugiej części analizie zostały poddane różne wyzwania w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa w szerokim rozumieniu tego słowa.

Rozdział I jest złożony z dwóch listów. Pierwszy, przygotowany przez Barbarę Marcinkowską oraz Aleksandrę Radziwoń, opisuje ideę współpracy w ramach forum oraz jego historię. Drugi z nich, napisany przez profesora Klaus-Heinricha Standtke, który był przemówieniem otwierającym WYF 2012. Rozdział II jest próbą wskazania kluczowych wniosków płynących z konferencji, wykładów oraz seminariów zorganizowanych w ramach Weimar Youth Forum.

Kolejne rozdziały są poświęcone różnym wyzaniom w dziedzinie szeroko rozumianego bezpieczeństwa. W rozdziale III Autor stara się ocenić wpływ kilku unijnych misji petersburskich na region Bałkanów Zachodnich. W celu realizacji tego zadania w tej części rozważań dokonano analizy ekonomicznych oraz politycznych wskaźników mierzących poziom dobrobytu państwa jak również opinii czołowych europejskich ekspertów.

Rozdział IV omawia postępy, jakie zostały podjęte w celu stworzenia europejskich zdolności wojskowych, niezbędnych do samodzielnego prowadzenia operacji *out of area* na pełną skalę. Autor uznaje, że bez znacznego wsparcia militarnego ze strony Stanów Zjednoczonych europejscy sojusznicy nie są w stanie prowadzić takich operacji.

W rozdziałach V i VI analizie poddano nowe, dotychczas ignorowane wymiary bezpieczeństwa: kulturowe oraz żywnościowe. Rozdział V jest poświęcony kwestii bezpieczeństwa kulturowego. Jego Autor uważa, że koncepcje autorstwa dawno zapomnianego uczonego – Feliksa Konecznego zapewniają rozsądne wytłumaczenie dlaczego europejska polityka kulturalna/kulturowa znajduje się w tak złej kondycji. Rozdział VI jest poświęcony analizie systemu bezpieczeństwa żywnościowego Unii Europejskiej. Przedstawione zagadnienia mają unaocznnić Czytelnikowi, że UE ma jedną z najbardziej złożonych i najlepiej funkcjonujących polityk w tym sektorze na świecie.

W ostatnim – VII rozdziale, Autorka uznaje, że Republika Federalna Niemiec jest postrzegana jako lider w Europie, przywództwo niemieckie nigdy wcześniej nie było tak pożądane jak obecnie. Podkreśla, że UE przestaje być jedynym obszarem realizacji niemieckich interesów, Berlin coraz bardziej spogląda poza jej granicę w poszukiwaniu nowych obszarów.

Wnioski płynące z powyższych rozważań pozwalają uznać, że wyżej wymienione nowe zagrożenia nie mogą przyćmić całkowicie “twardych” aspektów bezpieczeństwa. Ponadto, aby sprostać obecnym wyzwaniom bezpieczeństwa UE powinna być w stanie wypracować wspólne stanowiska oraz mówić jednym głosem na temat najistotniejszych problemów bezpieczeństwa. Niepowodzenia wskazane w tej monografii były rezultatem oddziaływania kilku czynników politycznych: braku spójnej strategii, decyzji podejmowanych *ad hoc*, chaotycznych wyborów politycznych oraz braku prawdziwego przywództwa w Europie.