

TAIWAN'S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The Current Position of Poland
and Its Possible Ways of Supporting Taipei

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For clarity, the titles of speeches, communiqués, and other documents in the main text are provided in English. The quotations are translated from Polish and Chinese to English; however, the Polish or Chinese language text is listed in the endnotes. For Taiwanese (ROC) terms, traditional characters are used; simplified characters are applied for Chinese (PRC) words.

All the sources used in this analysis are publicly available.

ACRONYMS

ABD	Asian Development Bank
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CPC	Communist Party of China
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU	European Union
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
KMT	Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (either Poland or China)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCBR	National Centre for Research and Development in Poland
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PiS	Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość)
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
TAIPEI Act	Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act
TRA	Taiwan Relations Act
TRO	Taipei Representative Office
TTA	Taiwan Travel Act
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	UN General Assembly
US	United States
V4	Visegrad Group
WHA	World Health Assembly
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

TABLE OF CONTENTS

About the Authors	<i>i</i>
Acknowledgements	<i>ii</i>
Acronyms	<i>iii</i>
Executive Summary	<i>vi</i>
Recommendations	<i>viii</i>
1. INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE	<i>1</i>
Introduction	<i>1</i>
Outline and Scope	<i>3</i>
2. POLAND AND THE ONE CHINA “PRINCIPLE” VS. “POLICY”	<i>5</i>
One China “Principle” vs. One China “Policy”	<i>5</i>
The European Union and the One China “Policy”	<i>6</i>
Poland on One China: “Principle” or “Policy”?	<i>7</i>
Consequences of Poland’s One China “Policy”	<i>12</i>
3. CORROSION OF LITHUANIA-CHINA RELATIONS: “KILL THE CHICKEN TO SCARE THE MONKEYS”	<i>17</i>
4. POLAND-CHINA RELATIONS	<i>20</i>
5. TAIWAN AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	<i>25</i>
Exclusion of the Republic of China from the United Nations	<i>25</i>
Current Support for Taiwan and Its Meaningful Participation	<i>26</i>
A Case Study of the WHO	<i>28</i>
Taiwan, WHO, and Covid-19	<i>30</i>
Poland and Taiwan During the Covid-19 Pandemic	<i>31</i>
6. TAIWAN WITHIN POLAND’S INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS	<i>33</i>
Russia’s War in Ukraine	<i>33</i>
American Legislations on Taiwan and their Consequences for Poland	<i>33</i>
China and Taiwan in the NATO Framework	<i>36</i>
Poland at the Crossroads	<i>37</i>
7. CONCLUSION	<i>39</i>

APPENDICES *41*

- A. The Politics of Language and China's Manipulated Narrative over the Claimed "(Re)unification" *41*
- B. Poland-Taiwan Relations During the Cold War *43*
- C. China's Leadership Influence in International Organizations *44*
- D. The Full Text of the UN Resolution 2758 on Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, 1971 *46*
- E. The Palestine Quest for Membership in UNESCO as a Lesson for Taiwan *47*

Endnotes *50*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 clarified the representation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the United Nations as “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations” in 1971. Over the past several decades, however, the Beijing government has linked the resolution to the One China “Principle” to prevent Taiwan from participating in international diplomacy. As a result, Taiwan faces a range of obstacles when it seeks meaningful participation in—and contribution to—international organizations within the UN system and beyond.

This report focuses on Taiwan's participation in international organizations and contextualizes Poland's possible support for Taipei's case. The communist government of the Polish People's Republic ceased its diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) in 1949 and has since recognized the PRC. With the end of the Cold War and the start of democratization reforms in both Poland and Taiwan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new window of opportunities for closer cooperation presented itself for Warsaw and Taipei. Even after ending the communist rule in 1989, the democratic Republic of Poland, however, confirmed its adherence to the One China “Principle” in 1997. It later evolved into a more ambiguous One China “Policy” around the time Warsaw was preparing to join the European Union (EU) in 2004. The

lack of recognition of the ROC, therefore, has kept the development of Poland-Taiwan relations—including Warsaw's support for Taiwan's participation in international organizations—legally and politically constrained.

Given the evolving dynamics of political governance and domestic affairs in Poland as well as the changing geopolitical situation in the Central and Eastern European region and the EU, new possibilities are seemingly opening for expanding Poland-Taiwan relations. Thus, these possibilities might offer a host of innovative prospects for Poland to support Taiwan's desire to increase its engagement in international diplomacy.

The evolving Polish-Taiwanese relations cannot be understood without taking into consideration the emerging dynamics of economic competition and political rivalry between China and the United States. American legislations on Taiwan—such as the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 and the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019—have consequences for the evolving Polish-Taiwanese bilateral relationship, especially related to Taiwan's desire to engage more in international space.

With the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine and ever-growing Polish-American strategic initiatives to support democratic leadership in Kyiv,

Warsaw has become a highly important and steadfast ally for the United States within the NATO framework. Against this geopolitical backdrop, it is indeed in Poland's national interest to be a trustworthy ally of the United States as well as a strong and reliable member of the European Union and NATO. From Poland's perspective, the Sino-Russian pact—which is an alternative to the EU-NATO partnership that guarantees Poland's security—presents a grave challenge to the liberal world order based on the rule of law and human rights. For Warsaw, this is simply not an option. Within such a broad geostrategic landscape, strengthening Taiwanese democracy by supporting its mutually beneficial presence in the international community seems to align with Poland's national interests and democratic values.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This report encompasses the global context of Poland-Taiwan relations within the European Union and NATO as well as the US foreign policy agenda. The development of Poland-Taiwan relations and the strengthening of Poland's support for Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations can hardly be analyzed without the consideration of complex and complicated interrelationships within larger institutional frameworks in Europe and legislations enacted by the US Congress. For the purpose of clarity, the following recommendations to Polish policymakers are divided into two categories: international organizations and Polish-Taiwanese relations.

IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, POLAND SHOULD:

1. Clarify its official position on the One China "Policy" to avoid further confusion with the One China "Principle" that Beijing advocates around the world through its informational warfare and wolf-warrior diplomacy. Like the European Union and the United States, Poland should particularly insist on using the proper lexicon, not coined by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), when commenting on—and writing about—Poland's position.
2. Support Taiwan's meaningful participation in—and contribution

to—international organizations. Promote a) Taiwan's full membership in international organizations where statehood is *not* required, and b) support Taiwan's associate membership or observer status where statehood *is* required.

3. Follow closely and engage actively in the European Union's policies toward Taiwan and EU's support for the Taipei government to participate meaningfully in—and contribute to—international organizations.
4. Engage with like-minded democratic countries to support Taiwan's meaningful *participation* in international organizations in a substantive—not simply symbolic—manner while highlighting Taiwan's practical *contributions* to the well-being of the global community. For instance, Warsaw should convince other countries that Taiwan should be granted observer status in the World Health Assembly (WHA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) because the island-nation has contributed globally to fighting the Covid-19 pandemic as well as maintaining and improving safety measures in civil aviation and at sea. Therefore, Poland should be a promoter of sharing the global commons for human progress while supporting

Taiwan's presence on international forums and highlighting Taipei's past and potential future *contributions* to other countries and global economy.

5. Share information with Taiwan informally but regularly about the proceedings of the WHA, ICAO, IMO, and other international organizations. Poland would then be recognized as a responsible *global* stakeholder and facilitator as Warsaw will assist Taipei in following international standards of quality and common welfare in aviation, maritime security, food safety, climate change, intellectual property, science, and education, among others.
6. Act as a champion of democracy by leading Central and Eastern Europe to support Taiwan and joining the club of powerful "friends" of Taiwan—such as Japan and the United States. In addition, Poland should serve as the cheerleader for its neighboring democracies—particularly the two Visegrad Group (V4) members (i.e., the Czech Republic and Slovakia) as well as the Baltic states (particularly Lithuania)—to voice greater support for Taiwan and take joint measures which would protect these democracies from Beijing's coercive actions.
7. Collaborate with NATO and its member states to monitor Beijing's challenges and threats against the security and stability of the Taiwan Strait. Warsaw should support

international initiatives aimed at keeping peace and ensuring that there is no forceful and unilateral change to the *status quo* in the Taiwan Strait.

8. Maintain and develop further cooperation with Taiwan for humanitarian aid to Ukraine, showcasing Warsaw's solidarity with other democracies and resistance against authoritarianism and territorial aggression.
9. Work with the Vatican—one of Taipei's remaining 13 "diplomatic allies"—to convince other countries with large Catholic communities to extend their endorsement for Taiwan's meaningful participation in—and contribution to—international organizations.
10. Support Taiwan officially when legally possible while maintaining and developing unofficial support for Taiwan to illustrate Warsaw's penchant for the *status quo* in Taiwan Strait relations which precludes China from isolating Taiwan or derailing its relations with other countries.

IN TERMS OF POLAND-TAIWAN RELATIONS, WARSAW SHOULD:

11. Acknowledge and respect the common aspirations of Taiwan people and refrain from denying or taking side on the statehood of Taiwan, while focusing on mutually beneficial substantive cooperation.
12. Initiate and develop cooperative relations by supporting Taiwan's international presence through the

vibrant Polish and Taiwanese communities in the United States. Chicago, for example, would be a pilot candidate for such initiatives, as this metropolitan area is the largest “Polish” city outside Poland, with approximately two million people of Polish origin.

13. Promote exchanges between high-ranking government officials in Warsaw and Taipei. Similar to other Taiwan-friendly countries like the Czech Republic and the United States, Poland may consider sending legislative leaders to Taiwan. Such leaders include the Speaker of the Sejm (Marszalek Sejmu) and the Speaker of the Senate (Marszalek Senatu)—who are the second and third most important positions in the Polish government after the president—as well as high-level officials in the executive branch. In turn, Poland should invite more Taiwanese officials to visit Warsaw. This would send a clear signal to like-minded countries and encourage them to emulate Poland’s leadership.
14. Maintain and develop cooperative links with Taiwan on the parliamentary and city level while expanding the list of Polish sister-city partnerships with Taiwan’s municipalities.
15. Include Taiwan in mainstream political debates in Poland, ensuring a lasting all-party consensus in supporting Taiwan’s meaningful participation in—and contribution to—international organizations to advance Poland’s national interests and democratic values.
16. Enhance economic cooperation with Taipei by carrying out promotional and marketing campaigns across Taiwan to attract more investors and high-tech companies to Poland while increasing and diversifying Polish exports to the island.
17. Activate the initiative of regular flight connections between Poland and Taiwan, especially Warsaw-Taipei or Krakow-Taipei, on the basis of the existing agreement of 2015, to enhance tourism.
18. Enhance further scientific, academic, student, and cultural exchange programs and joint projects between Poland and Taiwan.
19. Initiate an educational campaign at Polish schools to highlight the importance of Taiwan, its history, and culture. This would help to combat Chinese misinformation campaigns regarding the “(re)unification” of China and Taiwan being considered as a “renegade province” of the PRC.
20. Support research initiatives on Poland-Taiwan relations at academic institutions and independent think-tanks. Promote English-language publications of expert analyses and public commentaries for international audience and promote Polish-language publications to foster greater knowledge among Polish people.

1. INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE

Introduction

Diplomatic relations between Poland and Taiwan—the Republic of China, or ROC—can be traced back to the interwar period of World War I and II (1918-1939). Given their geographic locations and distance as well as disparate priorities in both domestic and foreign policies, the development of their bilateral relationship was not particularly intense during this period.

At the end of World War I in 1918, Poland regained independence after 123 years under the imperial domination of Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian Empires. The independent nation re-emerged as the Republic of Poland or the Second Polish Republic. The government in Warsaw recognized the government of the ROC in Beijing on March 27, 1920.¹ The normalization of diplomatic relations, however, had not started until the Treaty of Friendship, Trade, and Navigation was signed in Nanjing on September 18, 1929, and ratified by the Polish authorities on March 17, 1931.²

World War II was not only a turbulent time for both republics, but it also brought earthshaking political changes to their bilateral relations. As a result of these changes, the communists seized power in Poland and the country became a Soviet

satellite-state for almost half a century (since 1952, Poland was officially known as the Polish People’s Republic until it became a democracy in 1989). On July 5, 1945, the ROC withdrew its recognition of the government of the Republic of Poland in Exile, which had been located in London since 1940, and recognized the communist government of Poland.³

As a communist country, Poland recognized the PRC and established diplomatic relations with Beijing, following in the footsteps of the Soviet Union.

For the Republic of China, the end of World War II meant the resumption of the civil war between the Guomindang (Kuomintang, KMT, 中國國民黨) nationalists led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and the communist forces led by Chairman Mao Zedong (毛澤东). The victorious communist forces proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing on October 1, 1949. Consequently, Chiang’s nationalist ROC government had to evacuate from mainland China to Taiwan. Since then, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has adhered to its “reunification” narrative⁴ (see Appendix A).

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following in the footsteps of the Soviet Union. Only four days after the proclamation of the PRC, on October 4, 1949, the Polish communist government withdrew the recognition of the ROC and ceased all diplomatic contacts with Chiang's government.⁵ The Warsaw communist government recognized the PRC in Beijing one day later, on October 5. Finally, Poland and the PRC officially established diplomatic relations on October 7, 1949, making Poland one of the first countries in the world to normalize relations with Mao's communist government in mainland China.⁶

Warsaw continues to recognize the PRC and sustains official relations with Beijing; it has not recognized the ROC in Taipei and has had no official diplomatic relations with Taiwan since 1949.

Over the ensuing years, Polish-Taiwanese official diplomatic relations did not exist. As the Cold War and the dynamics of ideological hostilities between the Soviet Union and the United States continued, the relationship between Warsaw and Taipei hardly changed (see Appendix B). After the Sino-Soviet split of 1960, Poland took the side of Moscow and abandoned its previous admiration for the PRC. Deviating from Poland's earlier friendly relations with the PRC, Warsaw later became highly critical of Beijing, particularly during Mao's

Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). In essence, Warsaw began to imitate Moscow's sharp criticism of Mao's government in Beijing.⁷

During these intermittent years, Polish-Taiwanese relations were not revived until the time of democratic transformations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Poland, communism failed spectacularly as partially free elections were held in 1989—making a pathway for the full democratization of the country. In Taiwan, martial law ended in 1987 after 38 years—setting a stage for the democratic process to continue. It culminated in free presidential elections in 1996. During these years, the democratization of Taiwan was widely publicized in Polish press as Warsaw was equally favorable towards democratic reforms itself; however, Polish media expressed concerns over the potential threats of Chinese intervention in Taiwan.⁸

When Poland formally became the Third Polish Republic or the Republic of Poland in 1989—ending the period of the communist regime of the Polish People's Republic—the democratic authorities in Warsaw continued to maintain their previous communist positions on Sino-Polish relations. In other words, Warsaw continues to recognize the PRC and sustains official relations with Beijing; it has not recognized the ROC in Taipei and has had no official diplomatic relations with Taiwan since 1949.

Outline and Scope

Within this historical context, it is impossible to analyze evolving Polish-Taiwanese relations without understanding the forces of geopolitics at play between global powers and the emerging dynamics of economic competition and rivalry between China and the United States. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 and the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 passed by the US Congress may have some unforeseen and unintended consequences for the evolving Polish-Taiwanese bilateral relationship, especially related to Taiwan's desire to engage more in the international space. With the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine and ever-growing Polish-American strategic initiatives to support the democratic leadership in Kyiv, Warsaw has become a highly important and steadfast ally for the US within the NATO framework.⁹

The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 passed by the US Congress may have some unforeseen and unintended consequences for the evolving Polish-Taiwanese bilateral relationship.

These interrelated complexities between and among the stakeholders

of Polish-Taiwanese relations are considered in this analysis to provide a set of recommendations for Poland. Recognizing the existing challenges posed by China, this report explores the rights and responsibilities of democratic Taiwan as a member of the international community. In this changing global strategic landscape, the TRA, the TAIPEI Act, and other US congressional legislations have direct relevance to the evolving nature of Polish-Taiwanese relations.

With this outline, the body of this report consists of the history and interpretation of One China “Principle” vs. “Policy” in the Polish-Taiwanese relationship. The distinction between these terms has itself become a battle in the information warfare between China and other countries around the world. Thus, the report examines the issue of One China “Policy” of the European Union (EU) and the United States in dealing with China and Taiwan, especially as Poland remains a strategically important member of the EU and NATO. In the next section, the way in which Poland could support Taiwan to sustain Taipei's democratic values and allow it to participate in international organizations meaningfully is analyzed (see the case studies in Appendix C). The following section focuses more on Poland as a member of the EU and NATO, where Warsaw needs to carefully navigate through a web of geopolitical complexities of global forces with its own domestic politics of governance (e.g., the next parliamentary election of 2023) that would collectively help to

optimize its national security interests and to preserve its democratic values.

Before presenting the concluding remarks, the report offers a set of recommendations for Poland to facilitate Taiwan's efforts to meaningfully participate in—and successfully contribute to—international organizations within the legal framework of the European Union, NATO, and the United States. Indeed, the recently formulated American legislations related to Taiwan and China, which were signed into the US code of laws by the Trump and Biden administrations, may have consequences for Poland and other countries around the world.

2. POLAND AND THE ONE CHINA “PRINCIPLE” VS. “POLICY”

One China “Principle” vs. One China “Policy”

The phrases of One China “Principle” and One China “Policy” have two separate definitions with greatly different political meanings and implications. The term officially used in Beijing is the One China “Principle” (一个中国原则). According to Beijing and the countries that follow the Chinese foreign policy position, the accepted definition is: “There is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and the Government of the People’s Republic of China [PRC] is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.”¹⁰ The United States, however, follows the intentionally ambiguous One China “Policy” (一个中国政策). It means that the United States *recognizes* the PRC as the sole legal government of China but merely “*acknowledges* that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China” (italics added).¹¹ In other words, Washington does not *recognize* Taiwan as a part of the PRC—it only confirms that the US is *aware* of Beijing’s position on the matter.¹² The United States has left this issue of “One China” concept to be solved peacefully between Beijing and Taipei; however, Washington opposes any unilateral changes of the *status quo* and any violent means of engagement in the Taiwan Strait.¹³

In fact, in the Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China on the normalization of relations between Beijing and Washington on January 1, 1979, the United States reiterated that it “*acknowledges* the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China” (italics added).¹⁴ However, the Chinese-language version used the word that might be translated as “recognizes” (承认)¹⁵ signifying a stronger term to connote both recognition and assent¹⁶ as opposed to “acknowledges” (认识到), which was used in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972.¹⁷ When this language change was noted by American policymakers after it had already been made public by the Chinese side, then US Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher reportedly assured the senators that “we regard the English text as being the binding text.”¹⁸

Washington does not recognize Taiwan as a part of the PRC—it only confirms that the US is aware of Beijing’s position on the matter.

The United States is not the only country to follow a more ambiguous One China “Policy.” Their own versions of One China “policies” are being used in countries like Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Like the United States, these countries merely “acknowledge,” “take

notes,” or “understand and respect” the interpretation of the PRC.¹⁹ The One China “Policy” is also a term used by the European Union (EU), in which Poland has been a member since May 1, 2004.²⁰

More significantly, the utility of this ambiguity of the One China “Policy” is that it gives the United States and other countries greater space and freedom to develop wide-range relations with both China (officially) and Taiwan (unofficially). Nevertheless, this complicated situation of the existence of two phrases and their various interpretations also provides China with more space to manipulate the international narrative over Taiwan. Therefore, American experts and scholars recommend that US diplomats and policymakers should emphasize “our ‘One China’ Policy” when discussing the official position of the United States.²¹

Moreover, “only 51 countries, not 180 as claimed by Beijing, adhere to its ‘one China’ principle,” according to a study by a Singaporean researcher.²² China, on the other hand, appears to have been misleading the global community with its own narrative of One China “Principle” as a widely accepted norm.

The European Union and the One China “Policy”

When diplomatic relations between the European Union and China were established in 1975, the EU countries were committed to a “One

China” position in consistence with the prevailing policies.²³ The EU’s One China “Policy” itself, however, was not codified; therefore, it allowed EU member states to refer to One China “Policy” with their own interpretations.²⁴ It was also up to EU member states whether, and to what extent, they want to develop relations with Taiwan—including the rights to open their representative offices in Taiwan and the Taipei offices in their own countries.

The European Union essentially gave assurance to China in 1975 that none of the EU member states recognized the Republic of China (Taiwan); instead, they kept diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in Beijing. It explicitly asserts:

... in keeping with positions adopted at various times by all the Member States, the [EU] Community does not entertain any official relations with Taiwan or have any agreements with it.”²⁵

The position of the EU on maintaining the rights to develop economic and cultural relations with Taiwan—but not political ones—was explicitly stressed in the *Commission Policy Paper for Transmission to the Council and the European Parliament – A Maturing Partnership – Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations* of 2003. In this policy document, one of the priorities of the EU for the political dialogue with China was to:

stress EU insistence on a resolution of the Taiwan issue through peaceful dialogue, and underline the importance of growing economic ties for an improvement of the political climate; underline EU interest in closer links with Taiwan in non-political fields, including in multilateral contexts, in line with the EU's 'One-China' policy.²⁶

However, the former commitment of the EU not to develop political relations with Taiwan has changed. According to the “European Parliament Recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU-Taiwan Political Relations and Cooperation,” the European Parliament proposed to:

work closely with the Member States to intensify EU-Taiwan *political* relations and to pursue a comprehensive and enhanced partnership under the guidance of the EU's *One China Policy*; consider Taiwan a key partner and democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific on its own merit as a robust democracy and technologically advanced economy that could contribute to maintaining a rules-based order in the middle of an intensifying great power rivalry.²⁷ (italics added)

Even though the text confirmed explicitly the EU's One China “Policy,” it also observed “continued military belligerence and gray-zone activities, as well as other forms of provocation”

on the part of China which go against Taiwan and pose a “grave threat to the *status quo* between Taiwan and China, as well as to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region.”²⁸ On the other hand, the EU and Taiwan were regarded as “like-minded partners that share common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”²⁹

In light of the EU's changed policy on Taiwan, each member state has its prerogatives to develop its own policies. However, Poland—as a member of the EU as well as a critically important member of NATO and a friend of the United States—needs clarity on its China policy. This is increasingly vital for Poland as its strategic and security interests are threatened daily by the Russian invasion of neighboring Ukraine and the signing of the “no-limit” pact between China and Russia—just 20 days before Moscow's “special military operation” in Ukraine on February 24, 2022.³⁰

Poland on One China: “Principle” or “Policy”?

Over the years, the position of the democratic Poland on the issue of “One China” concept has evolved, as evidenced by the joint Polish-Chinese communiqués and other statements. Thus, the documents issued after 1989 have references to both One China “Principle” and One China “Policy.”

The primary document, which confirms Poland's adherence to the One China “Principle,” is the Joint

Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Poland issued on November 17, 1997. The communiqué was signed by President Jiang Zemin (江泽民)—the then general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and the president of the PRC—and Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski. The communiqué states:

The Polish side reiterates again that the Republic of Poland recognizes that there is only one China in the world, the People’s Republic of China; Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory; and the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.³¹

Even though this document does not explicitly mention the One China “Principle,” the definition by itself covers all the elements of the phrase One China “Principle” used by the PRC.³² However, the later joint statements by Poland and China in 2004 and 2016 clearly used the phrase One China “*Policy*.”

When Poland gained membership in the European Union on May 1, 2004, just over one month later Warsaw and Beijing signed an important Joint Statement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Poland on June 8, 2004. At the invitation of President Kwasniewski, President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) paid a state visit to Poland on June 8–10, 2004.³³ Paragraph 11 of the joint statement highlights:

Poland declares that it upholds the *unchanged* one China *policy* and expresses its opposition to any actions aimed at changing the status of Taiwan and causing an increase of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and supports the peaceful unification of China.³⁴ (*italics added*)

Here, there can be no mistake in the Polish-language version (“polityka jednych Chin”) because the term that appears in the Chinese-language version of the document is “一个中国政策,” i.e., One China “Policy.”³⁵ The statement of Poland that it upholds its “unchanged” One China “Policy” (“podtrzymuje niezmienną politykę jednych Chin,” “坚持一个中国政策不变”) may seem puzzling to many perceptive observers. The previous 1997 joint communiqué implied that it was the One China “Principle” Poland would follow even though the very term One China “Principle” was not used in the document.

Fourteen years later, the term One China “Policy” was also reconfirmed in a joint statement by Poland and China. When President Andrzej Duda invited President Xi Jinping (习近平) to visit Poland on June 19–21, 2016, both sides recognized each other as long-term and stable strategic partners.³⁶ Importantly, paragraph 3 of the Joint Statement on Establishing Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Poland, signed on June 20 underlines:

Both sides reiterated their respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as mutual understanding of each other's interests and key issues of concern. Poland supports the peaceful development of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and reaffirms its commitment to the one China *policy*.³⁷ (italics added)

Similar to the 2004 joint statement, the Polish-language version here also uses the term “polityka jednych Chin” and the Chinese language version employs “一个中国政策,”³⁸ both of which mean One China “Policy.”

Adhering to the One China “Principle” is not a sine qua non requirement for diplomatic relations with the PRC, as many countries have official ties with Beijing based on the One China “Policy.”

Indeed, it is confusing to find that the One China “Principle” is used as Poland's official China policy in the document, “Information about Specific Conditions of Cooperation with Taiwan.”³⁹ The Asia-Pacific Department of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued this memorandum on September 17, 2018, to the offices of the president, the prime minister, and other government ministries with a request to share it

with institutions under their jurisdictions. This MFA's guidance for Poland's relations with Taiwan was purposefully circulated prior to the upcoming events organized by the Taipei Representative Office in Warsaw.⁴⁰ In light of the prevailing sensitivity of the China-Taiwan issue, the memorandum summarizes all political restraints and their consequences in dealing with Taiwan, and instructs what is allowed and what is not. The examples include not using the name “Republic of China” but “Taiwan” and not using the ROC flag or the emblem.

This memorandum contains an obvious confusion between Poland's stated One China “Policy” and the MFA's guidance on the “Principle,” as it highlights:

In its relations with the People's Republic of China, Poland recognizes the “One China” *principle*, which was confirmed in all documents from the Polish-Chinese summit meetings (most recently in June 2016). References to the “one China” *principle* are found in documents from meetings between Chinese leaders and politicians of other countries and are a *sine qua non* [sic] condition for maintaining diplomatic relations with China.⁴¹ (italics added)

Indeed, the 1997 joint communiqué does describe the One China “Principle.” According to the MFA memorandum, this joint communiqué “expresses this principle to the fullest extent.”⁴² The

memorandum also claims that this principle was confirmed most recently in June 2016. However, the joint statement of the Polish-Chinese summit in June 2016 used unmistakably the term One China “Policy.”

Moreover, adhering to the One China “Principle” is not a *sine qua non* requirement for diplomatic relations with the PRC, as many countries have official ties with Beijing based on the One China “Policy.” Therefore, it seems that the Polish MFA may have misconstrued the meaning and definition of the two terms and their implications.

After announcing that Poland will donate 400,000 doses of AstraZeneca to Taiwan in September 2021,⁴³ Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau clarified Warsaw’s position on One China at a press conference in Vilnius, Lithuania:

Poland’s position is absolutely clear. We recognize the One China “Policy,” we recognize Taiwan as part of China, therefore the representation of Taiwan in our country is not a diplomatic mission, it is an economic and cultural office.⁴⁴ (italics added)

Evidently, Rau provided reassurance that Poland adheres to the One China “Policy;” however, the foreign minister also stressed that Poland “recognizes” Taiwan as part of China, which is the essence of Beijing’s One China “Principle.”

Notwithstanding Poland’s policy towards China, the official English-

language portal of the Chinese MFA on June 10, 2022, described the results of the Third Plenary Session of the China-Poland Intergovernmental Cooperation Committee, as if both Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Polish Foreign Minister Rau confirmed Poland’s adherence to the One China “Principle:”

Wang Yi said, China appreciates Poland’s adherence to the one-China *principle* and believes that Poland will unswervingly stay committed to the one-China *principle*. . . . Rau said, Poland attaches great importance to developing Poland-China relations and firmly pursues the one-China *principle*.⁴⁵ (italics added)

The official Polish MFA report from that event mentioned neither One China “Policy” nor One China “Principle.”⁴⁶

According to the report of the Chinese Embassy in Poland, Foreign Minister Rau was described as referring to the One China “Principle” when he was welcoming new Chinese Ambassador Sun Linjiang (孙霖江) to Warsaw on November 25, 2021. The Polish-language article published by the Chinese Embassy in Poland emphasizes:

The Polish side attaches great importance to the comprehensive strategic partnership between Poland and China, fully respects the one China *principle*, and supports cooperation between China and the countries of Central

and Eastern Europe.⁴⁷ (italics added)

Even more puzzling are the cases of China using both One China “Policy” and One China “Principle” in the same statement or report. In response to US Speaker of Congress Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan on August 2–3, 2022, Ambassador Sun wrote a letter to the influential Polish newspaper, *Rzeczpospolita*, on August 3, 2022, stating:

Polish leaders have repeatedly reiterated their firm commitment to the one China *policy*, which is the political foundation for the healthy and stable development of China-Poland relations. We hope that Poland will recognize the wrongness and harmfulness of Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, will always adhere to the one China *Principle*, and will stand on the right side in this important issue by supporting China’s position.⁴⁸ (italics added)

Relating to Speaker Pelosi’s visit, Representative Bob Chen (陳龍錦) of the Taipei Representative Office (TRO) in Poland also published a letter in *Rzeczpospolita* on August 9, 2022. TRO Rep. Chen called on Poland to support democratic Taiwan on the basis of shared values.⁴⁹

However, the Chinese MFA used the term One China “Policy” in its report after Foreign Ministers Rau and Wang met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York on September 21, 2022. The Chinese MFA published it on September 22:

Rau expressed that Poland views China as a friendly and reliable strategic partner, and the two countries have maintained close high-level interactions and exchanges at various levels. The two sides share common views on safeguarding independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Poland adheres to the one-China *policy* and appreciates China’s consistent pursuit of a foreign policy of peace.⁵⁰ (italics added)

It is always a question whether the usage of either of the terms is not just a slip of the tongue or simply a mistake as shown by the case of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) of Taiwan, who mistakenly talked about Washington’s adherence to the One China “Principle.”⁵¹ However, in light of the joint Polish-Chinese statements signed in 2004 and 2016—against the background of the statement of 1997—it can be observed that Poland did indeed modify its position towards a more ambivalent One China “Policy.” There are many indications that the change of Warsaw’s position towards One China “Policy” should be associated with Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004. It is crucially important to note that this change was accepted by China, as reflected in the Chinese-language versions of joint statements in 2004 and 2016.

The aforementioned publications of the Chinese MFA on June 10, 2022, and the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw on November 25, 2021, which referred

to Poland's adherence to the One China "Principle," are two examples of Beijing's unilateral decisions to alter the Polish narrative over Taiwan. It is clearly a premeditated action as part of China's persistent "information warfare" and assertive "wolf-warrior" policy. These two unilateral actions occurred after Poland donated 400,000 Covid-19 vaccines to Taiwan. Thus, the evidence seems to suggest that the Chinese reactions to the Polish assistance to Taiwan were calibrated on the assumption that Warsaw is opening up a new window of opportunity for developing unofficial relations with Taiwan. Beijing's use of the term One China "Principle" when describing the Polish position or using both terms interchangeably—as in the case of Chinese Ambassador Sun's open letter of August 3, 2022—are aimed at obscuring even more the complicated diplomatic situation, and consequently promoting the Chinese position.

Indeed, the awareness of the distinction between One China "Principle" and One China "Policy" is marginal in the Polish public square. In fact, many diplomats, public intellectuals, foreign policy experts, scholars, and journalists have often mixed up both concepts.⁵² These mistakes are understandable as China's public diplomacy with deliberate information warfare and wolf-warrior actions continues unchecked. Moreover, Poland's position on the "One China" concept needs clarity, and the Polish MFA should explicitly state the One China

"Policy" as its standing on the matter. Otherwise, Warsaw may face far greater consequences for the nature of Poland-Taiwan relations in various dimensions—not just the political one alone.

Consequences of Poland's One China "Policy"

Poland's lack of recognition of the ROC (Taiwan) affects the evolving relations and growing cooperation between Warsaw and Taipei. With this constraint, the official state visits of the president and other government representatives between Poland and Taiwan are nearly impossible, and there are no formal diplomatic missions or embassies in Warsaw and Taipei. Instead, both sides decided to establish respective offices representing Warsaw and Taipei in 1992. The responsibilities of these two offices have been limited to consular affairs as well as economic and cultural cooperation.

In 1995, Polish representatives arrived in Taipei to start their operations under the name of the Warsaw Trade Office in Taipei (Warszawskie Biuro Handlowe w Tajpej). Its name was changed to the Polish Office in Taipei (Biuro Polskie w Tajpej) in 2018.⁵³ In the same year, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Warsaw (Biuro Gospodarcze i Kulturalne Tajpej w Warszawie) was renamed to the Taipei Representative Office in Poland (Biuro Przedstawicielskie Tajpej w Polsce).⁵⁴

It is important to observe that the Polish officials are obligated not to refer to the “Republic of China,” but only to “Taiwan,” and they are not allowed to use the national flag or anthem of the ROC during any political, sport, and cultural events.⁵⁵ More noteworthy is the fact that even the name “Taiwan” is often not used; instead, Taiwan happens to be described as “Chinese Taipei” due to the increasing pressure from Beijing. For example, controversies were reported in 2021 during the latest edition of the prestigious 18th Chopin Competition in Warsaw when nine representatives of Taiwan were registered as “China, Taiwan” (“Chiny, Tajwan”). In his letter to *Gazeta Wyborcza*, one of the most opinionated newspapers in Poland, then Taiwan Representative to Poland Weber Shih (施文斌) argued that it is “equally unacceptable as if Chopin himself was registered on the list of participants as ‘Russia, Poland.’”⁵⁶

Poland became the first European country to sign an agreement on cooperation in criminal matters with Taiwan.

Despite such limitations and controversies, however, a series of significant joint Poland-Taiwan initiatives in various dimensions have developed over the past few years. In fact, Poland and Taiwan signed two meaningful legal agreements.

First, the Warsaw and Taipei authorities signed an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxable income on October 21, 2016.⁵⁷ It was the 15th agreement between Taiwan and a European country and the 34th comprehensive income tax agreement that Taiwan has signed worldwide.⁵⁸ In Poland, the domestic procedure concluded with a ratification on December 15, 2016, and its enforcement came into effect on December 30, 2016.⁵⁹

Second, the agreement on cooperation in criminal matters was established on June 17, 2019.⁶⁰ Under this vital agreement, Poland and Taiwan decided: a) to fast-track extradition proceedings, b) to increase exchanges of information on laws, c) to implement and prosecute criminal cases, d) to share intelligence on combating transnational crime and terrorism, and e) to streamline procedures for transferring prisoners. It was ratified in Poland on December 16, 2020, and enforced on February 18, 2021.⁶¹ Poland became the first European country to sign such an agreement with Taiwan. In the Polish ratification process, Warsaw assured that Poland does not recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan). First, the law—signed by President Andrzej Duda—was based on an agreement between the Polish Office in Taipei and the Taipei Representative Office in Poland; second, Taiwan itself was described as a “territory, to which tax law under the jurisdiction of the

Ministry of Finance of Taiwan is applied.”⁶²

Even though intergovernmental contacts are restrained, the evolving parliamentary relations between Poland and Taiwan have significantly increased over the last several years. Taiwan legislators launched the Taiwan-Poland Inter-Parliamentary Amity Association on April 6, 2022.⁶³ The Polish parliament also has its own Polish-Taiwanese Parliamentarian Group; its latest visit to Taiwan took place in December 2022.⁶⁴ In the agenda, the Polish delegation had an audience with President Tsai Ing-wen⁶⁵ and met with the members of the Legislative Yuan, the Mainland Affairs Council of the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Development Council in Taipei.

Despite the lack of official diplomatic relations, Poland and Taiwan have been developing a host of deeper levels of mutual connections between academic and scientific communities.

Apart from parliamentary relations, municipalities present great potential for cooperation. Several sister-city partnerships exist between Poland and Taiwan: Warsaw and Taipei,⁶⁶ Radom and Taoyuan,⁶⁷ as well as Elblag and Tainan.⁶⁸ Cooperation between city-level authorities became vitally important, especially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, as

Taiwan got deeply involved in helping Ukrainian refugees.⁶⁹ For instance, following the earlier €300,000 aid to Warsaw in May 2022, a donation agreement of \$1 million was concluded at the Warsaw City Hall on October 5, 2022. It was signed by Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski of Warsaw and Representative Bob Chen of the Taipei Representative Office in Poland.⁷⁰ The aid was meant to help Ukrainian refugees settled in Warsaw. Another aid agreement of \$500,000 was also signed with the city of Krakow on May 30, 2022.⁷¹ On that occasion, TRO Rep. Chen suggested to Krakow Mayor Jacek Majchrowski that the medieval capital of Poland should establish a sister-city cooperation with Tainan, the “cultural capital” of Taiwan.⁷²

Despite the lack of official diplomatic relations, Poland and Taiwan have been developing a host of deeper levels of mutual connections between academic and scientific communities. An important agreement on cooperation in science and higher education was signed on July 27, 2018, aiming to further enhance collaboration and joint endeavors.⁷³ The agreement is meant to increase academic exchanges and cooperation between universities, facilitate scholarship programs, and expand teaching opportunities for language teachers.

However, the Polish-Taiwanese research cooperation prioritizes science and technology fields over social sciences and humanities. The Polish National Centre for Research and Development (NCBR) confirmed

this in the previous ten editions of funding opportunities for the joint Polish-Taiwanese projects. The NCBR's program is designed to locate organizations and innovative enterprises in Poland and Taiwan for joint research projects that focus on energy efficiency, materials engineering, intelligent transport, cybersecurity, and space research.⁷⁴

It is significant to highlight that there is a direct cooperation between Polish and Taiwanese universities. For instance, the National Central University, the National Academy of Marine Research in Taiwan, and the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun signed an agreement on joint arctic research at the Polar Station in Svalbard, Norway, on June 25, 2022.⁷⁵

The most recent significant development in Poland-Taiwan research cooperation comes from the field of semiconductors.

Polish academics and independent experts have also participated in the Taiwan Fellowship program funded by the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).⁷⁶ This exchange has resulted in various academic initiatives in Poland. For example, the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies of the University of Warsaw and the Institute of the Middle and Far East of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow jointly organized a conference on “Taiwan: Prospects and Challenges in the Indo-Pacific” on July 12, 2022.⁷⁷

The guest of honor was Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Harry Ho-jen Tseng of the ROC. The conference hosted the largest number of alumni of the Taiwan Fellowship program among any other academic initiatives organized in Poland, according to the Taipei Office in Warsaw.⁷⁸

The most recent significant development in Poland-Taiwan research cooperation comes from the field of semiconductors.⁷⁹ After the visit of the Polish delegation led by Secretary of State Grzegorz Piechowiak in the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology on May 17, 2022, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on September 27, 2022, to further solidify the mutual cooperation on cutting-edge technologies in the semiconductor industry.⁸⁰ The Lukasiewicz Research Network Institute of Microelectronics and Photonics plans to conduct joint research with Taiwan's Industrial Technology Research Institute.

The signing of the semiconductor-related MoU raised speculations about what was believed to be a Chinese retaliation. Less than a month after the signing, it was suspected that China refused to allow the Polish government's aircraft—carrying Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Mariusz Blaszczak—to enter Chinese airspace.⁸¹ Defense Minister Blaszczak was scheduled to arrive in Seoul on October 17–19, 2022, to meet with his South Korean counterpart Lee Jong-sup and jointly participate in the release ceremonies of weapons

purchased recently by Poland from South Korea. The Chinese-Polish airspace incident was directly linked to the tightening of Warsaw-Taipei ties, according to the Polish,⁸² Korean,⁸³ and other international media reports.⁸⁴

Additionally, Beijing's anti-Polish maneuver over the Chinese airspace may have been associated with two other factors: a) South Korea's emergence as Poland's new and important partner in arms deals, and b) Poland's rearmament in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Warsaw's increasingly important role in NATO. It was speculated that the Chinese action against the Polish aircraft was meant to show Beijing's support for Moscow.⁸⁵ However, the Polish Ministry of National Defense clarified on Twitter that the trip was cancelled due to technical problems of the plane.⁸⁶

Poland's improving relations with Taiwan have always been in line with One China "Policy"—constructively maintaining good relations with Beijing and consciously avoiding possible negative reactions from China.

In 2015, Poland and Taiwan signed an agreement on air transport. This agreement was supposed to make it easier for airlines to launch connections from two airports in

Taiwan to Warsaw and two other airports in Poland.⁸⁷ Reportedly, codeshare flights were planned with a transfer in Bangkok, where LOT—the national carrier of Poland—would fly from Warsaw, and Taiwan's EVA Air from Taipei.⁸⁸ Poland's LOT has been sending charter flights during the Covid-19 pandemic and helped transport medical equipment.⁸⁹ At the moment, however, there is no regular flight connection.

Poland's improving relations with Taiwan have always been in line with One China "Policy"—constructively maintaining good relations with Beijing and consciously avoiding possible negative reactions from China. However, the recent friendly developments between Taiwan and Lithuania in the Baltics—bordering Poland—have opened up opportunities for Warsaw to deepen existing relations with Taipei.

3. CORROSION OF LITHUANIA-CHINA RELATIONS: “KILL THE CHICKEN TO SCARE THE MONKEYS”

Almost a year after the Taipei government opened the Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, on November 18, 2021,⁹⁰ the opening of the Lithuanian Trade Representative Office in Taiwan was announced on November 7, 2022.⁹¹ Although Lithuanian officials confirmed that the office in Vilnius would not have a diplomatic status, the development of Taiwanese-Lithuanian relations as well as the very usage of the term “Taiwanese” (instead of “Taipei”) in the name of the office in Vilnius prompted China to downgrade its diplomatic relations with Lithuania to the level of *chargé d'affaires* and to apply economic coercive measures against the Baltic state bordering Poland.⁹²

The Chinese actions led to filing a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) by the European Union on behalf of Lithuania.

Effective immediately, China blocked all bilateral exports to—and imports from—Lithuania. Since Lithuania’s exports to China had only been one percent of its total export, Lithuania could afford to risk trade retaliation by China.⁹³ To punish

Vilnius even harder, Beijing imposed informal secondary sanctions against international companies that trade with Lithuania. Some German companies with connections to Lithuania, for example, endured “customs problems” created by China.⁹⁴ It was widely believed that Beijing’s retaliation against German companies would force Berlin to put pressure on Vilnius.

The Chinese actions eventually led to filing a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) by the European Union on behalf of Lithuania—starting the trade dispute on “alleged Chinese restrictions on the import and export of goods, and the supply of services, to and from Lithuania or with a link to Lithuania.”⁹⁵ The complaint was supported by Australia and the United Kingdom.⁹⁶ Moreover, the EU approved a €130 million scheme to support and facilitate access to finance by Lithuanian companies, which have been affected by “China’s discriminatory trade restrictions.”⁹⁷ In addition, the United States offered a \$600 million export credit deal through the government-owned US Export-Import Bank to Lithuania.⁹⁸

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda admitted on January 4, 2022, that allowing Taiwan to open a representative office under its name (“Taiwanese”) was a mistake.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, the representative offices in both Vilnius and Taipei keep operating.¹⁰⁰

Taiwan has attempted to seize this vacuum created by the suspension of

China-Lithuania trade relations to strengthen its own connections with Vilnius. It has already announced an investment of more than €10 million (\$9.98 million) in semiconductor chip production in Lithuania.¹⁰¹ Lithuanian company Teltonika IoT Group in Vilnius and Taiwan's Industrial Technology Research Institute signed a €14 million deal on January 18, 2023, to share semiconductor chip technology.¹⁰² Furthermore, Taiwan's National Development Fund established the \$200 million Central and Eastern Europe Investment Fund in March 2022 to promote investments, build business partnerships, and leverage supply chains between Taiwan and the Central and Eastern European countries, including Lithuania.¹⁰³

Evidently, the coercive actions taken by China against Lithuania did not stop Central and Eastern Europe from developing friendly relations with Taiwan.

Apart from opening the representative offices and developing economic relations, Lithuania has also supported Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations. More than 200 key Lithuanian political and public figures sent an open letter to President Nauseda on April 22, 2020, requesting him to support Taiwan's involvement in the World Health

Organization (WHO) meetings, activities, and mechanisms—including Taiwan's participation in World Health Assembly (WHA).¹⁰⁴ The Lithuanian president initially did not support Taiwan's membership, explaining that only UN members can become WHO members, and Taiwan is not a UN member.¹⁰⁵ However, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius called the head of the WHO on May 13 to invite Taiwan to the WHA as an observer.¹⁰⁶

Lithuania's pro-Taiwanese gestures have caused widespread speculation that Vilnius is sending a crystal clear—though indirect—message to Moscow. As an independent Baltic nation under constant pressure from Russia for more than 30 years, Vilnius conveys that a democratic Lithuania would not succumb to any autocratic practices of any country.¹⁰⁷ This sentiment was also strongly reflected in the open letter to the Lithuanian president signed by more than 200 Lithuanian public leaders as a reminder that Taiwan had not recognized the occupation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.¹⁰⁸

The slew of Chinese coercive measures taken against Lithuania is a classic example of wolf-warrior tactics to preclude other countries from expanding cooperation with Taiwan. The Lithuanian case will therefore be a litmus test for the solidarity of Lithuania's democratic allies and partners to help Vilnius overcome China's coercive actions. If Taiwan

manages to balance out Lithuania's losses from previous trade relations with China—with a proper support from the United States and the European Union—it might encourage other middle-size and small countries in the region to follow in Lithuania's footsteps and tighten relations with Taiwan despite potentially negative reactions from Beijing.

As the largest economy in the region, Poland has its own “strategic compass” to manage the partnership with China.

Evidently, the coercive actions taken by China against Lithuania did not stop Central and Eastern Europe from developing friendly relations with Taiwan. The most recent episode comes from the already famous phone call made by General Petr Pavel, the newly elected President of the Czech Republic, to President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan on January 30, 2023. The president-elect also declared that he would like to meet with President Tsai in person.¹⁰⁹

Indeed, each country in Central and Eastern Europe has its own policies and priorities related to China and Taiwan. As the largest economy in the region, Poland has also its own “strategic compass” to manage the partnership with China.¹¹⁰

4. POLAND-CHINA RELATIONS

The strategic partnership between China and Poland was initiated under President Bronislaw Komorowski in 2011.¹¹¹ After the United Right coalition led by the Law and Justice party (PiS) came to power in 2015, President Andrzej Duda upgraded the bilateral relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” on June 20, 2016, when President Xi Jinping visited Poland.¹¹²

In the past, the China-Poland relationship was characterized mainly by economic ties. In Warsaw, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao (温家宝) inaugurated a regional cooperation process to tighten relations between China and the Central and Eastern European countries in April 2012. It came to be known as the 16+1 Format (later 17+1 when Greece joined in 2019, and now 14+1 as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania quit during 2021 and 2022).¹¹³

The bilateral trade relationship between Poland and China is not as beneficial to Warsaw as it is to Beijing.

Poland was initially enthusiastic about President Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as Warsaw and Beijing signed a Memorandum of Understanding to jointly support the BRI on November 26, 2015.¹¹⁴ From Beijing’s perspective, Poland is

strategically located on a logistics route connecting China with Europe. The Eurasian BRI railway routes connect Chengdu in central China with Lodz in central Poland; equally important is the train terminal in Malaszewicze in eastern Poland, located just nine kilometers away from the Belarus border. This Polish village is called the “Chinese gateway to Europe.”¹¹⁵

The bilateral trade relationship between Poland and China is not as beneficial to Warsaw as it is to Beijing. Although the intensity of bilateral trade has been significantly increasing, Poland’s export to China was ten times smaller than import from China to Poland in 2022.¹¹⁶ Since the level of Chinese investments remains relatively low and trade imbalance is high,¹¹⁷ it might be claimed that Poland’s engagement in the 14+1 framework did not fulfill Warsaw’s expectations.¹¹⁸

The Polish authorities are fully aware of the unfavorable balance of trade statistics in the ongoing Poland-China economic relationship. During a press conference in Lithuania on September 7, 2021, Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau commented on Poland’s trade relations with both Taiwan and China:

It is natural, due to the economic position of Taiwan, . . . that countries of the European Union have trade relations with Taiwan. . . . Poland participates in the 17 or 16+1 Formula. We believe that this formula is one of the many ways accepted by the countries of the European Union to conduct economic cooperation

with China. In relations with our Chinese partners, we always stress that this formula does not fulfill our expectations, . . . the trade balance between the countries of that 16 or 17 and China has not been improved.¹¹⁹

The issue of trade imbalance was also raised by President Duda when he spoke with President Xi over the phone on July 29, 2022. According to the Polish president's official website:

Another topic of the conversation concerned the development of economic cooperation, including ways to reduce Poland's trade deficit in its turnover with China (*inter alia* through increased exports of Polish food to China) and intensifying flight connections as the pandemics subsides.¹²⁰

Thus, Poland has arguably been sending signals to Beijing that it is expecting more economic incentives. Indeed, it has long been noted by the Chinese side. When Xi met with Duda, who came to China to attend the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Winter Games on February 6, 2022, they evidently discussed the trade issue. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, President Xi expressed:

China's readiness to take an active part in Poland's endeavor to build itself into a logistic hub and to support Poland's effort to become a key point in China-EU industrial and supply chains. China will further expand import of agricultural, food and other quality

products from Poland and encourage more Chinese enterprises to go to Poland for investment and cooperation.¹²¹

Such statements are usually quite general and diplomatic in nature. During a meeting between the foreign ministers of Poland and China on September 21, 2022, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, Wang Yi said:

China is willing to steadily advance the cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) on top of deepening bilateral cooperation. Poland is a major country in Central and Eastern Europe and an important initiator of China-CEEC cooperation. China supports Poland in building a CEEC wholesale market for agricultural products and making it a regional distribution center for agricultural products.¹²²

In his letter published by *Rzeczpospolita* on July 6, 2022, Chinese Ambassador to Poland Sun Linjiang similarly avoided details:

China attaches great importance to Poland's international and regional influence, hoping that Poland, as an important gateway to Europe, will strengthen faith in the possibilities of cooperation, use the potential of this cooperation, and open new perspectives for it. Poland is also expected to promote the idea of taking China's cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe to a

new level so that it can continue to bear new fruit.¹²³

One of Poland's most significant gestures was President Duda's trip to China to participate in Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2022. It illustrated Poland's strong engagement with China, especially when a diplomatic boycott of China-hosted Olympics was announced by the Biden White House due to "ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and other human rights abuses" in December 2021.¹²⁴ Despite a close alliance between Poland and the United States, Duda participated in the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, which made him one of the few representatives of key EU countries. It sparked a barrage negative reactions from the Polish press. For example, the news website *Onet* stressed that the Polish president was the highest representative of the European Union,¹²⁵ whereas traditionally conservative *Rzeczpospolita* titled its article: "President Duda in Beijing among Dictators."¹²⁶

Apart from the general disillusionment with the 14+1 Format, there have been two significant political letdowns for Poland related to Beijing's behavior in recent years.

Here, the timing was essential. In the current circumstances, following the outbreak of the Russian war in

Ukraine after the Olympic Games and the increasingly tightened Poland-US strategic cooperation, the behavior of the Polish authorities would have most probably been quite different.

However, in another strategically important case of limiting the use of Huawei's 5G technologies, Warsaw—like many other European capitals—has been under Washington's pressure to exclude Huawei from expanding 5G in Poland.¹²⁷ It is still not clear, however, whether Poland will finally allow Huawei to participate in the expansion of 5G in Poland. In the draft amendments to the Polish legislation on cybersecurity, there is no reference to Huawei or Chinese connections, but the "high risk provider" is mentioned.¹²⁸ It might be then treated as a window for Polish government not to allow Huawei to build 5G networks.¹²⁹

Apart from the general disillusionment with the 14+1 Format, there have been two significant political letdowns for Poland related to Beijing's behavior in recent years.

First, the main disappointment was caused by China's position on the Poland-Belarus migrant issue. It has been a part of the larger Belarus-European Union border crisis which started in May 2021, when tens of thousands of immigrants from Asia and Africa tried to cross the border with Belarus to Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland. The Belarus authorities have been accused of facilitating those migration flows as a "hybrid attack" in response to Western sanctions and

pressure on Belarus for prior human rights violations.¹³⁰

During the crisis, the idea of a potential usage of the “China card” circulated among Polish political and expert circles. Since most of the train cargo connections from China to Europe went through Belarus to Poland, some Warsaw policymakers considered closing down the border crossing, hoping that Beijing would put pressure on Moscow.¹³¹ However, China would not risk deteriorating its relations with Russia as Chinese media took the side of Moscow and Minsk and placed the responsibility for the crisis on the West.¹³² Polish experts also speculated that China would not get involved in Belarus because the railway cargo between China and the EU does not have a strategic value for Beijing.¹³³

Second, the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 provided a new context of Poland’s disappointment with China. As a member of NATO and a close American ally, Poland—having a shared border with Ukraine—has been on the opposite side of China. Thus, the public image of Poland in China has suffered as Beijing allowed fake news about Poland to circulate. In 2022, for example, a speech given by President Duda appeared on the Chinese networks having been manipulated so that Duda seemed to be calling for the mobilization of Polish troops and preparation to enter Ukraine. A spokesperson of the Polish Ministry of National Defense told the

French *AFP News* via email on May 24, 2022:

We treat the sensational reports about the alleged entry of the Polish Army into Ukraine as obvious propaganda actions of the Russian Federation aimed at achieving the effect of disinformation in the international media space, as well as the earlier absurdities about the partition of Ukraine with our participation.¹³⁴

Moreover, the Polish Embassy in Beijing issued a notice warning Chinese netizens against the Russian propaganda campaigns about Poland’s will to annex western Ukraine on May 13, 2022.¹³⁵

In the phone conversation with President Xi on July 29, 2022, President Duda was primarily concerned about the consequences of the Russian invasion.¹³⁶ The Polish president’s official website mentioned neither China’s ambivalent and tacitly supportive role for Russia, nor the fake news about Poland promulgated earlier; instead, it was more evasive:

The President of the People’s Republic of China expressed his readiness to cooperate with the Polish side in seeking ways to end the conflict peacefully.¹³⁷

Chinese Ambassador Sun in Warsaw presented an equally nebulous position. In his letter to *Rzeczpospolita* published on July 6, 2022, Sun writes:

World peace is in deep crisis, and new regional problems are emerging all the time. I believe that Sino-Polish relations will

continue to develop steadily despite the turbulent international situation.¹³⁸

This illustrates that Duda's conversation with his Chinese counterpart was another example of the Polish government's soft approach to Beijing's international policy.¹³⁹ However, the massive and uncontrolled spread of fake news about Poland in China did indeed push the Polish authorities to react through its embassy in Beijing.¹⁴⁰ It should also be noted that neither the Polish Embassy website nor the official statement of the Polish Ministry of National Defense mentioned the fault of the Chinese side. Instead, Polish diplomats and military officials blamed Russia for anti-Polish propaganda. This would indicate that the Warsaw authorities would hardly like to confront Beijing as it would negatively affect their bilateral relations.

Despite the economic imbalance, China is perceived as an important player in Poland's foreign policy.

All this indicates that Poland has generally been trying to maneuver its relationship with China delicately. Despite the economic imbalance, China is perceived as an important player in Poland's foreign policy.

Moreover, the Polish government is aware that political and economic matters cannot easily be separated in

dealing with China, as proved by the recent case of Lithuania. Therefore, the gamut of intricate relationships reveals that developing interactions with Taiwan has been closely and intrinsically entangled with Poland's relations with China.

All things considered, the Polish MFA has followed the general principle:

Due to the comprehensive strategic partnership developed by the Republic of Poland with the PRC, in the event of a collision between Polish-Chinese and Polish-Taiwanese cooperation projects, priority should—as a rule—be given to cooperation with the PRC.¹⁴¹

5. TAIWAN AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Exclusion of the Republic of China from the United Nations

The rejection of the “two Chinas” idea by the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) led to a zero-sum competition for diplomatic allies. Over the decades, the number of Taiwan’s allies dropped to only 12 UN members—and the Vatican—as of February 2023.¹⁴² Gradually, the Chinese pressure has also led to the exclusion of the ROC from the UN family and many other international organizations as part of “China’s comprehensive isolation campaign against Taiwan.”¹⁴³

When the United Nations was created in 1945, the ROC participated in the San Francisco UN Conference on International Organization between April 25 and June 26, 1945.¹⁴⁴ The ROC was one of the UN’s founding members.¹⁴⁵ After the establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, the ROC managed to keep the UN seat as the representative of China until 1971.

After decades of hostility, President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger established contacts with Chairman Mao Zedong and Prime Minister Zhou Enlai (周恩来) during 1970-1971 with the possibility of US-China rapprochement. As a consequence of American ping pong diplomacy and the normalization of Sino-American relations, the change of

attitude among UN members led to a vote in favor of the PRC against the ROC.¹⁴⁶

Even though the PRC and the United States did not establish official diplomatic relations until January 1, 1979, it was the Sino-American rapprochement that encouraged many countries in the world to follow the US lead. Paradoxically, the United States itself did not want to replace the ROC with the PRC in the United Nations; instead, Washington opted for dual representation, which means keeping representation for the ROC and granting a seat to the PRC at the same time.¹⁴⁷ These contradictory actions of the United States towards the PRC and the ROC created an impression of Washington telling allies and partners: “do as I say, not as I do.”¹⁴⁸

President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger established contacts with Chairman Mao Zedong and Prime Minister Zhou Enlai during 1970-1971 with the possibility of US-China rapprochement.

The UN General Assembly considered a number of draft resolutions and amendments in October 1971. Some member states proposed to keep the representation of the ROC (Taiwan) together with accepting the PRC.¹⁴⁹ However, it was the Resolution 2758 on the Restoration

of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations that was adopted at the 1976th plenary session on October 25, 1971 (see Appendix D). As a result, the representatives of the ROC were excluded from the UN and replaced by the representatives of the PRC.¹⁵⁰

China has subsequently tried to use the 1971 UN resolution to claim that the United Nations confirmed the One China "Principle," which states that Taiwan is part of the PRC and there is no sovereign ROC.¹⁵¹ In return, the ROC has condemned the PRC for "intentionally misinterpreting" the 1971 UN resolution.¹⁵²

Indeed, as several reports on Taiwan's UN status and international organizations indicated, the 1971 UN resolution only placed the People's Republic in a UN China seat; it did not even include the names "Republic of China" or "Taiwan."¹⁵³ In other words, the 2758 resolution neither affirmed nor denied the status of the Republic of China as a state.

These historical facts are crucially important as Taiwan continues to campaign for gaining meaningful participation in the UN family of specialized agencies. More importantly, many specialized agencies—like WHO, ICAO, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)—do not require the UN membership to join. In fact, the WHO Constitution states that it "shall be open to all States."¹⁵⁴ It should be emphasized, however, that neither the UN Charter defines the state nor does

the 1971 resolution specify the international status of Taiwan.¹⁵⁵

The Paris-based UNESCO provides another example.¹⁵⁶ In 2011, Palestine gained full membership in the agency without a prior inclusion in the United Nations. Despite controversies, UNESCO accepted Palestine as a state (see Appendix E).

Current Support for Taiwan and Its Meaningful Participation

The 1971 resolution of the UN has impacted Taiwan's ability to participate in other international organizations as well. Nevertheless, the ROC was not expelled from every organization at once in 1971. For example, the ROC has been a member of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) until 1984; in other words, it took another 13 years to be expelled from the Lyon-based 195-member organization after the original exclusion from the United Nations.¹⁵⁷

Expulsion from the UN does not mean that Taiwan is absent from all the international organizations. According to the Taiwanese MOFA, the ROC has a full membership in 40 intergovernmental organizations and their subsidiary bodies—including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the World Organization of Animal Health, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration. Moreover, Taiwan has an observer (or other) status in 25 intergovernmental

organizations and their ancillary bodies—including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) as well as the committees of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Central American Integration System.¹⁵⁸

From Taiwan’s perspective, it is crucial to rejoin or gain meaningful participation in—and contribution to—the UN structure and other international organizations, as Taiwan exemplified globally during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The process of joining international organizations has been arduous and compromising, as Taiwan is sometimes forced to use a name other than the Republic of China. The widely known case is Taiwan’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), where Taiwan has been a member as the “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu (Chinese Taipei).”¹⁵⁹

From Taiwan’s perspective, it is crucial to rejoin or gain meaningful participation in—and contribution to—the UN structure and other international organizations, as Taiwan exemplified globally during the Covid-19 pandemic. It is important to stress that since 1971, however, Taiwan has gone a long way to transform itself into

one of the most vibrant democracies in the world. As a consequence, the support for Taiwan has significantly risen from other democracies in recent years.¹⁶⁰

Supporting Taiwan’s meaningful participation in—and contribution to—the UN system, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken assured on October 26, 2021:

Taiwan’s exclusion undermines the important work of the UN and its related bodies, all of which stand to benefit greatly from its contributions. We need to harness the contributions of all stakeholders toward solving our shared challenges. That is why we encourage all UN Member States to join us in supporting Taiwan’s robust, meaningful participation throughout the UN system and in the international community, consistent with our “one China” policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.¹⁶¹

A few days earlier, the European Union announced a similar policy recommendation. According to the “European Parliament Recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU-Taiwan Political Relations and Cooperation,” the European Parliament:

Recommends that the Vice-President of the

Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission . . . strongly advocate for Taiwan’s meaningful participation as an observer in meetings, mechanisms and activities of international bodies, including the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); urge Member States and the EU institutions to support international initiatives calling for Taiwan’s participation in international organisations; welcome again Taiwan’s proactive cooperation with the international community in learning about the COVID-19 pandemic and finding the best ways to respond to it, and underline that this case has proven that Taiwan’s contributions in the WHO would be an added value to the health and well-being of the citizens of all its members.¹⁶²

It must be stressed that both the United States and the European Union’s support for Taiwan has been particularly strong for its presence in the WHO.¹⁶³ It is no coincidence that Taiwan’s exclusion has become very apparent and widely discussed in the times of the Covid-19 pandemic and the global efforts to contain the virus.

A Case Study of the WHO

As a consequence of the UN Resolution 2758 in 1971, the Executive Board of the World Health Organization in Geneva adopted a resolution which “*recommends* to the World Health Assembly [WHA] that it recognize the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the only Government having the right to represent China in the World Health Organization.”¹⁶⁴ There were 13 votes in favor, four against, and four abstentions at the Board’s fifteenth meeting on January 26, 1972. As a result, the Board’s resolution adopted by the WHA on May 10, 1972, decided to:

restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the World Health Organization, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-Shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the World Health Organization.¹⁶⁵

In recent years, Taiwan has actively been trying to rejoin the WHA as an observer. Indeed, the WHO has periodically granted Taiwan observer status to the WHA; however, the island’s political relations came into play in WHO decision. During the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou from the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT), Taiwan was annually invited to the WHA as an observer from 2009–2016 under the name “Chinese Taipei.”¹⁶⁶ However,

after the election of Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as president, who refused to affirm the 1992 Consensus between China and Taiwan,¹⁶⁷ Taiwan was prevented from participating in the WHA.¹⁶⁸ It clearly suggests that access to the UN for Taiwan has been highly politicized and used as blackmail against Taiwan—depending on relations between Beijing and Taipei.

Since 2016, Taiwan's bids to get the invitation to the WHA have consistently been rejected. Most recently, Taiwan's plea to attend the WHA was dismissed on May 23, 2022, after what was believed to be a campaign of diplomatic pressure from China to isolate the island-nation.¹⁶⁹ The president of the WHA, Dr. Ahmed Robleh Abdilleh—also a health minister of Djibouti—said that the proposal sent by 13 WHO members (who were Taiwan's diplomatic allies)¹⁷⁰ to allow Taiwan to join as an observer would not be included in the official agenda.¹⁷¹ It followed a recommendation from the General Committee, which discussed the proposal on a previous day in a “closed-door meeting.”¹⁷² It came despite wide support for inviting Taiwan as an observer from the United States,¹⁷³ all G7 economies,¹⁷⁴ as well as many other countries—such as Australia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Slovakia, and Sweden, which expressed their support in the form of direct endorsements, official statements, parliamentary resolutions, or through social media.¹⁷⁵

China's pressure on the WHO became even more apparent when the information about a secret Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of 2005 between the WHO and PRC was leaked. The MoU itself was never made public, but the Memorandum on Implementation of the 2005 China-WHO Taiwan MoU, after it leaked, was made publicly available on WikiSource before it was taken down.¹⁷⁶ It restricted Taiwan's access to the WHO and its facilities, and consequently used the name “Taiwan, China.”¹⁷⁷ The political maneuvering of China's behind-the-stage actions became particularly striking when the Covid-19 pandemic broke out, as Taiwan was barred from participating in official WHO consultations, during which Taiwanese experts, experienced in combating the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) back in 2003, were not able to share their knowledge and experience at the WHO.¹⁷⁸

Securing an observer seat at the WHO is an important goal for Taiwan—not only to participate meaningfully in WHA discussions, but also to contribute successfully to the global community as demonstrated during the Covid-19 pandemic. It would also open a window of opportunity for Taiwan to participate in a number of other specialized UN agencies whose charters or constitutions allow membership without the inclusion in the United Nations.¹⁷⁹

Taiwan, WHO, and Covid-19

Despite the lack of meaningful participation in the WHA, Taiwan was the first country to inform WHO about the suspicious virus transmissions originating from the central city of Wuhan in China.¹⁸⁰ According to the statement of the Central Epidemic Command Center in Taipei, Taiwan sent an email to the International Health Regulations focal point of the WHO on December 31, 2019. The Taiwan Center informed the WHO of its understanding of the disease and also requested further information from the WHO.¹⁸¹ When it later became public, the Trump White House accused the WHO of putting politics first by ignoring Taiwanese warnings over China's coronavirus outbreak.¹⁸²

Taiwan was widely recognized and globally praised as one of the countries which combatted the new virus most successfully.¹⁸³ Moreover, Taiwan made international headlines as an aid donor through its "Taiwan Can Help, and Taiwan Is Helping" campaign.¹⁸⁴ For example, Taiwan got involved in "mask diplomacy," which became particularly important in the first few months of the Covid-19 pandemic, when masks were a deficit item around the world. As of August 2022, Taiwan has donated 51 million masks worldwide.¹⁸⁵

Another example came from India. Taiwan's batch of health aid consisted of 150 oxygen concentrators and 500 oxygen cylinders left for New Delhi on May 2, 2021, to help India to fight

against the surging increase of Covid-19 infections.¹⁸⁶

Taiwan has also been trying to get involved in vaccine diplomacy. Taipei donated 150,000 doses of its domestically developed Medigen Covid-19 vaccine to Somalia's breakaway Somaliland region on January 31, 2022.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, according to Taiwan's Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, Taipei worked with New Delhi to ship 100,000 vaccine doses to Paraguay—Taiwan's "diplomatic ally"—in March 2021.¹⁸⁸ Previously, Taiwan had accused Beijing of offering China-made vaccines to Paraguay in exchange for establishing official relations with the PRC and severing ties with the ROC.¹⁸⁹ New Delhi itself denied Taiwan's role in India's vaccine supplies to Paraguay, claiming that it was a gift from the Indian government.¹⁹⁰

Taiwan was widely recognized and globally praised as one of the countries which combatted the Covid-19 pandemic most successfully.

Despite these successes in foreign assistance projects, Taiwan had its own problems caused by the lack of membership in the WHO and China's pressure. Taiwan faced severe obstacles importing Western-made vaccines. Taipei accused Beijing of putting pressure on a German firm producing vaccines, as China made it

nearly impossible for Taiwan to buy vaccines directly.¹⁹¹

Paradoxically, Taiwan—one of the largest mask donors worldwide—had to rely on vaccine donations from abroad. The biggest donations came from the United States¹⁹² and Japan.¹⁹³ The middle and small sized countries like Lithuania,¹⁹⁴ the Czech Republic,¹⁹⁵ Slovakia,¹⁹⁶ and Poland¹⁹⁷ made significant vaccine donations to Taiwan as well. Apart from that, two of the world’s biggest technology manufacturers—Taiwanese firms Foxconn, which makes devices for Apple, and the giant semiconductor chip producer TSMC—as well as the Tzu Chi Foundation brokered agreements worth \$350 million for the BioNTech vaccine.¹⁹⁸ It helped to bypass the problem of Taiwanese government buying vaccines directly.¹⁹⁹ This episode has been a reminder of Taiwan’s “geopolitical vulnerability” and a self-explanatory example as to why Taipei had decided to develop its own Covid-19 vaccine.²⁰⁰

Poland and Taiwan During the Covid-19 Pandemic

Poland and Taiwan have closely cooperated during the Covid-19 pandemic. Nearly 1,000 Taiwanese doctors, who had been educated at Polish medical universities, were involved in fighting the pandemic.²⁰¹ Poland and Taiwan have also developed medical cooperation through mutual donations.²⁰²

Poland benefited significantly from Taiwan’s aid as Taipei-donated

500,000 masks arrived in Warsaw on April 10, 2020.²⁰³ The number later increased to one million masks with additional 5,000 protective suits and 20,000 surgical gowns donated by Taiwan to Poland.²⁰⁴

Poland donated 400,000 doses of AstraZeneca to Taiwan in an act of “solidarity in face of vaccine deficiency” on September 5, 2021.²⁰⁵ At that time, Poland became the third largest vaccine donor to Taiwan.²⁰⁶ Apart from official gratitude—as Taiwan’s President Tsai thanks for Polish donation²⁰⁷—Polish food products gained popularity across Taiwan while Taiwanese supermarkets often promoted them as a form of appreciation of Poland’s donation.²⁰⁸ Taiwan Digital Diplomacy Association even came up with the idea of “Dumpling for Democracy” and “Dumpling Alliance,” tweeting a graphic presenting Taiwanese shuijiao (水餃), Polish pierogi, Lithuanian cepelinai, Czech houskove knedliky, and Slovakian halusky to praise vaccine donations from those democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe.²⁰⁹

Understandably, the Polish government did not want to risk affecting its relations with China. For example, a tweeted message of the Polish MFA about the donation of 400,000 doses of vaccine containing the Taiwanese flag was reportedly deleted.²¹⁰ More importantly, it was not the only time when the image of the Taiwanese flag was deleted by a Polish Ministry. The Polish Ministry of Economic Development and

Technology reportedly deleted its original tweet about the signing of three MoUs with Taiwan, because it featured the ROC flag; the ministry published a new tweet with edited photos, containing no flags, on May 18, 2022.²¹¹

Two days after the Polish donation of 400,000 doses of AstraZeneca arrived in Taiwan, Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau clarified Warsaw's position on One China "Policy" on September 7, 2021. Rau stressed that Poland recognizes One China "Policy," and the Taipei Representative Office in Poland does not have a diplomatic status.²¹²

Poland's support for Taiwan is expressed within the European Union's governing policy framework.

The two important committees of the Polish Senate—the upper house of the Polish parliament—passed a resolution on July 20, 2022, that the representatives of Taiwan should be permitted to participate in the work of the WHA on an expert level.²¹³ The Senate has encouraged the Polish authorities to actively cooperate with other like-minded countries that share those views to support Taiwan's meaningful participation in the WHO and gaining an observer status in the World Health Assembly. The Senate also persuaded the Polish Ministry of Health to enhance mutual exchanges and cooperation with the public health

and social welfare authorities of Taiwan.²¹⁴

Indeed, according to the "Information about Specific Conditions of Cooperation with Taiwan," issued by the Asia-Pacific Department of the Polish MFA on September 17, 2018, Poland:

supports Taiwan's participation in international organizations that do not require statehood from their members. Like the European Commission, we support the formula of enabling Taiwan's meaningful participation in the work of specialized international agencies, provided that the formula for such participation is developed as a result of the dialogue between Beijing and Taipei.²¹⁵

Naturally, Poland's support for Taiwan is expressed within the European Union's governing policy framework. Nonetheless, Poland's critically important national security elements related to Taiwan and its meaningful participation in international organizations have hardly been discussed widely in public square, academic communities, Polish media, and especially among political parties. Politicians' references to Taiwan's lack of participation in international organizations—particularly in the WHO—are neither frequently made nor broadly debated; they usually happen on an individual level, like the form of parliamentary questioning.²¹⁶

6. TAIWAN WITHIN POLAND'S INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS

Russia's War in Ukraine

After the election of President Joe Biden and the defeat of President Donald Trump in November 2020, US-Polish relations entered a new phase. When Russian President Vladimir Putin's armed forces invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it was indeed a gamechanger for Warsaw. Poland has become the frontline NATO member and an important American partner and ally to challenge Russia's ongoing aggression, reported war crimes, and massive corruption.

One month after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Biden delivered a forceful and historic speech at the Royal Castle in Warsaw on March 25, 2022. He opened it, saying "Be not afraid," which is a quotation from the first public address of the Polish Pope John Paul II after his election in 1978.²¹⁷ Moreover, Biden pointed out that the unprovoked war in Ukraine is part of a global struggle "between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and oppression, between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force."²¹⁸ He also stressed that this "great battle for freedom" will define the future of the world and it will not be an easy one.²¹⁹ With those words, Biden appealed not only to the global community, but also to the Polish authorities in particular. By invoking the Polish Pope and the Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa in his

speech, the US president sent a coded but unmistakably clear message to the government in Warsaw about the need to finish the Polish "culture war" internally and stand united against the challenges posed by Putin's aggression.²²⁰

American Legislations on Taiwan and Their Consequences for Poland

With the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, the United States severed its formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, but guaranteed the continuation of good relations between Washington and Taipei in accordance with the One China "Policy."²²¹ The legislation provides a rather ambiguous framework for "the policy of the United States to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan." Nonetheless, the US law clearly states that:

the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes is considered a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific

area and of grave concern to the United States.

More importantly, the TRA reaffirms the commitment that the United States will provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character, and it will maintain the capacity “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.”²²²

Apart from the TRA, the content of the Six Assurances is another basis for the US policy toward Taiwan. The Six Assurances were given to Taiwan by President Ronald Reagan in 1982.²²³ Though originally informal, their content was adopted by the US Congress in non-binding resolutions in 2016—one in the House²²⁴ and the companion resolution in the Senate²²⁵—as the “cornerstone” of the US-Taiwan relationship together with the TRA.²²⁶ Additionally, the Trump White House declassified the diplomatic cables behind the Six Assurances in 2020.²²⁷

During the Trump administration, the US Congress carried out the biggest revival of the US-Taiwan relationship since 1979.²²⁸ During that period, three important acts became US laws: the Taiwan Travel Act (2018), the TAIPEI Act (2019), and the Taiwan Assurance Act (2020):²²⁹

- a) The Taiwan Travel Act (TTA) of 2018 encourages “visits between officials from the United States and Taiwan at all levels.”²³⁰ It was indeed demonstrated by the increasing number of President

Trump’s cabinet officials visiting Taipei in 2019 and 2020.

- b) The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 advocates for “Taiwan’s membership in all international organizations in which statehood is not a requirement and in which the United States is also a participant” and “observer status other appropriate international organizations.”²³¹
- c) The Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 was passed as part of Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021. The law “expresses support for Taiwan’s defense strategy of asymmetric warfare and encourages Taipei to increase its defense expenditures.”²³² It reaffirms US support for “Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the United Nations [UN], the World Health Assembly [WHA], the International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO], the International Criminal Police Organization ([INTERPOL], and other international bodies.” The law also advocates for “Taiwan’s membership in the Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], and other international organizations for

which statehood is not a requirement for membership.”

All these congressional acts have navigated through the constraints related to Taiwan’s international status and the absence of official diplomatic relations between Washington and Taipei.

Indeed, the United States does not explicitly express its support for “Taiwan’s independence”—the formal declaration of sovereign and independent Taiwanese state, replacing the legacy of the Republic of China (ROC) by the “Republic of Taiwan.”²³³ However, Washington has strengthened Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations.

Since January 2021, the Biden administration has continued to intensify US support for Taiwan. When President Biden was asked during his visit to Japan in May 2022 whether he would be willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan from any attack from China, the president resolutely replied: “yes, that’s the commitment we made.”²³⁴ On another occasion, when the president was questioned in a *CBS 60 Minutes* interview in September 2022, whether the US forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, he answered: “yes, if in fact there was an unprecedented attack.”²³⁵ When he was then requested to clarify if the US forces would actually get involved to defend Taiwan, unlike in the case of Ukraine, President Biden replied: “yes.”²³⁶ His National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan later clarified that

President Biden was answering a “hypothetical question;” the presidential advisor also confirmed that the US One China “Policy” remains unchanged.²³⁷

The American support for Taipei—encompassing all of US congressional acts related to Taiwan—has consequences for other countries of the world, including Poland, depending on the extent of their relations with the island-nation. The most explicit legislation is the TAIPEI Act of 2019. It presents an artfully crafted language of hidden carrot and stick options for US authorities to either encourage or punish countries that either support or act against Taiwan. The TAIPEI Act states that the US government should:

- a) consider, in certain cases as appropriate and in alignment with United States interests, increasing its economic, security, and diplomatic *engagement* with nations that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan; and
- b) consider, in certain cases as appropriate, in alignment with United States foreign policy interests and in consultation with Congress, *altering* its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that take serious or significant actions to undermine the security or prosperity of Taiwan.²³⁸ (*italics added*)

Although the legal language has greater latitude for US foreign and

security agencies—like the Departments of Commerce, Defense, State, and the Treasury—to define the TAIPEI Act more broadly, the legislation does provide these authorities the right to support or “punish” other countries in their jurisdictions by either expanding or limiting American diplomatic, economic, and security assistance based on a country’s behavior toward Taiwan. Essentially, each country’s actions are carefully examined as to whether its government undermines the “security or prosperity” of Taiwan. In other words, the US agencies may identify governments that are not supporting Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations. Thus, the TAIPEI Act might have direct implications for Poland.

China and Taiwan in the NATO Framework

Other implications for Poland stem from its membership in NATO. The principle of collective defense—enshrined in Article 5—is the heart of NATO’s founding treaty document. NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States.²³⁹ It cites:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of

the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.²⁴⁰

NATO is increasingly concerned about China’s coercive actions.

It is important to note that Article 5 and Article 6 refer to areas physically present in Europe or North America. Technically speaking, territories such as Guam, the American alliance territory in the Pacific, or the state of Hawaii fall out of the NATO protection.²⁴¹ However, if an American territory were to be attacked during a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the United States may certainly ask its treaty allies—such as NATO countries and Japan—to get involved as Washington did in the Afghanistan conflict where Poland supported the American engagement.

It is clear that NATO is increasingly concerned about China’s coercive actions. NATO held talks on China’s threat to Taiwan in September 2022, stating that “the US encourages other members of the transatlantic security alliance to pay more attention to the rising threat of China to the island.”²⁴² The “NATO 2022 Strategic

Concept” adopted at the NATO Summit in Madrid on June 29, 2022, underscores:

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies *challenge* our interests, security and values. The PRC employs a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up. The PRC’s malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation *target Allies and harm Alliance security*. The PRC seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence. It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains. The deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run *counter to our values and interests*.²⁴³ (italics added)

China is then treated officially by NATO as a “challenge” to its “interests, security and values.” The concept paper also identifies that the “deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of

China and the Russian Federation” is a matter of concern for NATO countries. The document did not mention Taiwan; however, the case of Taiwan was reportedly discussed widely at the meeting.²⁴⁴

Poland at the Crossroads

The Polish government seems to be fully aware of the complicated nature of these dynamics. Two days before the publication of the “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki published an article in *Politico* on June 27, 2022. In the article, the prime minister mentioned Taiwan only once; nevertheless, it was within the very significant and insightful context of Russia and China:

If Ukraine falls, the foundations on which we have built our plans for the future will also collapse. The U.S. and Europe may be replaced by China—or China in tandem with Russia. We will find ourselves in a completely new chapter of world history, one that could be written in extremely bloody verses. There are increasing signs that the lack of decisive measures against Russia may be critical for Taiwan. China sees Russia’s relative weakness and, at the same time, it sees how much weaker the West is if it cannot stop a declining empire.²⁴⁵

Prime Minister Morawiecki was incredibly straightforward when he emphasized that the emerging Chinese-Russian tandem could write a

“new chapter of history” using “extremely bloody verses.” It may be interpreted as a confirmation by the Polish leader that the collective support for defending Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity will have consequences for Taiwan in the future. It seems that Morawiecki agreed with the slogan “Ukraine Today, Taiwan Tomorrow”²⁴⁶ as he observed the need for unifying world democracies against the China-Russia pact.²⁴⁷

The preservation of the current liberal world order is in Poland’s best national security interest.

Furthermore, Prime Minister Morawiecki accentuated not only military and security threats, but also economic challenges stemming from China’s actions:

And as for the elephant in the room, China—the largest importer of food from Ukraine—certainly, the war in Ukraine will not deal a blow to its economic position. It may, however, be an incentive to become more active in taking over global assets. The “Chinese Dragon” could seize this opportunity to make a giant leap forward.²⁴⁸

Within these current dynamics, the 2023 parliamentary election year will be critical for Poland and its democratic future. It is in Poland’s best interest to smooth out both its internal “culture war” and international standing. Given

the evolving global geopolitics and transatlantic relations, Poland’s security and stability depend on the continuing close military alliance with the United States and NATO as well as better relations with the European Union. Indeed, the EU and NATO are a tandem bicycle on which Poland can safely and steadily navigate towards becoming a more democratic and progressive nation.

After its tumultuous history, the Polish democracy needs to strengthen pluralistic governance. It is also crucial for Warsaw to end the conflict with the European Union over the rule of law, which would give Poland a stronger voice and position in the EU governing structure. Finally, Poland must remain a reliable NATO member and a trusted American ally.

The preservation of the current liberal world order is in Poland’s best national security interest; therefore, the presence of democratic Taiwan in international organizations is beneficial to Poland. At the same time, it should be Warsaw’s priority to keep peace in the Taiwan Strait. Any disruption of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait would be a disaster to the world economy, including Poland’s. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has recently warned that 50 percent of container ships operating around the world go through the Taiwan Strait and 70 percent of higher-end computer chips are manufactured in Taiwan.²⁴⁹ All in all, Poland has clear political, economic, and security interests to support Taiwan’s international presence.

7. CONCLUSION

Supporting Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations is not an easy task. Given the national security interests and economic considerations, it is quite understandable that other countries would calculate their own diplomatic relations with Beijing, as China may retaliate against them in various forms of coercive actions. From a long-term perspective, however, supporting Taiwan’s participation in—and contribution to—the international community is part of the battle between democracy and autocracy to preserve and continue the post-World War II liberal world order based on the rule of law, protection of human rights, and international solidarity.²⁵⁰

For Poland as a democratic country, which experienced the traumatic events and human suffering of foreign occupations and over the four decades of communism, it is the most vital national interest to maintain and strengthen the liberal world order. Advocating for the international presence of a vibrant Taiwanese democracy in the global community is clearly advantageous for Poland. With its own tragic history of fighting for freedom over the centuries, the 38-million Polish nation is obliged not to neglect the will and welfare of the 23 million Taiwanese.

The growing fear of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait due to a complicated political legacy does not help to resolve a dispute between the PRC and the

ROC. To live in peace and harmony, humanity should triumph over the politics and ideologies of the past. The will of the Taiwanese people to participate in—and contribute to—international organizations should be respected by the international community. After all, as reflected in the UN Charter, the mission of the United Nations is to protect and improve the life of every single human being on Earth.

Supporting the international presence of a vibrant Taiwanese democracy in the global community is clearly advantageous for Poland. With its own tragic history of fighting for freedom over the centuries, the 38-million Polish nation is obliged not to neglect the will and welfare of the 23 million Taiwanese.

The US decision to establish official diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979 and to cease official relations with Taipei rested upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means. It should be Poland’s position as well. Like the American adherence to the One China “Policy,” Warsaw should expect Beijing to limit its actions in Taiwan Strait affairs to peaceful dialogue. As a member of the European Union and NATO, and a

close ally of the United States, Poland should remind Beijing not to take any actions which might pose a threat to life and welfare of the Taiwanese people—including the forceful modification of the *status quo* in cross-Taiwan Strait relations.

The authors of this report wish that the analysis and recommendations will increase the awareness of Taiwan in the Polish public discourse and will encourage Polish policymakers to pay greater attention to the Chinese “information warfare” and “wolf-warrior” strategies that are designed to exclude Taiwan from international organizations. Hopefully, the report will also stimulate a range of academic, professional, and journalistic discussions and initiatives, and open a broader public debate on Poland’s position on Taiwan’s international presence—particularly in the context of the “no-limits” Sino-Russian pact and its challenges to keeping the world safe for democracies, including Ukraine and Taiwan.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

The Politics of Language and China's Manipulated Narrative over the Claimed “(Re)unification”

Beijing has been claiming that “Taiwan is a sacred and inseparable part of China's territory.”²⁵¹ Moreover, according to Beijing, “both historically and legally, Taiwan has always been a province of China.”²⁵² This position has become the basis for PRC's mission of “reunification” with Taiwan.²⁵³ However, Taiwan has a longer and more complicated history.

For most part of its history—starting with the migration and settlement of Taiwanese indigenous people, through the inflow of Han Chinese since around the 13th century, to the Western colonization—Taiwan had not politically and legally been a part of China. In 1684, Taiwan came under the rule of the Qing Dynasty,²⁵⁴ when the island became a part of the Fujian province.²⁵⁵ Initially, the Qing forces took control only of Taiwan's western and northern coastal areas,²⁵⁶ and the Qing administration expanded to other parts of the island over the decades. Taiwan was declared a province of the Qing Empire in 1885.²⁵⁷

A decade later, on the basis of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), which ended the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895), the Qing Empire declared

that “China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty . . . the island of Formosa, together with all the islands appertaining or belonging to said island of Formosa” and the Pescadores Group.²⁵⁸ Taiwan was controlled by Japan for exactly 50 years, until 1945 (although, legally speaking, Japan had not renounced Taiwan until 1951, as explained below).

To deal with the consequences of Japan joining World War II against the Allied Powers by attacking Pearl Harbor in 1941, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, ROC Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued the Cairo Declaration in 1943. It states:

The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan, shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China [ROC].²⁵⁹

These intentions were stated again in the Potsdam Declaration in 1945 by the representatives of the same three countries (i.e., the United States, the Republic of China, and the United Kingdom). It claimed that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of

Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”²⁶⁰

Within the framework of international law, these Cairo and Potsdam documents were only the declarations of intentions; they were not legally binding as these statements were not treaties. The post-war legally binding document in regard to territories controlled by Japan was the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, in which Japan renounced Taiwan. However, the San Francisco Treaty did not specify to whom Taiwan should be renounced, as it was merely declared that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.”²⁶¹

The Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan—known as the Treaty of Taipei in 1952—was another legally binding document. It confirmed that under the San Francisco Treaty, Japan “renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.”²⁶² Again, however, the treaty did not specify to whom the territory of Taiwan was renounced. Ever since, the status of Taiwan has remained legally undefined.

However, Beijing has stated something different and has interpreted both the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations to support its agenda. During a press conference, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian (赵立坚) said on July 26, 2022:

The Cairo Declaration stipulates clearly that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, shall be restored to China. The Potsdam Proclamation states that these terms shall be carried out There is only one China in the world and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory. The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the sole legal government representing the whole of China. The one-China principle is a fundamental principle affirmed in UNGA [UN General Assembly] Resolution 2758.²⁶³

First, the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations’ stated intentions were not legally binding as they were not treaties. **Second**, the intention of the Cairo Declaration was to return the island of Taiwan to the Republic of China. Since the ROC never ceased to exist, the transfer of intentions about returning Taiwan from the ROC to the PRC might be a matter of academic debate. **Third**, the UNGA resolution of 1971 did not affirm the “One China Principle;” it only replaced the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek by the representatives of the PRC in the UN China seat.

Certainly, the UN resolution did not comment on the statehood of the ROC or Taiwan being a part of China. The increasingly assertive China, however, has begun a war of wolf-warrior language to revise its history and repeat a national narrative to “reunify” Taiwan.

APPENDIX B

Poland-Taiwan Relations During the Cold War

The Cold War mindset laid the foundation for the decades of hostility between Poland—from 1952 until 1989 officially known as the Polish People’s Republic, PPR—and the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) since late 1949. This was apparent particularly in the late 1940s and the 1950s.

As a member of the Eastern Bloc, Poland stood by the Soviet Union. Since Moscow maintained close relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Warsaw also supported Beijing and its plans to overthrow the authorities in Taipei and take control over Taiwan.²⁶⁴

This was reflected, among others, in the case related to the detention of two Polish ships by Taiwan—probably the most serious Polish-Taiwanese incident in the history of relations between these two countries.

The cargo ship *Praca* (“Labor”) was detained by Taiwanese authorities in 1953 and *Prezydent Gottwald* (“President Gottwald”) in 1954. These cargo ships belonged to Chipolbrok—the Chinese-Polish Joint Stock Shipping Company in Shanghai established in 1951, which was the first ever PRC-foreign joint venture.²⁶⁵ The detention of the cargo ships sailing between Poland and China, along with their Polish-Chinese crew, was a consequence of the sea blockade (“closure policy,” 關閉政策) of mainland

China applied by the ROC Navy for 30 years (1949-1979). Its purpose was to cut off communist China economically from the rest of the world and, consequently, allow the ROC to retake mainland China from the PRC through a large-scale invasion.²⁶⁶

Negotiations on the release of Polish sailors—hampered by the lack of direct Polish-Taiwanese relations and the wider Cold War context—dragged on for months, and efforts were made through the United Nations and the Swedish Red Cross. The whereabouts of the sailors were also an important topic for Polish public opinion and the subject of propaganda for the Polish communist press, which presented the detention of two Polish ships as an example of Taiwanese “piracy,” sponsored by “American imperialism.”²⁶⁷

It all ended with the release and return to Poland of Polish sailors from both ships (those from *Praca* in 1954 and sailors from *Prezydent Gottwald* in 1955), although some members of the crews, after signing the asylum request, emigrated to the United States instead.²⁶⁸

APPENDIX C

China's Leadership Influence in International Organizations

Barring Taiwan from any form of participation in international organizations—be it full membership or observer status—has been part of grand strategy for China to exercise non-military coercion.²⁶⁹ In the meantime, the struggle of Taiwan and its democratic allies for influence in international organizations is continuing. The Chinese scheme is a highly calculated gamesmanship to take control over international organizations and, consequently, impose its own rules and modify the international governance and the liberal world order.

One of the reasons as to why China has been able to put the pressure on international organizations and influence their policy positions on Taiwan is the fact that a vast number of PRC nationals is employed in the UN at various levels. The Beijing strategy includes placing Chinese nationals in senior ranks across the UN funds and programs, its principal organs, and other UN-affiliated international organizations.²⁷⁰ The success of Beijing's strategy is also illustrated by the placement of over 1,300 Chinese nationals among the regular staff of the UN as of 2019.²⁷¹

Beijing has not only been accused of exercising power in placing Chinese nationals in international organizations, but also putting non-Chinese who are

supportive of the Beijing agenda. Since the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic, many world leaders have come to believe that WHO Director General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus of Ethiopia has been an outspoken advocate for the Chinese government's Covid-19 response despite the controversies of the Chinese authorities' efforts to manage the widespread of the virus and Beijing's communication strategy to the world.²⁷²

China's anti-Taiwan strategy in the UN is not only based on preventing the Taiwanese representation from the UN itself, but also influencing a wide range of activities and events. These include the practices of a) restricting NGOs from UN access and accreditation, if they do not comply with Beijing's demands to revise the name of "Taiwan" to "Taiwan, Province of China" on their websites and publications;²⁷³ b) editing some UN documents to accommodate PRC's preferences;²⁷⁴ and c) excluding Taiwanese nationals from scientific conferences co-sponsored by the UN and its specialized agencies.²⁷⁵

A classic case study is provided by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency of the UN, which develops international treaties on copyright, patents, trademarks, and related issues. Its overall mission is to promote and protect intellectual property. China has been trying to appoint a Chinese national, Wang Binying, as its director general during the last elections; however, in a secret

voting on March 5, 2020, she was defeated by the Singaporean candidate.²⁷⁶ Beijing's campaign to install its candidate was seen as controversial since China has been widely accused for stealing intellectual property.²⁷⁷ Moreover, Beijing exercised the veto power over the Taiwan issue in 2020 and 2021 when it blocked Wikimedia Foundation's accreditation to WIPO. China accused the Foundation of spreading disinformation via the independent, volunteer-led Taiwan chapter.²⁷⁸

The growing influence of China in international organizations has long-term consequences.²⁷⁹ Beijing's worldviews on international order are very different from those held by the United States, the European Union, and other like-minded democratic allies and partners. A long list of China's human rights violations in recent years includes: a) crushing the Hongkong protests against a series of draconian laws which *de facto* nullified the "one country, two systems" rule; b) violating the rights of Tibetan and Uighur minorities; c) detaining or prosecuting people who criticize the Chinese government's handling of the Covid-19 pandemic; d) cracking down on human rights defenders; e) limiting the freedom of expression and religious worship; and f) developing mass surveillance systems, among others.²⁸⁰

It all implies that if China dictates the world order through international organizations, less attention will be paid to the human rights, democratic values, and the rule of law.²⁸¹ The case

of Taiwan is just one example of how China is putting pressure and seriously undermining democratic values and rules.

The Trump White House's "America First" approach to world affairs and ignoring international organizations paved a way for China's inroads into the American vacuum of global leadership.²⁸² The Trump administration withdrew from UNESCO on December 31, 2018.²⁸³ Moreover, the United States announced halting funding to the WHO on April 14, 2020, stating the global health body's poor handling of the coronavirus.²⁸⁴ Such moves left more space for China to replace the United States not just with its pressure and influences, but also financial leverage coming from the membership dues.

Since President Joe Biden declared that "America is Back" barely two weeks after becoming the US leader,²⁸⁵ Washington has been trying to regain those lost influences in international organizations to counterbalance China.

APPENDIX D

The Full Text of the UN Resolution 2758 on Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, 1971

The General Assembly,

Recalling the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations,

Considering the restoration of the
lawful rights of the People's Republic
of China is essential both for the
protection of the Charter of the United
Nations and for the cause that the
United Nations must serve under the
Charter,

Recognizing that the
representatives of the Government of
the People's Republic of China are the
only lawful representatives of China to
the United Nations and that the
People's Republic of China is one of
the five permanent members of the
Security Council,

Decides to restore all its rights to
the People's Republic of China and to
recognize the representatives of its
Government as the only legitimate
representatives of China to the United
Nations, and to expel forthwith the
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek
from the place which they unlawfully
occupy at the United Nations and in all
the organizations related to it.

1976th plenary meeting,

25 October 1971.²⁸⁶

APPENDIX E

The Palestine Quest for Membership in UNESCO as a Lesson for Taiwan

Taiwan is currently excluded from UNESCO as it has neither a member nor associate member status.²⁸⁷ However, joining UNESCO is Taiwan's wish as a list of potential UNESCO sites has already been identified by its Ministry of Culture.²⁸⁸ However, China has been blocking the recognition of those sites by UNESCO.²⁸⁹

The legal situation in UNESCO is different from the main body of the United Nations. The Constitution of UNESCO declares:

Subject to the conditions of the Agreement between this Organization and the United Nations Organization, approved pursuant to Article X of this Constitution, states not members of the United Nations Organization may be admitted to membership of the Organization, upon recommendation of the Executive Board, by a two-thirds majority vote of the General Conference.²⁹⁰

History provides several cases when the nation states joined UNESCO prior to entering the UN or without joining UN at all. For example, Austria,²⁹¹ Hungary,²⁹² and Japan²⁹³ joined UNESCO years before entering the UN.²⁹⁴ Moreover, currently, there are three UNESCO member states which are not UN members: Cook

Islands,²⁹⁵ Niue,²⁹⁶ and Palestine—the latter is the only non-member *observer State* to the UN General Assembly.²⁹⁷ Therefore, the case of Palestine provides lessons for Taiwan.²⁹⁸

The Palestine authorities carried out a diplomatic campaign—known as “Palestine 194”—to gain the international recognition of the State of Palestine and to obtain membership in the UN as the 194th member.²⁹⁹

After a broad diplomatic campaign, Palestine became the 195th full member of UNESCO on October 31, 2011. Despite strong opposition from the United States, the majority rule allowed the recommendation of a draft resolution in the Executive Board sponsored by several Arab countries; every member of the Executive Board has one vote and there is no veto power.³⁰⁰ It then went to a majority rule in a general voting in UNESCO—with votes 107 to 14, and with 52 abstentions.³⁰¹

A year after Palestine's accession to the UNESCO, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution granting Palestine the status of non-member observer State in the United Nations—with 138 votes for, 9 against, and 41 abstentions on November 29, 2012.³⁰²

As a result of admitting Palestine to UNESCO as a full member, the United States stopped funding the Paris-based UN body in 2011.³⁰³ According to a 1990 law passed during the Bill Clinton administration,³⁰⁴ the United States may not fund any part of

the UN system that grants Palestine the same standing as UN member states. After stopping paying dues—22 percent of the UNESCO annual budget—the United States lost its voting rights.³⁰⁵

At the end of December 2018, the Trump White House withdrew completely from the UN agency,³⁰⁶ claiming the need for fundamental reforms in the organization and accusing UNESCO of continuing anti-Israel bias.³⁰⁷

When the US Congress passed the \$1.7 trillion Omnibus Appropriations Bill on December 22, 2022, it provided a waiver for the 1990 law, which will allow the United States to return to UNESCO and pay the past dues since 2011:

The President may waive section 414 of Public Law 101–246 and section 410 of Public Law 103–23 with respect to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] if the President determines and reports in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and the appropriate congressional committees that to do so would enable the United States to counter Chinese influence or to promote other national interests of the United States: *Provided*, That the authority of this section shall cease to have effect if, after enactment of this Act, the Palestinians obtain the same standing as member states or full membership as a

state in the United Nations or any specialized agency thereof outside an agreement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians: *Provided further*, That the authority of this section shall sunset on September 30, 2025, unless extended in a subsequent Act 13 of Congress.³⁰⁸ (italics original)

The president may therefore waive the Palestine-related law “to counter Chinese influence or to promote other national interests of the United States.”³⁰⁹ It suggests that the US battle with the Chinese influence in international organizations has begun under the Biden administration.

The timing of this issue is important. The previous case was when the United States rejoined the UNESCO after President Ronald Reagan had withdrawn from the organization on December 31, 1984.³¹⁰ The United States returned to UNESCO under President George W. Bush on October 1, 2003. He argued that the US return is a “symbol of our commitment to human dignity” and that “this organization has been reformed and America will participate fully in its mission to advance human rights, tolerance, and learning.”³¹¹ Some experts claimed, however, that it coincided with the eve of the Iraq invasion to gain the support and goodwill of the international community for Washington and its “Global War on Terror.”³¹²

As the history seems to be repeating itself, one could say that the United States is now trying to regain

the support of the global community and strengthen its influences in the UN and its agencies to “counter the Chinese influence;” therefore, possibly preparing for a battle over international organizations—including countering China’s anti-Taiwan activities.³¹³

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